1. In this case, a rule was issued upon the District Magistrate Burdwan, and also upon the complainant to show cause why the proceedings under Sec. 500, I.P.C, against the petitioners should not be quashed or such other order made as to this Court may seem fit and proper. The petitioner Ramkissen lodged an information at the thana on 19th July 1936 that he went to the firm of Keshabram and demanded some money due to his master; that he was an employee of the firm of Kuarram Jharilal of Ranigunge, an altercation ensued and Rameswar Lal Marwari snatched away his cloth bag containing Rs. 378-4-6 and assaulted him. An enquiry was made and all the accused were charged under S. 323, I.P.C and Rameswar Marwari was, in addition to that section, charged under S. 379, I.P.C The Magistrate found the four accused guilty and sentenced them to pay fines of Rs. 50 each under S. 323, I.P.C and found Rameswar Marwari guilty under S. 379, I.P.C On appeal, the Sessions Judge found that the story of theft had been falsely added to the charge of assault and therefore he set aside the conviction for assault. Then on 11th August, the complainant lodged a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate charging the petitioners with an offence under S. 500, I.P.C on the ground that by reason of the allegations of theft made against him he had been lowered in public estimation and the business of his firm has suffered. The petitioners were accordingly summoned under S. 500, I.P.C and it is in consequence of that this application has been made. The ground on which this rule is urged is that as the present prosecution is designed to avoid the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr PC, the prosecution should not be allowed to proceed. For the petitioners, the case in 44 Cal 9701 has been referred to. In that case, the learned Judge has held (head-note):
Where an offence, though described as an offence under S. 500 of the Penal Code, still remains an offence ‘punishable’ under S. 211. Process should not issue under the former section be the application of a person discharged or acquitted, when the Court has refused sanction under the latter section.
2. The reason given by the learned Judge for this view of the law is that if, after sanction has been refused, prosecution under S. 500 was allowed, the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr PC, will be nugatory.
The case taken to protect “complainants” from being harassed by prosecutions for instituting false cases is a clear indication that the Legislature never intended or contemplated that upon refusal of leave to prosecute under S. 211, a person who has been discharged or acquitted should be allowed to fall back upon S. 600.
3. This decision was referred to in a Full Bench decision in 48 Cal 388.2 There the Acting Chief Justice has discussed the matter as follows:
The maker of a single statement may be guilty of two district offences, one under S. 211 (which us an offence against public justice) and the other an offence under S. 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates. The Legislature has provided, in the Code of Criminal Procedure that the sanction of the Court where the offence is committed, is essential in the former case for the institution of criminal proceedings. In the latter case the Legislature has omitted to make a similar provision. This diversity, for caught we know, may have been deliberate and plainly affords no reason why the Court should struggle to hold that the statement does not fall within the mischief of the rule embodied in S. 499. The two offences are fundamentally district in nature, as is patent from the fact that the former is made non-compoundable while the latter remains compoundable; in the former case for the initiation of the proceedings, the Legislature requires the sanction of the Court under Section 196 of the Cr PC in the latter case, cognizance can be taken of the offence only upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved under Section 198 of the Cr PC.
4. Then he goes on to say:
It is after all the province of the statesman and not of a Judicial Tribunal to discuss and of the Legislature to determine, what is the best for the public good and to provide for it by proper enactments.
5. But till the law has been amended, in one, or other of the modes just indicated, or possibly in some other manner, it is incumbent upon us, if we are to avoid the greatest uncertainty and confusion, to interpret the clear and unambiguous provisions of the statute in their plain natural sense, and not to allow ourselves to be led into speculations as to their reasonableness or unreasonableness by reference to the ever captivating but often misleading ideals of public policy.
6. This decision was followed unanimously by all the members of the Full Bench and although the main point for consideration of the Full Bench in that case was whether a defamatory statement by a party to a judicial proceeding was or was not absolutely privileged, the question, which is now before us, was discussed and considered at length in the course of the decision of the Full Bench and certainly it must be regarded as overruling the decision in 44 Cal 970. Our attention however has been drawn to the case in 111 IC 433,3 in which Sir George Rankin has quoted the case in 44 Cal 970 with approval and found that in a case where the offence committed was really one under S. 471, Penal Code, it was illegal to reduce the charge to one under S. 474, Penal Code, and prosecute the accused without a complaint under Section 476 of the Cr PC. The facts of that case were however quite different. There the learned Judge was satisfied that the offence was clear under S. 471, if any offence was made out at all, and that process having been sought and refused under Section 476 of the Cr PC, it would be wrong to permit the prosecution to take place in the manner which had been adopted. He discusses why S. 474, I.P.C, was not included in the sections which require action to be taken under Section 476 of the Cr PC and says that prosecution under Sec. 474, I.P.C, was, in that case, escaping from the effect of Section 195 of the Cr PC. Both, the case in 44 Cal 970 and the case in 111 IC 433, are distinguishable from the present case in that in both those cases sanction to prosecute coming under S. 195 had been refused. It seems clear that since the Legislature has not chosen to include S. 500 amongst these sections in which prosecution must be initiated by the Court in connexion with which the offence has been committed, there is no provision of the law by which the Court can refuse to permit a prosecution under S. 500 where the facts appear to justify such a prosecution. It would, therefore, not be right to quash the proceedings under S. 500, I.P.C The guilt or innocence of the accused must be decided in accordance with the evidence in the case and provisions of S. 499 of the Code. This Rule is accordingly discharged.
R.M/R.K
7. Rule discharged.