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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Mehar Singh, J.
Acts
  • provisions of section 17(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act 31 of 1950),
  • Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956), providing by sub-section (1) of section 19
  • SECTION 13 DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT 1952
  • section 13 of Act 38 of 1952, and section 2(j) of this Act
  • sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • sub-section (1) of section 19 of Act 96 of 1956
  • Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • clause (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act
  • sub-s. (1) of S. 19 of Act 96 of 1956
  • section 182 of the Limitation Act,
  • section 17(1) of Act 31 of 1950
  • section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956
  • 29, 1958, Act 96 of 1956
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Mehar Singh, J.
Acts
  • provisions of section 17(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act 31 of 1950),
  • Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956), providing by sub-section (1) of section 19
  • SECTION 13 DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT 1952
  • section 13 of Act 38 of 1952, and section 2(j) of this Act
  • sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • sub-section (1) of section 19 of Act 96 of 1956
  • Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • clause (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act
  • sub-s. (1) of S. 19 of Act 96 of 1956
  • section 182 of the Limitation Act,
  • section 17(1) of Act 31 of 1950
  • section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956
  • 29, 1958, Act 96 of 1956
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mehar Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents, Jain Sweitamna Temple and its manager Mithoo Mal, filed a suit under section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (Act 38 of 1952) seeking eviction of several persons including the appellant Ram Kirpal. A decree in favour of the respondents was obtained on February 19, 1954; the High Court's decree is dated November 5, 1956. In the final decree the name of Ram Kirpal was omitted. On the respondents' application the decree was corrected and amended on December 29, 1958 (under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Ram Kirpal filed an appeal against the amendment order, which was dismissed on August 25, 1959.

The Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956) came into force during the pendency of these events (the opinion records its coming into force on December 29, 1956). Section 19(1) of that Act provides that no person who has obtained a decree or order for eviction from any building in a slum area shall be entitled to execute such decree except with the prior written permission of the Competent Authority. The accommodation in question was situated in a slum area.

The respondents instituted an application for execution on August 7, 1962. The appellant objected that the execution application was barred by limitation; that objection was rejected by the two courts below. The present opinion disposes of the appellant's second appeal against the appellate order in the execution application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. From which date did the period of limitation under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act (1908) begin to run for the execution of the decree against the appellant: (a) the date of amendment of the decree (December 29, 1958) under clause (4) of Article 182, or (b) the date of the appellate court's order dismissing the appellant's appeal (August 25, 1959) under clause (2) of Article 182?
  2. Whether the competency or non-competency of the appellant's appeal against the correction/amendment order (made under sections 151 and 152 CPC) affects the starting point of limitation under Article 182.
  3. Whether sub-section (1) of section 19 of Act 96 of 1956 (which prohibits execution of eviction decrees in slum areas without Competent Authority permission) applies to a sub-tenant (the appellant) or only to a tenant.
  4. Whether the absolute prohibition in section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 prevented the running of limitation for execution until permission was granted, and if so, from which date limitation should be reckoned (e.g., the date permission became effective).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act provides three years for execution; clause (4) applies where the decree has been amended, so limitation should run from the date of amendment (December 29, 1958). Reckoning three years from that date, the respondents' execution application of August 7, 1962, was time-barred.
  • The order correcting and amending the decree was made under sections 151 and 152 CPC, under which no appeal was competent; therefore the appeal filed by the appellant was incompetent and its filing should not alter the starting point of limitation.
  • Sub-section (1) of section 19 of Act 96 of 1956 confers protection only upon a tenant, and a sub-tenant is not a tenant; consequently section 19(1) did not apply to the appellant and no application for permission under that section could be competent to affect limitation.
  • Reliance was placed on Peare Lal v. Krishan Sarup (1963 65 P.L.R. 793), where the court considered section 17(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and concluded that the bar in that provision did not stop the running of limitation for execution once limitation had begun; by analogy, the appellant argued the bar in Act 96, 1956 should not arrest limitation.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Clause (2) of Article 182 applies because the appellant appealed against the order correcting and amending the decree; therefore limitation runs from the date of the appellate court's order (August 25, 1959). The respondents' execution application of August 7, 1962, is within three years from that date.
  • The competency or non-competency of the appeal is not material to the starting point of limitation; the court relied on authorities where limitation was held to run from the date of the appellate order in analogous situations.
  • Section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 imposes an absolute prohibition on execution of eviction decrees affecting slum area buildings until permission of the Competent Authority is obtained. Because the corrected decree as to the appellant was made on December 29, 1958 (after Act 96 had come into force), execution was prohibited from that date and the decree could become executable only after permission was granted. The Competent Authority granted permission effective from May 31, 1962; therefore limitation for execution began to run from that date and the respondents' execution of August 7, 1962, was within time.
  • For purposes of the eviction suit, the appellant was a 'tenant' within section 2(j) of Act 38 of 1952 (the Rent Control Act), which includes sub-tenants within the definition of 'tenant'; thus section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 applied to the appellant and the respondents were required to obtain permission under that provision before executing the decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagappa Bandappa Kadadi v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa Umbargi, 1932 I.L.R. 57 Bom. 388 Limitation (Article 182) — starting point in appeals against orders (the cited decision involved an appeal against a review order) Cited to support the proposition that where there is an appeal against an interlocutory correction/review-type order, limitation for execution may start from the date of the appellate court's order.
Narmadabai Narayanshet v. Hidayatalli Saheballi, A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 115 Limitation (Article 182) — starting point where appeal lies against order dismissing an application to set aside an ex parte decree Cited to show analogy: the limitation period was held to run from the date of the order in the appeal, supporting respondents' reliance on Article 182(2).
Peare Lal v. Krishan Sarup, 1963 65 P.L.R. 793 Interpretation of section 17(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 — addressed whether a statutory bar prevented the running of limitation for execution Considered by the appellant in support of the argument that a statutory bar does not necessarily stop limitation. The court distinguished this precedent as inapposite because section 17(1) merely restricted availability of particular property in execution, whereas section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 imposes an absolute prohibition on execution until permission is obtained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two, complementary strands, each leading to the conclusion that the respondents' execution application of August 7, 1962, was within time.

  1. Starting-point of limitation under Article 182:
    • The court accepted that the only effective decree as against the appellant was the corrected and amended decree of December 29, 1958, because prior to that date the appellant's name did not appear in the decree and therefore there was no executable decree against him.
    • Because the appellant filed an appeal against the order correcting and amending the decree and failed on August 25, 1959, the court held clause (2) of Article 182 applied — i.e., where there has been an appeal, the period starts from the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court.
    • The court considered the competency of the appeal immaterial to the question of when limitation begins to run, following the approach in the cited Bombay cases (Nagappa Bandappa Kadadi and Narmadabai).
    • Applying Article 182(2), the three-year period for execution began on August 25, 1959, and the respondents' execution application (filed August 7, 1962) was therefore within that period.
  2. Effect of section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 and alternative starting-point:
    • The court observed that section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 imposes an absolute prohibition on executing eviction decrees affecting slum-area buildings except with prior written permission of the Competent Authority — a materially different prohibition from the limited restriction considered in Peare Lal (which concerned availability of particular property in execution).
    • Because the corrected decree as to the appellant was made on December 29, 1958 (a date after Act 96 had come into force), execution was absolutely prohibited from that date until permission was obtained.
    • The respondents obtained permission from the Competent Authority effective May 31, 1962; the court held that limitation for execution could only start to run from the date the decree became executable — that is, from May 31, 1962. From that vantage the respondents' execution application of August 7, 1962, was within time.
  3. Scope of the word 'tenant' for section 19(1):
    • The court examined the Rent Control Act, noting that section 2(j) of Act 38 of 1952 defines 'tenant' to include a sub-tenant for the purposes of that Act. Consequently, for the eviction suit under section 13 of Act 38 of 1952, the appellant (a sub-tenant) was treated as a tenant and thus section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 applied to him.
    • On that basis the requirement to seek permission under section 19(1) was imperative before executing the decree as against the appellant.
  4. Rejection of appellant's reliance on Peare Lal:
    • The court distinguished Peare Lal because the statutory bar there (section 17(1) of Act 31 of 1950) differed in nature: it only made evacuee property unavailable for execution, whereas section 19(1) imposes an absolute prohibition on executing an eviction decree in slum areas until permission is obtained. Thus Peare Lal did not support the appellant's contention that limitation should run from the date of amendment (December 29, 1958).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed (the opinion states "Appeal dismissed." and records dismissal with costs).

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The respondents' execution application filed on August 7, 1962, was held to be within time: either because Article 182(2) makes the limitation start from the date of the appellate court's order dismissing the appellant's appeal (August 25, 1959), or because section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 prevented execution until permission was granted (permission effective May 31, 1962), so limitation started from that later date.
  • The court confirmed that for the purposes of the eviction suit the appellant (a sub-tenant) fell within the definition of 'tenant' in section 2(j) of Act 38 of 1952, causing section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 to apply.
  • No broader precedent or novel legal principle is announced beyond applying established rules on the starting point of limitation in the circumstances described; the decision resolves the parties' competing limitation and statutory-bar contentions in favour of the respondents and dismisses the appellant's appeal with costs.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion; no outside information or inference beyond that text has been included.

Show full summary ...

    Ram Kirpal v. Jain Sweitamna Temple Buildings And Others

    Mehar Singh, J.:— In a suit by Jain Sweitamna Temple and its manager Mithoo Mal, respondents, under section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (Act 38 of 1952), for a decree of eviction against a number of persons including Ram Kirpal, appellant, a decree was obtained by these two respondents on February 19, 1954, and ultimately the decree of the High Court is of November 5, 1956. This litigation is not concerned with others whose eviction was sought in that suit. It so happened that in the final decree the name of Ram Kirpal appellant was omitted. On an application by the two respondents the decree was corrected and amended on December 29, 1958. That of course must have been under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal was probably not competent against such an order, but Ram Kirpal appellant all the same filed an appeal against it which was dismissed on August 25, 1959. In between these dates, on December 29, 1956, came into force the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956), providing by sub-section (1) of section 19 that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area shall be entitled to execute such decree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority. The residential accommodation in regard to which the two respondents obtained decree of eviction against Ram Kirpal appellant is situate in a slum area. So, though the original final decree in favour of the two respondents of November 5, 1956, had been granted before the coming into force of Act 96 of 1956, time for its execution started running immediately on the passing of that decree, but by the time the decree was corrected and amended on December 29, 1958, Act 96 of 1956 had come into force and from that date the execution of the decree was prohibited by section 19(1) of that Act.

    2. The two respondents instituted an execution application on August 7, 1962. The appellant raised an objection to this decree, which has failed in both the Courts below, that the execution application is barred by time. It is against the appellate order in this respect that the appellant has filed this second appeal in the execution application of the two respondents.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellant refers to Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which provides a period of three years for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court, the starting point of limitation, so far as it is relevant for the present argument being covered by clauses “2 (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or 4 (where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment.” The learned counsel urges that in clause (4) it is specifically stated that the time starts running from the date of amendment, where there has been an amendment of the decree and as in this case the amendment was made on December 29, 1958, so reckoning three years from that date, the execution application of the respondents on August 7, 1962, was barred by time. To this the reply on behalf of the two respondents is that it is not clause (4) that will apply because against the order correcting and amending the decree, the appellant went in appeal, which attracts clause (2), and the limitation will take a start from the date of the order of the appellate Court, which is August 25, 1959, and reckoning the time of three years from that date, the execution application made by the two respondents is well within time. In this respect the learned counsel for the two respondents points out that the competency or the non-competency of the appeal is not a material matter, and this is in reply to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the application for the correction of the decree made by the two respondents was under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the result that no appeal was competent against an order made under those sections in that application. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the respondents is supported by Nagappa Bandappa Kadadi v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa Umbargi . 1932 I.L.R 57 Bom. 388., and Narmadabai Narayanshet…Applicant; v. Hidayatalli Saheballi…Opponent. . A.I.R 1949 Bom. 115.. The first was a case of an appeal against the review order, and the second was a case of an appeal against the order dismissing an application to set aside the ex parte decree. The limitation in either case was taken to have started to run under Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act from the date of the order in appeal against the order of review in the first case and against the order of dismissal of the application to set aside the ex parte decree in the second case. In the present case the only effective decree in so far as Ram Kirpal appellant is concerned is the corrected and amended decree of December 29, 1958. The reason for this is simple, and that is that before that date his name did not exist in the decree, and consequently there was no executable decree against him. There was, therefore, no occasion for him to go in appeal against any decree in which he did not figure. If he wanted to go in appeal against the original decree he would have himself had to have it corrected to have his name included in it before an appeal would have been competent on his part. So that the only effective decree so far as he is concerned is the decree as corrected and amended on December 29, 1958. It was against the order correcting and amending the original decree that he then filed an appeal and failed in it on August 25, 1959. In the circumstances of this case under clause (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act it is obvious that it is the date of the final order of the appellate Court that is the starting point of three years for the execution of the decree against Ram Kirpal appellant. On this consideration the approach of the Courts below is correct that the execution application of the two respondents is within time. There is another aspect of the matter. The two respondents initially brought a suit for eviction against Mohan Lal and Piare Lal as tenants and impleaded in the suit seven other persons, including the present appellant Ram Kirpal, as sub-tenants of those two tenants. As stated, a decree for eviction was made in that suit, but the learned counsel for the appellant points out that there was no order against Mohan Lal and Piare Lal evicting them, which means that the decree was only confined to sub-tenants. Now, the learned counsel for the appellants contends that sub-section (1) of section 19 of Act 96 of 1956 just confines its protection to a tenant, and a sub-tenant is not a tenant. This is also the view that really prevailed with the Competent Authority under Act 96 of 1956 when granting permission to the two respondents on February 21, 1962, to enable them to execute the decree from May 31, 1962. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that as Ram Kirpal appellant was not a tenant of the two respondents, sub-section (1) of section 19 of Act 96 of 1956 was not at all attracted. No application for permission was competent under that provision. The making of an incomplete application, according to him, cannot possibly arrest the running of the limitation against the two respondents once it started to do so after the passing of the final decree. In this respect he relies on Peare Lal v. Krishan Sarup . 1963 65 P.L.R 793., in which the learned Judge was considering the provisions of section 17(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act 31 of 1950), and came to the conclusion that in spite of the bar that evecuee property was not liable to be proceeded with in execution of any decree, that provision did not have the effect to stopping the running of the limitation for the execution of the decree once the limitation started running. It is obvious that this case has no bearing on the present case because section 17(1) of Act 31 of 1950 did not bar an execution application, but all it did was not to make available evacuee property in the execution of any decree. In other words, the execution of the decree was allowed to go in the normal way, but when it came to the question of bringing in execution an evacuee property that alone was permitted. On the other hand sub-s. (1) of S. 19 of Act 96 of 1956 says that no person who has obtained a decree for eviction shall be entitled to execute such a decree. This is an absolute prohibition. It has already been pointed out that the real decree so far as Ram Kirpal appellant is concerned is of December 29, 1958, of the trial Court when correction and amendment in the original decree was made adding the name of this appellant to it. This is a date subsequent to the coming into force of Act 96 of 1956. So on December 29, 1958, there was total prohibition to the two respondents to execute their decree. It could only become executable if and when they obtained permission under section 19(1) of the Act 96 of 1956, and it is immediately apparent that time under section 182 of the Limitation Act, started running against them for execution of the decree only from the date it became executable and that date according to the order of the Competent Authority under Act 96 of 1956, is May 31, 1962. So in this way again the execution application of the two respondents is within time. There remains only for Consideration, in this respect, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is not a tenant of the two respondents and thus section 19(1) of the Act 96 of 1956 is not attracted. The eviction of Mohan Lal and Piare Lal tenants and with them of the appellant was sought under section 13 of Act 38 of 1952, and section 2(j) of this Act while defining the word ‘tenant’ includes in it a sub-tenant. So that for the purposes of that suit the appellant was a tenant and it is in pursuance of that decree in that suit that permission has been sought by the two respondents to execute it under S. 19(1) of the Act 96 of 1956, so that for all these purposes the appellant is a tenant and the provision last mentioned directly applies to this case. It was imperative for the two respondents to seek permission under section 19(1) of Act 96 of 1956 before they could execute the decree. I have already said that the permission to them was granted to execute it from May 31, 1962, and the execution application having been filed on August 7, 1962, is within time from any consideration.

    4. These are the only two arguments which have been urged in this appeal and as they do not succeed, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ram Kirpal v. Jain Sweitamna Temple Buildings And Others
    (Nov 27, 1964)