Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

L.P.A No. of 1983 (R)

Judges

S.B Sanyal
B.P Singh, JJ.

Acts

section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter
section 2(1)(n)

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Letters Patent Appeal (S.B. Sanyal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The deceased was employed by the Eastern Railway Administration as "Head Trains Clerk". On 13.4.1967 he was murdered in the railway yard while, as found by the Labour Court, he had been at the yard for operation of railway wagons and coaches. The claimant, the deceased's wife, filed a claim for a lump sum compensation of Rs. 10,000/- under section 4 read with Schedule IV of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

The Railways challenged the claim on several grounds, including that the claimant was not the legally married wife, that the claim was barred by limitation, that the death did not occur in the course of employment, and that the claim was otherwise not maintainable. In support of the claim the claimant adduced oral evidence (four witnesses) and documentary evidence including Exhibit W5 (a letter from the Chief Yard Master describing the petitioner as supervising staff on twenty-four hours duty) and a post-mortem report (Exhibit 3).

The Labour Court found the claim was not barred by limitation, found death in connection with employment, and recorded wage statements. However, it rejected the claim on the basis that the deceased was designated a "clerk" and thus fell outside the definition of "workman" under section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II, clause (i). A Single Judge of the High Court affirmed that the nature of the job was clerical and dismissed the claimant's appeal. This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the Single Judge's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the deceased, though designated "Head Trains Clerk", was a "workman" within the meaning of section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II (clause (i)) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, having regard to the nature of his duties (supervisory and operational control of wagons) rather than his designation.
Whether the death of the deceased occurred in the course of his employment, entitling the claimant to compensation under section 4 and Schedule IV of the Act.
Whether the claimant is entitled to interest and penalty under section 4A of the Act, and if so, the rate and period of such interest and the quantum of any penalty.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant's Arguments

The deceased was supervisory staff, not a mere clerical employee, and his duties required operation of railway wagons in the yard.
He supervised and controlled the movement of wagons and was assisted by about 36–37 clerks whose duty was to take down numbers of wagons; this demonstrates the deceased's supervisory and operational role.
There is an admission by the Yard-master (Exhibit W5) and supporting evidence from the Railways' witness that the deceased had supervisory responsibilities and no fixed duty hours.
The Railways did not plead in their show cause that the deceased was working in a clerical capacity and thus outside the definition of a workman.
Clause (xii) of Schedule II (which deals with persons employed by contractors/sub-contractors) is not applicable; the deceased should be evaluated under clause (i) of Schedule II.

Railways' Arguments

The Railways contended inter alia that the claimant was not the legally married wife of the deceased.
They contended that the claim was barred by limitation.
They argued that the death did not occur in the course of the deceased's employment and that the claim was not maintainable in law or fact.
The employer (through lower courts' reasoning) relied on the designation "clerk" to place the deceased outside the statutory definition of "workman" under section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Madan Mohan Verma v. Mohan Lal, 1982 LIC 1729 (Bench decision of Allahabad High Court)	Cited for the principle that interest must be paid from the date of the accident until realization.	The court referred to this authority in concluding that the claimant is entitled to simple interest on the awarded compensation from the accident date until payment.
Smt. Jyamma v. Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Madhugiri Division, 1982 LIC NOC 61 (Kant)	Expresses a similar view about entitlement to interest from the date of the accident until realization.	Used as supportive authority for awarding interest on the compensation amount.
Iqbal Shamshuddin Aasari v. Ghasi Salauddin Ansari, 1980 LIC 125 (Bombay High Court Bench)	Also supports the view that interest is payable from the date of the accident until realisation.	Relied upon together with the other cited authorities to justify awarding interest on the compensation amount.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court engaged in a textual and factual analysis that proceeded along these lines:

Designation versus nature of duties: The court emphasised the established principle (as articulated in the opinion) that a person's job designation alone is not decisive in determining whether he is a "workman" under section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II. What matters is the dominant nature of his duties and functions.
Assessment of evidence: The court reviewed the oral and documentary evidence before the Labour Court and the High Court—including Exhibit W5 (letter from the Chief Yard Master stating the petitioner was supervising staff on twenty-four hours duty), witness testimony that the deceased oversaw the operation and movement of wagons, the presence of about 36 assistant train clerks, and the wage statements showing monthly wages between Rs. 300–400 and specifically a finding of Rs. 400 monthly by the Labour Court.
Characterisation of the deceased's work: Applying the dominant-duty approach, the court concluded that the deceased's principal duties were supervisory and operational—overseeing assistants, issuing directions, and controlling the movement and maintenance of wagons—rather than routine clerical functions (such as routine writing, copying or account-keeping without supervisory control). Although some tasks of the deceased involved taking down numbers of wagons (a clerical act), those clerical tasks were incidental to and integrated with his supervisory operational responsibilities and thus did not render his overall role "clerical" in the statutory sense.
Critique of the Single Judge's reasoning: The court rejected the Single Judge's apparent generalisation that workmen must be persons exposed to some danger and the reliance on designation; it observed that certain Schedule II entries (e.g., Clause (xii)) cover persons who may not be engaged in obviously hazardous tasks yet are included as workmen. The court found that the earlier courts had improperly prioritized designation over actual duties.
Procedural observation: The court noted that the Railways had not pleaded in their show cause that the deceased was not a "workman", yet the Presiding Officer had decided the issue against the claimant. The lack of such a plea weighed in favour of entertaining the claimant's case on the evidence presented.
Entitlement to compensation and quantum: Given the Labour Court's finding as to monthly wage (Rs. 400), the claimed amount of Rs. 10,000 was within the schedule for compensation under section 4. The court therefore found the claimant entitled to the claimed sum.
Entitlement to interest and penalty under section 4A: The court examined section 4A's provisions for provisional payment, interest at 6% per annum where an employer defaults in paying within one month of the amount becoming due, and the power to award an additional penalty not exceeding 5% where there is no justification for delay. The court also cited earlier authorities (see Table of Precedents) establishing that interest is payable from the date of the accident until realization and applied those authorities in awarding interest.
Remedies ordered: On the basis of the foregoing, the court allowed the Letters Patent Appeal, set aside the judgments of the Single Judge and the Labour Court to the extent inconsistent, awarded Rs. 10,000 by way of compensation, ordered simple interest at 6% per annum from 13.4.1987 until actual payment, and ordered a penalty equal to fifty percent of the compensation. The court also assessed hearing fees at Rs. 1,000 and ordered costs.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal succeeds. The court held that the deceased was not employed in a merely clerical capacity and was a "workman" within the meaning of section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II. The court directed payment of compensation and ancillary relief as set out below.

Direct consequences and orders:

The claimant (the wife of the deceased) is entitled to Rs. 10,000/- by way of compensation under section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
The claimant is entitled to simple interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the sum of Rs. 10,000/- from 13.4.1987 until the date of actual payment.
The claimant is entitled to a penalty equal to fifty percent of the compensation claimed (i.e., 50% of Rs. 10,000/-) in addition to interest.
The judgments of the Single Judge and the Labour Court are set aside insofar as they rejected the claim on the basis that the deceased was a clerical employee outside the statutory definition of "workman".
Hearing fee was assessed at Rs. 1,000. The appeal succeeds with costs.

Note: The opinion applies the principle that designation is not decisive; the dominant nature of duties controls whether a person falls within the statutory definition of "workman." The court relied on section 4A and cited prior authorities concerning the entitlement to interest from the date of the accident until realization.

The judgment records that B.P. Sinha, J. concurred ("I agree.").

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Gulabdei Ahir v. Union Of India & Anr.

S.B Sanyal, J.:—This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against a judgment of this Court rendered under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) rejecting the claim for compensation by the wife of the deceased on the ground that the deceased was employed in a clerical capacity in the Railways and, thus, not covered by the definition of workman under section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II, clause (i) of the Act.

2. Facts. The deceased was employed by Eastern Railway Administration as Head Trains Clerk. He was murdered, while in course of duly he had been to the railway yard for operation of Railway wagons and coaches on 13.4.1967, by micreants. The claim was laid by the wife of the deceased for a lump sum compensation of Rs. 10,000/- as provided under section 4 of the Act read with Schedule IV. The Railways assailed the claim inter alia, on the ground that the claimant is not the legally married wife. The claim is barred by limitation. The death was not in course of the deceased's employment. The claim is not maintainable in law as well as in fact.

3. In support of the claim the claimant examined four witnesses as also produced documentary evidence. Exhibit-W 5 is a letter of the Chief Yard Master to the Divisional Personnel Officer stating the petitioner to be a Supervising Staff and he was on twenty four hours duty: (Exhibit 5). Witness no. 1 of the claimant stated that the deceased was on the operation side looking after the movements of wagons in the yard with no fixed working hours. There were large number of Clerks working under him. Witness no. 1 on behalf of the Railways affirmed that there were about thir-tysix Assistant Tiain Clerks and Senior Train Clerks who were to work under the deceased. The Assistants were required to take down the number of wagons. The deceased, on the other hand, with the assistance of the Assistants was to look after the operation and movement of the wagons and its maintenance. The deceased was a Supervisory Staff of the Railways. The responsibility and the duty of the deceased was such that he may be required by the Railways and for operation of the wagons at any time of the day with no fixed duty hours. The post mortem report (Exhibit 3) dated 15.4.1967 shows that the deceased bore sharp cutting injuries which is said to be the cause of his death. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, found the claim not barred by limitation and/or any other infirmity. It also held that the deceased met with death in connection with some work in course of his employment. The wage statement filed showed the monthly wage of the deceased ranging between Rs. 300/- to Rs. 400/- but scuttled the claim on the ground that he was designated as clerk and, therefore, outside the definition of workman under the Act as envisaged under section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II of the Act. An appeal was taken to the High Court by the claimant and the learned Single Judge held that the nature of the job was only clerical, though the scheme of the Act is to compensate the employees who strictly come within the definition of workmen and whose nature of job put them to some amount of danger. The benefit of the Act is meant for such persons who are involved in the operation and maintenance of the Railways. It further held there is nothing on the record to show that the job of the deceased employee was in any way related with the maintenance or the operational activities of the wagons whose number he was to note”. It was, however, further held by the learned Single Judge that “while performing his job and noting the number of wagons, he was murdered by some criminals but, of course during the duty hours. Having so held the appeal was dismissed on merit.

4. Mr. Tara Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant contended that the deceased was a supervisory staff and was tot working in a Clerical capacity in the Railways. His duty required the operation of the railway wagons in the yard. In discharge of his responsibility be was assisted by 37 Clerks whose, duty was to take down the number of the wagons to facilitate the operational duty cast upon the deceased. There has been an admission of this fact by the Yard-master as would be evident from the exhibits as well as the evidence of the Railway's witness no. 1. According to the learned counsel the Railways have not even pleaded, in the show cause, that the deceased was in a Clerical capacity, therefore, he is outside the definition of workmen. He has further contended that even assuming that the deceased was working in view of Schedule II, clause (xii). Nobody has appeared for the Railway. I have no difficulty in holding that the claim could only be entertained if the deceased is covered under section 2(n)(i) read with Schedule II, Clause (i) of the Act. Clause (xii) of Schedule II deals with such persons who are employed by a contractor or sub-contractor fulfilling a contract with the Railways. Therefore, said clause has no application. I find, therefore do merit in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.

5. I, however, find considerable force in the argument of the learned counsel that the deceased was not working in a Clerical capacity even though he was designated as Head Trains Clerk. It is now well settled that designation is not decisive in this matter but what is decisive is, the nature of the duties and functions to an individual. The deceased was to over-see the work of his subordinates. His duties and responsibilities required issuance of directions and control the movement of the wagons in the yard. A clerk, on the other hand, is a person doing routine work as a writer, copyist, account keeper, correspondent or stereo-type work without any power of control or dignity or creativeness. It is true that in course of the supervisory duty of the decased he might have been required to take down number of wagons which may be said to be of clerical nature. But in deciding whether a particular person is doing clerical work or not one has to find out the dominant nature of the work done by him. In my opinion the Clerical work done by the deceased was identical to deceased's main work of supervising the operation of the movement of the wagons in the yard. Even though the learned Single Judge was dealing with Miscellaneous First Appeal, there has no reference to any evidence, either oral or documentary, for the Court to conclude that the deceased was required to note down the number of the wagons and submit it to his office. From the impugned judgment it further appears that the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that under the scheme of the Act a workman is a person who is exposed to some amount of danger and risk in performing his drily. I am afraid, there can be no such generalisation. As for example clause (xii) of Schedule II deals with all persons employed directly or through a sub-contractor by person fulfilling a contract with the Railway Administration. Clause (xii) envisages inspector, mail guard, sorter or van peon in the Railway Mail Service, or employed in any occupation ordinarily involving outdoor work in the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department is a workman. These entries negative the assumption of the learned Single Judge in dismissing the claim as obviously there could be no hazard for discharging the work of a sorter or for doing outdoor work in Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department. It may be true that person doing hazardous work are also workman within the meaning of section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II of the Act: In my opinion, the courts have rejected the claim looking to the designation of the deceased and not the duties and responsibilities discharged by the deceased in connection with his employment. This has vitiated their decision. I am of the firm opinion, on the basis of the oral documentary evidence made available to the learned Single Judge inform of a paper book-that the deceased was not engaged in clerical capacity in the Railways. His duties required the proper operation of the wagons in the yard of the Railways with the assistance of the Assistants whose work he had to control and also issuance of directions for proper operation and maintenance of the wagons in the yard. It is curious that the Railways nowhere pleaded in their show cause that the deceased was not a workman within the meaning of Act but the Presiding Officer decided the point against the claimant even though not pleaded by the employer. In view of the finding of the Labour Court that the monthly wage of the deceased was Rs. 400/- the compensation of Rs. 10,000/- claimed is within Schedule of section 4 of the Act. The amount of Rs. 10,000/- claimed is not said to be excessive by to a two courts below. Therefore, the appellant shall be entitled to the said sum of Rs. 10,000/- claimed by way of compensation.

6. The next question, which falls for consideration, is whether the claimant shall, at all, be entitled to any interest on the said amount. Section 4A envisages payment of compensation under section 4 of the Act as soon as it fell due. It further envisages provisional payment based on the extent of liability which the employer accepts, and, such payment shall be deposition with the Commissioner or paid to the workman, as the case may be, but if the employer makes a default in paying the compensation due under this Act, within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner has been authorised to award simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum. On the amount due together with, if in the opinion of the Commissioner there is no justification for the delay, a further sum not exceeding 5% of such amount shall be paid by way of penalty. The Courts have held that interest has to be paid from the date of accident or till realisation. See the case of Madan Mohan Verma v. Mohan Lal 1982 LIC 1729: a Bench decision of Allahabad High Court. A similar view has been expressed in the case of Smt. Jyamma v. Executive Engineer, P.W.D Madhugiri Division, by a Bench of Karnataka High Court reported in 1982 LIC, NOC 61 (Kant). A Bench of the Bombay High Court has taken similar view in the case of Iqbal Shamshuddin Aasari v. Ghasi Salauddin Ansari: 1980 LIC 125. I am, therefore, of the view that the claimant shall be entitled to the payment of simple interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the sum Rs. 10,000/- from 13.4.1987 till the actual payment of the compensation claim. She shall further be entitled to fifty percent of the compensation claimed by way of penalty.

7. In the result, the Letters Appeal succeeds with costs. The judgments of the learned Single Judge and that of the Labour Court are set aside with the aforesaid directions. Hearing fee is assessed at 1000/-.

B.P Sinha, J.:—I agree.

Gulabdei Ahir v. Union Of India & Anr.

Summary of Opinion — Letters Patent Appeal (S.B. Sanyal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant's Arguments

Railways' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Gulabdei Ahir v. Union Of India & Anr.

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