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  • provisions of Section 164, sub-Section 2 of the Tenancy Act.
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Citation Codes
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  • provisions of Section 164, sub-Section 2 of the Tenancy Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a cosharer in a patti of which the defendant is the lambardar. The plaintiff first sued the defendant for profits for the years 1313, 1314 and 1315 faslis; that suit was dismissed for the plaintiff's default of appearance under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Some years later the plaintiff brought a new suit against the same defendant for profits of his share for the years 1316, 1317 and 1318 faslis, and obtained a decree in that suit. The decree in the later suit included sums recovered during the years in suit that related to the earlier years 1313–1315. The defendant contended that the later suit was barred, insofar as it sought recovery of any portion of rents attributable to 1313–1315, by Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, because of the earlier dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the CPC precludes the plaintiff from bringing a fresh suit under Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC in respect of the same cause of action, specifically whether the present suit (for profits of years 1316–1318) is barred insofar as it includes recovery of sums attributable to earlier years (1313–1315).
  2. Whether the causes of action in the two suits (the earlier suit for 1313–1315 and the later suit for 1316–1318) are the same for the purposes of Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant relied on the earlier suit and contended that Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC precluded the plaintiff from suing afresh in respect of the same cause of action, so that any portion of the rents recovered in the later suit that related to the years 1313–1315 should be barred.
  • In both the court below and in the present court, the defendant emphasized that in the previous case the plaintiff claimed profits on the basis of gross rental, apparently on the ground that a large amount of profits had remained uncollected due to the defendant's alleged negligence or misconduct; the defendant relied on this fact in support of the bar argument.

Plaintiff's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiff's specific legal arguments beyond the fact that he brought and succeeded in the later suit and obtained a decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the legal effect of Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC: where a suit is dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a fresh suit "in respect of the same cause of action." The court analysed what constituted the cause of action in each suit.

For the earlier suit (1313–1315), the court described the cause of action as consisting of the plaintiff's title to his share and the profits thereof, together with the defendant's alleged failure to give him those profits at the end of each of the years 1313, 1314 and 1315 faslis.

For the later suit (1316–1318), the court described the cause of action as the plaintiff's title to his share and the profits thereof, together with the defendant's failure to give the plaintiff those profits at the end of each of the years 1316, 1317 and 1318 faslis.

The court concluded that the causes of action for the two suits were "totally different" because they related to distinct years and distinct alleged failures by the defendant. The court explained that the defendant's argument conflated two separate questions: (1) whether the two suits are based on the same cause of action and (2) whether the plaintiff in the later suit may properly recover moneys that, had the earlier suit not been dismissed, might have been recovered in that earlier suit if Section 164(2) of the Tenancy Act had been applied by the court in the earlier proceeding. The court indicated that the latter question (concerning what might have been recovered under the Tenancy Act in the earlier suit) was distinct from the statutory bar under Order IX, Rule 9.

On this basis the court held that no portion of the present suit was barred by Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to the decree obtained from the lower appellate court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the decree obtained by the plaintiff in the later suit (for profits of the years 1316–1318) stands; the defendant's contention that portions of that decree relating to rents attributable to 1313–1315 are barred by Order IX, Rule 9 was rejected. The opinion does not purport to establish any broader precedent beyond applying the statutory test of whether the two suits arise from the same cause of action, and it does not set out any new general legal rule beyond this application.

    Raj Bahadur v. Shyam Lal

    1. The plaintiff in this case is a cosharer in a patti of which the defendant is lambardar. The plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant for the profits of the years 1313, 1314 and 1315 faslis. That suit was dismissed for default of appearance on the part of the plaintiff under O. 9, R. 8 of the CPC. Some years later the plaintiff brought the present suit against the same person for profits of his share for the years 1316, 1317 and 1318 faslis and he has obtained a decree. Included in those profits are sums recovered during the years in suit in respect of the years 1313, 1314 and 1315 faslis. It is contended that the present suit is barred by O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, so far as the plaintiff seeks to recover any portion of the rents recovered on account of the years 1313, 1314 and 1315 faslis. In the Court below and here the defendant relied strongly on the fact that in the previous case the plaintiff claimed profits on the basis of the gross rental on the ground apparently that a large amount of profits had remained uncollected owing to the negligence or misconduct of the defendant. This fact does not not appear to me to affect the question which I have to decide. O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, provides that where a suit is dismissed under O. 9, R. 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. The cause of action for the previous suit was made up of the plaintiff's title to the share and the profits thereof and the failure of the defendant to give him those profits at the end of each of the years 1313, 1314 and 1315 faslis.

    2. The plaintiff's cause of action for the present suit is made up of his title to the share and the profits thereof and failure of the defendant to give the plaintiffs those profits at the end of each of the years 1316, 1317 and 1318 faslis. The causes of action for the two suits appear to me to be totally different. The contention of the defendant in the present case seems to confuse two questions namely the question whether the two suits are based upon the same cause of action and the question whether the plaintiff is entitled in the present suit to sue for and recover any moneys which, if his suit had not been dismissed for default, he might have recovered in the previous suit if the Court had applied to the case the provisions of Section 164, sub-Section 2 of the Tenancy Act. If as I hold, no portion of the present suit is barred by O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, the plaintiff is entitled to the decree which he has obtained from the lower appellate Court. I therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

    V.B/R.K

    3. Appeal dismissed.

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    Raj Bahadur v. Shyam Lal
    (Jul 30, 1915)