The suit out of which this Second Appeal arises was instituted to establish the right of the 1st plaintiff to conduct the “Puja” of the Mottagopuram Mahamuneeswarar Temple in Madura by deputy, and to enjoy the emoluments attached to the office of Pujari. There were other subsidiary reliefs asked for in the plaint, but this was the chief one Both the Lower Courts have held, against the contentions of the appellant-defendant, (1) that the plaintiff was not disqualified by her sex from holding the office, and (2) that in selecting a deputy to perform the duties she was not restricted to members of the family of her husband and appellant. In other words she was entitled to appoint the 2nd plaintiff. They have therefore decreed in her favour.
Mr. K. Srinivasa Iyengar, who argued the case for the appellant, admits that as regards the second point there are concurrent findings of fact which he is not entitled to question; but as regards the first point he relies on a very recent Judgment of this Court reported in Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal and argues that the finding of the Lower Courts must be set aside as illegal.
The question whether the 1st plaintiff is debarred by reason of her sex from holding the pujari office and (as would follow) from succeeding in the present suit is embodied in the first issue which runs thus:—
Is it the usage of the institution that a woman cannot inherit to the office and is the 1st plaintiff not entitled to the interest of her late husband?
The first portion is the material portion, the second being a mere corollary.
The District Munsif on a consideration of the evidence decided in plaintiff's favour, basing his decision very largely on previous admission by defendant himself of the 1st plaintiff's right to the office.
The District Judge says at the outset of his Judgment: “The first “contention of the appellant as defendant in the lower court was that “the 1st plaintiff could not inherit the office entitling her to the rights “which her husband had to a six months' turn of puja in the temple referred “to in the plaint. This contention has now been given up. It is “conceded that the office has passed to the 1st plaintiff and the appeal is “limited to the question of the extent of her rights of appointment of “a deputy, as she, being a woman, is admittedly incompetent to per-‘form the functions of the office herself.”
It must therefore be taken that there are concurrent findings of both courts on this issue, which is, on the face of it, one of fact and in the District Court the finding was acquiesced in by the appellant who now seeks to attack it, We are asked to set these findings aside on the ground that they are counter to an absolute rule of law enunciated in the case above quoted by Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar, i. e., that where a woman is disqualified by sex from performing the duties of a religious office, she is equally disqualified from holding the office and performing the duties by proxy. It is only if we accepet this as an absolute rule of law that we think we should be justified in interfering.
We have carefully considered the judgment of the learned Judge and are satisfied that he does in effect lay this down as an absolute rule of law; but while appreciating the cogency of much of the reasoning by which he supports it, we regret that we do not feel prepared to follow him to that extent, any more than did the learned Judge who sat with him in pearing that case. The rule may be salutary, but it seems to us to run counter to ideas which have been commonly accepted by parties concerned and given effect to by the courts for many years. If we are not mistaken the most recent authority quoted by the learned Judge in support of his view is Mujavar Ibrambibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff which dates back to 1880; and it is undeniable that since then, this and other High Courts have in numerous cases acted on the assumption (which was not questioned) that women could hold religious offices and get the duties performed by proxy.
Kakrannaya v. Padyaya, Pattabhi Ramanujacharyalu v. Alahaswaracharyulu, Bhaiaji Thakur v. Jharula Das Mahamaya Debi v. Hari Das Halder are all instances of this; and the list might, no doubt, be indefinitely extended. It may be that the parties concerned are so accustomed to the idea of female office holders with proxies that it has usually not occurred to them to question the legality of such a state of affairs and that in the absence of contest, the courts have somewhat too readily assumed it to be legal, without requiring proof of a valid custom in support of it. But in the present case such a custom is found to exist: and with all deference, we are not prepared to follow the learned Judge in pronouncing such a custom illegal.
We dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.