Maclean, C.J:— The question submitted for our decision is “whether in an appeal against the final decree in a partition suit it is open to the Appellant to question the correctness of the preliminary order or decree for partition when no appeal was preferred against such order within the time allowed by law.”
The first point to consider is whether the preliminary order or decree is a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Full Bench case of Didhin Golab Koer v. Radha Didari Koer is a distinct authority to the effect that such an order is a decree within sec. 2, and this view is clearly supported by the recent case of Raja Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bejai Bahadur Singh(2) before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in which judgment was given on the 21st July 1900. There it was held that an order upon an issue, “For what period are mesne profits recoverable” was final and not interlocutory, that it was a decree within the definition of sec. 2 of the Code and consequently appealable under sec. 540. Their Lordships then say:— “Treating the question as if it were whether the order under consideration is final or interlocutory in its nature, and testing it by the ordinary principles applicable to such questions their Lordships think not only that the High Court are right in the particular circumstances of the case, but that there is not any need to rely upon the accident that the District Judge took the convenient course of trying the liability to account in a separate issue and deciding it in a separate judgment. His decision is a final one in its essence and would be so equally whether it stood alone or was combined with decisions on other points. It resembles in principle a decree for account made at the hearing of a cause which is final against the party denying liability to account and is appealable; though it is also in another way interlocutory and may result in the exoneration of the accounting party or even in the award of a balance in his favour. And it can make no difference in point of principle whether the decision be in favour of or against the liability to account. It is equally final in its effect and as such equally open to appeal.” If a decree adjudicating upon the question of liability to account be final, a decree in a partition suit, which completely determines the shares of the parties must equally be so. It is clear then that the preliminary order here was a decree appealable and final as opposed to being interlocutory in its nature. I am not dealing with the question whether a statement in a judgment as to the rights of the parties where no formal decree has been drawn up and where the declaration of such rights has not been embodied in a formal decree, is a decree within the meaning of the Code. That point is not now before us. I would only add for the guidance of Judges in the mofussil, that, in my opinion, preliminary orders in partition suits and in suits for account, if they declare the rights of the parties either as to their shares of the property to be partitioned or as to liability to account, ought to be drawn up formally as decrees in compliance with sec. 206.
But now arises ??? question submitted to us and upon this there are the two conflicting decisions mentioned in the reference.
Neither party suggests that the case is within sec. 59], which appears to me to have codified in a statutory form the principles involved in the Privy Council cases of Moheshur Sing v. The Bengal Government(3), Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum(4) and Sheonath v. Ramnath(5). The question is whether the principle of these cases apply to a final order, an order which finally decides the rights of the parties as to the shares to which they are entitled, and which is appealable. In Moheshur Sing v. The Bengal Government their Lordships said—the point being whether it was open to the Appellant to impugn the regularity of certain proceedings to grant a review—“We are of opinion that this objection cannot be sustained. We are not aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting for over the benefit of the consideration of the Appellate Court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would, impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before this tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous interlocutory orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided and brought hither by appeal for adjudication.” The same opinion was entertained by their Lordships in the cases of Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum and Sheonath v. Ramnath and again in Shah Makhun Lal v. Sree Kishan Singh(6). But as I read these judgments they were all cases of interlocutory as opposed to final orders and the question now before us is whether the same principle applies to the case of a decree which is final in its essence and effect. In all these cases the orders are referred to as interlocutory orders. If they were intended to apply to final as well as to interlocutory orders then the present case is covered by their authority, by which we are bound. But as I have said I do not so read these cases.
It is said that sec. 396 indicates that there can be only one decree in a partition suit, and that decree after the Commissioner's report: but this argument is inconsistent with, and cannot be reconciled with the view that the first order which declares the shares of the parties is a final and not an interlocutory decree. The Code affords us but little direct assistance on the point, but upon the best consideration which looking to the Code, to principle and to the authorities, I can give to the case, I am of opinion, when there is in a particular suit a decree declaratory of the rights of the parties, a decree which is, in point of law, final as regards those rights, and also appealable, and the time allowed for appealing has expired, that decree cannot be challenged upon an appeal from a subsequent decree in the suit, say, the decree confirming or dealing with the Commissioner's report. To hold otherwise would be to extend the time for appealing to an indefinite period, contrary to the period of limitation defined by the legislature. The inconvenience and costs to the parties of the opposite view is manifest. All the expense incident to a partition by metes and bounds, of the Commissioner's report and so forth,—proceedings which might occupy years,—would be thrown away, and though, no doubt, such useless expenditure might in some cases be met by special provision as to payment of costs by those who had caused it, such compensation in many cases might prove inadequate, for costs are not always recoverable. I can find nothing in the Code nor in principle which imposes upon me the necessity of arriving at such a conclusion, and I therefore, prefer to arrive at one which appears to me to be consistent with convenience, as opposed to one which is calculated to produce endless delay and grave and unnecessary expense.
In my opinion the question ought to be answered in the negative and the case with this expression of opinion returned to the Division Bench for ultimate decision, the costs of the reference to abide the result.
Prinsep, J.:— In this suit which is for a partition by metes and bounds amongst certain co-sharers in a certain property the Subordinate Judge, by his order of the 23rd July 1898, found that the parties to the suit, including the persons made on that date parties to the suit, had certain shares, and he accordingly directed a Commissioner to be appointed for the purpose of making a partition amongst the parties in those specific shares. There was no appeal filed against that order such as the law permits. A final decree has now been passed and the question referred to a Full Bench is:— “Whether in an appeal against the final decree in a partition suit, it is open to the Appellant to question the correctness of the preliminary order or decree for partition when no appeal was preferred against such order within the time allowed by law.” This reference is made because there are two contradictory decisions on this point, a Division Bench of this Court having held, in the case of Boloram Dey v. Ram Chundra Dey that no appeal having been made against the preliminary order, it was barred by the operation of the law of limitation and, on the other hand, another Division Bench of this Court having held, in the case of Biswa Nath Chaki v. Bani Kant Dutt the judgment being delivered within a few months of the judgment in the first case and before it had been reported, that it was competent to an appellant, in appeal against the final decree, to reopen the entire case. The first case, I may mention, was a suit for partition and, therefore, on all fours with the case now before us. The second case was a suit for dissolution of partnership and an account in which the Court of first instance overruled the objection of one of the Defendants and found that the Plaintiff was a partner and entitled to an account. The Defendant, however, did not appeal against that order until after a final decree on accounts taken. The same principle is however involved in both cases.
The law gives the right of appeal (certain cases being excepted) from the decrees of the Courts exercising Original Jurisdiction to the Courts authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of those Courts (sec. 540, C.C.P) and inasmuch as a decree has been defined to mean the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or any defence set up in a Civil Court when such adjudication, so far as regards the Court expressing it, decides the suit or appeal, it has been held that an appeal lies from an order declaring the rights of parties to certain shares in a suit for partition by metes and bounds and also against an order declaring that certain parties are partners in a suit for dissolution of partnership and an account before the actual decree in the suit has been passed.
There was much uncertainty in this respect, but the matter has at last been finally settled, so far as this Court is concerned, by the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Didhin Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer and their Lordships of the Privy Council have also finally set this matter at rest by their judgments in more than one reported case. These cases, it may be observed, commence from the case of Moheshur Sing v. The Bengal Government, decided in 1859, the last case on the subject being Saiyad Muzhar Hossein v. Bodha Bibi(9), decided in 1894. So far as regards the right of appeal, the law is now settled. The question raised on this reference, however, is whether, the right of appeal existing and no appeal having been made, it is competent to a party in the suit to appeal against the final decree on the whole case, as if he had no such right of appeal at an intermediate stage. I may observe that though, by reason of the definition of a decree this right is given, a decree, as explained in sec. 206 and the following sections of the Code, clearly means the final decree in the suit, for, under sec. 206, it is stated that the decree shall set out the particulars of the claim in the suit and shall specify the relief granted or other determination of the suit. From this, I have always understood (and this has been the practice of our Courts) that, notwithstanding the definition of the expression ‘decree’ first given in the Act of 1879, in amendment of the then existing Code of Civil Procedure, a decree within the terms of sec. 206 means the final decree in the suit and that it is such a decree which is contemplated in giving a right of appeal under sec. 540. There is only one decree within the terms of Chapter XVII in the suit and that is the final decree. Any order passed in the course of the trial of a suit, though it may, in some respects, be an adjudication of the rights of the parties, if it does not finally dispose of the suit, is not a decree within the terms of that chapter because with any other findings already arrived at in the suit, it must be embodied in the decree drawn up in accordance with sec. 200.
The terms of sec. 396 are also significant in connection with the matter now under consideration. That section provides that the Court, after ascertaining the several parties interested in the property and their several rights therein, may issue a commission to such persons as it thinks fit to make a partition according to such rights, and it further provides that, or consideration of the Commissioner's report and any objections thereto, the Court shall either quash the same and issue a new commission or pass a decree in accordance therewith. That decree is the decree within the terms of sec. 206 and, in my opinion, it is also the decree within the terms of sec. 540. There is no provision of the law taking away a right of appeal on the entire case when such a decree has been passed.
In the same manner, in an administration suit, sec. 213 declares that the Court, before making a decree, shall order such accounts and inquiries to be taken and made, and give such other directions, as it thinks fit and, under sec. 394, the Court may issue a commission to any person directing him to make such examination or adjustment of accounts as it may consider to be necessary. So also, in a suit for dissolution of partnership, sec. 215 declares that the Court, before making its decree may pass an order fixing the day on which the partnership shall stand dissolved and directing such accounts to be taken and other acts to be done as it thinks fit. Now, it would be impossible for a Court to declare accounts to be taken unless it had previously found that the parties were partners and, as such, entitled to receive or bound to render accounts. Similarly, sec. 215A declares that “when a suit is for an account of ??? transactions between a principal and agent and in all other suits not hereinbefore provided for, where it is necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of money due to or from any party, that an account should be taken the Court shall, before making its decree, pass an order directing such accounts to be taken as it thinks fit.” Now, in such a suit, it may happen and constantly does happen that a party denies his liability to account and, if an order be passed against him, although he may have the right of appeal because the order is within the definition of a decree, still no decree is passed until an account has been taken showing the amount due to the Plaintiff. These matters were all fully considered in the case of Biswa Nath Chaki v. Bani Kant Dutta by a Bench consisting of myself and Mr. Justice Hill and we also considered several judgments of the Privy Council referred to in our judgment bearing on this point, as well as the rules laid down in several well-known treatises on the interpretation of statutes. No authority has been shown to us for a contrary view except the judgment in the case of Boloram Dey v. Ram Chundra Dey. In that case, the authorities on which we relied were not referred to or considered. The argumentum ab inconvenienti has, however, been pressed upon us on the ground that it is not reasonable to require a party to go to the expense of an enquiry into accounts or to settle a partition by metes and bounds when it was open to him to stop that inquiry and the expense consequent thereon by asserting his rights, if he still maintained that he had them, by exercise of the right of appeal given him under the law. It seems to me that instances may be given where a party may reasonably abstain from exercise of this right of appeal without any prospect of putting his adversary to such an expense and, at the same time, reserve to himself the right of appeal, once for all, instead of delaying the proceedings and appealing on two separate occasions and it may be added that this very objection was considered by Hill, J., and myself in the case before us, for we pointed out that, on appeal against the final decree, a party who had not exercised his right of appeal against the intermediate finding or decree against him, “would certainly suffer in costs in consequence of his having without objection allowed the subsequent proceedings to take place” and, as an authority for this, we referred to the concluding remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum. Their Lordships there stated, considering that the Appellant might have appealed against the order and that his conduct in the subsequent proceedings in the Court below had not been satisfactory, that they “are not disposed to recommend that he should have costs in those proceedings against the opposite party.” There would, therefore, be protection in such a case to the Respondent. If, however, the position be considered in another point of view, it does not seem altogether unreasonable to grant the right of appeal on the whole case. By the exercise of his right of appeal against what I may term the intermediate decree, we proceedings in the suit would be prolonged, if that appeal were unsuccessful and, if he had good grounds to appeal against the final decree, the Appellant would be put to the expense of two appeals. But if there was only one appeal on the whole case, it would the dealt with by the Appellate Court once for all, while, if the Appellant succeeded on the point decided by the intermediate decree, he might, as I have already pointed out, suffer in costs because he had allowed proceedings to be held which he might have prevented if he had exercised his right of appeal at once against the intermediate decree. In my opinion, it would not be right or proper to allow the argumentum ab inconvenienti to prevail against the terms of the law as expressed in the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure to which I have referred and I would add that it would be very injurious to litigants if the practice of the Courts which has recognized this right of appeal were suddenly altered so as to deprive them of a right which they have been led to believe existed and which they intended to exercise.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the case of Biswa Nath Chaki v. Bani Kant Dutta is rightly decided and I would answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.
Banerjee, J.:— The question referred to us for determination in this case is, whether in an appeal against the final decree in a partition suit, it is open to the Appellant to question the correctness of the preliminary order or decree for partition, when no appeal was preferred against such order within the time allowed by law.
There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure or in any other enactment bearing directly upon this question. It is argued for the Appellant that as the final decree for partition incorporates with it the preliminary order or decree, and is based upon that order in appealing against the final decree, the Appellant is entitled to question the correctness, as well, of the actual allotments made, as of the determination of shares upon which the allotments are based. It is further argued that the Appellant had this right under the old law, as is clear from the cases of Moheshur Sing v. The Bengal Government, Forbes v. Ameeroonissa and Shah Makhun Lal v. Sree Kishan Singh, and there being no express provision in the present law taking away that right, it cannot be held to be taken away by any implication arising from the definition of the term decree in sec. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or from the provisions of sec. 591 of the Code. And the case of Biswa Nath Chaki v. Bani Kant Dutta, which gave effect to considerations like the foregoing, is relied upon in support of the Appellant's argument.
On the other hand, it is argued for the Respondeut that, as the preliminary order issuing a commission after ascertaining the several rights of the parties interested in the property to be partitioned as contemplated by sec. 396 of the Code is a decree within the definition of the term in sec. 2, and is appealable as such under sec. 540, as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Dulhin Golab Koer v. Radha Didari Koer, if it is not appealed against within the time allowed by law, it become final and conclusive, and its correctness cannot be questioned in the appeal against the final decree. It is further argued that as secs. 591 and 629 of the Code expressly provide that certain orders may be either appealed against immediately, or taken exception to in the appeal against the final decree, the natural inference is, that if the Legislature intended to leave an order coming within the definition of a decree similarly open to question in the appeal against the final decree, it would have expressly said so. Moreover it is urged that the opposite view would lead to most inconvenient, results. Thus a preliminary decree for making a partition or for taking accounts may be carried out by an investigation extending over a long time and entailing much expense; and if it be open to any party to question the correctness of the preliminary decree in an appeal against the final decree, the time and trouble taken, and the expense incurred, in carrying out the preliminary decree, will go for nothing. As for the cases cited on the other side, it is said that they were decided under the old law, and that as that law has been altered by the introduction of a more comprehensive definition of the term decree, those eases do not govern any case under the present law, except so far as that law has embodied the principle laid down by them in secs. 591 and 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These are reasons which are no doubt entitled to careful consideration; and it is for reasons such as these, that it was held in the case of Boloram Dey v. Ram Chundra Dey, that the correctness of a preliminary decree for partition, which has not been appealed against within the time allowed by law, cannot be questioned in an appeal from the final decree.
After considering the arguments on both sides, I am of opinion that the view contended for by the learned vakil for the Appellant is correct.
In appealing against the final decree in a partition suit, the Appellant must be deemed to have the right of appealing on the whole case, notwithstanding that he might have appealed against the preliminary decree dealing with a part of the case, namely, the part relating to the determination of the shares of the parties. That right has not been taken away by any express provision of the Code: nor, in my opinion, has it been taken away by necessary or sufficient implication arising from secs. 591 and 629 of the Code. Nor is it sufficient to say that the cases of Forbes v. Ameeroonissa and Shah Makhun Lal v. Sree Kishan Singh are distinguishable from the present case by reason of their being decided under the old law, because the order, the correctness of which was held to be open to question in the appeal against the final decree in each of those cases, was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council to be appealable, just as much as the preliminary order or decree in a partition suit is under the present Code. In the last-mentioned case, it was said:— “Their Lordships think that the question as to the interest is open in this appeal though the Plaintiff might have appealed, and did not, from the interlocutory decree on the point.” It is true that the orders in question in both the two cases cited above were interlocutory orders or decrees, in the sense that they did not dispose of the cases; but so is the preliminary decree in a partition suit an interlocutory decree as it does not completely dispose of the case. That is clear from sec. 396 of the Code. The principle upon which the Respondent's contention is mainly based, is that where a preliminary order in a case is appealable as a decree, and is not appealed against within the time allowed by law, its correctness cannot be questioned in an appeal from the final decree in the case. But that principle is nowhere affirmed in the Code; and it is expressly denied in the passage quoted above from the judgment of the Privy Council in Shah Makhun Lal v. Sree Kishan Singh.
The argument based upon considerations of convenience noticed above, is no doubt the strongest argument in favour of the Respondent's view. But when that view is opposed to the decision of the Privy Council in the two cases cited above, which we are bound to follow, I am unable to adopt it as correct.
I should add that the argument based upon considerations of convenience is not altogether without an answer; nor are the considerations of convenience all in favour of the Respondent's view. If by reason of a party successfully impugning the correctness of the preliminary decree for partition in an appeal from the final decree the partition proceedings have to be commenced de novo, the Court may compensate all the other parties by making the Appellant bear the costs that are thrown away. On the other hand, if it be held that the law renders it imperative on every party to appeal from a preliminary decree by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so appeal, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the Appellate Court, there will follow many more appeals from preliminary decrees than would otherwise be the case. It is easy, moreover, to imagine cases in which, if a party is under no such imperative necessity of immediately appealing against a preliminary decree and can safely wait to see what the final decree may be, lie may, notwithstanding that he might have felt somewhat aggrieved by the preliminary decree, in the end find little reason to complain of the final decree. Thus, against the preliminary decree in a partition suit, a party may have a slight objection as to the extent of the shares; or against a similar decree in a suit for account, he may have a slight objection as to the period over which the account is to extend; but when the final decree is made, he may not have reason to complain, having regard to the nature of the allotments made in the one case, and to the amount decreed in the other; and so eventually no appeal may be preferred against the final decree, and thus time and trouble may be saved.
For the foregoing reasons, I would respectfully dissent from the view taken in the case of Boloram Dey v. Ram Chundra Bey, and agreeing with the decision in the case of Biswa Nath Chaki v. Bani Kant Dutta I would answer the question referred to the Full Bench in the affirmative.
Ameer Ali, J.:— I am also of opinion that the case of Biswa Nath Chaki v. Bani Kant Dutta was rightly decided and that the question referred to us should be answered in the affirmative.
As I agree with the reasons given by Prinsep and Banerjee, JJ., for arriving at this conclusion, I do not think it necessary to go over the same ground. I would only add that although under sec. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, as interpreted by the Full Bench in the case of Dulhin Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer, certain orders made in the course of a suit are appealable, there is nothing to show that the Legislature has taken away the right to question, upon an appeal from the main and final decree, the propriety of such orders if they are not appealed against separately within a certain time.
In suits for partition, administration, dissolution of partnership, & c., the declaratory orders are made in the first instance with the object of forming a basis for further proceeding. Such orders are by no means of a definitive character; in practice they are often modified by the Court upon application by the parties. It would be inexpedient in my opinion to embody such orders in formal decrees or to compel parties to appeal therefrom whether they wish or not. In many eases the objection to the declaratory order disappears in the final decree.
Rampini, J.:— I agree in the judgment of his Lordship the Chief Justice.
It appears to me that if a preliminary order or decree for partition in a partition suit be a decree, as defined in sec. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, it necessarily follows that it is not open to an Appellant to question the correctness of this decree after he has allowed the period of limitation for appealing against such a decree to pass without appealing against it.
In the Full Bench case of Dulhin Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer it has been decided that a preliminary order or decree in a partition suit declaring the specific rights of the parties in the properties to be partitioned, is a decree, and appealable as such. The question of the correctness of this decision is not before us, and as it is the decision of a Full Bench we are bound to follow it. That being so, it appears to be certain that the present Appellant cannot now be allowed to impugn the correctness of the lower Court's decree of the 23rd July 1898, as he seeks to do.
The cases which have been cited to us by the Appellant, other than the case of Biswa Nath Ghaki v. Bani Kant Dutta, which in my opinion has been wrongly decided, are all cases decided before the passing of the present Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, do not seem to me to be relevant to the question we have now to decide.
I would therefore answer the question referred to us in the negative.
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