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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This criminal revision challenges an order dated 3-12-1986 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Mirzapur in Criminal Case No. 83 of 1986, State v. Shaukat Ali, whereby the Magistrate summoned the applicant and others for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.

The material facts in the opinion are: Imamul Haq (opposite party 2) lodged a first information report alleging offences under Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC and other offences. Police investigated and submitted a final report which the learned Magistrate accepted. Subsequently a protest petition together with affidavits was filed. The Magistrate then passed the impugned order taking cognizance and summoning the applicant and others for trial.

The revisionist (the applicant) contended that once the Magistrate had accepted the final report, he was not entitled to take cognizance of the matter; alternatively, if cognizance were to be taken it should have been under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. treating the protest petition as a complaint, followed by the procedural steps applicable to complaints (including recording a statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and then deciding whether to proceed forthwith or to enquire further). The revisionist argued that it was impermissible for the Magistrate to summon the accused straightway as is done on a police report.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after once accepting a final report submitted by the police, the Magistrate can under any circumstance proceed with the case under Section 190(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  2. Whether it is possible for the Magistrate to proceed under Section 190(1)(a) or under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C in such circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Revisionist's Arguments

  • After accepting the police final report, the Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance of the case.
  • If cognizance were to be taken after acceptance of the final report, it could only be taken under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. by treating the protest petition as a complaint and following the complaint procedure (including recording a statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and then deciding whether to proceed, enquire, etc.).
  • It was impermissible for the Magistrate to summon the accused straightway as is done in cases where cognizance is taken on a police report.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any counter-arguments advanced at length by the opposite party in the record excerpt provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Munilal Thakur v. Nawal Kishore Thakur, 1985 Cri LJ 437 (Patna High Court) The Division Bench considered whether a Magistrate, after accepting a final police report, can still take cognizance on a complaint/protest petition on the same or similar allegations; it concluded that the Magistrate can take cognizance on the basis of a complaint petition. The court relied on this Patna High Court decision as a similar authority supporting the proposition that cognizance on a complaint is permissible even after a final police report has been accepted.
Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 Held that if a Magistrate agrees with the police opinion, he may accept the final report and close proceedings; such an order is a judicial closing of proceedings and can only be set aside in revision. The opinion cites this authority as the basis for the view adopted by a single Judge of a High Court (that acceptance of the final report operates as closing proceedings and hence precludes later cognizance on a complaint unless set aside). The present court contrasted this with later Supreme Court authority.
Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 : AIR 1977 SC 2401 Not specified in the provided opinion. The case was listed among authorities considered by a Division Bench in Patna; the opinion does not state the precise rule from Tula Ram relied upon in the present decision.
H.S. Bains v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631 : AIR 1980 SC 1883 The precise rule is not detailed in the provided excerpt; the case was one of those examined by earlier courts on related points. The opinion notes that H.S. Bains does not lay down anything contrary to the view that a Magistrate may take cognizance after earlier refusing to do so on a police report; it is treated as not being an obstacle to the court's conclusion.
Gopal Vijay Verma v. Bhumeshwar Prasad Sinha, (1982) 3 SCC 510 The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate could take cognizance of a case upon complaint even though he had earlier refused to take cognizance on a police report; the High Court that took the contrary view was in error. Characterised as the most important authority for decision. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court and directed remittal for disposal according to law. The present court treats this as dispositive of the proposition that acceptance/refusal on a police report does not preclude later cognizance on complaint.
Bhumeshwar Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, 1981 Cri LJ 795 (Patna High Court, single judge) The single Judge had quashed cognizance taken on complaint where the Magistrate had earlier accepted a final report, stating the Magistrate should not take cognizance on a complaint after accepting a final police report because that would produce inconsistent judicial orders. The single-judge view was expressly considered and noted to have been reversed by the Supreme Court in Gopal Vijay Verma; the present court rejects the single-judge's reasoning as incorrect in light of Supreme Court authority.
Pradyum Narain Pandey v. State, 1968 All LJ 768 (Allahabad High Court, Division Bench) The Division Bench framed the question whether a Magistrate can take cognizance after having accepted a police report under Section 169 Cr.P.C and answered that even if the Magistrate exercises judicial functions in taking cognizance, there is no bar to his taking cognizance on second thought after having accepted the final report; the order approving a report under Section 169 is not an order of acquittal or discharge. The opinion treats this Division Bench decision as remaining good law and as extending the law in keeping with the Supreme Court's view; it is used to support the proposition that a Magistrate can take cognizance on second thought and the distinction between proceeding on a complaint and taking cognizance on police report upon reconsideration.
Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State, AIR 1958 Orissa 11 Held that if a Magistrate accepts a final report and later new facts come to light, or he discovers he overlooked an important aspect, he may revise his earlier order. Used to support the proposition that a Magistrate may, on discovering new facts or having reconsidered the material, revise an earlier acceptance of a final report and take cognizance on the police report itself.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a focused analysis of the authorities and the procedural posture of the case. It first examined previously conflicting decisions and noted the controlling effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Gopal Vijay Verma v. Bhumeshwar Prasad Sinha, where the Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had held a Magistrate could not take cognizance on a complaint after earlier refusing to take cognizance on a police report. The Supreme Court held the High Court was in error and remitted the matter for disposal according to law.

The opinion then considered the Patna Division Bench (Munilal Thakur) and the Allahabad Division Bench decision in Pradyum Narain Pandey. Pradyum Narain Pandey specifically addressed the question whether a Magistrate can take cognizance after accepting a police final report under Section 169 Cr.P.C.; the Division Bench concluded there is no bar to the Magistrate taking cognizance on a "second thought" and observed that the order under Section 169 is not an order of acquittal or discharge.

Synthesising these authorities, the court articulated the legal position as follows (as stated in the opinion):

  • Even after once accepting a final report submitted by the police, the Magistrate may take cognizance of the case in one of two ways:
    • (i) On the protest petition treating it as a complaint — in which event the Magistrate must follow the procedure prescribed for complaint cases (e.g., proceedings under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.).
    • (ii) On the police report itself, if the Magistrate, on reconsideration (for instance because new facts have come to light or on perusal and hearing he concludes that an important aspect was overlooked previously), concludes there is a prima facie case — which is cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and permits issuance of summons straightway.

Applying that legal framework to the facts before it, the court found that after having accepted the police final report, the learned Magistrate had been presented with a protest petition and affidavits, and had perused the earlier police report, the original FIR and medical examination reports showing injuries. On that basis the Magistrate concluded there was a prima facie case. The court characterised that action as taking cognizance on the police report as a result of a "second thought" — i.e., a reconsideration of the earlier acceptance — which falls within Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. Consequently, the Magistrate was justified in issuing summons without following the complaint-procedure steps of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.

The court therefore reasoned that the procedure followed (summoning straightway under Section 190(1)(b) after reconsideration) was permissible and that the revisionist's grounds were without merit.

Holding and Implications

REVISION DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and practical implications stated in the opinion:

  • The revision was dismissed and the interim stay previously granted by the Court was vacated.
  • The Magistrate's impugned order summoning the accused (issued after reconsideration of the police report and related documents) was held to be legally justified as cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C., permitting summons to be issued without resort to the complaint procedure under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.
  • The order was to be transmitted to the learned Magistrate forthwith so that he may proceed expeditiously; an expressed administrative aim was to ensure that this case and the cross-case before the Sessions Judge be heard one after the other and judgments delivered on the same date.

The opinion does not purport to create a novel precedent; it applies and synthesises existing authorities (including Supreme Court and Division Bench decisions) to determine that a Magistrate may either proceed on a protest petition as a complaint (following complaint procedure) or may, on reconsideration and the discovery of new facts or after hearing and perusal, take cognizance on the police report itself under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C.

    Shabir Ali v. State Of U.P.

    1. This criminal revision is directed against the order passed by Mr. R.S Misra, Judicial Magistrate, Mirzapur on 3-12-1986 in Criminal Case No. 83 of 1986, State v. Shaukat Ali through which he has summoned the applicant and others for offences punishable under Ss. 147, 148, 149 and 323 of the I.P.C

    2. Briefly stated the facts are that Imamul Haq opposite party 2 had filed a first information report in respect of a cognizable offence under Ss. 147, 148 and 149, I.P.C and some other offences. An investigation was made and a final report was submitted. This final report was accepted by the learned Magistrate after which a protest petition was moved along with some affidavits and the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order dt. 3-12-1986 taking cognizance of the matter and straightway summoning the applicant and others to stand their trial for the offences complained of. The contention of the revisionist is that after accepting the final report once, the Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance of the case and in any view of the matter if a cognizance had to be taken, it could be taken under S. 190(1)(a) of Cr. P.C treating the protest petition as a complaint and the procedure of the complaint cases had to be followed i.e statement under S. 200, Cr. P.C had to be recorded and then the Magistrate had to decide whether he wanted to proceed forthwith or to enquire into the matter himself or through some other agency. It is contended that it was not open to the learned Magistrate to proceed by summoning the petitioner and others straightway as is done in cases of police report. Two important points for decision arise in this case; namely (i) Whether after once accepting a final report, the Magistrate can under any circumstance proceed with the case under S. 190(i) of the Cr. P.C (ii) Whether it is possible for the Magistrate to proceed under S. 190(a) or (b).

    3. In the case of Munilal Thakur v. Nawal Kishore Thakur, 1985 Cri LJ 437, Patna Highi Court considered a similar case. The question before the Division Bench was whether a Magistrate even after accepting the final report filed by the police can still take cognizance of an offence upon a complaint or a protest petition on the same or similar allegations of fact. The Division Bench of Patna High Court looked into the law laid down in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117, and the case of Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 : AIR 1977 SC 2401; as also the case of H.S Bains v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631 : AIR 1980 SC 1883 and after considering all these cases as well as the Supreme Court case of Gopal Vijay Verma v. Bhumeshwar Prasad Sinha, (1982) 3 SCC 510, came to the conclusion that even after accepting a final report once, the Magistrate can take cognizance on the basis of the complaint petition.

    4. The most important case for consideration before the Division Bench was of Gopal Vijay Verma (supra). This was a matter which went to the Supreme Court against a single Judge decision of the Patna High Court in the matter of Bhumeshwar Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, 1981 Cri LJ 795. A question identical with the present one was raised before a single Judge of the Court. The learned Judge while quashing the cognizance of the offence, made the following observation.

    “If the Magistrate takes cognizance on the basis of the compliant petition then in that case he should not accept the final form. If once he accepts the final form then on the same facts constituting the offence, he is not entitled to take cognizance on the basis of the complaint petition or protest petition because that will result in two inconsistent orders passed by the Judical Officer.”

    5. It was also observed with reference to Abhinandan Jha's case (supra). In that case it has been held by the Supreme Court that if the Magistrate agrees with the opinion of the police, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. It will be deemed that the proceedings against the accused persons in respect of the facts constituting the offence have been closed by the Magistrate in a judicial proceeding. If it is so, such proceeding can only be set aside in revision by a higher authority. Unless and until the order is not set aside, the Magistrate is not entitled to take cognizance on the basis of the complaint petition or protest petition in respect of the same facts constituting the offence as mentioned in the final form………….”

    6. Against this order, an appeal was taken before the Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal Vijay Verma, (1982) 3 SCC 510 (supra). It came up before a Bench presided over by Chinappa Reddy, J. who, as will be noticed, was also a party to the judgment in the case of H.S Bains, 1980 Cri LJ 1308 (supra). Categorically reversing the High Court's order, their Lordships summarily disposed of the matter by the following order:

    “The High Court was clearly in error in thinking that the Magistrate could not take cognizance of a case upon complaint because he had earlier refused to take cognizance of the case on a police report. The order of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna for disposal according to law……….”

    7. It means, therefore, that the view that once a final report is accepted, the Magistrate who acts judicially cannot proceed against the accused persons in respect of the facts constituting same offence under any circumstances whatsoever and even on a complaint petition, because, if he does so, he would be acting against his previous order, closing the proceedings, is not a correct view of the matter. The Supreme Court is of the view, in spite of the cases of H.S Bains ((1980) 4 SCC 631 : AIR 1980 SC 1883) and Abhinandan Jha (both supra) (AIR 1968 SC 117) that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the case upon a complaint, even, if he had earlier refused to take cognizance.

    8. This brings us to the consideration of another aspect of the matter. It is whether in such circumstances cognizance can be taken only on a complaint or a protest petition which may amount to complaint and in no other way. There is a Division Bench case of this High Court in the matter of Pradyum Narain Pandey v. State, reported in 1968 All LJ 768. The brief facts of the matter were that one Bechan son of Mahavir had lodged a report at police station disclosing an offence under S. 325, I.P.C An investigation was made and the police submitted a report under S. 169, Cr. P.C of which final report was accepted by the learned Magistrate. Then the informant moved an application after about 19 days before the Court concerned praying that the accused persons be summoned on the basis of the report and the connected papers submitted by the police. This application was allowed and the learned Magistrate directed issue of summonses to the accused persons. Aggrieved by this order, an application in revision was preferred by Pradyum Narain Pandey, one of the accused persons, which was rejected by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur. Then a revision came up before this High Court and since there was some conflict of opinion, the matter was referred to a larger Bench.

    …..A Division Bench in this case framed three questions for decision:

    9. Question No. 1 is relevant for the present purpose and it is as follows:

    1. Whether it is open to a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence after having accepted a report submitted by the Police under Sec. 169 of Cr. P.C relating to that offence?

    10. It may however be mentioned that so far as Questions Nos. 2 and 3 were concerned, they are not relevant for the present enquiry, and moreover the answer to question No. 2 does not lay down a law which is good now. In view of amendment in the Code of Criminal Procedure sub-sec. (c) of S. 190(1) through which the earlier provision of suspicion of the Magistrate has been deleted.

    11. The Division Bench made the following observation in connection with the decision of Question No. 1:

    “Even if Magistrate is held to exercise judicial functions in taking cognizance of a case there does not appear to us to be any bar to his taking cognizance of a case on second thought after having accepted the final report once. The order approving the report under S. 169 of the Cr. P.C is not an order of acquittal and S. 403 of the Cr. P.C can possibly have no application to the question under consideration. The aforesaid order again is not even an order of discharge and it is significant that a fresh complaint is entertainable on the passing of an order of discharge. If a fresh complaint can be filed after an order of discharge, it should in our opinion be open to a Magistrate to take cognizance of a case on second thought after having accepted the final report under S. 169 of Cr. P.C”

    12. A reference was made to the case of Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State, AIR 1958 Orissa 11, wherein it was held that if at one stage a Magistrate even accepts the final report and does not wish to proceed with the matter further, but subsequently either new of acts come to light or after hearing the parties land perusing the papers available he finds that on the previous occasion he had overlooked an important aspect of the case, it is open to him to revise his earlier order.

    13. This Division Bench law remains good (law even now and the case of H.S Bains v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh) ((1980) 4 SCC 631 : AIR 1980 SC 1883) and Abbhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, mentioned above do not lay down anything against it. As I have already mentioned earlier in the matter of Gopal Vijay Verma ((1982) 3 SCC 510) (supra) the Supreme Court has already held that even though the order of the Magistrate may be treated as a judicial order, the Magistrate would still be justified in taking cognizance of a case even after earlier refusing to take cognizance on the police report. The case of Pradyum Narain Pandey, 1968 All LJ 768 (supra) only extends, the law laid down in the case of Gopal Vijay Verma and the legal position now is:

    14. Even after once accepting a final report submitted by the Police, the Magistrate can take cognizance of the case either (i) on the protest petition treating it as a complaint or (ii) on the police report itself if he comes to the conclusion on the basis of new facts or after hearing the parties and perusing the papers that are made available to him that on the previous occasion he had overlooked some important aspect of the case and he can revise his earlier order.

    15. In the first contingency he has to proceed on the protest petition and hence the procedure prescribed for a complaint case has to be undergone.

    16. In the second case the cognizance is again taken on the police report itself and it will be a cognizance under S. 190(i)(b) of the Cr. P.C and straightway summonses can be issued.

    17. In the light to this legal position when we peruse the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that after the learned Magistrate had accepted a final report, a protest petition along with some affidavits was filed before him. He considered the same and also perused the police report which was submitted earlier and was accepted by him. With the police report, the first information report, and the medical examination reports showing injuries on the persons of Nanhey and Imamul Haq, Mobin and Imran were also perused and the Court came to the conclusion that there was a prima facie case. It would clearly be taking cognizance on the police report as a result of second thought, which is permissible under the law and the cognizance being under S. 190(i)(b) of the Cr. P.C the Magistrate will be perfectly justified to straightway summon the accused without resorting to the procedure laid down in Ss. 200 and 202 of the Cr. P.C

    18. This being the situation the revision has no force and stands dismissed accordingly and the stay order granted by this Court on 25-1-88 stands vacated.

    19. This order shall be transmitted to the learned Magistrate concerned forthwith so that he may proceed with the matter expeditiously. This is necessary in order to ensure that this case as well as the cross-case which is already before the Sessions Judge concerned, are heard by the same Court one after the other and the judgments in both the cases are passed on the same date.

    20. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Shabir Ali v. State Of U.P.
    (Apr 18, 1988)