JUDGMENT
D.P. Wadhwa, J.
1. This is a petition under S. 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (for short the Act for cancellation of the registered trade mark No. 294966 in the name of Vaid Prem Sagar Aggarwal, proprietor M/s. Hindustan Medicines, Aligarh, who is respondent No. 1 in the petition. The case of the petitioner is that he has been carryig on his business of manufacturing and selling an ayurvedic medicinal preparation for children (Ghutti) under the trade mark ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTTI since the year 1951 and that the packing carton bearing this trade mark was duly got registered by the petitioner with the Registrar of Copyrights under Registration No. A-1961/66. The petitioner then claims that he had sold this Chutti of the value of over Rs. 1 lac and also advertised the said Ghutti under the trade mark ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTTI through different media of advertising. The complaint of the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 got registered this trade mark by concealing the material facts and making false statements, which trade mark was registered under Registration No. 294966. It is stated that it was only on April 1, 1970, that the respondent started using this trade mark which the petitioner had used extensively and continuously for about 16 years. It is alleged that registration of the aforesaid trade mark in the name of respondent No. 1 is contrary to the provisions of S. 11 of the Act and the same is likely to cause confusion and deception among the public and the trade.
2. The impugned trade mark was registered on August 20, 1977, in class 5 under No. 294966 as of the date March 16, 1974, in respect of Ayurvedic medical syrup for children for sale in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was, however, mentioned in the trade mark that registration of the trade mark shall give no right to exclusive use of the device of women and child and device of medicine jar.
3. The respondent No. 1 in his written statement took many preliminary objections. It was stated that the petition was barred by the principles of res judicata and also barred on the principles of waiver and acquiescence. It was stated that the trade mark 112 SAL KI BURHIA KI GHUTI had been used by Revti Prasad Ghuttiwala of Aligarh and that the petitioner dishonestly and with mala fide intentions and ulterior motives traded upon the goodwill of the 112 SAL KI BURHIA KI GHUTI and that when the petitioner applied for registration of his trade mark, his application was declined by the Registrar of Trade Marks on the Opposition made by Revti Prasad. It was alleged on this ground that the petitioner had no locus standi to file this petition and also that the petition was not maintainable. The Petitioner filed his rejoinder.
4. On the pleas of the parties, the following issues were framed:
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to have the registered trade mark No. 294966 of respondent struck off the register on the grounds mentioned in the amended petition? OPP
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable for the reasons stated in para 2 of the preliminary objections? OPD
3. Whether the petition is barred by rule of res judicata for the reasons stated in para 4 of the preliminary objections? OPD
4. Relief.
Additional Issues:
1. Is the application for rectification maintainable in view of section 31 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958?
2. Is the trade mark of the respondent liable to be struck off in view of section 32 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958?
5. Parties led evidence by means of affidavits. Both the parties filed only their own affidavits apart from filing various documents.
6. In para 2 of the preliminary objections, in the written statement, respondent No. 1 stated that the petitioner had already availed of the opportunity when the petitioner could file opposition to the application of the respondent for registration of the trade mark. It was stated that the trade mark of respondent No. 1 which was sought to be registered before the Registrar of Trade Marks was duly advertised in the journal and the petitioner was thus fully aware of the factum of the publication of the application of respondent No. 1 in journal No. 660. It was thus contended that the petition was barred under the principles of waiver and acquiescence. To me it appears that this contention has no merit. Failure to file opposition before the Registrar of Trade Marks under section 21 of the Act cannot bar the right of the petitioner to file a petition under S. 56 of the Act. Issue No. 2 is held in favour of the petitioner.
7. Then, respondent No. 1 refers to an order dated July 5, 1976, passed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks on an application of the petitioner seeking registration of the trade mark ASLI BHURIA KI GHUTTI. By this order, the Assistant Registrar rejected the application of the petitioner. This was on the opposition filed by Revti Parsad owner of the trade mark 112 SAL KI BHURHIA KI GHUTTI. On this basis, it is contended that the present petition is barred res judicata. Again, I am afraid, this plea has no merit. To invoke the principles of res judicata the respondent No. 1 had to show that the issue in the present proceeding was directly and substantially in issue before the Assistant Registrar of the Trade Marks and that the parties were also the same in both the proceedings. This is certainly not so in the present case. Issue No. 3 is also held in favour of the petitioner.
8. S. 31 of the Act says that registration of a trade mark is to be taken as prima facie evidence of the validity thereof. This issue, being additional issue No. 1 does not arise is the present case. Learned counsel for the parties also did not address any arguments on this issue. Accordingly, this issue is struck off.
9. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that his trade mark has been in vogue for more than last seven years from the date of registration and it has to be taken as valid in all respects. This argument was advanced with reference to S. 32 of the Act. I am afraid, I cannot agree. In the present case, the petition was filed on October 6, 1977, and if it has been pending all this period it does not mean that respondent No. 1 gets any right under this section. I would, therefore, decide additional issue No. 2 in favour of the petitioner.
10. With reference to issue No. 1, Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that his use of the trade mark ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTI was much earlier in time. He said that the petitioner was using this trade mark since 1954 and in support of his contention he referred to various documents like bill books, order letters, certificate of copyright, advertisements in news papers or otherwise and declarations from the Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, which declaration is dated August 10, 1964. The newspapers containing advertisements of the trade mark ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTTI of the petitioner are from 1971 onwards. In view of all these documents, it could not be disputed that the petitioner was using the trade mark ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTTI much prior to the date of the user of the trade mark of respondent No. 1 Mr. Aggarwal said that use of the trade mark by respondent No. 1 was likely to cause deception or confusion in the minds of the public and respondent No. 1 was even otherwise disentitled to protection of the court and he, therefore, submitted that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to get his trade mark registered. In support of his contention, he referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Kanshiram Surinderkumar v. Thakurdas Deoomal Rohire AIR 1982 Bombay 505.
11. It was, however, the contention of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the petitioner had no locus stands to file the present petition under S. 56 of the Act in as much as, he said, that an application of the petitioner for registration of his trade mark was rejected by the Registrar of Trade Marks on opposition filed by Revti Prasad. Mr. Gupta referred to a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Charan Singh v. Ajit Singh and another (1970 Current Law Journal 85). In this case, there was a petition under section 56 of the Act for cancellation of the trade mark 'Do Chiri' under No. 141359 on agricultural implements. The petitioner had himself applied for registration of his trade mark 'Do Kabutar' which, the court held, clearly implied that even according to the petitioner the use of the birds makes the trade mark distinctive which was entitled to be registered. The court also noticed that products of various manufacturers had come to be known by the bird or the animal which was used as the trade mark in those types of goods. The court, therefore, observed that,-
It cannot, therefore, be said that the trade mark of respondent 1 was not distinctive in nature when it was got registered or has ceased to be so since its registration because some other manufacturers have started the name of some other bird as a trade mark on their products. The distinctiveness of the trade mark is not lost in this manner. When the petitioner has applied for the registration of his own trade mark in my opinion, he is not entitled to the relief of expunging or varying the entry with regard to the trade mark of respondent 1. This petition is, therefore, not competent under section 56 of the Act, and no other provision of the Act has been brought to my notice under which the petitioner is entitled to any relief.
I do not think this judgment is of much help to Mr. Gupta in support of his contention that the petitioner in the present case has no locus standi to file the present petition.
12. It was not disputed that the present petition under S. 56 of the Act was maintainable as such except that it was contended that the petitioner could not be a person aggrieved to bring the present petition. Mr. Aggarwal submitted that the expression person aggrieved is wide enough to include the petitioner in the present case. He said, the petitioner and respondent No. 1 were in the same line of trade and registration of the impugned trade mark was causing him immense damage. He said it was immaterial for the purpose of the present petition that his application for registration of his trade mark had earlier been rejected by the Registrar of Trade Marks which was principally on the ground that a similar trade mark was in use much prior to the date when the petitioner claimed to have started using his trade mark. Mr. Aggarwal also contended that the contest in the present case was not limed to the parties inter-se but the question involved was of public interest. Mr. Aggarwal referred to the following lines in the quotation from the judgment of Bowen, L.J., in re Powell's Tm. (1983) 10 R.P.C. 195 C.A. at page 201) as given in the book of Dr. S. Venkateswarn at page 627 of the Book entitled The Law of Trade and Merchandise Marks:
Wherever it can be shown, as here, that the Applicant is in the same trade as the person who had registered the Trade Marks, and wherever the Trade Mark, if remaining on the Register, would, or might, limit the legal rights of the Applicant, so that by reason of the existence of the entry on the Register he could not lawfully do that which, but for the existence of the mark upon the Register, he could lawfully do, it appears to me he has a locus standi to be heard as a person aggrieved.
He also referred to the following passage under the heading 'Public interest' from this book at page 629:
It is to be remembered that the question is not merely one between the parties concerned, but is one of public interest. The purity of the Register is of much importance to the trade in general, and therefore, if the applicant is a person aggrieved, the fact that he is unmeritorious or fraudulent or had no mark to register will not disqualify him.
13. In Kanshiram Surinderkumar (supra), the court held that in the case of identical marks falling within S. 11(a) of the Act the question of purity of Register in public interest was a primary consideration as against the question of acquiescence or delay unless the same had caused substantial injury to the opposite party so as to outweigh the question of public interest.
14. I am of the opinion that the submissions made by Mr. Aggarwal are correct. The two marks, that of the petitioner which was in use earlier to that of respondent No. 1 and the mark of respondent No. 1, are quite identical. It was the contention of Mr. Gupta that in the whole body of the petition, the petitioner did not describe the trade mark of respondent No. 1 correctly. He said, the petitioner had described the trade mark of respondent No. 1 as ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTTI while in fact if reference is made to the registration of the trade mark of respondent No. 1, his trade mark is ASLI BURHIA KI GHUTTI No. 475. I think, this is a hyper technical objection. The petitioner has referred time and again to the registered trade mark No. 294699 and I do not think anyone was in doubt as to the description of the trade mark of respondent No. 1. This objection of Mr. Gupta is of no avail to him.
15. I asked Mr. Gupta as to how respondent. No. 1 was able to get registration of his trade mark which admittedly he started using in 1974 when registration of the trade mark of the petitioner which he was using since 1954 was declined by the Registrar of Trade Marks. He submitted that no one filed opposition to his application. Be that as it may, respondent No. 1 has himself brought on record the fact that the trade 112 SAL KI BURHIA KI GHUTI of Revti Prasad was in use since 1939. This mark is certainly deceptively similar to that of respondent. No. 1 as well.
16. On consideration of all these facts, I would decide issue No. 1 in favour of the petitioner. The petition is, therefore allowed. The trade mark No. 294699 is directed to be removed from the Register of Trade Mark and respondent No. 2 will cancel this trade mark. I may however, state that this order will not in itself entitle the petitioner to ask for registration of his trade mark ASLI BURAIA KI GHUTTI if he is not otherwise entitled. There will be no order as to costs.