1. It is first contended that the Court had no power to extend the time upon a pauper application, and that even if it had power to extend the time inasmuch as the party has not applied for and obtained an extension of time, the plaint must be regarded as presented only on the date of representation, and secondly that there can be no implied extension of time. We think that the lower Courts were right in holding that the authority given by Section 148 of the CPC is sufficient to cover this case, and we agree with the observations of Maclean, C.J, in Padmanund Singh v. Anant Lal Misser(1), that as a general rule when once a Court has admitted and registered a plaint, it cannot subsequently reject it and that a Court may be taken to have extended the time and to have treated the time when the Court-fees were actually paid as the time fixed for payment, when it accepted them on that date. Section 149 of the CPC also permits a Court in its discretion to allow a party to pay the whole of any Court-fee at a subsequent state of the trial of a suit and to treat the payment as having been made in the first instance.
2. A third point has been raised, which is whether the plaintiff having given up a portion of the reliefs originally claimed by him should not be treated as having presented a new plaint on that date.
3. The mere relinquishment of a portion of the relief claimed in a plaint does not, in our opinion, make the plaint a new one.
4. The decision of the Privy Council in Stuart Skinner alias Nawab Mirza v. William Orde(2), is sufficient authority for pauper suits being converted into regular suits and for reckoning limitation from the date when the pauper petition was filed.
5. We agree with the lower Appellate Court and dismiss this appeal against order with costs.
S.N/R.K
6. Appeal dismissed.