Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges

    Imam Bee v. Molla Khasim Sahib

    The District Munsif held that women were entitled to share in the profits of the inam lands attached to the office of Muzawar of the suit mosque, as the evidence adduced in the case did not prove that women were prohibited from getting the duties of the office performed by deputies. The District Judge considered that the duties to be performed by the Muzawar were of such a religious and spiritual character that the office could not be held by a woman and therefore that women and persons deriving their title from them could not have any rights to the lands. Both Courts rightly placed the onus on those who sought to exclude women, of proving that they were disqualified (vide Tangirala Chiranjivi v. Raja Manikya. Row(1) and both found that a custom whereby women were excluded in this institution had not been proved.

    On the facts, therefore, the finding is in the appellant's favour. On the question of law whether women should be excluded from the succession, a number of decisions have been cited on either side. Without enumerating them, it may be briefly stated that there is a considerable volume of judicial decisions to the effect that the duties of Sajjad-i-nashin, or as it is sometimes called Gaddee Nashin, the superior of an endowment and religious preceptor, cannot be discharged by a woman or by a, deputy as the trust involves certain special spiritual duties. On the other hand, it has frequently been held that a woman can be a muttawalli or trustee, who has charge of secular affairs of an endowment and sometimes has religious duties as well, and that there is no legal prohibition against a woman holding a muttawalliship where there is nothing to the contrary in rules made by the founder or in the usage governing the particular institution.

    As stated in the note at the foot of page 343 of Macnaugh ten's Principles and Precedents, “The office of trustee maybe held by a woman, and the duties may be discharged by proxy; whereas the office of superior requires personal qualifications: Vide App. Tit. End. 28, 31.”

    Now when we come to the office of Muzawar we find two Madras decisions, Hussain Beebee v. Hussain Sheriff and Mujavar Ibram Bibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff(2). In both of these decisions it was held in respect of the same endowment that a woman was not competent to perform the duties of Muzawar. In accordance with these decisions, it is stated by Mr. Ganapathi Aiyar in his book on Hindu and Mahammadan Religious Endowments that the office of Muzawar is a subordinate office which entails on the holders the performance of religious duties and cannot therefore be held by a female.

    If these two cases can be said to lay down the proposition enunciated by Ganapathi Aiyar, it seems to us that they go too far, as being opposed to the dictum of the Privy Council in Shahoo Banoo v. Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem(3), which lays down that an office can be held by a woman unless there are duties of a religious nature which she cannot perform in person or by deputy; but we do not think that they do lay down any such broad proposition.

    When the case in Mujawar Ibram Bibi v. Mujawar Hussain Sheriff, is closely examined, it is seen that that was a first appeal and the learned Judges found on the evidence that it had been proved that the plaintiff, who was a woman, had never participated in the profits or performed the duties either in person or by proxy and that there was no evidence that the office of Muzawar in this particular institution had ever been held by a women. Reliance was also placed by the Judges on the previous decision to the same effect in Hussain Beebee v. Hussain Sheriff. The earlier decision proceeded upon a comparison of the office of Muzawar with that of Gaddee Nashin and upon the admission of Mr. Mayne, who appeared for the appellants, that he was unable to find any authority in Muhammadan Law for saying that a woman was competent to hold any religious office in connection with a mosque.

    But in the case before us, we have evidence, which both the Lower Courts have accepted, that there is a usage in this institution of getting the duties of Muzawar done by proxy, and in one instance a woman has enjoyed a share in the profits and has had the duties preformed by a man who lived in her house. Even the 1st plaintiff now deputes somebody to read for him as he cannot himself read.

    From the discription of the duties of the office, which include lighting and cleaning the mosque, spreading mats feeding travellers, they appear to be more on a level with the secular duties of Muttawalli than with the religious duties of a Sajjad-i-nashin. It is true that the witnesses speak of certain members of their family also preaching and calling to prayers, but this they may have done because they were Imams or Mulzzins and not by reason of their holding the office of Muzawar. In fact, plaintiff's witness No. 3 says that his father acted as Imam on behalf of Ismail Sahib and read the Kutba and the Fatiha during his period of litigation.

    Where the duties of the office are not very distinctly defined the safest course to follow is to be guided by the custom of the institution This being in the present case in favour of deputies being appointed, we see no obstacle to women sharing in the endowments of this office and getting their duties performed by proxy.

    Accordingly, allowing the appeal, we set aside the decree of the District Judge and restore that of the District Munsif with costs of the appellants in this and the lower Appellate Court.

    C.KAppeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Imam Bee v. Molla Khasim Sahib
    (Sep 6, 1916)