S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— What is the precise legal import of the concept of a precedent of the larger Bench being binding on smaller Benches—has become the threshold focal question in these three references by the learned single Judge recording a frontal dissent against the ratios of Division Bench judgments of this very Court and seeking their reconsideration.

2. The necessary matrix of facts may be noticed with brevity from C.W.J.C 3071/81 (Santosh Kumar Chaterjee v. The State of Bihar). The petitioner therein sought to challenge the appellate order of the Collector, Madhepura (annexure 6) whereby he had allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector in a bataidari case under section 48 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. This case ??? came up before the learned single Judge. Before him firm reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment in Jai Ram Das Bhatia v. State of Bihar (A.I.R 1977 Patna 315) by the learned Counsel for one of the parties. It would appear that there was no serious dispute that the said judgment covered the issue and was not distinguishable. However, the learned Judge declined to follow the same and delineated a number of reasons for which it required to be reconsidered. He also opined that if the affirmative view given by the Division Bench is accepted then it may involve an infraction of the constitutional rights of the landlord. Declining to abide by that precedent, the matter was referred to a Division Bench for disposal. Similar references have been made in the other two cases. Before us the preliminary objection has been forcefully taken at the very threshold by the learned Counsel that this reference to the Division Bench is not competent. It was vehemently submitted that the learned single Judge was bound to follow the decision of the larger Bench and to decide the case in accordance therewith. The binding nature of the precedent, which is the linchpin of our justice system, was submitted to have been allegedly infected by a smaller Bench refusing to follow the law laid down by the larger Bench of this very court.

3. Undoubtedly, an issue of great significance pertaining to the very doctrine of precedent arises herein. This deserves some in depth examination from its three facets, of principle, precedent and the special provisions contained in proviso (a) to sub-rule (xv) of rule 1 of Chapter II of the Patna High Court Rules, at page 6.

4. On principle it goes without saying that the binding nature of precedents generally and of larger Benches in particular is the king-pin of our justice system. It is the bond that holds together what otherwise might well become a thicket of individualistic opinions resulting in a virtual judicial anarchy. The system of Anglo Saxon jurisprudence, which we inherited, is now rooted in the hierarchy of precedent. This is a self imposed discipline which is so settled in practice as to have hardened into the rule of law and is rightly the envy of other schools of law. Because of the legal position here being axiomatic and well settled, it is un-necessary to overly elaborate the issue on principle.

5. Before us the admitted and common position taken by learned Counsel for the parties is that undoubtedly the ratio of Jai Ram Das Bhatia v. The State of Bihar (supra) was attracted to the facts and was not at all distinguishable. Now, once it is so, then a fortiori the said judgment having been rendered by the Divison Bench was binding on the learned Single Judge. What is the precise import of this binding nature seems now to need no exhaustive dissertation in the context of our jurisprudence. The matter deserves some delving into history because more than two centuries ago Blackstone in his celebrated commentaries elaborated what even then appeared to be the settled rule of the binding nature of precedent in the following term:—

“It is an established rule to abibe by former precedents when the same points come again into litigations as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady and not likely to waver with every Judge's new opinion, as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent Judge to alter or vary from according to his private sentiments.”

6. It would appear that the aforesaid rule, which was not of Blackstone's coinage only but is the reiteration of the principle, which was held to be axiomatic much earlier, has since been unhesitatingly followed in Great Britain, so much so, that the superior Courts of England have held themselves bound by their own earlier decisions irrespective of the number of Judges rendering the judgment. In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944 (2) All England Law Reports 293] it has been settled beyond doubt that even the Court of Appeal was bound to follow previous decisions of its out irrespective of the fact, whether the judgment was of a Division Bench or of a Full Court.

7. Indeed it was in conformity with this very rule and discipline that the House of Lords was so inflexibly bound by its earlier decisions that the same could be corrected only by an Act of Parliament and not otherwise. However, being the final Court and with the change or time correction by the Parliament becoming difficult and rarer, a limited change from this rigid rule was made in the following terms by the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent 1966 (1) W.L.R 1234:—

“Lord Gardiner L.C: Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rule. Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.

In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.

This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House.”

8. The precise legal position as existing today in England cannot be stated with absolute authority but it would appear that the aforesaid change his been made only with regard to the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal and other superior Courts continue to be bound by the rule in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (supra) and are bound by their previous decisions.

9. In appears to me that the true approach to a binding precedent is illustrated by the celebrated words of Lord Justice Buckley in Produce Brokers Co. Ltd. v. Olympic Oil & Cake Co. Ltd. [(1916) I Appeal Cases 314] as under:—

“I am unable to adduce any reason to show that the decision which I am about to pronounce is right. On the contrary, if I were free to follow my own opinion, my own powers of reasoning such as they are, I should say that it is wrong. But, I am bound by authority-which, of course, it is my duty to follow-and, following authority, I feel bound to pronounce the judgment which I am about to deliver.”

Similarly, Lord Cozens-Hardy, Master of ???, in Velazquez Limited v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [(1914) 3 K.B 458] had the occasion to observe as follows:—

“But there is one rule by which, of course, we are bound to abide—that when there has been a decision of this Court upon a question of principle it is not right for this Court whatever its own views may be, to depart from that decision. There would otherwise be no finality in the law. If it is contended that the decision is wrong, then the proper course is to go to the ultimate tribunal, the House of Lords, who have power to settle the law and hold that the decision which is binding upon us is not good law.

10. It seems unnecessary to go to the American law and that of the Commonwealth countries of Canada and Australia, because admittedly they follow the same rules and principles with regard to the doctrine of precedent. As in England so in India, the legal position herein is identical and indeed it would appear that the doctrine of precedent has been placed at the highest pedestal by giving it a constitutional status. Article 141 now promulgates as under:—

“141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all Courts—The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”

11. In Jai Kaur v. Sher Singh (A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 1118) their Lordships gravely frowned on any deviation from the law once settled by the larger Bench and observed that thereafter any previous decision on the same point by a smaller Bench contrary thereto would have to be ignored, and, particularly, with regard to Division Bench, it was observed:—

“If, as we pointed out there, considerations of judicial decorum and legal propriety require that Division Benchs should not themselves pronounce decisions of other Division Benches to be wrong, such considerations should stand even more firmly in the way of Division Benches disagreeing, with a previous decision of the Full Bench of the same Court.”

12. Later, in A. Raghavama v. A. Chenchamma (A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court 136) it was held as well-settled that even a Division Bench was bound by the decision of another Division Bench. Still later, in Tribhuvandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Batlilal Patel (A.I.R 1968 Supreme Court 372), whilst settling all veiled doubts raised by Raju, J. in the judgment of the High Court with regard to the theory of precedent, it was held:—

“Precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of a administration of justice under our system. It has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason of the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law.”

13. It would thus follow that once a precedent is held to be a binding one then no deviation therefrom is permissible within the judicial polity except in the well accepted categories of cases enumerated hereinafter.

14. Now, apart from the decision of a larger Bench being binding on smaller Bench, it will appear that even judgments of co-ordinate Benches of the same High Court in a limited way are binding in the sense that no judgment on merits can be rendered contrary to the eartier decision of a co-equal Bench. At the highest, only an equivalent Bench can differ from another and only seek reconsideration of the same by a larger Bench and this also may sometimes be left to the discretion of the Chief Justice. It is unnecessary to quote and multiply precedents on the point and reference may instructively be made to Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator-General Of West Bengal (A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 936). Jaisri Sahu v. Rajedewan Dubey (A.I.R 1962 Supreme Court 83), Chetu Ram v. Asa Nand (1962 Punjab Law Reports 235), C. Varadarajulu Naidu v. Baby Ammal (A.I.R 1964 Madras 448), Lala Sri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand (A.I.R 1965 Supreme Court 1767), and Maganlal Chhaganlal (Private) Limited v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay ((1974) 2 SCC 402 : A.I.R 1974 Supreme Court 2009).

15. From the above, it would follow as a settled principle that the law specifically laid down by the larger Bench is binding upon the smaller Benches within the same High Court, and, any and every veiled doubt with regard thereto does not justify the reconsideration thereof by a larger Bench and thus put the issue in a ferment afresh. The ratios of the larger Benches are and should be rested on surer foundations and are not to be blown away by every sidewind. It is only within the narrowest fields that the judgment of the larger Bench can be questioned for reconsideration. One of the obvious reasons is that where it is unequivocally manifest that its ratio has been impliedly over ruled or whittled down by a subsequent judgment of a superior court or by a larger Bench of the same High Court. Secondly, where it can be held with certainty that a co-equal Bench has laid the law directly contrary to the same, plainly, in such a situation two contrary judgments cannot be binding and a clarification thereof becomes necessary. Thirdly, where it can be conclusively said that the judgment of the larger Bench was rendered per incuriam by altogether failing to take notice of a clear cut statutory provision or an earlier binding precedent of the superior Court or a larger Bench. It is normally within these constricted parameters that a smaller Bench may suggest reconsideration of the earlier view and not otherwise. However, it is best in these matters to be neither dogmatic nor exhaustive, yet the aforesaid categories are admittedly the well accepted ones, in which an otherwise binding precedent may be suggested for reconsideration.

16. It seems equally necessary to elaborate what should not be a valid ground for questioning or reconsidering the law settled by a larger Bench. The very use of the word ‘binding’ would indicate that it would held the field despite the fact that the Bench following the same may not be agreeable with that view. It is the necessary discipline of the law that the judgments of the superior courts and of larger Benches have to be followed unhesitatingly, whatever doubt one may individually entertain about their correctness. The reasoning for this is plain. To seek an universal intellectual unanimity is an ideal which obviously is too Utopian to achieve. Therefore, the logic and the rationale which may underlie the ratio of the larger Bench are not matters open for reconsideration. Negatively put, therefore, the challenge to the rationale and reasoning of a larger Bench is not a valid ground for unsettling it and seeking a re-opening and re-examination of the same, thus putting the question in a ferment afresh. Even where a smaller Bench has its doubt or reservations, the correct approach thereto is that of Lord Justice Buckley in Produce Brokers Co. Ltd. v. Olympis Oil & Cake Co Ltd. (supra) and of Lord Cozens Hardy in Velazquez Limited v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (supra).

17. Having noticed both the principle and precedent on the point, it remains to advert to the special provisions in Chapter V of the Patna High Court Rules (Page 29) which again appear to me as wholly in consonance with what has been said above. It is true that specifically this Chapter deals with the references to a Full Bench, yet the letter and spirit thereof would be equally attracted in references doubting the correctness of a Division Bench and its reconsideration by a larger Bench. Rule 6 in the Chapter aforesaid reiterates the principle of binding precedents in the following terms:—

“6. Every decision of a Full Bench shall be treated as binding on all Division Benches and Judges sitting singly, upon the point of law or usage having the force of law determined by the Full Bench, unless it is subsequently reversed by a Bench, specially constituted, consisting of such number of Judges as in each case shall be fixed by the Chief Justice, or unless a contrary rule is laid down by the Supreme Court.”

18. It is manifest from the above that all Division Benches and Judges sitting singly are bound to follow a law declared by the Full Bench irrespective of the opinion which they may hold about its correctness. Rule 6 does not even remotely visualise a single Judge or a Division Bench declining to follow or differing from a Full Bench and seeking its reconsideration. If this were to be allowed, uniformity and finality, which is the quest of the law, would be perpetually lost by every smaller Bench casting its doubt upon a larger Bench and seeking a still larger Bench for its reconsideration. The only reason herein for deviating from a Full Bench is if a contrary rule is laid down by the Supreme Court or when the Full Bench is reversed by a specially constituted larger Bench.

19. The procedure for references to a Full Bench is again illuminating and is spelt out in rule 1 which is in terms following:—

“1. Whenever a Division Bench desires and the Chief Justice consents that any case shall be referred to a Full Bench, or whenever in any case a Division Bench differs from any other Division Bench upon a point of law or usage having the force of law, such case shall be referred for decision by a Full Bench.”

20. It is somewhat plain that the aforesaid rule visualises two contingencies-firstly, when a Division Bench differs from any other Division Bench upon a point of law or usage, it is mandated that the case may be referred to a Full Bench. It is significant that what this rule visualises is a difference by a co-equal Bench only. It does not and indeed cannot visualise any difference by a Single Bench from a Division Bench which, as I have side arlier, would be binding upon it. Equally, this rule does not visualise even a Division Bench differing from a larger Bench and seeking its reconsideration. Significantly, the Chapter contains no provisions for a single Judge to seek a reference to a Full Bench. Ia the first category, the requirements are that the Benches must be of equal strength and they must express the difference from each other on law or usage. The second category of cases is where a Division Bench desires a reference to a Full Bench dehors any difference. Here, a reference is made dependent upon the consent and concurrence of the Chief Justice. No other methodology of references to a larger Bench have been provided in Chapter V. Thus, it is manifest that on the provisions of Chapter V of the Patna High Court Rules also the necessary inference is that a Division Bench would be binding on a learned Judge sitting singly. To finally conclude, it has to be held on principle, precedent and the provisions of Chapter V of the Patna High Court Rules that the larger Bench is binding on all smaller Benches and consequently a learned single Judge is bound to follow the law laid by a Division Bench. In line with the above, it has to be inevitably held that the ratio of Division Bench in Jai Ram Das Bhatia v. State of Bihar (supra) as also the other Division Bench cases was still binding upon the learned Single Judge and be could not doubt its correctness and dissent therefrom. The casts do not come remotely within the parameters where a smaller Bench could seek reconsideration of the law laid down. In this situation, it would follow that the present references do not arise and the cases have consequently to be sent back to another learned Single Judge for a decision on merits in accordance with law.

Anand Prasad Sinha, J.:— I agree.