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  • Article 144 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
  • Article 3, Sch. 3, Ben. Ten. Act. Section 185(2)
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  • Article 144 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
  • Article 3, Sch. 3, Ben. Ten. Act. Section 185(2)

    Panchoo Kapali v. Jajneswar Majhi

    Mookerjee, A.C.J:— This is an appeal under Cl. 15, Letters Patent from the judgment of Newbould, J., in a suit for recovery of possession of land.

    2. On 20th January 1909 the plaintiffs took a lease of 12 cottas of land from the defendants; they obtained delivery of possession of 7 cottas only, and the defendants, who had their dwelling-huts on the remaining 5 cottas, agreed to vacate that portion after three months.

    3. The defendants however failed to carry out the terms of the agreement and continued in occupation of the 5 cottas, notwithstanding the lease in favour of the plaintiffs. These facts have been established by the plaintiffs, but their suit has been dismissed as barred by limitation under Article 3, Sch. 3, Ben. Ten. Act. That article provides that a suit to re cover possession of land claimed by the plaintiff as a raiyat or an under-raiyat must be instituted within two years from the date of dispossession. This plainly implies that, in respect of the disputed land, the plaintiff was previously in possession and that he has been deprived of possession by the defendant.

    4. As was pointed out by this Court in Brojendra Kishore Roy v. Bharat Chandra Roy (1) the term “dispossession” implies the coming in of a person and the driving out of another from possession while “discontinuance” implies the going out of the person in possession and his being followed into possession by another.

    5. In the present case, the defendants never placed the plaintiffs in possession of the 5 cottas which is the subject-matter of the litigation. Consequently, there was no dispossession, such as would attract the operation of Article 3, Sch. 3, Ben. Ten. Act. Section 185(2) accordingly makes Article 144 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applicable, and the suit is in time, as it was instituted on 20th May 1916, which is within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendants became adverse, after the lapse of three months from 20th January 1909. We cannot possibly accept the argument that there was “dispossession” in law though not in fact, on 20th April 1909, for this Court has emphatically discouraged recourse to the fiction of “constructive dispossession,” which, however attractive, has tended to create much confusion; Sonatan Sheikh v. Chaku Sheikh (2), Basanta Kumari v. Nanda Ram (3), Budra Narain v. Natabar Jana (4) and Kedar Nath v. Mohesh Chandra (5).

    6. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decrees of all the Courts are set aside and the suit is decreed with costs in all Courts.

    Fletcher, J.:— I agree.

    V.B/R.K

    7. Appeal allowed.

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    Panchoo Kapali v. Jajneswar Majhi
    (Apr 29, 1920)