On the authority of the judgment of the Privy Council in Webb v. Macpherson(1) which is since the decision of the lower Appellate Court in this case, we must hold that the District Judge was wrong in his view that the case was governed by article 111 of the schedule to the Limitation Act. It is pointed out in the judgment of the Privy Council that the charge which a vendor obtains under section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act is different in its origin and nature from the vendor's lien given by English Courts of Equity to an unpaid vendor. The charge in the present case is not the vendor's lien contemplated by article 111, but the statutory charge which arises by virtue of the provisions of section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. The article applicable is article 132 and not article 111 and the suit is not barred by limitation. It was argued by the respondents that if this he the right view, no case could arise to which article 111 would be applicable. This may or may not be so. For the purpose of the present case it is enough for us to hold that the period of limitation in this case is twelve years from the date of the sale. Having regard to the decision of the Privy Council it would seem that Natesan Chetti v. Soundararaja Ayyangar, Avuthala v. Dayumma(2), and Subrahmania Ayyar v. Poovan(3), can no longer be regarded as binding authorities in so far as this point is concerned. We must set aside the decrees of the lower Courts. There will be the usual decree for sale for Rs. 900 with interest at six per cent, per annum from the date of plaint to the date of payment with proportionate costs out of the sale-proceeds of the properties in schedule B. The respondents will hear their own costs throughout.
The time for payment will be three months from this date.