B.R Tuli, J.:— This order will dispose of Civil Writ No. 2497 of 1968. Satishwar Singh v. Chief Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, and Civil Writ No. 2498 of 1968, Ashok Kumar Soni v. Chief Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, as common questions of law and fact arise in both the petitions. The facts of both the petitions are identical and I shall state the facts of Satishwar Singh's petition.

2. Satishwar Singh petitioner is residing at Chandigarh with his father who is working as Assistant in the Punjab Civil Secretariat, Chandigarh, and owns house No. 425, Sector 15-A. He is thus a resident of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The petitioner passed his Higher Secondary Examination from the D.A.V Higher Secondary School, Chandigarh, and thereafter joined the Pre-Medical Classes in the same College. He passed the Pre-Medical Examination held by the Punjab University in 1968 by securing 415 marks out of a total of 650. In compulsory subjects he obtained 370 marks out of 600. In the daily “Tribune” dated June 4, 1968 an advertisment appeared on behalf of the Union Territory of Chandigarh inviting applications from eligible persons for nomination against the seats allotted to the Union Territory of Chandigarh at the various medical colleges in the country for the Pre-Medical and M.B.B.S courses. The desirous candidates were directed to apply along with particulars of their parents' domicile and residence on prescribed form obtainable free of cost from the Director of Health Services, General Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh. It was further stated in the advertisement that the selected candidates would have to furnish a bond for serving the Government for a minimum period of three years after completion of the course. Only those candidates could apply who secured at least so per cent marks of the aggregate marks at the Pre-Medical/Intermediate Science (Medical Group) or equivalent examination in the four compulsory subjects, namely, English, Physics, Chemistry and Biology. The last date for the receipt of the applications was June 30, 1968. The petitioner submitted his application on June 29, 1968 and in that application he gave particulars regarding himself as well as his father, immovable property owned by his father and place of residence etc. These particulars were required in order to determine the domicile of the candidates as the nomination was meant for bona fide residents of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. No interview letter was issued to the petitioner till July 16, 1968 while some other candidates had received such letters. On the enquiries made by him and his father they were informed that the interview letters were being issued only to the children of the employees of the Union Territory Administration. The petitioner then filed a writ petition in this Court on July 22, 1968 (C.W 2263 of 1968) and along with the writ petition he filed a miscellaneous application (Civil Miscellaneous No. 3062 of 1968) praying for the stay of the finalisation of the result. The writ petition along with the miscellaneous application came up for admission before D.K Mahajan and P.C Jain, JJ. on July 23, 1968 when the learned Judges gave notice to the respondents and stayed finalisation of the result meanwhile. The stay order was served on the respondents on July 23, 1968.

3. On July 26, 1968, the petitioner received a savingram from the Director, Health Services-cum-Deputy Secretary, Chandigarh, reading as under:—

“Reference application addmission for MBBS course (.) intimate willingness for admission against Chandigarh Union Territory Quata Ahmedabad Medical College (.) reply 27th July positively (.) Please furnish in original copy of the registered deed in respect of property at Chandigarh affidavit duly attested by Magistrate first class that your parent do not have property elsewhere except Chandigarh and that you did not apply for admission to MBBS in any other College in the country (.)”

4. The petitioner filed an affidavit on July 27, 1968 in which he stated:—

“that my parents do not have property elsewhere except Chandigarh and I did not apply for admission to M.B.B.S in any other college in the country.”

5. On July 30, 1968, an application was made on behalf of the respondents for the vacation of the stay order issued by the Motion Bench on July 23, 1968. In this application it was stated that “the petitioner was considered on merit vis a vis other candidates for nomination to M.B.B.S course, that the Chandigarh Administration had already decided to nominate the petitioner for M.B.B.S course and that the petitioner without disclosing the exact facts to the Hon'ble Court got the ex parte stay order.” This application was supported by an affidavit of Shri Darshan Singh, Superintendent, Office of Director, Health Services-cum-Deputy Secretary, Chandigarh Administration, and on this application the following order was passed by P.C Jain, J. on August 2, 1968, dismissing the writ petition as infructuous:—

“The learned Deputy Advocate General states that the relief asked for in the petition has been given to the petitioner. In view of this statement the writ petition has become infructuous and the same is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.”

6. The petitioner, however, did not get any letter from the respondents nominating him for admission to the Medical College, Ahmedabad, for which college he had been selected for nomination. On August 9, 1968, the petitioner was informed that his candidature had been cancelled. He asked for a copy of the order cancelling his nomination but no copy was supplied to him. It has been stated in the return filed by the respondents that his candidature had been cancelled because he filed a false affidavit to the effect that he had not applied for admission to any other Medical College in the country. The fact was that he had applied for admission to the Medical Colleges at Amritsar Ludhiana and Patiala. In his application submitted on June 29, 1968 he had stated that he had applied for admission to the Medical Colleges at Amritsar and Patiala but in the affidavit he did not even mention those colleges. The explanation of the petitioner is that what he understood from the savingram dated July 26, 1868 was that the affidavit was to contain the names of colleges other than those already mentioned in his application. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition on August 12, 1968 in which he prayed for a writ of certiorari, mandamus or any other suitable writ, direction or order directing the respondents to nominate him against one of the seats reserved for the Union Territory of Chandigarh in the Medical College at Ahmedabad. This writ petition was admitted on August 13, 1968 and interim stay was granted regarding filing of four seats which were still vacant. The stay order was, however, of no avail to the petitioner as the remaining four seats had been filed on August 12, 1968. The petitioner then filed a petition under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act (Criminal Original No. 135 of 1968) against Dr. M.S Randhawa, Chief Commissioner of Union Territory of Chandigarh, Dr. Pritam Singh, Director Health Services, General Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh, and Shri Darshan Singh, Superintendent, Office of the Director Health Services, General Hospital, Sector 16. Chandigarh. The petition for contempt was dismissed by Bedi, J. on January 13, 1969. In that petition the petitioner stated that the sequence of events, as narrated above, and the conduct of the respondents evidenced thereby clearly showed that the respondents had acted mala fide on account of certain extraneous considerations and made a concerted effort to mar the interests of the petitioner. When these efforts did not succeed they made a statement before the Hon'ble Court that the petitioner had been granted the relief asked for in the petition. Even this solemn undertaking was not honoured. All this was a mischief calculated to impede the course of justice and amounted to contempt of Court. In reply the respondents stated that the nomination of the petitioner had been cancelled because he had filed a false affidavit on the point of other colleges to which he had applied for admission. The counsel for the respondents submitted that the Union Territory of Chandigarh had been allotted twelve seats by the Government of India for nominating boys and girls to the various Medical Colleges in India and these seats were meant for the bona fide residents of Chandigarh alone. It was, therefore decided by the Union Territories authorities that these seats should go only to such persons as were bona fide residents of Chandigarh and not to others who had applied on the basis of residence elsewhere for admission to medical Colleges in other States namely, Punjab, Haryana etc. It transpired luring the course of selection that some students including the petitioner had wrongly descried themselves to be bona fide residents of Chandigarh and that they had also applied for admission to medical colleges in Punjab and Haryana stating that their domicile was of Punjab and Haryana respectively. In cases of doubt respondent 2 called upon the candidates to swear to the fact that their parents did not own any property elsewhere other than Chandigarh and that they had not applied admission to any medical college in the country. On these facts the learned Judge held that the respondents were quite justified in cancelling the nomination of the petitioner for admission to the Medical College, Ahmedabad, as a nominee of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the petition for contempt was dismissed.

7. The return to the writ petition has been filed by Dr. Pritam Singh, respondent 2, who has reiterated the facts stated before Bedi, J. in reply to the contempt petition. He had received letter No. 1348 dated August 6, 1968, from the Principal of Dayanand Medical College, Ludhiana to the effect that the petitioner had applied for admission to the 1st yeary M.B.B.S class in his college on the basis of Punjab domicile and was considered as such. The photograph of the petitioner along with the other candidates who had applied for admission in Dayanand Medical College were handed over to Shri A.K Singla, Head Clerk, Office of the Director, Health Services-cum-Deputy Secretary, Health, Chandigarh Administration, as desired by the Director. It was on the basis of this letter that respondent 2 decided to cancel the nomination of the petitioner. The matter was placed before the Chief Commissioner of the Union Territory of Chandigarh who concurred with the decision of respondent 2 to cancel the nomination of the petitioner on the ground that he had filed a false affidavit. The result has been that the petitioner could not obtain his admission into any medical college for the 1968–1969 session. On this ground the present petition has become infructuous but the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a direction be issued to the respondents to reserve two seats for the two petitioners in these writ petitions for the next session 1969–1970. I am of the opinion that this submission of the learned counsel cannot be acceded to. It is not possible to reserve seats for the two petitioners for the next session and thus prejudice the rights of the eligible candidates who may apply for nomination then. It is true that the petitioners have lost their chance to be admitted into any medical college as nominees of the Chandigarh Administration but that cannot help in view of the fact that their nominations were cancelled as a result of their filing wrong affidavits and a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the respondents were justified in cancelling their nominations on that ground.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court, (Dua and Narula, JJ.) in Ramesh Chander Garg v. State of Punjab . A.I.R 1966 Punj. 476. in which the learned Judges came to the conclusion that reservation made in the medical colleges in the State was violative of Article 15 of the Constitution and the seats (20 per cent) reserved for members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes could not be transferred to members of backward classes for whom 2 per cent seats were reserved. The denial of admission in the medical college to the petitioner in that case was violative of his fundamental right under Article 15 of the Constitution. It was held that the seats reserved for scheduled castes but which were not filed because sufficient number of members of scheduled castes did not apply for admission could not be reserved only for backward classes for whom a separate reservation of 2 per cent had been made. If those seats had been added to the general pool of seats to be filed exclusively on merits, Ramesh Chander Garg, the petitioner in that case, would have got the admission. The learned Judges struck down the adoption of the carry-over formula as well as the reservation of more than 50 per cent seats as illegal and directed that the petitioner in that case should be admitted to the 1st year M.B.B.S class 1966 to the State Medical College, Rohtak, Patiala or Amritsar irrespective of the fact whether i.e would or would not be entitled to such admission in competition with the candidates who may offer themselves for admission in the said class during that year. It is evident that the case decided by the learned Judges of the Division Bench is distinguishable. In that case the petitioner had a fundamental right under Article 15 of the Constitution which had been violated and in order to do justice learned Judges held that he should be admitted in the next year's course. In the instant case it has not been shown that the petitioners had any such right. They had applied to the Medical Colleges at Amritsar, Patiala and Ludhiana claiming to possess Punjab domicile and competed with the candidates possessing Punjab domicile. They were rejected because as compared with other candidates, who were admitted, they had secured less marks. They then tried to have admission out of the Chandigarh quota on the ground that they were residents of Chandigarh. The petitioners have not been able to show any legal right in their favour which can be enforced by a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution. The submission that because of the statement in the application dated July 30, 1968, to the effect that the petitioners had been granted the necessary relief conferred on them an indefeasible right has no substance. The nomination of the petitioners was cancelled later on the discovery of the fact that they had filed false affidavits when the letter dated August 6, 1968, from the Principal of the Dayanand Medical College, Ludhiana, was received by respondent 2. The statement made in the said application was neither false nor was made to mislead the Court or prejudice the decision of the writ petitions. There might have been some substance in the submission of the learned counsel if the nomination of the petitioners had been cancelled on any other ground than the one that they had filed affidavits, the falsity of which was discovered after they had been selected for nomination which selection and nomination cannot thus, be said to have been cancelled arbitrarily or without reasonable cause. The petitioners, in my opinion, did not acquire such an indefeasible right because of the statement made in the application dated July, 30, 1968, that they should be selected right now for the next session. They shall have to compete with the other candidates who apply for nominations then.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has then tried to base his right on Article 15 of the Constitution but there is no substance in that plea. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, pine of birth or any of them. It is evident that the petitioners have not been discriminated against on any of these grounds but their nomination was cancelled on the ground that they filed false affidavits. It cannot be said that it was an extraneous consideration as the filing of false affidavit does reflect on the character of the person giving such affidavit. To say the least, it does detract from his being a person of good moral character. If a person gives a false affidavit to attain his object, it is selfish and leads to the conclusion that the person concerned has no regard for truthfulness. Article 15 has, therefore, in no way been violated.

10. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. (In Both The Appeals) . A.I.R 1966 S.C 384. that—

“a writ of mandamus may be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge that statutory obligation. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep the subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limits of their jurisdictions.”

11. The reservation of seats in various colleges for the nominees of Chandigarh Administration has not been provided for by any law or rule which has the force of law. The Government of India has been able to get this reservation in various colleges by a letter with a view to benefit the residents of the Union Territory of Chandigarh.

12. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that while making nominations preference is given to the children of the employees of the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the Union of India and the High Court and the bona fide residents of Chandigarh who own property there. The petitioners do not fall in those categories and could not be given preference. They bad the chance of getting admission on the basis of their Punjab domicile in view or the fact that their fathers are employees of the Punjab State. They were not rejected by the Punjab Colleges at Amritsar, Ludhiana and Patiala on the ground that they did not possess Punjab domicile but on the ground that the marks obtained by them were less than the candidates who had been admitted. Since there is no legal right in favour of the petitioners nor is there any statutory or public duty cast on the respondents; I do not think that this Court can issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to nominate the petitioners for admission to the medical colleges on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly relied upon discrimination and submitted that the discriminatory treatment meted out to the petitioners amounted to the violation of their fundamental right under Article 14 of the constitution. It is evident that Article 14 only applies to law and forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. This Article cannot apply where the petitioner does not base his right on a statute. The learned counsel has strongly relied upon the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam . A.I.R 1967 S.C 1836., which are as under:—

“The next question is whether the act of the respondents in refusing to issue the passport infringes the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. 14 of the constitution. Article 14 says that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. This doctrine of equality before the law is a necessary corollary to the high concept of the rule of law accepted by our Constitution. One of the aspects of rule of law is that every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority. See State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh . A.I.R 1967 SC 1170., C.A No. 1066 of 1965, dated 23rd January, 1967, Secondly, such a law would be void, if it discriminates or enables an authority to discriminate between persons without just classficition. But a legislature could not do, the executive could not obviously do.”

14. The learned counsel submits that the executive has to justify its action on the basis of some legislative authority and that it is up to the respondents to show on what legislative authority did they cancel the nomination of the petitioners. It has been admitted by the learned counsel that there are no rules or regulations or statutory law for selecting the candidates for nomination to various medical colleges and, therefore, the act of nomination or its cancellation cannot be said to be based on any legislative authority. This is an executive act which is done for the benefit of the subjects of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It is not disputed that in other States preference is given to its own residents and it is because there is no medical college in the Union Territory of Chandigarh that the reservation for its residents has to be made elsewhere. The petitioners cannot, therefore, insist that they must be nominated as admittedly they have no statutory right for such nomination in their favour nor is there any obligation cast on the respondents to necessarily nominate them which can be enforced by the issue of a writ of mandamus by this Court. The judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is distinguishable as it was concerned with the provisions of the Indian Passports Act and the fundamental right of free movement and free travel guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. The observation of their Lordships to the effect that “every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority”, refers to executive action in the governance of the country or the State for which laws or rules, notifications or regulations having the force of law have been framed. It refers to such rights of the subjects as are based on some law and the infringment thereof. It does not refer to ameliorative actions of the Government which are taken in the interest of the subjects without the authority of any law but by way of executive instructions. The factors to be taken into consideration for nominating residents of Chandigarh to various medical colleges in the country are left to the persons making the selection or nomination. Those very persons have the authority to prescribe rules or to take decisions with regard to the cancellation of a nomination, which has been made, on a relevant consideration. I have not been persuaded to hold that the reason given by the respondents for cancelling the nominations of the petitioners, namely, the filing of false affidavits by them was not relevant especially when it has already been held by Bedi, J. in deciding the contempt petitions that the respondents were justified in cancelling the nominations. The observations of their Lordships do not, therefore, help the petitioners in the instant case. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the candidates who were nominated were those who were the children of the Central Government employees or of Union Territory of Chandigarh or of the High Court. One of them is a son of a teacher of a private school in Chandigarh who was rejected by the Medical College, Rohtak, on the plea that he did not possess Haryana domicile. There was no discrimination made in the case of the petitioners because all those candidates who filed false affidavits were rejected without exception. Not only the petitioners but two other candidates, namely, Bhalinder Pal Singh and Anil Kumar Pahwa were also rejected on the ground that they had filed false affidavits like the petitioners. The petitioners have not, therefore, been able to show that they were meted out different treatment as compared with those who were similary placed.

15. For the reasons given above, both the writ petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.

16. Petition distressed.