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  • provisions of sec. 8A of the Court Fees Act
  • sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sec. 8A of the Court Fees Act
  • sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Jemo Raj family had divided into five branches, with this appeal concerning the Madhyam and Na-tarafs. Raja Saradindu Narayan Roy (Na Raja) was the proprietor of the Na-taraf and had two sons, Sibendu and Ardhendu. Rajah Purnendu Narayan, proprietor of the Madhyam Taraf, adopted Ardhendu (renamed Rajendu), whose widow Anilabala is the Appellant. Sibendu predeceased the Na Raja, leaving two sons Amarendu and Dibyendu (the Respondent and Plaintiff). After Rajendu's death, Anilabala purportedly adopted Dibyendu, naming him Madhabendu.

Rajendu had executed two wills: the first in 1919 (Ex. O) limiting Anilabala's adoption power to adopting Dibyendu if alive; the second in 1926 (Ex. 01) revoked the first and granted Anilabala a life-estate with unrestricted adoption power. Rajendu died in 1927 without issue. Post his death, Anilabala intended to adopt a son from the Chota Taraf, leading to disputes.

Amarendu applied for probate of the first Will; Anilabala opposed and sought probate of the second Will. A compromise was eventually reached, including adoption of Dibyendu by Anilabala, withdrawal of Amarendu's probate application, and Anilabala receiving probate of the second Will. Anilabala signed three key documents on 4th January 1930: an arpannama dedicating properties to idols, a deed of adoption admitting adoption of Dibyendu, and a petition of compromise settling the probate disputes.

Madhabendu attained majority in 1935, attempted forcible possession, and then filed suit in 1937 seeking declaration of adoption, ownership of the estate, and injunction against Anilabala's management. Anilabala denied adoption, alleged undue influence, and challenged the validity of the adoption and compromise. The trial court upheld the adoption and compromise, granting decree in favor of Madhabendu. Anilabala appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the adoption of Dibyendu by Anilabala was valid in law.
  2. Whether the compromise, including the petition of compromise, resulted in Anilabala relinquishing her life-estate under the second Will.
  3. Whether oral evidence could be admitted to interpret or vary the terms of the petition of compromise.
  4. Whether the compromise was binding on Anilabala, a pardanashin lady.
  5. Whether the suit as framed, seeking injunction and declaration without possession, was maintainable in law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The adoption was invalid in law.
  • The effect of the compromise must be gathered solely from the petition of compromise; oral evidence is inadmissible to alter its terms.
  • The compromise did not require Anilabala to give up her life-estate under the second Will.
  • The compromise was not binding on her as a pardanashin lady.
  • It was not a term of settlement that Anilabala would relinquish her life-estate on adoption or on the adopted son attaining majority.
  • The suit as framed was not maintainable in law.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The adoption of Dibyendu by Anilabala was valid and legally effective.
  • The compromise, including the adoption deed and petition of compromise, constituted a binding settlement.
  • Anilabala had agreed to relinquish her life-estate in consideration of the compromise terms.
  • The adoption conferred on Madhabendu the rights of a natural born son under the second Will.
  • The suit sought proper relief based on the adoption and compromise.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Joy Narayan Sen, Ukil v. Srikantha Roy Definition of "further relief" under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Used to determine that injunction as further relief requires the plaintiff to be in possession or to claim recovery of possession.
Sunder Singh—Mallah Singh Sanatan Dharma High School Trust v. Managing Committee, Sunder Singh—Mallah Singh Rajput High School Clarification of when injunction constitutes “further relief” under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Applied to assess whether injunction could be granted to a plaintiff out of possession against a defendant in possession.
Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar Principle that injunction as further relief will not be granted to a plaintiff out of possession against a defendant in possession. Supported the court's discretionary refusal to grant injunction to the plaintiff who was out of possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the validity of the adoption by applying Hindu marriage rules relating to gotra and prohibited degrees of relationship. It held that Santi Debi was eligible for marriage with Rajendu under the trigotra rule, thus validating the adoption of Dibyendu by Anilabala.

Regarding the compromise, the court examined the evidence about the terms agreed upon on 4th January 1930, including the arpannama, adoption deed, and petition of compromise. It found that four terms were established: adoption of Dibyendu, probate of the second Will, continuation of Patitpaban as manager, and Anilabala becoming shebait of dedicated properties.

The critical issue was whether Anilabala agreed to relinquish her life-estate under the second Will as part of the compromise. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove such an agreement. The arpannama was likely a proposal from the Na-taraf to induce Anilabala to compromise but did not amount to surrender of her life-estate.

The court further held that the petition of compromise was the definitive document for determining rights but found it did not bind Anilabala to give up her life-estate. The explanation of the document to her was inadequate to inform her of the full effect, especially given her status as a pardanashin lady.

On the issue of injunction, the court reasoned that since Anilabala was in possession asserting her own right, and the plaintiff was out of possession, the injunction was not maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff had not prayed for recovery of possession, making the suit defective in this regard.

Consequently, although the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration of adoption, he was not entitled to possession or injunction.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed in part: It is declared that the Plaintiff is the adopted son of Rajendu Narayan Roy. However, the life-estate conferred on Anilabala by the second Will remains subsisting during her lifetime, and the prayer for injunction restraining her management is refused.

The parties are directed to bear their own costs. The decision clarifies the limits of adoption rights and life-estate interests under competing wills and underscores the necessity of clear and informed consent in compromise agreements, especially involving pardanashin ladies. No new precedent was set beyond the application of existing legal principles.

    Anilabala Debi v. Madhabendu Narain Roy

    1. In the course of time, Jemo Raj family had divided itself into five branches called the Bara-taraf, Madhyam-taraf, Na-taraf, Ful-taraf and Chota-taraf. In this appeal we are concerned with the Madhyam and the Na-tarafs only.

    2. Raja Saradindu Narayan Roy (called hereafter the Na Raja) was the proprietor of the Na-taraf. He had two sons Sibendu and Ardhendu. The proprietor of the Madhyam Taraf, Rajah Purnendu Narayan, had no male issue. He adopted Ardhendu, the youngest son of Raja Saradindu, and named him Rajendu, whose widow Anilabala, is the Appellant before us. Sibendu's wife is Santi Devi. Sibendu predeceased his father, the Na Raja, leaving two sons Amarendu and Dibyendu, who is the principal Respondent in this appeal and was the Plaintiff in the suit. It is his case that after the death of Rajendu he was adopted by Anila bala and named Madhabendu.

    3. Rajendu and the Na Raja lived as members of a joint family till about 1926 when there was separation. While living jointly with the Na Raja, Rajendu executed a Will (Ex. O) on the 16th May, 1919. Amarendu and Dibyendu were appointed executors, and Anilabala was to be the executrix during their minority. A maintenance allowance of Rs. 100 per month was provided for Anilabala. She was given the power to adopt a son, but that power was limited both in regard to time and choice. If Dibyendu was alive she was to adopt him and no one else. If he and other sons of the Na Raja were dead then she could adopt from outside the Jemo family. On adoption the adopted son was to get his estate and would be entitled to possession from the date of adoption. Anilabala was directed to adopt Dibyendu within eighteen months of the testator's death. If she failed to do so his estate would vest in Amarendu and Dibyendu in equal shares, and Anilabala was to get the monthly allowance of Rs. 100 only. Other provisions of this Will are not material to this appeal.

    4. After separation from the Na Raja, Rajendu executed his second Will (Ex. 01) on the 11th August, 1926. By it he revoked his earlier Will, Ex. O. He appointed Anilabala as executrix and his brother-in-law (sister's husband) Bejoy Gopal Roy as executor. He gave a life-estate in the whole of his estate to Anilabala. She was given authority to adopt but her power was not limited. She could exercise it at any time and could adopt any body she pleased. If Rajendu had a natural born son (aurasa son) that son was to get the estate in possession on attaining majority, but the enjoyment of the estate by the adopted son was to be postponed till the death of Anilabala. The net effect is that Anilabala's life-estate was to cease on the natural born son attaining majority but was to continue till her death when an adopted son only entered the field. We do not set out the effect of the Will where a natural born son came into existence after a boy had been taken in adoption, as that contingency has not happened. Rajendu died on the 23rd December, 1927, without leaving any issue. It appears from the evidence that before his death he was not on good terms with the Na Raja and after his death the relations between his widow Anilabala and the Na Raja did not improve.

    5. Shortly after the death of Rajendu, Anilabala expressed her intention of adopting a son from the Chota Taraf. That brought matters to head. Amarendu made an application before the District Judge on the 30th April, 1928, for probate of Rajendu's first Will, Ex. O. (Case No. 18 of 1928). Dibyendu, then a minor, filed a suit against Anilabala and others through his mother and next friend, Santi Debi, for restraining Anilabala from adopting the son of the Chota Taraf. In that plaint it was alleged that Anilabala was stating that the Will Ex. O had been revoked by Rajendu by a later Will which she was attempting to set up. Anilabala in her turn opposed the application for probate of the Will Ex. O, filed by Amarendu and on the 25th August, 1928, made an application before the District Judge for probate of Rajendu's second Will Ex. 01 (Case No. 23 of 1928). Amarendu opposed this application and on the 3rd April, 1929, made an application in this case, Case No. 23 of 1928, for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. Patitpaban Chowdhury, the father of Anilabala, who had shortly after the death of Rajendu, taken service under the Na Raja at the latter's request and who had leaning towards the Na Raja was appointed administrator pendente lite by an ex parte order dated the 25th May, 1929. He was ordered to give security to the extent of one lac of rupees and the Na Raja stood security for him for that amount.

    6. Anilabala's application for probate was postponed from time to time, from the 19th June, 1929, to the 2nd January, 1930, on her applications. The ground stated in those applications was that negotiations for compromise were proceeding. On the 2nd January, 1930, a joint application for postponement of the case to the 6th January, 1930, was made by Anilabala and Amarendu in which it was stated that almost all the terms of the compromise had been settled between the parties and if the short adjournment prayed for were granted there was every chance of the case being settled. On the 4th January, 1930, Anilabala signed three documents:

    (1) An arpannama by which some items of immovable property were dedicated to the idols Sri Sri Radha Krishna Jius. (Ex. 3-II 173). This document was executed in the morning according to the version of both sides. By it Anilabala became the shebait.

    (2) A deed of adoption (Ex. 4-II 178) in which it was admitted that Anilabala had taken in adoption Dibyendu and had named him Madhabendu. There is difference between the parties as to the time of execution, Anilabala's case is that it was executed in the morning while the case of the other side is that it was executed at about 2 P.M

    (3) A petition of compromise (I-85) intended for being filed in Probate Case No. 23 of 1928.

    7. There were seven terms in it. The fact of adoption of Dibyendu was admitted in the first paragraph. Amarendu undertook to withdraw his application for probate of the first Will of Rajendu. Anilabala was to get probate of the second Will, her father Patitpaban was to remain as manager of the estate till Madhabendu attained majority, Anilabala would be bound to bring up, educate and marry the minor Madhabendu, and in case the latter died without leaving an heir Anilabala bound herself to adopt another descendant of the Na Raja. The parties were to bear their respective costs. There is a similar difference between the parties as to the time of the execution of this document as in the case of the deed of adoption. This document was filed in the probate cases on the 6th January, 1930. Amarendu's application for probate of the first Will was withdrawn. On the 13th January, 1930, an affidavit in proof of the second Will was filed and an order for the issue of probate of that Will to Anilabala was made on that date. Temporary probate was issued to her on the 2nd April, 1931, and on her paying the full probate duty later on probate was issued to her on the 18th May, 1932. On the 18th February, 1933, Santi Debi acting on behalf of Madhabendu made an application for revocation of the probate granted to Anilabala. This application was not eventually pressed and was dismissed on the 21st March, 1934. Madhabendu attained majority in October, 1935. Patitpaban ceased to be the administrator pendente lite in August, 1930, but continued to be the manager till 1932. From that time Anilabala was in charge of the management. Within a year of his attaining majority Madhabendu tried to take forcible possession from Anilabala. Those acts of his resulted in criminal proceedings. Having been baffled in his attempt to take forcible possession he filed this suit on the 21st May, 1937, wherein he prayed for

    (a) a declaration that he was the adopted son of Rajendra,

    (b) for a declaration that he was the full owner of the whole estate as left by Rajendu, and as the life-estate given to Anilabala by the second Will of Rajendu had been completely destroyed by the compromise effected on the 4th January, 1930, he was entitled to possess and enjoy the estate, and

    (c) for an injunction restraining Anilabala from exercising acts of management over the estate left by Rajendu and from interfering with his management of the same.

    8. In the plaint no mention is made of the arpannama. The effect of the compromise is stated in paragraph 16 in a manner which does not indicate that the arpannama was in any way connected with or was a material part of the compromise as pleaded in that paragraph. No schedule of properties was appended to the plaint. The Plaintiff being later on required by the Court to file a valuation statement of the properties in suit under the provisions of sec. 8A of the Court Fees Act filed a statement in which he included the properties dedicated by the arpannama to the said idols, as being properties in suit also.

    9. In her written statement Anilabala pleaded inter alia

    (i) that she never adopted Dibyendu,

    (ii) that she put her signature on the arpannama, on the deed of adoption and on the petition of compromise at the same time under undue influence and coercion,

    (iii) that no proposal was ever made to her, not even a hint uttered, that she was to give up the life-estate conferred on her by the second Will of her husband.

    10. By an additional written statement she pleaded that the alleged adoption of Dibyendu was invalid in law. On this state of the pleadings the parties went to trial.

    11. At the trial the case of the Plaintiff as finally developed can be stated in the following manner:

    Negotiations for compromise between Anilabala and the Na-taraf started about May, 1929. Anilabala's maternal grand-father, Saradapro-sanna Roy, and her maternal uncle, Kaliprosanna Roy, were not then on the scene. They appeared on the scene later on—towards the fag end of December, 1929. During the period May to December, 1929, her father Patitpaban and her brother Shibapro-sad were there, Sabitri Debi was there as also other members of the Na-taraf. By the end of December, 1929, the negotiations had reached this stage, namely that Anilabala agreed to take Dibyendu in adoption.

    12. The difference between the parties at that stage was only on the point as to whether the first or the second Will of Rajendu was to be probated. Anilabala insisted on the probate of the second Will but Amarendu insisted on the probate of the first Will of Rajendu. To compose this difference between them the services of Sarada Prosanna were requisitioned. He came accompanied by his son Kaliprosanna to the Jemo Rajbati on the 30th or 31st December, 1929, and saw Anilabala. Anilabala wanted to have the probate of the second Will, as, according to her, her consent to the probate of the first Will would imply an admission on her part that her husband was a drunkard and a fickle-minded man. Sarada Prosanna thereupon pointed out the unfairness towards the adopted son in case the second Will was probated without any modification of its terms. He pointed out that Dibyendu would lose his rights in his natural family on adoption and that he would get nothing from the estate of Rajendu on account of the life-estate of Anilabala. He suggested a via media. The second Will would be probated provided she gave up the life-estate conferred on her by the said Will on taking a maintenance of of Rs. 300 to Rs. 400 a month. Anilabala in reply said that she would not want maintenance, but would be satisfied if properties yielding Rs. 5,000 a year were dedicated to the idols and she made the shebait, the underlying idea being that the surplus of income from the debutter properties after meeting the costs of worship would be sufficient to enable her to maintain herself. That proposal of Anilabala was accepted (see Kaliprosonna I 381, Sabitri Debi I 217-218 Santi Debi I 241). The arpannama was drawn up and it was arranged that it would be executed first. It was to have been executed on the evening of the 3rd January, 1930, but as at the last moment Anilabala objected to some items of property to be included therein, it was not executed on that date, but was executed in the morning of the 4th January, 1930. The adoption ceremony was then begun at about 8 o'clock in the morning and concluded at about 1 P.M or so and immediately thereafter Anilabala signed the adoption deed and the petition of compromise at the same sitting. Many witnesses who were then present attested the adoption deed and some witnesses who came later on attested the same on Anilabala acknowledging execution. According to this version the arpannama was an essential part of the compromise.

    13. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the adoption was in fact made, that it is valid in law, that Anilabala had failed to prove her case of undue influence and coercion, that the compromise was on the terms as stated by the Plaintiff's witnesses, that the arpannama, the deed of adoption and the petition of compromise had been adequately explained to her and she had signed them after knowing fully their effect. According to him by the petition of compromise, Madhab-endu got on adoption the rights of a natural born son as defined in Rajendu's second Will. He accordingly made a decree in favour of the Plaintiff on the 27th February, 1939.

    14. Anilabala has preferred this appeal against this decree. Mr. Sarat Bose appearing on her behalf has not challenged the fact of adoption and has not pressed the case of undue influence and coercion. He has urged the following points only:—

    (1) the adoption is invalid in law;

    (2) the effect of the compromise has only to be gathered from the terms of the petition of compromise, no oral evidence being admissible to supplement or vary its terms,

    (3) that on a construction of the said petition of compromise, it must be held that Anilabala had not given up the life-estate conferred on her by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Will, Exhibit O1;

    (4) that the compromise as set up by the Plaintiff is not binding on her, a pardanashin lady;

    (5) that at any rate it was not a term of settlement that Anilabala was to give up her life-estate on the adoption or on the adopted son attaining majority, and

    (6) that the suit as framed is not maintainable in law.

    15. The validity of the adoption depends solely upon the question as to whether Santi Debi, the natural mother of Dibyendu, could have been married in her maiden state by Eajendu. The parties are Brahmins, special custom is not alleged. The parties being of the twice-born class the following rules are applicable:

    I. The bridegroom and the bride must not be of the same gotra and provara.

    II. The bride must not be a descendant within the seventh degree from the bridegroom's father and of the latter's six male ancestors.

    III. She must not be a descendant within the fifth degree from the bridegroom's maternal grandfather and of the latter's four male ancestors.

    IV. She must not be a descendant within seven degrees of the bridegroom's father's bandus and of the latter's six male ancestors, and

    V. She must not be a descendant within five degrees of the bridegroom's mother's bandhus and of the latter's four male ancestors.

    16. To these rules there is an important exception. It is that if the bride is removed by three gotras, she would be eligible for marriage even if she falls within the prohibited degrees as defined in rules II to V.

    17. The admitted pedigree is as follows:—

    18. S2 is Rajendu's pitri bandhu, being the maternal uncle's son of his father, Purnendu. Santi Debi is the third in the descent from the paternal grandfather of S2. She accordingly comes within the prohibition of rule IV and unless she comes within the exception the trigotra rule as it is called, she would not have been eligible for Rajendu. Rajendu's gotra was Pundarik, the gotra of S2, S1 and Raja Maha-nanda was Gautam. Annapurna on marriage adopted her husband's gotra which was Sankrit, Jotirmohini on her marriage got her husband's gotra, which was Kasyap and Santi Debi in her maiden state had the same gotra, namely Kasyap,—the gotra of her father. Counting Rajendu's gotra as the first, there are four gotras altogether and so she was removed from Rajendu's gotra by three gotras. If therefore Rajendu's gotra be taken into the computation for the trigotra rule, Santi Debi would have been eligible for Rajendu inspite of the fact that she fell within the prohibition of rule No. IV. Whether that gotra can be taken into consideration or not is therefore the vital question. If it can be, Santi Debi would have been eligible if not, she would not be eligible for Rajendu. Both Sir Guru Das Bannerjee and Mr. Shyama Charan Sarkar have expressed the opinion that in the matter of computation for the trigotra rule the bridegroom's gotra has to be reckoned. Both state the scope of the exception in the following manner:

    “A girl who is removed by three gotras from the bridegroom is not unmarriageable, though related within seven or five degrees aa above described.” (Tagore Law Lectures on Marriage and Stridhan, p. 64, 4th edition and Vyavastha Darpana, p. 662, 2nd edition).

    19. The illustration given at the top of p. 65 of the said Tagore Law Lectures and that given at the foot-note of page 862 of the Vyavastha Darpana (2nd Edition) make it clear that if on proceeding from the boy's gotra to that of the girl's there are four gotras in all, the girl would be regarded as being removed by three gotras from the boy and would be eligible for marriage. Those illustrations make it clear that it will be legitimate to take into account the boy's gotra in the matter of calculation. It has however been contended by the learned Advocate for the Appellant that the trigotra rule as expressed in general terms by Sir Gurudas Banerjee and by Mr. Shyama Charan Sarkar is not what has been understood and defined by Raghunandan, where the connection between the boy and the girl is through a bandhu. In that case it is said that the counting of gotras must commence from the bandhu's gotra or the bandhu's maternal grandfather's gotra, as the case may be, and not from the gotra of the hoy or of his father (which is the same). It is further said that Sir Gurudas Bannerjee in a way recognised this at the passage at the bottom of page 64 of his Tagore Law Lectures (2nd Edition). In support of his contention the Appellant's Advocate has placed reliance upon the twenty-first stanza of Raghunandan's Udbapatattwa, the material portion of which as translated in this Court at page 512, Part I of the paper books is as follows:

    “In counting the three gotras with respect to the descendants of a Bandhu it should be commenced from the Bandhu's own Gtoira, but in counting the three got, as with respect of the male ancestors of the Bandhu the three gotras should be counted commencing from the Bandhu's gotra, where such Bandhu is the father's maternal uncle's son or the mother's maternal uncle's son and that in case of other Bandittis the counting should commence from the Bandhu's maternal grandfather's gotra;

    20. In our judgment, the illustrations given by Raghunandan immediately after this passage bring out the meaning of this passage. The starting point is only indicated, but the passage does not prohibit that in the course of counting from that starting point the counting should proceed from the bandhu only towards the girl's family and not towards the boy's. The boy's gotra may not be taken into account, but we do not understand why on this passage the boy's father's gotra which is the same as that of the boy, should not be reckoned. The first illustration of Raghunandan is represented by the following table: (M represents males, F females in the table.)

    21. M (B) is the father's bandhu, being his (father's) paternal aunt's son. Raghunandan says that the girl would have been eligible for the boy if the counting commenced from M (B)'s gotra but as the counting has to be made from M (B)'s maternal grandfather's gotra according to the rule formulated, because the bandhu is not the father's maternal uncle's son, she is not eligible as she falls within three gotras. In the illustration the girl would not be beyond three gotras on a counting being made from M (B)'s gotras unless the gotra of the boy or of his father, (which is the same) were taken into consideration. We accordingly hold that the rule as formulated in Exception No. 1 in Sir Gurudas Bannerjee's Tagore Law Lectures at page 64 (2nd Edition) is a correct interpretation of Raghunandan and as in the case before us there are four gotras in all in proceeding from the gotra of Rajendu's father to the gotra of Santi Defoi's father, the marriage between Santi Debi and Rajendu would have been valid. The adoption of Dibyendu by Anilabala is accordingly valid in law.

    22. The most important question in this case is what were the terms of the compromise.

    * * * * *

    [After discussing the evidence, their Lordships came to the following conclusion.]

    * * * * *

    23. In our judgment it has been established that four of the terms of the compromise were

    (1) that Dibyendu was to be adopted,

    (2) the second Will of Rajendu, Ex. 01, was to be probated,

    (3) Patitpaban was to continue in management under Anilabala as executrix, and

    (4) Anilabala was to be the shebait of the deities to whom certain properties were to be dedicated.

    24. The material question on which there is a difference is whether Anilabala also agreed to give up her life-estate on the adoption being made or on the adopted son attaining majority.

    * * * * *

    [After discussing the evidence their Lordships concluded as follows.]

    * * * * *

    25. We accordingly hold that it has not been established by the Plaintiff that in her talks with Sarada Prosanna Babu or with others Anilabala had agreed to give up her life-estate either on adoption or on the adopted son attaining majority resting herself satisfied with arpannama properties only. It seems to us to be probable that the suggestion of the arpammmot came from the Na-Taraf in order to induce Anilabala, a Hindu widow, who had just then returned from pilgrimage to holy places with thoughts more directed to the next world, to a reasonable frame of mind, so that she may consider the proposal for adopting Dibyendu and not spurn at and summarily reject any offer for compromise coming from Na-Taraf which she had done in the past.

    26. The other aspect of the matter that has to be considered is the effect of the compromise petition. That was the final document and in our judgment the rights of the parties are to be determined on that document and that document only, provided of course that it was executed under circumstances which would make it binding on her, a pardanashin lady.

    * * * * *

    [After discussing the evidence their Lordships concluded as follows.]

    * * * * *

    27. We therefore hold on the construction of the petition of compromise that her life-estate was not taken away either on adoption or on the adopted son attaining majority. Even if the phrase “in the interest of a son born of Anilabala's womb” used in the recital has the effect contended for by the Plaintiff, we cannot hold Anilabala to be bound by the compromise, for that was an essential term and no body explained to her the full effect thereof. There is no evidence that at the time of the explanation of the document by Rakhal Babu, the latter brought to the notice of Anilabala the substance, of Rajendu's second Will and explained to the lady that that Will conferred on her a life-estate which was to last even on adoption and that by that phrase in the petition of compromise she would be losing that interest. In the absence of such clear statements by Rakhal Babu we do not think his explanation of the document to be adequate for that purpose. It would not in our judgment be enough to bind the lady if Rakhal Babu had simply stated that the adopted boy would become the owner on attaining majority or that her life-estate would cease without explaining to her her position under the terms of the second Will.

    28. Even if the Plaintiff had established his case that he had an estate which he was entitled to enjoy on attaining majority, we have grave doubts about the maintainability of his prayer for injunction. Anilabala was in possession of the properties in the assertion of her own right. That was quite apparent to the Plaintiff. Before the suit the Plaintiff wanted to take forcible possession but was unsuccessful. After filing the suit he applied for the appointment of a receiver. In his order on the said application the Subordinate Judge found that Anilabala was in possession not only as an executrix but also in her own right as legatee (I. 160 at 161). In spite of that finding the second prayer in the plaint was not amended and possession prayed for. The reason why such a course was not adopted by the Plaintiff is obvious. If he had amended his prayer in that manner he would have had to pay ad valorem court-fees on the market-value of the properties in suit. It could not have proceeded on the basis of the comparatively small court-fee that had been affixed by him on the plaint. The suit as framed is a suit for declaration with a prayer for injunction. The first question is whether in this case where the Plaintiff is out of possession injunction could be regarded as “further relief” mentioned in the proviso to sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. And the second question is, assuming that a prayer for injunction would be “further relief” within the meaning of that section in such a case, whether the Court in its discretion would grant it to a Plaintiff out of possession and against the Defendant who is in possession.

    29. The cases establish the proposition that “further relief” mentioned in the proviso to sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act must be

    “relief in relation to the legal character or right as to property to which the Plaintiff is entitled to-and whose title to such character or right the Defendant denies or is interested to deny and that relief must also be appropriate to and necessarily consequent on the right or title asserted,” Joy Nara-yan Sen, Ukil v. Srikantha Roy(1).

    30. On this principle where the Plaintiff whose title is denied by the Defendant is out of possession and the Defendant is in possession, the “further relief” would be recovery of possession and a suit for declaration of title will not be maintainable unless the Plaintiff prayed for possession also. If, however, the Plaintiff is out of possession but the Defendant is not in possession or is not in a position to deliver possession to the successful Plaintiff, injunction would be the further relief. This proposition has been laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sunder Singh—Mallah Singh Sanatan Dharma High School Trust v. Managing Committee, Sunder Singh—Mallah Singh Rajput High School(2). On the observations made by the Lord Thankerton in that case it may be urged that where the Plaintiff is out of possession and the Defendant is in possession or is able to deliver possession to the Plaintiff, “further relief” would-be recovery of possession and if such relief is not claimed the suit would be a bad suit. In this case however we prefer to rest our decision on the second point we have indicated above Even if injunction could be considered to be further relief within the meaning of the proviso to sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, we would not have granted it to Plaintiff in the exercise of our discretion, even if he had established his right to present enjoyment of the estate, as he could have prayed for recovery of possession, on the principle formulated in Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar(3).

    31. As on the merits we have found that the Plaintiff is not entitled to possession, we think that he ought to get a declaration that he is the adopted son of Rajendu. As Anilabala had denied the factum and validity of the adoption that is the only relief he can obtain.

    32. The result is that this appeal is allowed in part. It is declared that the Plaintiff is the adopted son of Rajendu Narayan Roy. On the finding that the life-estate conferred on the Defendant No. 1, Anilabala Debi, by the second Will of Rajendu Narayan Roy is still subsisting and will subsist during her life-time, the prayer for injunction made by the Plaintiff is refused. As the success is divided the parties must bear their respective costs throughout.

    C.C

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    Anilabala Debi v. Madhabendu Narain Roy
    (Jul 18, 1941)