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  • Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act.
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  • Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act.

    Seshamma (Widow And L.R, Of The Deceased Manchraju Narayana Rao Alias Satyanarayanamurthy (L.R Of Counter-Petitioner.) v. Yberanki Pedda Venkatrao And Others S (Petitioner And His Legal Representatives.)

    This appeal is against the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Cocanada, setting aside an abatement of a suit, the order appealed against being passed under O. 22, R. 9. In ordinary circumstances, no appeal lies against such an order; but in the circumstances of this case, it is contended that the order appealed against was passed without jurisdiction and vitiated by material irregularity.

    2. The plaintiff, who is the respondent in this appeal, sued one M. Narayana Rao, in the Court of the District Munsif of Peddapur, on a mortgage and on 27th November, 1918, obtained a preliminary decree. It since transpired that the judgment-debtor died on the morning of 27th November, 1918, before the decree was passed. The plaintiff admits that, not long after the decree, he came to know of the facts, of the death of the judgment-debtor, but not of the actual date of it, and assumed that he had died after the decree and that therefore the decree was valid. He took no steps to bring on the legal representatives, until 27th September, 1920, when he filed E. A. No. 2411 of 1920, under O. 34. R. 5, wherein, while setting out that the judgment-debtor had died and entering his widow (the present appellant) as the defendant in the petition, he asked merely that a final decree be passed. The present appellant, in her counter, pointed out that the judgment-debtor had died before the preliminary decree was passed, that no petition to bring on the legal representative on record had been put in time, that therefore the suit had abated, and that the date of limitation for bringing on the legal representatives had passed. Even after this allegation, the plaintiff did nothing until 23rd March, 1921, when he put in E. A. No. 911 of 1921, in which he asked that the delay in bringing on the legal representatives be excused, and that a final decree be passed. In his affidavit to that petition, he persisted in saying that the defendant, judgment-debtor, died after the decree and that the allegation that he died before the decree was not true.

    3. The District Munsif dismissed both the petitions. The Additional Subordinate Judge, on appeal, held that the Application, E. A. No. 2411 of 1920, may be treated as one for setting aside the abatement of the suit and that the excuse for the delay in filing such an application is reasonable and he set aside the abatement of the suit and directed the District Munsif to take it on file and proceed with it.

    4. It is not now disputed that the judgment-debtor died before the preliminary decree was passed, that therefore, the preliminary decree was a nullity, and that no steps to bring on the legal representatives were taken, within six months of 27th November, 1918, as required by the Limitation Act then in force. It follows that the suit abated on 26th May, 1919. The plaintiff no doubt contends that in O. 22, R. 4, the phrase ‘right to sue’ does not apply, after a preliminary decree is passed and that therefore there is no limitation to the period, within which he was bound to apply, to have the legal representatives brought on; but, apart from the fact that the law is at present against him on this point—see Subbarayudu v. Ramadasu(1)—there is the obvious rejoinder that there was in fact no valid preliminary decree, therefore the suit has not even reached the stage of a preliminary decree. Clearly then the suit abated on 26th May, 1919.

    5. The first point to be noted is that, though the plaintiff has never asked that the abatement be set aside, the Lower Court, nevertheless, chose to treat his E. A. No. 2411 of 1920, as a prayer for that relief. That Execution Application, as already pointed out, was not put in, under O. 22 at all but under O. 34. Not only that, when the present appellant's rejoinder to it pointed out that the suit had abated, the plaintiff, evidently without making any enquiry, chose to take the stand-point that the suit had not abated and maintained that stand-point in his second petition E. A. No. 911 and never even then asked for the abatement to be set aside. It is true that E. A. No. 911 purports to have been put in, inter alia, under O. 22, Rr. 4 and 9; but even there he did not pray for the abatement being set aside; nor does the Lower Appellate Court make any reference to the Execution Application in the body of its order. Had it been pleaded before it, that E. A. No. 911 impliedly contained a prayer for the abatement being set aside, we cannot see why he should have thought it necessary to fall back on E. A. No. 2411 of 1920, in order to discover such an implied prayer for that relief. Even in his grounds of appeal, before the Lower Appellate Court, the plaintiff styles E. A. No. 911, merely as a petition to excuse the delay in bringing the legal representative on record. We must hold that technically there was not before the District Munsif or the Lower Appellate Court, any prayer under O. 22, R. 9 to set aside the abatement, and therefore the Lower Appellate Act had no jurisdiction to set it aside.

    6. There is a further technical difficulty in the plaintiff's way. E. A. No. 911 was dismissed by the District Munsif under a separate order and no copy of that order seems to have been put in, in the Lower Appellate Court and no petition asking to excuse the omission to file it has been filed. There was therefore no proper appeal against that order filed in the Lower Appellate Court. This may be the reason why the Lower Appellate Court ignores E. A. No. 911 altogether in its judgment. Here also, we must hold that the Lower Appellate Court had not before it any legal appeal against the order in E. A. No. 911 and had therefore no jurisdiction to set that order aside. Technically it remains in force and is a legal bar to the present appellant being brought on record, as the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor.

    7. Now, when it is necessary in order to do substantial justice, to brush aside technicalities, the Court will not be too scrupulous in enforcing them; but when, as we find in this case, there are no merits in the plaintiff's favour and the merits are on the appellants' side, the Court will not go out of its way to clear from the plaintiffs' path technical obstacles. As already pointed out, although the plaintiff knew of the death of the judgment-debtor, he did not make any enquiry as to when it had occured or make any attempt to have the legal representative brought on record within the legal period, six months. He did not even in E. A. No. 2411 ask the legal representative to be brought on record and he did not do so until 23rd March, 1921, nearly two years after the last day for bringing on the legal representative; and even though it had been pointed out to him on 4th December, 1920, by the appellant's counter that the suit had abated, he omitted or refused to make an enquiry, categorically said that that allegation was not true, and refused to believe that there had been any abatement and that there should be a petition to set it aside. So that even now, upto date, there is no petition to set aside the abatement. The Lower Court's reasons for indulging the plaintiff are based wholly on unsupported surmises; that the plaintiffs' pleader might have been ignorant of the law, or that the plaintiff had this or that mistaken idea in his head. He announces a general plenary indulgence to parties to take their own time, for applying for a final decree and that the “usual procrastination” of plaintiff is a good ground for calling in aid Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act. Such a principle is subversive of that Act altogether. We cannot see any ground for granting any indulgence to such a dilatory, negligent and mendacious party and we are not prepared to override the technical difficulties in the plaintiff's way.

    8. We hold therefore that the Lower Appellate Court's order is without jurisdiction, first because it had before it no prayer to set aside the abatement and no substantive motion, under O. 22, R. 9, Civil Procedure Code and secondly because it had no jurisdiction to revise the order in E. A. No. 911, which was not properly before it. It followed that its order, though technically one under O. 22, R. 9, and technically not appealable under that order, was not really passed under that order, because it was passed without jurisdiction, and it is therefore appealable, or at least open to revision, on the ground that it was without jurisdiction. We, therefore, set it aside and restore that of the District Munsif, with costs of the appellant throughout.

    S. S.Appeal allowed.

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