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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Manohar Pershad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the plaintiffs' first appeal from an order of the Subordinate Judge, Secunderabad, dismissing their suit for redemption of a mortgage.

Facts as pleaded by the plaintiffs: Abdul Masud Faqer (father of plaintiffs 1–5 and husband of plaintiff 6) was owner of the suit property and had mortgaged it to the Secunderabad P.C.C. Society. To pay that mortgage debt he allegedly approached Mohd. Abdul Rahim (father of defendants 1 & 2) for a loan. Because of Islamic law objections to interest, it was agreed that Rs. 5,500 would be advanced to Abdul Masud Faqer against mortgage of the house and that he would execute what was described as an English mortgage; on repayment Abdul Rahim would reconvey the property, Abdul Masud would remain the owner, and Abdul Rahim would obtain interest in the shape of rent. On 30-11-1933 three contemporaneous documents were executed: (i) a sale-deed in favour of Md. Abdul Rahim for Rs. 5,500, (ii) an agreement to reconvey by the purchaser, and (iii) a rental deed. All three documents were argued to form one transaction by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege that in February 1953 they offered the mortgage amount to defendants and asked reconveyance; defendants refused, alleging an absolute sale. Plaintiffs assert continued possession and payment of taxes and seek decree for redemption.

Defendants admitted the prior ownership and prior mortgage to the P.C.C. Society but denied the asserted arrangement with Abdul Rahim and pleaded the transaction was an outright sale. A jurisdictional objection was also raised.

The trial court framed seven issues (with subparts), heard oral arguments principally on issue no. 1 (whether the transaction constituted an English mortgage / mortgage by conditional sale / usufructuary mortgage and whether rent was in truth interest) and held the transaction to be an out-and-out sale, dismissing the suit. The plaintiffs appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transaction evidenced by the sale-deed, rental agreement and agreement to reconvey dated 30-11-1933 constitutes an English mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale or a usufructuary mortgage (i.e., whether the transaction was really a mortgage or an out-and-out sale).
  2. Whether the rent provided in the rental agreement was in truth interest on a mortgage loan.
  3. Whether, if findings on issue No.1 favour the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' allegations are true (i.e., proof of the asserted mortgage arrangement).
  4. Whether the court has jurisdiction to try the suit.
  5. Whether the court-fee paid is sufficient.
  6. Whether the plaintiffs can sue without setting aside the documents.
  7. Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action, when it arose, and whether the suit is within time.
  8. To what reliefs, if any, the plaintiffs are entitled.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — as advanced by Shri Vinayak Rao Vaidya

  • The court below erred in concluding that the agreement to reconvey and the sale are not part of the same transaction; all three documents (sale-deed, agreement to reconvey, rental deed) form a single transaction.
  • Because Abdul Rahim agreed to accept rent to be reduced pro tanto proportionate to any amount repaid by Abdul Masood Faqer, the parties' intention must have been to create a mortgage and not an absolute sale.
  • The subsequent document altered the previous document; i.e., the later contemporaneous writings change the character of the transaction and were not properly considered by the trial court.
  • Reliance was placed on the definitions of mortgage forms in Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and on authority: Mohini Mohan Misra v. Sarat Sundari Debi (AIR 1925 Cal 862), David Elias Duek Cohen v. Baidyanath Mukerji (AIR 1936 Cal 646), Fozmal Bhutaji v. Shridhar Vithal (AIR 1946 Bom 499) and Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramchandra Iyer (AIR 1942 Mad 628) to support that the deed(s) could be treated as constituting a mortgage.
  • Although conceding the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1954 SC 345, appellants argued that the proviso to Section 58(c) (introduced by amendment) should be read as limiting only the class defined in clause (c) and not as foreclosing the possibility that the transaction could nevertheless fall under clauses (d) or (e) (English mortgage or usufructuary mortgage) if intention to create a mortgage were proved.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments — as advanced by Shri Venkatachar

  • Reliance on Chun Chun Jha v. Ebadat Ali (AIR 1954 SC 345): if the agreement to repurchase and the sale are embodied in separate documents the transaction cannot be treated as a mortgage, whether or not the documents are contemporaneous.
  • The agreement to reconvey and the sale are independent transactions, not parts of a single transaction, though executed on the same date.
  • The document cannot be treated as an English mortgage because there is no obligation on the mortgagor to repay in the manner required by that class; nor can it be a usufructuary mortgage because the plaintiffs admittedly remained in possession (contradicting the characteristics of a usufructuary mortgage where possession is delivered and the mortgagee receives rents/profits in lieu of interest).
  • Reliance on several High Court authorities (Narayana Iyer v. Venkatramana Iyer, ILR 25 Mad 220; Venkat Subba Rao v. Veeraswami, AIR 1946 Mad 456; Samsherkhan v. Vithal Das, AIR 1946 Nag 264; Jaggaranath Singh v. Butto Krishto Ray, AIR 1947 Pat 345; Suryaprakash Rao v. Venkatraju, AIR 1953 Mad 830) to support the respondents' position on the character of the transaction and the inapplicability of other forms of mortgage in the present facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohini Mohan Misra v. Sarat Sundari Debi, AIR 1925 Cal 862 Relied on by appellants to support that separate documents might evidence a mortgage in certain circumstances (case cited in argument). The court observed this case was decided prior to the 1929 amendment and therefore "cannot help the contention of the appellants."
David Elias Duek Cohen v. Baidyanath Mukerji, AIR 1936 Cal 646 Relied on by appellants (cited authority). The court noted this is one of the cases where the transaction was not embodied in two separate documents and thus does not support the appellants' position that separate documents here could constitute a mortgage.
Fozmal Bhutaji v. Shridhar Vithal, AIR 1946 Bom 499 Relied on by appellants (cited authority). No specific distinguishing analysis recorded in the opinion beyond being cited by appellants; not treated as undermining the court's view that separate-document transactions are excluded by the proviso.
Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramchandra Iyer, AIR 1942 Mad 628 Relied on by appellants (cited authority). The court grouped this with other decisions where the transactions were not embodied in two separate documents and held that these cases therefore do not help the appellants' case.
Chun Chun Jha v. Ebadat Ali, AIR 1954 SC 345 Held that if the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents, the transaction cannot be a mortgage (authoritative Supreme Court ruling). The court accepted and applied this principle as decisive against the appellants' contention that the separate documents here could constitute a mortgage by conditional sale; it treated the Supreme Court decision as controlling.
Narayana Iyer v. Venkatramana Iyer, ILR 25 Mad 220 Relied on by respondent in arguing against classification of the transaction as an English or usufructuary mortgage (cited authority). Cited by respondent and noted by the court among authorities relied upon to show the present transaction lacked the essential features of English or usufructuary mortgages; the opinion records reliance but does not adopt a detailed point-by-point application from this case.
Venkat Subba Rao v. Veeraswami, AIR 1946 Mad 456 Relied on by respondent (cited authority). Cited by respondent as supportive authority; the court recorded the reliance in support of respondent's submissions about the nature of mortgages.
Samsherkhan v. Vithal Das, AIR 1946 Nag 264 Relied on by respondent (cited authority). Cited by respondent; the court recorded the citation in the roster of authorities supporting respondent's position.
Jaggaranath Singh v. Butto Krishto Ray, AIR 1947 Pat 345 Relied on by respondent (cited authority). Cited by respondent; recorded by the court among respondent's authorities.
Suryaprakash Rao v. Venkatraju, AIR 1953 Mad 830 Relied on by respondent (cited authority). Cited by respondent; the court recorded the citation as part of the respondent's supporting case.
D'Souza J.M. v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1946 Bom 510 Relied on in submissions/cited authority. The court noted this as one of the cases where the transaction was not embodied in two separate documents and therefore it did not assist the appellants' position.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the precise nature of the competing characterizations: whether the three contemporaneous documents constituted a mortgage by conditional sale (Section 58(c) Transfer of Property Act), an English mortgage (Section 58(e)), a usufructuary mortgage (Section 58(d)), or whether, as the documents on their face indicate, the transaction was an out-and-out sale with a collateral undertaking to reconvey.

The court focused on the proviso to Section 58(c) which provides that "no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale." The court found the language of that proviso "perfectly clear and unambiguous" and observed its effect is to exclude an ostensible sale with a stipulation for repurchase from being regarded as a mortgage where the stipulation is not contained in the same document effecting the sale.

The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Chun Chun Jha v. Ebadat Ali (AIR 1954 SC 345) which it described as holding that if the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents, the transaction cannot be a mortgage, whether the documents are contemporaneous or not. The court treated that decision as decisive in relation to the appellants' primary contention that the instrument was a mortgage by conditional sale.

The appellants' argument that the proviso to Section 58(c) should be read narrowly to affect only clause (c) and not clauses (d) or (e) (i.e., that a transaction excluded as a mortgage by conditional sale might still qualify as an English or usufructuary mortgage) was considered and rejected. The court explained that accepting appellants' construction would require reading words into the proviso that are not there and would effectively nullify the effect of the amendment (i.e., would leave the prior state of law practically unchanged). The court concluded the object of the proviso was to "shut out an inquiry whether a sale with a stipulation of retransfer is a mortgage where the stipulation is not embodied in the same document."

The court further analysed whether the transaction could be characterised as an English mortgage or a usufructuary mortgage on the facts. It held that the transaction lacked the essential features of a usufructuary mortgage (where the mortgagor binds himself to deliver possession and permits the mortgagee to retain possession and receive rents and profits in lieu of interest), and likewise lacked the elements of an English mortgage (which entails an obligation on the mortgagor to repay the mortgage money). As those essential conditions did not exist in the present transaction, these alternative classifications were unavailable.

The court observed that other cited authorities either predated the relevant amendment or concerned transactions not embodied in separate documents and therefore did not assist the appellants.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences: the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Secunderabad (which dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the basis that the transaction was an out-and-out sale) stand affirmed. The court explicitly declined to pass any order as to the costs of the appeal ("Having regard to the facts of the case, we do not wish to pass any order regarding the costs of this Court.").

Broader implications noted by the court (as recorded in the opinion): the court applied the Supreme Court ruling in AIR 1954 SC 345 and the proviso to Section 58(c) to hold that where the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents the transaction cannot be treated as a mortgage; the court also found the transaction did not satisfy the requirements of an English or a usufructuary mortgage on the facts. The opinion does not announce a novel rule beyond applying and following the cited statutory proviso and the Supreme Court authority.

Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    Abdul Faiz Fakhr And Others v. Abdul Hafeez And Others

    Manohar Pershad, J.:— This is the plaintiffs' first appeal which arises out of a suit filed by them for the redemption of the mortgage and dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, Secunderabad. Plaintiffs' case is that Abui Masud Faqer, the father of the plaintiffs 1 to 5 and the husband of plaintiff No. 6, was the owner of the suit property; that he had mortgaged the same with the Secunderabad P.C.C Society and in order to pay the mortgage debt he approached Mohd. Abdul Rahim, the father of defendants 1 and 2 to advance a loan; that the parties were not willing to have the loan on interest in view of the Islamic Law and it was agreed that Rs. 5500/- should be advanced to Abdul Masood Faqer on the mortgage of the suit house, and he should execute a document by way of an English Mortgage. It was also agreed that on repayment of the said amount, Abdul Rahim would reconvey the property to Abdul Masood who would continue as owner and Mohd. Abdul Rahim would get interest in the shape of rent from him (Mohd. Abdul Masood). Accordingly, Abdul Masud executed a sale-deed in favour of Md. Abdul Rahim on 30-11-1933 for a sum of Rs. 5500/- and on that very date, the father of defendants 1 and 2 also executed an agreement to reconvey the property. Abdul Masood further executed a rental deed on that very date. All the three documents form part of one and the same transaction.

    2. The plaintiffs in the month of February 1953 offered the defendants the mortgage amount and asked them to reconvey the property in their favour. But the defendants however refused to accept the amount alleging that the property was sold to them. The plaintiffs do not admit that the intention of the parties was to treat the transaction as a sale. The plaintiffs it is stated have not only been in possession of the property but have been paying the taxes also and therefore are entitled to a decree for redemption.

    3. The defendants in their written statements admitted that Abdul Masood Faqer was the owner of the suit property and that he had mortgaged the same to the P.C.C Society, Secunderabad, but denied that he was intimate with Abdul Rahim, or that he desired or negotiated for a loan from him on security of the said house or that any agreement or arrangement was entered into between him and Abdul Masood as alleged by the plaintiffs or that any transaction of loan on the mortgage of the suit house was in fact, entered into. They further denied that there was any agreement between them; that Mohd. Adul Masood should continue as owner of the suit house or be in possession as owner or that Abdul Rahim was to get any interest in the shape of rent from Abul Masood. It is averred that due to pressing demands from the Society for payment of the mortgage amount, Abul Masood desired to sell away the house with a view to repay the mortgage amount of the Society, and offered to sell and convey the house absolutely to Mohd. Abdul Rahim, and accordingly executed the sale-deed in his favour. It is also pleaded that even assuming that the plea of the plaintiffs that the said Abdul Rahim agreed to reconvey the house, the agreement gives rise to a separate transaction independent of the sale, and the terms and conditions thereof constitute a separate cause of action. The transaction which is termed by the defendants a mortgage is an out and out sale. A legal objection was also raised that the court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. On these pleadings the trial court framed the following issues:

    (1) Are the plaintiffs entitled in law to prove the allegations?

    (a) that the transaction between Abdul Masood and Md. Abdul Rahim evidenced by the sale-deed, rental agreement and agreement to reconvey the same dated 30-11-1933 constitute really an English mortgage payable within six years; and

    (b) that the rent provided in the rental agreement was really interest on the mortgage loan;

    (2) If the findings on issue No. 1 be in favour of the plaintiffs are the said allegations true?

    (3) Has the court jurisdiction to try the suit?

    (4) Is the court-fee paid sufficient?

    (5) Can the plaintiffs sue without setting aside the documents?

    (6) Have the plaintiffs any cause of action? If so when did it arise and is the suit within time?

    (7) To what reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled? The court below after hearing the arguments of the parties relating to issue No. 1 dismissed the suit having come to the conclusion that the transaction in question is an out and out sale.

    4. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree this appeal is preferred on behalf of the plaintiffs. In this appeal Shri Vinayak Rao Vaidya, the learned Advocate for the appellants, urged that the court below has erred in coming to the conclusion that the agreement to reconvey and the sale are not part of the same transaction. He contends that the agreement to reconvey and the sale form part of one and the same transaction. The second contention is that having regard to the fact that Abdul Rahim had agreed to accept a rent to be reduced pro tanto and proportionate to any amount to be paid by Abdul Masood Faqer, there can be no inference other than this, that the intention of the parties was to treat the transaction as a mortgage and not a sale. It is further contended chat by the subsequent document the previous document has been altered and the court below has not taken this point into consideration.

    5. Referring to the definitions of mortgage by conditional sale, English Mortgage and Usufructuary Mortgage in Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is contended that if the document in question is not a mortgage by conditional sale there is no reason, why the same should not be treated as an English Mortgage or a Usufructuary Mortgage. Reliance was placed on the cases of — ‘Mohini Mohan Misra v. Sarat Sundari Debi’, AIR 1925 Cal 862. (A); — ‘David Elias Duek Cohen v. Baidyanath Mukerji’, AIR 1936 Cal 646 (B); — ‘Fozmal Bhutaji v. Shridhar Vithal’, AIR 1946 Bom 499 (C) and — ‘Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramchandra Iyer’, AIR 1942 Mad 628 (D).

    6. Shri Venkatachar the learned advocate for the respondent, relying on the case of — ‘Chun Chun Jha v. Ebadat Ali’, reported in AIR 1954 SC 345 (E), contended that as the agreement to repurchase and the sale are embodied in separate documents, the transaction can never be treated to be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. It is further submitted that the agreement to reconvey and the sale are not part of the same transaction but are independent transactions though they are executed on the same date. With regard to the contention that the document in question should be treated as an English Mortgage or a Usufructuary Mortgage, it is contended that the document in question cannot be treated as an English Mortgage as there is no obligation on the part of the mortgagor to repay and it cannot also be a Usufructuary Mortgage, as it is admitted by the plaintiffs that they are in possession. Reliance was placed on the cases reported in — ‘Narayana Iyer v. Venkatramana Iyer’, ILR 25 Mad 220 (F); — ‘Venkat Subba Rao v. Veeraswami’, AIR 1946 Mad 456 (G); — ‘Samsherkhan v. Vithal Das’, AIR 1946 Nag 264 (H);. — ‘Jaggaranath Singh v. Butto Krishto Ray’, AIR 1947 Pat 345 (I) and — ‘Suryaprakash Rao v. Venkatraju, AIR 1953 Mad 830 (J).

    7. Shri Vinayak Rao Vaidya conceded that in AIR 1954 SC 345 (E), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have no doubt held that if the agreement to repurchase and the sale are embodied in separate documents the transactions cannot be treated as a mortgage, but he contends that this decision was based on the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, whereas there is no such provision in S. 58(e) or (d) and if that was the intention of the Legislature, a similar provision would have been found in the definition of an “English Mortgage” or a “Usufructuary Mortgage”.

    8. To appreciate the relevancy of the rulings cited we have to analyse the present transaction. The transaction is embodied in two documents accompanied by a third document (the rental deed), all dated 30-11-1933 as already stated above. One document purports to be an out and out sale of the property, the other provides that the property shall be reconveyed on repayment of price and the third is the rental agreement. The contention of the appellants is that all the three documents taken together evidence and constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, or an English Mortgage or a Usufructuary Mortgage and attempted to show by the recital in the document itself and by reference to the surrounding circumstances, the real nature of the transaction according to the intention of the parties. The court below refused to go into that question holding that it is an out and out sale. The question in dispute is whether the transaction was a mortgage by conditional sale or an English Mori gage or a Usufructuary Mortgage as defined in Section 58(c), (e) and (d) of the Transfer of Property Act; or whether it was, as it appears to be on the very face of it an out and out sale. The point to be considered is whether the question is concluded by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act which runs thus:

    “Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.”

    9. The language of the proviso is perfectly clear and unambiguous and its effect is that an ostensible sale with a stipulation for repurchase shall not be regarded as a mortgage unless this stipulation is contained in the same document which effects the sale.

    10. In the case reported in AIR 1954 SC 345 (E), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that:

    “If the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents, then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not.”

    11. Shri Vinayak Rao Vaidya conceded that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court the contention that the transaction in question is a mortgage by conditional sale does not hold good, but he contends that as the new proviso has been introduced into Cl. (c) which defines a mortgage by conditional sale, it should not be understood as having a wider scope than the clause itself, and should not be taken to limit or qualify in any way Cl. (a) which defines the mortgage. In other words it is contended that the proviso should be read as providing only that such a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage by conditional sale with the consequence that it can still be regarded as a mortgage falling under S. 58 clauses (d) or (e) if it is established that the intention of the parties was that the transaction should operate as a mortgage and not as an out and out sale with the condition of retransfer.

    12. Shri Venkatachar on behalf of the respondent contends that the recent decision of the Supreme Court is quite clear that if the transaction is embodied in separate documents it cannot be treated as a mortgage at all. We cannot accept the construction suggested by the learned advocate for the appellants for it would involve reading into the proviso the words which are not there, and it would, moreover, stultify the new enactment as it would leave the previous state of law practically unchanged. It is, however, contended that if that was the intention of the Legislature, it could have made similar provision in the other kinds of mortgage also.

    13. We do not agree. For it would not make much difference in the legal effect of a sale accompanied by a separate agreement for repurchase to provide that it shall not be deemed to be a mortgage by conditional sale but may be regarded as an English or a Usufructuary Mortgage. We do not think that the proviso was intended to have that effect. Its object evidently was to shut out an inquiry whether a sale with a stipulation of retransfer is a mortgage where the stipulation is not embodied in the same document. Further the document cannot either be accepted to be a usufructuary or an English mortgage for in the former case the mortgagor binds himself to deliver possession and authorize the mortgagee to retain such possession until repayment of the mortgage money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property in lieu of interest and in the latter case he binds himself to repay the mortgage money and none of these conditions exist in the transaction in question. Three other cases have been cited before us one of the Calcutta and the other of the Bombay and Madras High Courts, namely AIR 1936 Cal 646 (B); — ‘D'Souza, J.M v. Reserve Bank of India’, AIR 1946 Bom 510 (K) and AIR 1942 Mad 628 (D). These are cases where the transaction was not embodied in two separate documents and therefore they do not help the contention of the appellants.

    14. Of course in the last case relied upon by the appellants reported in AIR 1925 Cal 862 (A) the transaction has been embodied in separate documents but that was a case prior to the amendment of 1929 and cannot help the contention of the appellants.

    15. In the result we see no force in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed. Having regard to the facts of the case, we do not wish to pass any order regarding the costs of this Court.

    K.S.B

    16. Appeal dismissed.

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    Abdul Faiz Fakhr And Others v. Abdul Hafeez And Others
    (Feb 22, 1955)