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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • S.C Mukherji, for the petitioner.
  • Shambhu Nath, for the opposite-party.
Judges
  • Shearer
  • Reuben, JJ.
Acts
  • section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922, the District Judge(1)
  • SECTION 224 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act (Act III of 1922).
  • SECTION 3 BENGAL AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT 1887
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 3 of the Code
  • sections 57 and 58 of the Villages Administration Act,
  • section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil
  • section 115 of the Code,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • S.C Mukherji, for the petitioner.
  • Shambhu Nath, for the opposite-party.
Judges
  • Shearer
  • Reuben, JJ.
Acts
  • section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922, the District Judge(1)
  • SECTION 224 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act (Act III of 1922).
  • SECTION 3 BENGAL AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT 1887
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 3 of the Code
  • sections 57 and 58 of the Villages Administration Act,
  • section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil
  • section 115 of the Code,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Shearer, J. (with concurrence by Reuben, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This application in revision challenged an order of the learned District Judge of Muzaffarpur which had set aside a decree previously passed by a panchayat under the powers conferred by section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act (Act III of 1922). The opposite-party contended that the revision application was not maintainable because the High Court, purporting to act in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, had no power to set aside the District Judge's order.

The central procedural posture was therefore a civil revision petition before the High Court seeking to impugn the District Judge's decision that had reversed a panchayat decree. The High Court considered statutory definitions of courts under the Code of Civil Procedure (notably section 3 and section 9), the scope of the Letters Patent (clause 11), the supervisory arrangements established by statute for panchayats (the Provincial Government's superintendence), and the rules made under section 96(1) of the Village Administration Act applicable to proceedings under section 78.

The application was dismissed on preliminary objection with costs (hearing fee: one gold mohar). Reuben, J. concurred and the rule was discharged.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a panchayat is a "court", and more particularly whether it is a court "subordinate to the High Court" within the meaning of the words as they occur in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction to set aside an order made by a District Judge exercising the powers conferred by section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act (i.e., whether the District Judge in that exercise acts as a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 CPC).

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite-Party's Arguments

  • The revision application was not maintainable.
  • The High Court, purporting to exercise revisional jurisdiction, had no power to set aside the order of the District Judge (implying there was no proper supervisory/revisional jurisdiction in the High Court in respect of panchayat matters or orders under section 78).

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. S.C. Mukherji)

  • The District Judge's court is a subordinate court and, on a strict interpretation of the language used in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court necessarily has jurisdiction to entertain a civil revision.
  • Reliance was placed on the observations of Chatterji and Meredith, JJ., in Abdul Razak v. Kuldip Narain to support the proposition that where jurisdiction is conferred on a District Judge (or enlarged for an existing court) the incidents of court jurisdiction — including appellate or revisional incidents — remain.
  • Collected a number of other decisions by way of analogy (including Goni Mahton v. Emperor and certain Allahabad High Court decisions), arguing by analogy that revision by the High Court was permissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Razak v. Kuldip Narain Authority for the proposition that where a District Judge exercises jurisdiction (here, as an Election Commissioner) the extended jurisdiction may carry with it the incidents of the court's jurisdiction, including appellate rights (as applied by Chatterji and Meredith, JJ.). The court treated Abdul Razak as distinguishable and open to criticism for present purposes: in that case the District Judge sat as a court of original jurisdiction and was bound by ordinary law of procedure and evidence, whereas in the present matter the District Judge was exercising revisional jurisdiction under special rules and was not bound by ordinary procedural or evidentiary laws.
National Telephone Company, Limited v. His Majesty's Postmaster General (Lord Atkinson; Lord Parker) Principle that extending the jurisdiction of an existing court to a new matter generally carries all the incidents of that court's jurisdiction, including a right of appeal. The court quoted this principle but found it inapposite on the facts: the present grant of jurisdiction to the District Judge under section 78 (and the statutory regime governing panchayats) did not amount to an extension of District Court jurisdiction in the same sense as contemplated by that authority.
Goni Mahton v. Emperor Authority in which Agarwala, J. held that the Court could interfere in revision with an order made by a panchayat sitting as a criminal court; relied upon by the petitioner. The court noted this decision but distinguished it and observed that the phrase "inferior criminal court" (as used in discussion) is ambiguous; however, the present case turned on clearer language in section 115 CPC and the statutory scheme conferring superintendence on the Provincial Government rather than the High Court.
Decisions of the Allahabad High Court (as cited in Goni Mahton) Authorities relied on in Goni Mahton to support interference with panchayat orders in criminal matters. These decisions were noted as cited in Goni Mahton and were relied upon by the petitioner by analogy; the court did not treat them as determinative for the civil-revisional question under section 115 CPC in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of statutory construction and functional comparison grounded in the text of the relevant statutes and rules:

  1. The court began with the statutory definition of courts under section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which identifies the District Court as subordinate to the High Court and describes which courts are "every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes" for the purposes of subordination.
  2. Section 9 CPC (jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature) and the provisions of the Village Administration Act (notably sections 57 and 58) were invoked to show that the legislature had taken away certain jurisdictions from civil courts and conferred them on panchayats; the court observed that panchayats are "courts" but not "civil courts" within the meaning of the CPC.
  3. The Letters Patent (clause 11) was examined — it makes the High Court "a court of appeal from the civil courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa, and from all other courts subject to its superintendence." The court asked whether panchayats are "courts subject to the superintendence of the High Court."
  4. The court concluded they are not: the legislature conferred superintendence over panchayats on the Provincial Government, not the High Court. That allocation of supervisory power in the statute (and the Government of India Act, s.224(2), raising further doubt) suggested the High Court lacked supervisory and hence revisional jurisdiction over panchayats.
  5. The Act constituting panchayats did not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to question their decisions; rather, it provided that there shall be no right of appeal and that the District Judge is the only authority competent to set aside their decrees and orders. The court found it impossible to treat a court as "subordinate to the High Court" when the High Court has no statutory powers of superintendence or appellate/revisional jurisdiction over it.
  6. The court then considered whether the High Court could revise an order made by a District Judge acting under section 78 of the Act. The petitioner argued that the District Judge's court is subordinate to the High Court and thus s.115 CPC applies. The court examined Abdul Razak (and the National Telephone authority relied on therein) but distinguished Abdul Razak: in that case the District Judge sat as a court of original jurisdiction and was bound by ordinary civil procedure and evidence rules; here the District Judge exercised a revisional jurisdiction under special statutory rules.
  7. The rules made by the Provincial Government under section 96(1) were pivotal: they provide that in proceedings under section 78 the District Judge (1) may, if he thinks fit, hear any party or their agents as defined in section 86, and (2) shall be bound by no laws of evidence or procedure other than that prescribed. Sections 86 and 87 further barred advocates or legal practitioners from appearing before panchayats (and by extension in the special procedure). The combination of these rules indicated the District Judge, when exercising section 78 jurisdiction, was not sitting as the normal District Court president bound by ordinary civil procedure and evidentiary law, but was exercising a novel, anomalous jurisdiction similar in character to that conferred on panchayats.
  8. For these reasons the court rejected the petitioner's analogy-based arguments and analogous authorities, holding that the statutory scheme impliedly ousted the High Court's revisional jurisdiction in respect of panchayat matters and of orders made by the District Judge under section 78.
  9. The court therefore sustained the preliminary objection to maintainability of the civil revision petition and dismissed the petition with costs.
  10. Separately, on the facts before it the court identified apparent deliberate misstatements by members of the panchayat regarding the date of presentation of the plaint (sarpanch reported institution on 11 August 1946; other members said plaint was presented on 28 April 1946 but entered on the register on 11 August). The court considered that either the sarpanch or the other members had deliberately lied to procure a miscarriage of justice and recommended that the matter be brought to the Provincial Government's notice for consideration of removal of the panchayat members.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court's preliminary objection was upheld and the civil revision petition was dismissed with costs (hearing fee one gold mohar). Reuben, J. agreed with the reasoning and result; the rule was discharged.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the revision application failed and the decree (or the District Judge's setting aside of the panchayat decree) is left undisturbed by this High Court revision; costs were awarded against the petitioner.
  • On jurisdictional doctrine: the court concluded, on the statutory scheme before it, that panchayats are not "civil courts" within the meaning of the CPC and are not courts subordinate to the High Court for purposes of section 115 CPC because the Provincial Government — not the High Court — has statutory superintendence over panchayats; consequently, the High Court lacks revisional jurisdiction over panchayat decrees and over District Judge orders made under section 78 of the Village Administration Act as constituted under the special statutory regime.
  • Administrative follow-up: the court directed that the matter be brought to the attention of the Provincial Government so that it may consider whether the members of the panchayat (or some of them) should be removed because of apparent deliberate false statements affecting the administration of justice.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to material and reasoning found within the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Saudagar v. Radharaman

    Shearer, J.:— This application in revision is directed against an order of the learned District Judge of Muzaffarpur, setting aside a decree passed by a panchayat in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act (Act III of 1922). It is contended on behalf of the opposite-party that the application is not maintainable and that this Court purporting to act in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has no power to set aside the order made, by the learned District Judge. The question that primarily arises is whether a panchayat is a court and, more particularly, whether it is a court “subordinate to the High Court” within the meaning of these words as they occur in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 3 of the Code states that:—

    “For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.”

    The court herein referred to are the courts constituted under section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887.

    Section 9 states that:—

    “The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.”

    By reason of this provision and of the provisions contained, in sections 57 and 58 of the Villages Administration Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to entertain and try certain suits has been taken away by the legislature, and that jurisdiction has been conferred on panchayats which are courts but not civil courts within the meaning of these words as they are used in the Code of Civil Procedure. It would not, of course, necessarily follow from this and this alone that the High Court has no jurisdiction to revise their decrees and orders. But the extent of the civil appellate jurisdiction which must be taken to include also its civil revisional jurisdiction is defined in clause 11 of the Letters Patent which states that the High Court—

    “shall be a court of appeal from the civil courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa, and from all other courts subject to its superintendence”.

    I have just said, panchayats are not civil courts. Are they then courts subject to the superintendence of the High Court? It is quite clear that they are not. The legislature has conferred the power of superintendence over panchayats not on the High Court but on the Provincial Government. In view of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 224 of the Government of India Act it seems to me open to doubt whether, if panchayats were subject to superintendence by the High Court, the High Court would ipso facto still be entitled to revise their decrees and orders. The Act which constitutes these courts does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to question their decisions. On the contrary, it impliedly, if not expressly, ousts its jurisdiction. It provides that there shall be no right of appeal and that the only authority competent to set aside their decrees and orders shall be the District Judge. It seems to me impossible to say that a court is subordinate to the High Court, when the High Court has no powers of superintendence over it and when the statute creating the court does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain appeals or applications in revision against its orders. Now, if the High Court has no power revise an order made by a panchayat, it is difficult to understand on what principle it can be said that it has jurisdiction to revise an order made by a District Judge in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 78 of the Act. It is contended by Mr. S.C Mukherji, for the petitioner, that the court of the District Judge is a subordinate court, and that, on a strict interpretation of the language used in section 115 of the Code, the High Court necessarily has jurisdiction. Mr. Mukherji strongly relied on the observations made by Chatterji and Meredith, JJ., in Abdul Razak v. Kuldip Narain*. There an order made by a District Judge, sitting as Election Commissioner under the Bihar. District Board Election Petitions Rules, 1939, was set aside on an application in revision. The ratio decidendi, as I understand it, was that the order, although it purported to have been made by an Election Commissioner, was really made by the District Judge presiding over the District Court, the jurisdiction of that court having been enlarged to enable it to deal with the particular matter in controversy between the parties. One of the decisions cited by Meredith, J., was the National Telephone Company, Limited v. His Majesty's Postmaster General, Lord Atkinson there said:—

    “It is simply the question of extending the jurisdiction of an existing Court of law, with all its incidents including a right of appeal, to a new matter closely resembling in character those matters over which it has already jurisdiction as a Court of law.”

    Lord Parker similarly said:—

    “Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court, will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same.”

    With the greatest respect, I think myself that the decision in Abdul Razak v. Kuldip Narain* is open to criticism. In any case, it is clear that the District Judge was there sitting as a court of original jurisdiction and that he was bound by the ordinary law of procedure and evidence applicable to the civil courts. In the case with which we are now concerned, the District Judge was exercising a revisional jurisdiction and the District Court, as such, has no revisional jurisdiction. Moreover, the Provincial Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by section 96(1) of the Act has made the following rules:—

    “In proceedings under section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922, the District Judge—

    (1) may, if he thinks fit, hear any party or their agents as defined in section 86 of the Act, and

    (2) shall be bound by no laws of evidence or procedure other than that herein prescribed.”

    Section 86 of the Act provides that—

    “While parties to suits triable by a panchayat may appear by agent, no advocate or legal practitioner shall be permitted to appear as an agent.”

    Section 87 provides:—

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, advocates or legal practitioners shall not be permitted to appear before a panchayat.”

    When the District Judge, when exercising his jurisdiction under section 78 of the Act, is debarred from permitting any legal practitioner to appear on behalf of either of the parties and when he is not hound by the ordinary laws of evidence or procedure, it cannot, I think, be said, for a moment, that he is sitting as the president of the district court and that the jurisdiction of the district court has been enlarged to enable it to deal with some new matter which would not otherwise come before it. On the contrary, the District Judge is, in my opinion, exercising a jurisdiction of a highly anomalous and novel kind, in fact, the same arbitrary jurisdiction as the legislature has seen fit to confer on panchayats.

    Mr. S.C Mukherji, for the petitioner, was at pains to collect a number of decisions which, he frankly admitted, were not directly, or even very indirectly, in point, but on which he relied by way of analogy. It is not, I think, necessary to liefer to these decisions except, perhaps, to Goni Mahton v. Emperor in which Agarwala, J., as he then was, decided that this Court could interfere in revision with an order made by a panchayat sitting as a criminal court. Mr. Mukherji strongly relied on this decision and on the decisions of the Allahabad High Court which were cited there. It appears to have been contended before Agarwala, J., as he then was, that a panchayat was not a court at all and to have been conceded that, if it was a court, it was necessarily an inferior criminal court. I am inclined myself to think that the expression “inferior criminal court” does not connote a court of lower status than the High Court, as, the High Court alone being a court of record, and all other courts being courts not of record, the word “inferior” would, in such a case, be redundant and unnecessary, but connotes rather a court which is subordinate to, or subject to the superintendence of, the High Court. Even, however, if there is an ambiguity in the language used in section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no such ambiguity in the language used in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    In my opinion, the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the opposite-party must prevail and the application must accordingly be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee one gold mohar. At the same time, I consider that the case ought to be brought to the notice of the Provincial Government, which has superintendence over panchayats, in order that it may consider whether the members of this panchayat, or some of them, should not be removed. The sarpunch apparently reported to the District Judge that the suit was instituted on the 11th of August, 1946. The other members of the panchayat reported that, although the suit had been entered in the suit-register on the 11th of August, 1946, the plaint had in fact been presented on the 28th of April, 1946, and had, for some reason or other, been left lying about in the office of the panchayat and not entered in the register. If the sarpunch was correct, the suit was barred by limitation; if the other members of the panchayat were correct, it was not. It is perfectly clear, that either the sarpunch or the other members of the panchayat have told, a deliberate untruth and have done so in order to procure a miscarriage of justice.

    Reuben, J.:— For the reasons given by my learned brother, I agree that a Civil Revision petition will not lie, and that this petition must be dismissed with costs.

    S.H
    Rule discharged.

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    Comments

    Saudagar v. Radharaman
    (Nov 20, 1948)