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  • section 115, clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • provisions of section 26F, sub-section (1), clause (a)
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  • section 115, clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • provisions of section 26F, sub-section (1), clause (a)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Mitter, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Rule was obtained by the landlord (the petitioner) whose application for pre-emption under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act had been dismissed by the learned Munsif of Lakshmipur. The subject matter was an occupancy holding admitted to be held under the petitioner. The holding originally belonged to Samar Ali Patwari and devolved upon his heirs on his death. Two heirs, Nana Miya and Nural Huq (together holding 5 annas 8 gandâs), sold their interest by a registered conveyance dated 5 October 1933 to the opposite party No. 1, Abdul Majid Miya. Samar Ali Patwari also left a son, Serajul Huq, who is an admitted co-sharer of the tenancy.

A notice of transfer under section 26C was served on the petitioner, who applied for pre-emption on 25 November 1933. The Munsif dismissed the petitioner's application on the ground that the purchase by Abdul Majid Miya was a benâmi purchase for the benefit of Serajul Huq, an admitted co-sharer. The central question brought before Mitter J. was whether Abdul Majid Miya could plead in the pre-emption proceedings that the real purchaser was a co-sharer (i.e., that Abdul Majid was a benâmdar) and thereby defeat the landlord's claim for pre-emption.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the purchaser (Abdul Majid Miya) is entitled, in proceedings under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to plead that he is a benâmdar and that the real purchaser is an admitted co-sharer (Serajul Huq), so as to defeat the landlord's application for pre-emption.
  2. Whether the non-joinder of the alleged beneficial owner (Serajul Huq) is a material irregularity that prevents the court from deciding the benâmi question in the pre-emption proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord's) Arguments — Mr. Mukherji

  • The court in proceedings under section 26F must proceed on the document of transfer and the notice of transfer; the person shown as transferee in the notice ought to be treated as the transferee.
  • The purchaser should not be allowed to "go back" on statements made in the notice or the conveyance; the landlord should not be required to search for the real transferee beyond the notice of transfer.
  • The question of benâmi should not be allowed to be raised in the absence of the person alleged to be the beneficial owner (non-joinder objection).
  • Cases cited in support: Surendra Narayan Layek v. Notan Behary Mondal; Troilokya Nath Ghose v. Jajnesivar Pal; Satyendra Nath Rai Chaudhury v. Fulsom Bibi. For the non-joinder proposition he cited Umed Mai v. Chand Mal.

Opposite Party's (Purchaser's) Arguments — Mr. Nagendranath Basu

  • The question of benâmi is properly raised and ought to be gone into; benâmi purchases are lawful and common.
  • If the benâmi issue is shut out, the protection in section 26F(1)(a) would be defeated and a landlord could obtain pre-emption contrary to the statutory exceptions.
  • The purchaser should be allowed to plead and prove statements at variance with the contents of the notice or deed of transfer to defeat the claim for pre-emption.
  • Cases cited in support: Barkatulla Pramanik v. Ashutosh Ghose; Brajendra Kumar Banerji v. Symannessa Bibi; Adhar Chandra Saha v. Gour Chandra Saha.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surendra Narayan Layek v. Notan Behary Mondal Cited for the proposition that, where a conveyance purports to transfer an occupancy holding, the transferee who initiated proceedings under section 26F (having deposited the landlord's transfer fee under section 26D) could not interrupt those proceedings by saying he purchased a holding held at a fixed rate of rent. The court observed that the cited case did not lay down any general rule preventing a purchaser from going back upon statements in the notice; the earlier court expressly refrained from laying down a general rule of law.
Troilokya Nath Ghose v. Jajnesivar Pal Cited in relation to an occupancy raiyat granting a sub-lease where the landlord alleged the lease was a colourable transaction (really a sale). The court noted that in that case the court refused pre-emption because, as between parties to the document, it was a lease and they could not show it was not what it purported to be; used to show limits of when a purchaser can plead substance over form.
Satyendra Nath Rai Chaudhury v. Fulsom Bibi Cited by petitioner to show that a defence that a deed of transfer was not acted upon was not allowed in a proceeding under section 26F on the ground that it would be against the tenor of the deed. The court examined the earlier decision and concluded that it did not support the broad proposition advanced; the earlier case in fact addressed delivery/operation of hibâ-bil-ewâz and did not hold that such a defence was closed after service of the notice.
Umed Mai v. Chand Mal Cited for the proposition that it was a material irregularity to decide a question (in that case) in the absence of certain parties who should have been on record (relating to section 115 CPC irregularity). The court held Umed Mai inapplicable here because, unlike that case, the beneficial owner (if any) could be represented by the benâmdar and, in fact, Serajul Huq appeared as a witness; hence non-joinder was not a material objection.
Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh Cited for the proposition that a benâmdar represents the beneficial owner and that a benâmdar can sue and be sued, with adjudications binding the beneficial owner. The court relied on this principle to conclude that non-joinder of the alleged beneficial owner (Serajul Huq) was not a bar to deciding the benâmi issue in the section 26F proceedings.
Barkatulla Pramanik v. Ashutosh Ghose Cited by opposite party as authority that a purchaser may plead a defence that a deed of transfer was not operative. The court observed that Barkatulla Pramanik was not authority for the proposition that a defence that a deed was not operative is open after service of the notice; the lower court had treated there as if no transfer of a particular share occurred, but this Court did not have to consider that question fully.
Brajendra Kumar Banerji v. Symannessa Bibi Cited for the proposition that a purchaser could plead that persons over and above those named in the notice were landlords, and adduce evidence to support that plea. The court treated this case as supporting the principle that purchasers may adduce evidence to show matters at variance with the notice (e.g., additional landlords) and that such pleas can defeat pre-emption in appropriate circumstances.
Adhar Chandra Saha v. Gour Chandra Saha Raised alongside Brajendra Kumar Banerji as authority that a purchaser may adduce evidence to support pleas not strictly matching the notice of transfer. Used similarly to show that earlier decisions allowed purchasers to prove matters at variance with the notice, and that such rulings do not support an absolute bar to raising benâmi defences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Non-joinder: The court first addressed the argument that the benâmi question was impermissible because Serajul Huq (the alleged beneficial owner) was not a party. The court rejected that objection. It held that a benâmdar represents the beneficial owner and can sue and be sued; an adjudication against the benâmdar would bind the beneficial owner. The court relied on Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh to support this point and contrasted the present facts with Umed Mai, where no one on the record could represent the absent mortgagors.
  2. Permissibility of raising benâmi: The court held that the question whether a transfer is benâmi can be raised and gone into in proceedings under section 26F. The court reasoned that the petitioner's position (that the purchaser could not go back on the notice) would be valid only if the petitioner could invoke estoppel.
  3. Estoppel and statute: The court analysed the effect of estoppel. It concluded that the statements in the notice, if the estoppel principle is excluded, amount only to admissions and do not bar the purchaser from showing that he is a benâmdar. Crucially, the court held that estoppel cannot be used to defeat or override a statutory provision: allowing estoppel to prevent inquiry into benâmi would defeat the statutory exception (no pre-emption where purchaser is a co-sharer). The court formulated the position succinctly as a case of "there cannot be estoppel against statute."
  4. Precedent review and limits: The court reviewed the cases cited by counsel and concluded that none established a broad rule precluding a purchaser from going back on statements in the notice. Some cited cases were distinguished on their facts (for example, where the document between parties was treated as conclusive of their legal relationship as between themselves). Others supported the narrower proposition that, in particular factual matrices, purchasers may adduce evidence to show matters at variance with the notice. The court emphasised that those authorities do not preclude inquiry into benâmi in the circumstances before it.
  5. Conclusion: Given the statutory scheme and the inability to invoke estoppel to defeat a statutory exception, the court found it legitimate and proper to decide, in section 26F proceedings, whether the case fell within the exceptions made by the statute (i.e., whether the purchaser was effectively a co-sharer and thus pre-emption was barred).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the question of benâmi may be raised and adjudicated in proceedings under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act and that the purchaser (Abdul Majid Miya) may plead that he is a benâmdar for a co-sharer (Serajul Huq). The court discharged the Rule. The order also awarded costs: hearing fee 1 gold mohur.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The landlord's Rule (seeking to overturn the Munsif's decision) was discharged; the petitioner's application for pre-emption remained defeated on the benâmi ground as considered by the lower court.
  • The court applied the principle that estoppel cannot be used to override a statutory provision (i.e., "there cannot be estoppel against statute") and therefore allowed inquiry into whether the purchaser was a benâmdar despite the purchaser's name appearing in the notice of transfer.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a sweeping new general rule; the court stated that earlier reported cases do not establish a broad principle preventing purchasers from disproving or explaining matters stated in a notice, and the decision was reached by applying the statute and the estoppel principle to the facts before the court.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Rule discharged." Costs: hearing fee 1 gold mohur.

    Nabendrakishore Ray v. Abdul Majid

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Mitter, J.:— This Rule has been obtained by the & landlord, whose application for pre-emption under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act has been dismissed by the learned Munsif of Lakshmipur.

    The subject matter of the application is an occupancy holding admittedly held under the petitioner. It formerly belonged to one Samar Ali Patwari, on whose death it devolved upon his heirs. Two of them, namely his sons Nana Miya and Nural Huq, who had inherited 5 annas 8 gandâs share therein, sold their interest to the opposite party No. 1, Abdul Majid Miya, by a registered conveyance dated the 5th October, 1933. Samar Ali Patwari also left him surviving a son, named Serajul Huq, who is admittedly a co-sharer of Nana Miya and Nural Huq.

    The notice of transfer under section 26C being served on the petitioner, he applied for pre-emption on the 25th November, 1933. His application has been defeated on the ground that the purchase by Abdul Majid Miya is a benâmi purchase for the benefit of Serajul Huq, an admitted co-sharer of the vendors in the holding.

    The question before me is whether Abdul. Majid Miya is entitled to plead in these proceedings that the real purchaser is not he, but a co-sharer of the vendors and so defeat the application for pre-emption.

    Section 26C requires a notice in the prescribed form to be filed with the registering officer. The form of the notice as prescribed contains a column where the name and address of the purchaser has to be given. In the notice, which was given in this case, the name of the purchaser is stated to be Abdul Majid Miya.

    Mr. Mukherji, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contends that the question of benâmi should not have been allowed to be raised in these proceedings. He put his contention in this way. He says, firstly, that, in proceedings under section 26F, the court has to proceed upon the document of transfer, and on the notice of transfer; the person shown as the transferee therein must be taken to be the transferee, and that the purchaser should not be allowed to go back upon the statements made in the notice. He contends that the landlord making the application for pre-emption should not be required to go beyond the notice of transfer and to hunt for the real transferee, nor should the court allow the question of benâmi to be raised in the absence of the person set up as the beneficial owner.

    In support of his contention that the court must proceed upon the terms of the notice of transfer and should not allow the purchaser to go back upon the terms of the notice or of the conveyance, Mr. Mukherji has cited before me the following cases, namely, Surendra Narayan Layek v. Notan Behary Mondal, Troilokya Nath Ghose v. Jajnesivar Pal and Satyendra Nath Rai Chaudhury v. Fulsom Bibi. For the proposition that it was a material irregularity to decide the question of benâmi in the absence of Serajul Huq, he cites the case of Umed Mai v. Chand Mal, .

    Mr. Nagendranath Basu, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, contends that the question raised in the case ought to be gone into and has been rightly gone into by the court below. He says benâmi purchases are lawful and common, and unless the question of benâmi be gone into the provisions of section 26F, sub-section (1), clause (a) would be defeated and the landlord would get a pre-emption order in his favour in a case where the legislature says that he will not have it. He further contends that the cases show that the purchaser has been allowed to plead and prove statements at variance with the contents of the notice of transfer or of the deed of transfer and thereby to defeat the claim for pre-emption and for that purpose he cites the cases of Barkatulla Pramanik v. Ashutosh Ghose, Brajendra Kumar Banerji v. Symannessa Bibi(6) and Adhar Chandra Saha v. Gour Chandra Saha(7).

    Before dealing with the main question as to whether the purchaser shall be allowed to plead that he is the benâmdar for another person, who is a co-sharer in the tenancy, it would be convenient to deal with the point made by reason of the non-joinder of Serajul Huq. I do not see how that can be a material point at all. A benâmdar represents the beneficial owner. He can sue and be sued and the result of the adjudication would bind the beneficial owner. Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh. In the application under section 26F, there was, accordingly, complete representation of Serajul Huq and the decision of Viscount Haldane in Umed Mai's case has no application. In that case it was held that the plaintiff ought to have, having regard to his claim, made his mortgagors parties to the suit, and as there was no person on the record who could represent the mortgagors it was held that a decree made in favour of the plaintiff in the absence of the mortgagors was a decree irregularly made within the meaning of section 115, clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case before me if Abdul Majid Miya is the benâmdar of Serajul Huq, the decision pronounced, or to be pronounced, on the application for pre-emption would bind the latter, especially as the case of Serajul Huq, who has appeared as a witness in the case, is that Abdul Majid Miya is his benâmdar.

    Regarding the main point in the case, my judgment is that the question of benâmi can be raised and gone into. The position taken by the petitioner would have been a sound one, only if he had been able to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. If the principle of estoppel be out of the way, the statements made on the notice cannot have a greater value than of admissions. The case can be put by the petitioner, as has been put before me, in the following way. The notice showed that the purchaser was a stranger and not a co-sharer in the tenancy. On the faith of the said statement, the petitioner made the application for pre-emption and incurred expense. If the notice of transfer indicated that the purchaser was a co-sharer tenant, he would not have made the application for pre-emption and incurred expense. Assuming that the petitioner altered his position on the faith of the statements in the notice that Abdul Majid Miya was the purchaser, the question is whether the latter can go back upon his statement and say that he is a mere name-lender. I do not see how the principle of estoppel can be invoked. The statute says that there can be no pre-emption where the purchaser is a co-sharer tenant. To allow the petitioner to pre-empt would be to defeat a statutory provision. If by shutting out the defence an order for pre-emption be made in favour of the petitioners, I do not see by what further proceedings Serajul Huq would be able to set aside the said order. I hold, accordingly, that it is legitimate and proper for the court to go into and decide the question, in the proceedings for pre-emption, as to whether the case comes within the exceptions made in section 26F on the principle conveniently put, that there cannot be estoppel against statute.

    The reported cases do not lay down the broad proposition that in no case will the purchaser be allowed to go back upon the statements made in the notice. In the case of Brajendra Kumar Banerji v. Symannessa Bibi and Adhar Chandra Saha v. Gour Chandra Saha, the purchaser had mentioned in the notice of transfer certain persons as the landlords of the holding. Applications for pre-emption were made with those persons only as parties on the record. The purchaser turned round and said that other persons over and above the persons named as landlords in the notice were also landlords and the applications were not, accordingly, maintainable by reason of the provisions of section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was held that such a plea could be raised by the purchaser and that he could adduce evidence to support his plea. In fact, in the last mentioned case, he could successfully support it and the application for pre-emption was dismissed. Mr. Mukherji cited the case of Satyendra Nath Rai Chaudhury v. Fulsom Bibi for showing that a defence that a deed of transfer was not acted upon was not allowed in a proceeding under section 26F on the ground that it would be against the tenor of the deed. An examination of the said case does not support his proposition. I have looked into the petition on which the rule was issued and the judgment of the lower court. In that case, Fulsom Bibi executed an instrument of hibâ-bil-ewâz in favour of Nazem Mallik, the consideration for the document being a promise by the latter to pay her maintenance. In fulfilment of the said promise, the latter executed an instrument on the same day by which he undertook to pay the lady maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5 per month. The two deeds were registered and the first deed was taken from the registration office by Nazem. It was proved, that after the registration, the lady took back the deed of exchange, and that possession of the property remained with the lady as before. It was contended that the transfer was not complete and title had not passed to Nazem, as there was no delivery of possession. This contention prevailed with the Munsif, who held that no title had passed from the donor to the donee. Mitter J. pointed out that in a hibâ-bil-ewâz delivery of possession is not essential and that with the registration of the deed title had passed to the donee. The defence was not that the instrument of hibâ-bil-ewâz was not intended to be acted upon and this Court did not hold that such a defence was not open after the service of the notice of the transfer on the landlord. I do also hold that the case of Barkatulla Pramanik v. Ashutosh Ghose cited by the advocate for the opposite party is no authority for the proposition that a defence that a deed of transfer was not operative is open in such proceedings after the service of the notice of transfer. In that case, the lower court held that there could be no pre-emption of the 8 annas share in the holding purchased by the judgment-debtor's wife as there was really no transfer of the same, but inasmuch as the landlord did not move against the said part of the order, this Court had not to consider the said question. In the case of Troilokya Nath Ghose v. Jajneswar Pal the occupancy râiyat granted a sub-lease to the opposite party, which was registered under section 48H of the Bengal Tenancy Act. On receipt of the notice, the landlord made an application for pre-emption under section 26F, his case being that the lease was a colourable transaction, the transaction being really an out and out sale. S.K Ghose, J. pointed out that as between the parties to the document it was a lease, i.e, it was not open to them to show that it was not what it purported to be, and if that be so the grantor still continued to be a tenant of the applicant. In this view of the matter the application for pre-emption was refused.

    It now remains to consider the case of Surendra Narayan Layek v. Notan Behary Mondal. In that case the conveyance purported to transfer an occupancy holding. In answer to the application for pre-emption the purchaser wanted to show that it was mokarrari holding. This Court held that the transferee was responsible for the initiation of the proceedings under section 26F, by depositing the landlord's transfer fee under section 26D, and that he could not be allowed to interrupt those proceedings by saying that he purchased a holding held at a fixed rate of rent. Suhrawardy and Costello, JJ. expressly refrained from laying down any general rule of law.

    In my judgment, none of the cases lay down any general principle of law which precludes me from taking the view I have taken.

    The rule is, accordingly, discharged with costs, hearing fee 1 gold mohur.

    Rule discharged.
    A.A

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    Comments

    Nabendrakishore Ray v. Abdul Majid
    (Feb 19, 1935)