Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • K.C Agrawal, J.
Acts
  • Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Rule 7(2) of the Rules
  • Sub-rule (4) of the aforesaid Rule 7
  • Section 18 of U.P Act XIII of 1972,
  • U.P Act XIII of 1972
  • Rule 10 of the Rules
  • Section 177 I.P.C
  • sub-rule (2) of R. 7
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • Rule 7(4)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • K.C Agrawal, J.
Acts
  • Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Rule 7(2) of the Rules
  • Sub-rule (4) of the aforesaid Rule 7
  • Section 18 of U.P Act XIII of 1972,
  • U.P Act XIII of 1972
  • Rule 10 of the Rules
  • Section 177 I.P.C
  • sub-rule (2) of R. 7
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • Rule 7(4)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners 1 and 2 were the owners of bungalow No. 110-B, Civil Lines, Bareilly. South of that bungalow were four residential quarters; one had been let to S.N. Verma, Provident Fund Inspector, Bareilly. In 1975 S.N. Verma was transferred. Before he vacated, respondent 4 (Ajai Kumar) applied to the District Magistrate, Bareilly, for allotment of the said quarter. The District Magistrate endorsed the application requesting allotment because the applicant's need seemed genuine.

The application with the District Magistrate's endorsement was forwarded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (RCEO). On 7-11-1975 the RCEO was directed to notify the vacancy if the premises was vacant. A Rent Control Inspector reported that the premises was in the process of being vacated by S.N. Verma and was vacant for allotment purposes. Consequent upon that report, the RCEO notified the vacancy on 7-11-1975 and invited applications for consideration on 13-11-1975. Notice of the proceeding was sent to the landlords (petitioners 1 and 2), who appeared and objected on the ground that the premises was not covered by U.P. Act XIII of 1972.

The applications were adjourned and ultimately, after several adjournments, the RCEO made an allotment order in favour of respondent 4 on 15-12-1975. Intimation of that allotment was given to Om Prakash (petitioner 3), who received it on 2-1-1976. The three petitioners filed an appeal to the appellate authority; that appeal was dismissed by the impugned order dated 6-2-1976 on the grounds that the appeal was incompetent (not accompanied by a certified copy of the RCEO's order) and barred by time. The petitioners then filed the present writ petition challenging those decisions and the allotment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the memorandum of appeal presented by the petitioners was rendered incompetent for want of a certified copy of the order of allotment under Rule 7(2) of the Rules framed under U.P. Act XIII of 1972, and whether Rule 7(4) permitted dispensing with such certified copy upon adequate affidavit.
  2. Whether the appeal was barred by limitation under Section 18 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (i.e., whether limitation runs from date of the order or from date of knowledge/communication of the order), and whether petitioners 1 and 2 could take benefit of the communication to petitioner 3.
  3. Whether the allotment order was valid where the application may not have been in the prescribed Form A under Rule 10(1) of the Rules framed under U.P. Act XIII of 1972, and whether non-compliance with Form A would invalidate allotment.
  4. Whether the allotment was vitiated because it was made pursuant to a direction by the District Magistrate and without independent application of mind by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as recorded)

  • Counsel for the petitioners argued that the Additional District Judge erred in treating the appeal as incompetent because a certified copy of the RCEO's order was not filed with the memorandum of appeal. Rule 7(2) ordinarily requires such certified copy, but Rule 7(4) allows dispensing with it if the appellant gives adequate reasons by affidavit; the petitioners had filed an uncertified copy with an affidavit explaining the inability to procure a certified copy within the time available.
  • The petitioners contended that the appeal was within time: the allotment intimation was received by Om Prakash on 2-1-1976 and the appeal was filed on 6-1-1976, which — on the petitioners' case — made the appeal timely.

Appellate Authority's Reasons (as recorded by the Court)

  • The appellate authority held that the memorandum of appeal was incompetent because it did not include a certified copy of the order of allotment, as required by Rule 7(2).
  • The appellate authority also held that the appeal was barred by time. It additionally found that petitioners 1 and 2 could not take the benefit of the date of communication of the allotment order to petitioner 3, and noted that petitioners 1 and 2 already had notice of the allotment proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madan Lal v. State of U.P., (1975) 2 SCC 779 : AIR 1975 SC 2085 Held that the limitation for filing an appeal runs from the date of the knowledge of the order and not from the date on which the order itself was made. The court relied on this decision to conclude that limitation runs from the date of knowledge/communication of the order; consequently Om Prakash's knowledge on 2-1-1976 made the appeal filed on 6-1-1976 timely.
Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 (1961 All LJ 650) Earlier decision relied upon by the Supreme Court; treated as an authoritative precedent on the start of limitation from knowledge of order. The court noted that Madan Lal followed this earlier decision; it used the chain of authority to support the proposition that limitation runs from knowledge of the order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages addressing the objections raised by the appellate authority and the validity of the allotment itself.

1. Competence of the Appeal (Rule 7(2) and 7(4)): The court found that the learned Additional District Judge erred in treating the appeal as incompetent solely because a certified copy of the allotment order was not filed. Although Rule 7(2) normally requires a certified copy of the order to accompany every memorandum of appeal, Rule 7(4) expressly permits the appellate authority to dispense with that requirement where the appellant produces adequate reasons in an affidavit for not filing the certified copy. The petitioners had filed an uncertified copy together with an affidavit explaining their inability to procure a certified copy in time. The Additional District Judge did not consider that affidavit; the court held that the appellate authority should have considered and addressed that affidavit and that the reasons given were adequate to justify dispensing with the certified copy under Rule 7(4).

2. Limitation (Section 18 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972): The court observed that Section 18 (as it stood at the relevant time) allowed fifteen days for filing an appeal from the date of the order under Section 16. The petitioners contended the fifteen-day period should be counted from the date of communication/knowledge. The court agreed and relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Madan Lal, which held that limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the order rather than the date the order was passed, and which followed Harish Chandra Raj Singh. Applying that principle, the court found that Om Prakash obtained knowledge of the allotment on 2-1-1976 and the appeal filed on 6-1-1976 was therefore within time. The Additional District Judge's separate reasons — that petitioners 1 and 2 could not take benefit of Om Prakash's communication date, and that petitioners 1 and 2 already had notice of the proceedings — were found to be both legally and factually incorrect. The court held that petitioners 1 and 2 had not been informed of the date (15-12-1975) on which the allotment was passed, and therefore their limitation period began on 2-1-1976 as well. Even if petitioners 1 and 2 were time-barred, the court held that petitioners' joint appeal could not be dismissed where petitioner 3's appeal was within time.

3. Validity of the Allotment (Rules on Form A and administrative independence): The court addressed Rule 10(1), which prescribes that an application for allotment "shall be made in Form A", and noted that the language indicates mandatory compliance. Rule 10(2) provides an exception for certain government needs. The court observed that strict compliance with Form A appears essential because the form contains a declaration and an undertaking (including potential consequences under Section 177 IPC) and other particulars relevant for disposal. However, the court explicitly stated it need not decide whether non-compliance with Form A would invalidate an allotment in this case because the allotment was liable to be set aside on another ground.

4. Predominant basis for quashing the allotment: The court concluded that the true and decisive flaw was that the allotment was made following a direction from the District Magistrate and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not applied independent mind; the proceedings had been, in effect, for form's sake. The District Magistrate's direction of 7-11-1975 to allot the premises to respondent 4 and the RCEO's compliance showed lack of independent adjudication. The court held that the District Magistrate was not justified in issuing such a direction and that the RCEO was unduly influenced by it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition succeeds. The court quashed both the order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 6-2-1976 and the allotment order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 15-12-1975. The court directed that the parties bear their own costs and allowed the petition.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the allotment in favour of respondent 4 (order dated 15-12-1975) is set aside and the appellate authority's dismissal of the petitioners' appeal (order dated 6-2-1976) is quashed.
  • The court relied on settled principles about the computation of limitation (limitation runs from date of knowledge) and procedural discretion under Rule 7(4) to excuse non-filing of a certified copy when adequate reasons are furnished by affidavit.
  • The opinion does not purport to set a new precedent beyond these applications of existing principles; it addresses the specific facts (direction from the District Magistrate and lack of independent mind by the RCEO) as the decisive ground for quashing the allotment.

This summary is confined to the matters expressly dealt with in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Jairaj Singh v. District Magistrate

    1. Petitioners 1 and 2 are the owners of bungalow No. 110-B, Civil Lines Bareilly. Towards the south of the aforesaid Kothi, there were four residential quarters. One of them had been let out to one S.N Verma. Provident Fund Inspector, Bareilly. In 1975 S.N Verma was transferred from Bareilly, However, before he vacated the premises, an application for allotment was filed by Ajai Kumar, respondent 4, to the District Magistrate, Bareilly, for allotment of the said premises. On the said application, the District Magistrate made the following order:—

    “Please see. I would like the house in question to be allotted to the applicant, whose need seems to be very genuine. Please report and take action.”

    2. It may be noted that the application itself was filed by respondent 4 on that date. Along with the said endorsement, the application was sent to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On 7-11-1975, he directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to notify the vacancy, if the premises was vacant. The Rent Control Inspector made an enquiry and submitted a report that S.N Verma was in the process of leaving the quarter, and that the premises was vacant for the purposes of allotment. Consequent upon the aforesaid report, on 7-11-1975 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer notified the vacancy inviting applications for consideration on 13-11-1975. A notice of this proceeding was sent to the landlords, petitioners 1 and 2 also. The petitioners 1 and 2 appeared before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and filed an objection. The objection was that as the premises was not covered by U.P Act XIII of 1972, no proceedings for its allotment could be taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It however, appears that the applications for allotment were not disposed of on 13-11-1975, and the case was adjourned. After some adjournments, on 15-12-1975, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer finally made an allotment order in flavour of respondent 4. An intimation of the aforesaid order of allotment was, thereafter, given to Om Prakash, petitioner 3, who was occupying the premises at that time. The intimation was received by him on 2-1-1976. Thereafter, the three petitioners filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appeal was dismissed by the impugned order dated 6-2-1976. Apart from the merits, the appellate authority also found that the appeal was incompetent and also that it was barred by time, Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present writ petition.

    3. The first point urged by Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, counsel appearing for the petitioners, was that the learned Additional District Judge committed an error in holding that the appeal filed by the petitioners was incompetent because it was not accompanied by a certified copy of the order of allotment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Rule 7(2) of the Rules framed under U.P Act XIII of 1972 provides that every memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the order sought to be appealed or revised. Sub-rule (4) of the aforesaid Rule 7 provides for a contingency where the filing of a certified copy of such an order may be dispensed with. It lays down that if an appellant gives adequate reasons for not being able to file the certified copy of the order on an affidavit, the appellate authority could dispense with the filing of the same. In such an event, a copy filed along with an affidavit will be treated as correct.

    4. In the instant case, the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners shows that they had filed an uncertified copy of the order of allotment made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer along with an affidavit and stated therein that as the petitioners were required to obtain a stay order by the 9th of January, 1975, it could not be possible for them to obtain a certified copy and to file it along with the memorandum of appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, however, held that since Rule 7(2) was mandatory, the omission to file a certified copy by the petitioners along with the memorandum of appeal rendered the appeal incompetent. Obviously, the learned Additional District Judge did not consider the affidavit which had been filed by the petitioners along with the memorandum of appeal giving the reasons due to which they were not able to file the certified copy. It may be true that Sub-rule (2) of R. 7 should normally be complied with, but Rule 7(4) contemplates of special cases where the filing of a certified copy may be excused. In the present case, the appellate authority committed an error in rejecting the appeal on the ground indicated above without addressing himself to the affidavit which was filed by the petitioners. In my opinion, the reasons given by the petitioners in the affidavit for not filing the certified copy of the judgment were adequate, and that the learned Additional District Judge should not have dismissed the appeal on the ground stated above.

    5. The learned Additional District Judge also held that the appeal filed by the petitioners was barred by time and hence he dismissed the appeal. Section 18 of U.P Act XIII of 1972, as it stood at the relevant time, provided that a person aggrieved by an order under Section 16 could file an appeal within fifteen days from the date of the order. The petitioners claimed that as the allotment order was communicated to Om Prakash, petitioner 3, on 2nd of January, 1976, the appeal filed by them on 6th January, 1976, was within time. The learned Additional District Judge, however, did not accept the submission of the petitioners on two grounds. The first was that the benefit of communication of the allotment order could be taken by Om Prakash, petitioner 3, alone and not by petitioners 1 and 2. The learned Additional District Judge while holding that the petitioners 1 and 2 were not entitled to the benefit of the date of communication received by petitioner 3, held that petitioners 1 and 2 already had notice of the proceedings for allotment, This was the second reason.

    6. In my opinion, both the grounds given by the learned Additional District Judge are manifestly erroneous. The petitioners had jointly preferred the appeal and if Om Prakash was entitled to get the benefit of the communication of the order to him, there was no reason to hold that the memorandum of appeal presented by him along with petitioners 1 and 2 was liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation. Admittedly, Om Prakash acquired knowledge of the order on 2nd January, 1976. It is now settled that the limitation for filing an appeal runs from the date of knowledge of the order and not from the date of its passing, if a person against whom an order is passed was not a party to the proceeding.

    7. Interpreting the expression ‘date of order’, the Supreme Court in Madan Lal v. State of U.P, (1975) 2 SCC 779 : (AIR 1975 SC 2085), held that the limitation for filing an appeal runs from the date of the knowledge of the order and not from the date on which the order itself was made. In taking this view, the Supreme Court had followed its earlier decision in Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 : (1961 All LJ 650).

    8. That apart, it was also incorrect to say that petitioners 1 and 2 had knowledge of the allotment proceedings. It is no doubt true that notices were sent to the aforesaid petitioners about the allotment proceedings, and that these petitioners had also filed an objection to the same. But, subsequent to the filing of the aforesaid objection, the hearing of the allotment applications was adjourned and thereafter petitioners 1 and 2 were not informed of 15th December, 1975, on which date the allotment order was passed in favour of respondent 4. In this view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge should have held that the limitation as against the petitioners 1 and 2 started running from 2nd January, 1976, and not from before. Even if it be assumed that the appeal of petitioners 1 and 2 was barred by time, but as the appeal of petitioner 3 was within time, the same could not have been dismissed on that ground.

    9. Next comes the question about the validity of the allotment order. Rule 10 of the Rules framed under U.P Act XIII of 1972 lays down that an application for allotment shall be made in Form A. Sub-rule (2) dispenses with the requirement of filing an application in the prescribed form in certain cases. It provides that in the case of need for Government office or for a Government servant, a letter of the Head of the Department shall be sufficient. The use of the words “shall be made in Form A” are indicative of its mandatory character. If the words used in Rule 10(1) would have been that an application should be in accordance with Form A, the consequence would have been different. But where, as here, the words are “shall be made is Form A”, strict compliance is necessary. The filing of the application further appears to be imperative due to the declaration which is required to be given by the applicant at the end. It incorporates an undertaking of the applicant for allotment that if the particulars given are disclosed to be incorrect, not only the allotment shall stand cancelled but he would also be liable to punishment under Section 177 I.P.C There are various other details which have to be considered at the time of disposal of the applications for allotment. In case the application is not made in Form A, it is liable to be rejected. Where a statute lays down that a particular thing shall be done in a particular manner or form but does not deal with the consequences of non-compliance, the question shall be differently treated. In the instant case, however, the form prescribed is essential. To accept that an application for allotment need not be in Form A, even in cases not covered by Rule 10(2) would amount to enlarge its-scope. If the intention would have been to treat the requirements directory, Rule 10(1) would have been differently worded.

    10. However, whether the omission to give the application for allotment in the prescribed form would invalidate the allotment order and would afford a ground for interference, need not be gone into in the present case inasmuch as the allotment order is liable to be set aside on another basis. The same being that the allotment was made in favour of respondent 4 on the direction of the District Magistrate. The facts would show that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer complied with the formality of taking the proceedings only for the purposes of show. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not apply his independent mind in making the order. Admittedly, a direction had been issued by the District Magistrate on 7-11-1975 that the premises be allotted to respondent 4.

    11. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was greatly influenced by the direction of the District Magistrate and allotted the premises to the said respondent. The District Magistrate was not justified in giving a direction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.

    12. In view of the above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 6th February, 1976 and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 15-12-1978 are quashed. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.

    13. Petition allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Jairaj Singh v. District Magistrate
    (Sep 25, 1978)