P.C Pandit, J.:— This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed by the Ambala Bus Syndicate (P.) Ltd. and is directed against the order dated 27th July, 1967 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Patiala, respondent No. 3.
2. By the impugned order, the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation Patiala, respondent No. 4, was allotted two temporary permits with two return trips for Patiala Rupar route for a further period of four months. It might be mentioned that respondent No. 4 had previously also been granted two temporary permits on that very route. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order deserved to be quashed on the short ground that it was not a speaking order and since the Regional Transport Authority was performing quasi-judicial, functions in the matter of grant of such carriage permits, under the law, it was bound to pass a speaking order. The relevant portion of the cyder reads:—
“The representative of Ambala Bus Syndicate stated that portion of the route falls in the area covered under 50:50 scheme and that the Syndicate has also approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court through a civil writ. Shri Sharma pointed out that neither stay has been allowed by the High Court in this case nor any further date has been fixed for hearing. Resolved that the Corporation be allowed two temporary permits with two return trips for Patiala Rupar route for a further period of four months.”
A perusal of the order would show that no reasons had been given by respondent No. 3 for granting these permits. It had to mention some reasons as to why the temporary need still persisted after the expiry of the previous permits which had been granted to respondent No. 4. As I have said, no reason, whatsoever, had been given in the impugned order. In Bhagat Raja v. Union Of India & Others . A.I.R 1967 S.C 1606., the following observations of Subba Rao, C.J, in M.P Industries Ltd. v. Union of India . A.I.R 1966 S.C 671., were approved;
“Our constitution posits a Welfare State………In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the necessary concomitants of a welfare State. But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself. Self-descipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimise arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimise arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory Court to keep the tribunals within bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal.
………If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard.”
Following this decision, I would hold that there is force in this contention of the learned counsel.
3. In this view of the matter, it is needless to discuss the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. In the result, this petition succeeds and the impugned order is quashed, but with no order as to costs.
Petition succeeds.