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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • Order I, Rule 10, Clause (8), of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • Sections 18, 21 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • SECTION 16 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Section 622 of the Code of 1882.
  • Section 21 of Act XI of 1859,
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • Order I, Rule 10, Clause (8), of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • Sections 18, 21 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • SECTION 16 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Section 622 of the Code of 1882.
  • Section 21 of Act XI of 1859,
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Rule challenges an order made under Order I, Rule 10, Clause (8) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, which struck the petitioner's name out of the record on the ground that he had been improperly joined as a party to a Land Acquisition reference pending in the Court below.

Key events recited in the opinion (all dates and actions are taken from the text):

  • 26 May 1906 — A declaration under the Land Acquisition Act was made for acquisition of the disputed property.
  • 1 September (year not re-stated in every instance) — Notices under Sections 9 and 10 were served.
  • At the outset of Collector's proceedings the parties were Manmatha Nath Mitter (the owner at that time) and Rakhal Das Addy.
  • 23 September 1908 — The estate was sold for arrears of revenue and purchased by Promotho Nath Mitter.
  • 17 October 1908 — Promotho Nath applied to the Collector to stay proceedings until confirmation of the revenue sale; the application was rejected two days later.
  • 30 October 1908 — The Collector made his award, awarding the whole compensation to Rakhal Das, who asserted a lakheraj title.
  • 10 November 1908 — Possession of the acquired land was taken by Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act and title vested in Government from that date.
  • 18 November 1908 — Manmatha Nath applied for a reference to the Civil Courts (contending under-valuation and erroneous award to the lakherajdar).
  • 7 December 1908 — Rakhal Das applied for a reference on the ground of under-valuation.
  • 6 January 1909 — Manmatha Nath withdrew his objection to the valuation; 21 January (year implied 1909) — the Collector made a reference to the Civil Court.
  • 11 January 1909 — The revenue sale was confirmed under Section 21 of Act XI of 1859, with title to the purchaser (Promotho Nath) relating back to the date of default (29 June 1908).
  • 23 March (year omitted in text, but while the reference was pending) — Promotho Nath was added as a party to the reference upon his application (apparently ex parte).
  • 7 August (year not specified) — Rakhal Das applied for reconsideration of the order adding Promotho Nath; 19 August — the Special Judge issued an order permitting Promotho Nath to remain but limiting the Court from framing/deciding issues between him and other parties that would not have arisen otherwise; any money found due to Manmatha would be paid to Manmatha and Promotho jointly unless parties agreed to compromise.
  • 29 September (year not stated) — The Land Acquisition Judge decided to review his previous order; 6 October 1909 (at one place in the text) he decided Promotho Nath ought not to remain a party; elsewhere the decision is recorded as dated 6 October 1908. The Rule before this Court challenges that order removing Promotho Nath from the record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Special Judge striking Promotho Nath from the record (i.e., deciding that he ought not to remain a party) ought to be maintained or set aside.
  2. Whether a purchaser at a revenue sale, whose sale has been confirmed before a Collector's reference, may be joined as a party to a reference made at the instance of the previous owner — either in his own right as purchaser or as representative-in-interest of the prior owner.
  3. If such a purchaser is added as a party in the capacity of representative-in-interest, what is the precise scope of the enquiry he may urge before the Civil Court (i.e., whether he may urge grounds that were not available to the original objector who obtained the reference).
  4. Whether this Court can, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the impugned order striking the petitioner from the record (including the effect of authority such as Rabbaba Khanum v. Noorjehan Begum and the operation of Section 622 of the Code of 1882).

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments in support of the Rule (for the petitioner Promotho Nath)

  • Promotho Nath contended that he was entitled to be made a party to the reference — at least in his capacity as representative-in-interest of Manmatha Nath, if not in his own right as purchaser at the revenue sale.

Arguments on behalf of Rakhal Das (opposite party)

  • It was argued that Promotho Nath ought not to be made a party even as representative-in-interest because the revenue sale under which he claims title had been confirmed before the Collector's reference was made to the Civil Court; therefore he had an ample opportunity to ask for a reference on his own behalf.
  • Even if added, it was contended he should not be allowed to claim the position of a purchaser at a revenue sale within the reference.
  • It was lastly suggested that, even if the order striking Promotho Nath out were erroneous, this Court should not interfere by way of revision in view of Rabbaba Khanum v. Noorjehan Begum 13 C. 90 (i.e., a contention about the limits of revisional jurisdiction under Section 622 of the Code of 1882).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aim Bahar v. Peary Mohan Mukerjee, 34 C. 451 Where a party did not object to the apportionment of compensation as made by the Collector, he is taken to have accepted the award on that point and cannot invite the Civil Court to decide issues for which no reference was made by the Collector. The Court held this case was not directly in point: its underlying principle (that the Civil Court is restricted to the question referred by the Collector and that a party who did not obtain a reference cannot expand the enquiry) did not apply to the present facts because the reference here had been obtained at the instance of Manmatha Nath while he was still owner.
Gobinda Kumar Roy v. Debendra Kumar Roy, 12 C.W.N. 987 Where a reference relates to apportionment of compensation between certain parties, the Special Judge is not competent to join additional parties and examine questions not included in the Collector's reference. The Court treated this as illustrating the limit that the Civil Court cannot enlarge the scope of enquiry beyond the Collector's reference; it found the present case distinguishable because the reference here was properly obtained at the instance of a prior owner and the purchaser could in certain circumstances be joined as representative-in-interest.
Muhammad Safi v. Haran Chandra Mukerjee, 12 C.W.N. 985 Similar principle to Gobinda Kumar Roy — restriction of Civil Court to matters referred by the Collector and limitation on joining parties who have not obtained reference orders. The Court observed these cases supported the general rule that the Civil Court's scope is limited to the Collector's reference, but found them inapplicable on the particular facts before it.
Prabal Chandra Mukherjee v. Raja Peary Mohun Mukherjee, 12 C.W.N. 987 Also cited for the principle that the Civil Court may not expand the Collector's reference or allow parties to raise issues not referred. The Court regarded this decision as aligned with the others above and not directly controlling in the present circumstances, where the purchaser's joinder as representative-in-interest raised different considerations.
Rabbaba Khanum v. Noorjehan Begum, 13 C. 90 Addressed the consequences of a subordinate Court striking a name out of the record as improperly joined and the scope of revisional jurisdiction (Section 622 of the Code of 1882). The Court examined Rabbaba Khanum and concluded that no comprehensive proposition was intended in that case to preclude interference by this Court; Rabbaba Khanum did not bar revisional interference in the present facts.
Khetttramoni Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu, 21 C. 539 Holds that if an order striking out a name has been improperly made, this Court may interferе by way of revision. The Court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that it was competent to set aside the impugned order striking Promotho Nath from the record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the matter in three principal steps corresponding to the main issues raised:

1. Whether the purchaser could be joined as a party

- The Court first considered earlier authorities relied upon by the opposite party (Aim Bahar, Gobinda Kumar Roy, Muhammad Safi, Prabal Chandra), which establish that the Civil Court's enquiry is restricted to matters referred by the Collector and that parties who did not obtain a reference cannot expand the scope of enquiry. The Court found these authorities not directly applicable to the present facts.

- It emphasized chronological facts: the Collector's reference was obtained at the instance of Manmatha Nath at a time when he was still the owner (the revenue sale had not yet been confirmed and proceedings to reverse the sale were pending). The sale was confirmed later (11 January 1909), with title to the purchaser relating back to the date of default.

- The Court reasoned that once the revenue sale was confirmed, title vested in the auction-purchaser as of the date of default, but that purchaser was free to adopt the position of a mere representative-in-interest of the defaulting owner if he so chose. If the purchaser chose that position, there was "no conceivable reason" why he should not be added as a party to the reference.

- The Court also observed a practical consequence: if the purchaser were not made a party after confirmation of the sale, the reference might lapse for want of active prosecution because the original owner (having ceased to have a subsisting interest) might not continue to pursue the reference.

- Conclusion: the Special Judge erred in deciding that Promotho Nath ought not to continue as a party.

2. Scope of the enquiry if the purchaser is added as representative-in-interest

- The Court considered whether Promotho Nath, if brought on record as representative-in-interest of Manmatha Nath, could urge grounds not available to Manmatha Nath himself, or whether he could assert broader rights in his own capacity as purchaser.

- The Court held that a person who is effectively a stranger to the original reference should not be allowed to be made a party for the purpose of expanding the enquiry. To the extent that Promotho Nath claimed superior title as purchaser at the revenue sale, he could be treated as a stranger; thus he should not be permitted to urge grounds which were not open to Manmatha Nath.

- The Court accepted that this result might force a purchaser defeated in the reference to bring a separate suit to establish his rights as an auction-purchaser, but it considered that possibility insufficient to justify allowing the purchaser to be joined and then to expand the reference beyond the original matters.

- The Court relied on statutory provisions (Sections 18, 21 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, as cited in the opinion) to show that the purchaser retains the right to assert his auction-purchaser rights in a separate suit; Section 18 provides for apportionment references, Section 21 restricts the scope of inquiry to the interests of persons affected by the objection, and the proviso to clause (2) of Section 31 preserves liability of a person who receives compensation to pay the lawful claimants.

- Conclusion on scope: if added as representative-in-interest, the purchaser may urge only those grounds that were open to the original objector (Manmatha Nath); if he wants to press claims arising from his superior status as purchaser, he must sue separately.

3. Competency of this Court to interfere by revision

- The Court examined the contention that Rabbaba Khanum v. Noorjehan Begum precluded revisional interference under Section 622 of the Code of 1882. It concluded that Rabbaba Khanum did not intend to lay down a comprehensive proposition that would bar interference.

- The Court referred to Khetttramoni Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu as authority that where an order striking a name out has been improperly made, this Court may interfere by revision.

- On the facts, the Court found that the learned Judge below had acted illegally and with material irregularity in removing the petitioner from the record, thereby justifying revisional interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule is made absolute and the order of the Special Judge (dated 6th October — recorded in the opinion as 1908 in the operative paragraph) setting aside the petitioner's joinder is set aside; the petitioner's name is restored as a party to the proceedings.

Implications (direct consequences):

  • The petitioner's name is restored on the record as a party to the Land Acquisition reference.
  • The petitioner is awarded the costs of the Rule; the hearing fee is assessed at two gold mohurs.
  • It is conceded that the same order applies to three other Rules (Nos. 3894, 3895, 3896 of 1909) — those Rules are made absolute with costs; the hearing fee in each of those cases is assessed at one gold mohur.

The opinion applies established principles concerning the limited scope of Civil Court enquiry in references under the Land Acquisition Act and the circumstances in which a purchaser at a revenue sale may be joined as a party (in particular, as representative-in-interest), but it does not purport in its text to lay down a novel precedent beyond the application and reconciliation of the cited authorities to the facts before the Court.

    Promotha Nath Mitra v. Rakhal Das Addy And Anr.

    1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order made under Order I, Rule 10, Clause (8), of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, by which the name of the petitioner was directed to be struck out on the ground that he had been improperly joined as a party to a Land Acquisition proceeding pending in the Court below.

    2. It appears that on the 26th May 1906, the usual declaration was made under the Act for the acquisition of the disputed properly. Notices under Sections 9 and 10 were served on the 1st September following. In the proceedings before the Collector, the parties at the beginning were the petitioner Manmatha Nath Mitter and the opposite party Rakhal Das Addy. On the 23rd September 1908, the estate which comprises the disputed property, was sold for arrears of revenue and was purchased by the petitioner Promotbo Nath Mitter. On the 17th. October 1903, Promotho Nath applied to the Collector to stay proceedings till the confirmation of the revenue sale. Two days later, this application was rejected, and on the 30th October 1908, the Collector made his award, by which the whole compensation money was given to Rakhal Das, who had set up a lakheraj title to the property. On the 10th November 1908, possession of the acquired property was taken by Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, and from that date the title vested in Government. On the 18th November, Manmatha Nath applied to the Collector to make a reference to the Civil Courts both on the ground that the property had been under-valued arid the compensaticm had baen erroneously awarded to the alleged lakhsrajdar. On the 7th December 1908, Rakhal Das made a similar application on the sole ground that the property had been under-valued. On the 6th January 1909, Manmatha Nath withdrew his objection to the valuation of the property, and on the 21st January foil wing, the Collector made a reference to the Civil Court. "Meanwhile, on the 11th January 1909, the revenue sale had been confirmed under Section 21 of Act XI of 1859, whereupon the title vested in the purchaser Promotho Nath with effect from the date of default, that is, the 29th June 1908. Promotho Nath had not applied to the Collector to make any reference, but on the 23rd March 190 while the reference made at the instance of Manmatha Nath was pending before the Special Judge, he was added as a party to the proceeding upon his application. This order apparently was made ex parte. Subsequently, on the 7th August, Rakhal Das applied to the Court for a re-consideration of the order in question, and on the 19th August, the Special Judge recorded the fallowing order:

    I do not think that my predecessor ought to have added Promotho Nath Mitter as a party, unless all the parties have given their consent; nor do I think that be would have done so had he heard the pleaders for the parties other than Kumar Manmatha Nath Mitter and Roy Promotho Nath Mitter. As, however, the name of Roy Promotha Nath Mitter has been added, I shall allow it to remain. But as his name is not mentioned in the reference made to this Court by the Special Land Acquisition Collector, I shall neither frame nor decide any issue between him and any party to the proceedings that would not have arisen had his name not been added as a party, and any money that may be found due to Kumar Manmatha Nath Mitter will be paid to him and Roy Promotho Nath Mitter jointly as contemplated by my predecessor, unless, of course, all the parties interested agree to compromise the matter.

    3. Later on, on the 29th September, apparently without any application by the parties, the Land Acquisition Judge decided to review his previous order, and on the 6th October 1909, decided that Promotho Nath ought not to remain a party to the proceeding. No reasons were assigned in the order in support of the action thus taken; and the sole question in controversy between the parties in this Rule is, whether that order ought to be maintained.

    4. In support of the Rule, it has been contended that Promotho Nath is entitled to be made a party to the proceeding, if not in his right as a purchaser at the revenue sale, at any rate, in his capacity as the representative-in-interest of Manmatha Nath. It has been argued, on the other hand, on behalf of Rakhal Das, that Promotho Nath ought not to be made a party even as the representative-in-interest of Manmatha, because the revenue sale, under which he claims title, was confirmed before reference was made by the Collector to the Civil Court, and he had thus ample opportunity to ask for a reference on his own behalf. It has further been contended that even if he is added as a party, he should not be allowed to claim the position of a purchaser at a Revenue Sale. Finally, it has been suggested that if the order of the Land Acquisition Judge be regarded as erroneous, this Court ought not to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, in view of the decision in Rabbaba Khanum v. Noorjehdn Begum 13 C. 90.

    5. In support of the first contention of the learned Vakil for the opposite party, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Aim Bahar v. Peary Mohan Mukerjee 34 C. 451, Gobinda Kumar Roy v. Debendra Kumar Roy 12 C.W.N. 987, Muhammad Safi v. Haran Chandra Mukerjee 12 C.W.N. 985 and Prabal Chandra Mukherjee v. Raja Peary Mohun Mukherjee 12 C.W.N. 987. None of these cases, however, is directly in point, and the principle deducible from them has, in our opinion, no application to the circumstances of the present case. In the first of these cases, it was ruled that in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, a party who had raised no objection to the apportionment of compensation as made by the Collector, must be taken to have accepted the award in that respect, and such a party who has not obtained a reference cannot invite the Civil Court to decide a question for the trial of which no reference has been made. In that case, there was a dispute before the Collector about the apportionment of the compensation money between the zemindar, his tenants, and the undertenants. The tenants were dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector and obtained a reference to the Civil Court. The zemindar then contended that the tenants had not only no grievance but had actually obtained more than what they were legitimately entitled to get and that, therefore, the amount payable to them ought to be reduced. The Land Acquisition Court investigated into this matter and increased the amount of compensation paid to the zemindar. On appeal to this Court, it was held that the proceeding was wholly irregular and that the zemindar who was apparently satisfied with the order made by the Collector as he did not ask for a reference, could not, upon a reference made at the instance of the tenant, obtain a reversal or modification of the order of the Collector in so far as it was in favour of the tenant. The principle which underlies this case has obviously no application to the case before us. In the second case upon which reliance is placed, it was ruled that where the reference to the Civil Court related to a dispute about the apportionment of compensation between two parties A and B, the Special Judge was not competent to join as parties to the proceeding C and U and thus examine questions not included in the reference by the Collector. To the same effect are the two other cases to which reference has been made by the learned Vakil for the opposite party. The principle which underlies these oases is that the Civil Court is restricted to an examination of the question which has been referred by the Collector for decision, and that the scope of the enquiry cannot be enlarged at the instance of parties who have not obtained any order of reference. In the case before us, the position is entirely different. Here the reference was obtained at the instance of Manmatha Nath. At the time he made the application for a reference, he was still the owner of the property, because the Revenue sale had not been confirmed; and as proceedings were pending in. the Revenue Court for reversal of the sale, it was still a matter of uncertainty whether the sale would be ultimately confirmed. No doubt, the sale was confirmed before the order of reference was actually made by the Collector; bat it has not been suggested that this circumstance does, in any way, invalidate the reference made by the Collector at the instance of Manmatha Nath Mitter. It is reasonably plain that as soon as the revenue sale was confirmed, title vested in the auction-purchaser with effect from the date of default, and although as such purchaser, he acquired a higher status than that of the defaulting owner, yet he was free to take up the position of a mere representative-in-interest of such defaulter. If he chooses to take up that position, there is no conceivable reason why he should not be added as a party to the proceedings. If he is not made a party to the proceedings, it is not improbable that the reference may lapse for want of active prosecution, because after the sale has been confirmed, and Manmatha Nath has ceased to have any subsisting interest in the property acquired, he may not care to support the reference made at his instance, by the Collector. We must, therefore, hold that the learned Special Judge was in error in holding that the petitioner ought not to continue to be a party to the proceedings.

    6. The second question which requires consideration is, as to the precise scope of the enquiry to be held at the instance of the petitioner when he is added as a party to the proceedings. It has been argued on behalf of the opposite party that if the petitioner, is brought on the record as the representative-in-interest of Manmatha Nath, he ought not to be allowed to urge any ground not open to Manmatha Nath himself. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that once he is made a party he ought to be allowed to urge every ground that is open to him in his capacity as a purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue. In our opinion, this contention is not well founded. The cases to which reference has been made, show that a person, who is a stranger to all the parties to the reference, should not be made a party to the proceeding. In so far, as the petitioner claims to be a purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue and as such purchaser sets up a title superior to that of the defaulter, he may properly be regarded as a stranger to the proceedings. No ground, therefore, should be allowed to be urged by him which would not haw been equally open to Manmatha. It has been suggested, however, by the learned Vakil for the petitioner that the result of this view would be that is the event of possible defeat in the person proceedings, he would be driven to a separat suit to establish his rights as a purchaser at a revenue sale. That may, no doubt, be a possible contingency, but, in our opinion, that consideration ought not to induce us to order that he should be joined as a party to the proceedings in his character as the representative-in-interest of Manmatha and then to allow him to urge grounds which would not have been open to the person whose interest he claims to have acquired. Besides it is obvious that the rights of the petitioner would not be prejudiced in any way, for Sections 18, 21 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act show that the petitioner would be entitled in a separate suit to assert his rights as an auction-purchaser. Of these, Section 18 provides for a reference for apportionment of the compensation, while Section 21 lays down that the scope of the inquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection; and the third proviso to clause (2) of section 31 states that nothing herein

    "contained shall affect expressly the liability of any person who receives the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto."
    Here the petitioner has obviously a two-fold capacity. As a representative of Manmatha Nath, even though his benamdar, as faintly suggested by the opposite party, he would be entitled to urge every ground open to Manmatha Nath, himself. But in a higher capacity, namely, as a purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue, if he is not the binamdar of Manmatha Nath, he would be entitled to assert more extensive rights. There is no reason, therefore, why he should not have a regular suit open to him for assertion of his right as revenue-sale purchaser. The second contention of the opposite party must, therefore, prevail.

    7. The third point which requires consideration is as to the competency of this Court to set aside the order of the Court below in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has been suggested that in the case of Rabbaba Khanum v. Noorjehan Begum 13 C. 90, it was ruled by this Court that when an order has been made by a subordinate Court striking out the name of a person from the record s having been improperly joined, the. case oes not fall within the scope of Section 622 of the Code of 1882. An examination of the judgment in that case, however, shows that no such comprehensive proposition was intended to be laid down On the other hand, it is clear from the case of Khetttramoni Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu 21 C. 539, that if an order of this description has Been improperly made, it is competent to this Court to interfere. In our opinion, there can be no reasonable doubt that in the present instance the learned Judge has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity so as to justify and necessitate the interference of this Court.

    8. The result, therefore, is that this Rule must be made absolute and the order of the Special Judge made on the 6th October 1908, set aside. The effect will be that the name of the petitioner will be restored as that of a party to the proceedings. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this Rule. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.

    9. It is conceded that this order will apply to the three other Rules (Nos. 3894, 3895, 3896 of 1909) which will, therefore, be made absolute, with costs; nut the hearing fee in each of these cases will be assessed at one gold mohur.

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    Promotha Nath Mitra v. Rakhal Das Addy And Anr.
    (Jan 17, 1910)