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  • sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • sec. 90 of the Trusts Act, 1882;
  • sec. 4 of Act III of 1885
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • sec. 90 of the Trusts Act, 1882;
  • sec. 4 of Act III of 1885
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a parcel of land of about ten cottahs within the town of Pabna. The superior landlord originally leased the land by a kabuliyat dated 29th Magh 1291 to the predecessor in interest of the Defendant. The Defendant (including his predecessor) allowed the Plaintiff's father to reside on the land on condition that the father would work as a mukhtear in the Criminal Courts and pay rent to the superior landlord. While in possession under that license, the Plaintiff's father obtained a lease of the same land from the superior landlord; the rights under that lease were intermediate between those of the superior landlord and those of the Defendant.

After the father's death, the Defendant brought two ejectment suits against the present Plaintiff. The second of these was defended by the Plaintiff but was ultimately decreed, awarding khas possession to the Defendant. Thereafter the present suit was instituted by the Plaintiff: he purported to terminate the Defendant's tenancy by notice (apparently under sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act), and, after the notice period had expired, sued for a declaration that the Defendant's rights had terminated and for an injunction restraining execution of the earlier decree. The lower Appellate Court decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiff, and the Defendant appealed to the court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit is barred by res judicata under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (including Explanation II).
  2. Whether the Plaintiff, as a confidential agent of the Defendant, obtained a lease that in equity must be held on trust for the Defendant (reference to section 90 of the Trusts Act, 1882).
  3. Whether the Defendant's kabuliyat constitutes a lease (with reference to section 4 of Act III of 1885).
  4. What is the nature of the tenancy created by the Defendant's kabuliyat—specifically whether a lease granted for building purposes with no fixed term is effectively a permanent lease (reference to the case Juhooree Lall Shahoo v. M. Dear and to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  5. Whether there is a cause of action in the Plaintiff's suit and, relatedly, whether the cause of action was properly dated in the plaint.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The suit is barred by section 13 of the former Code of Civil Procedure (res judicata), relying on Explanation II to that section.
  • The Plaintiff, having been a confidential agent of the Defendant, obtained the second lease in breach of duty and must be regarded as a trustee for the Defendant's benefit (relying on the equitable principle expressed in section 90 of the Trusts Act, 1882).
  • The Defendant's kabuliyat is not a mere license but should be treated as a lease (reference made to section 4 of Act III of 1885 in support of treating it as a lease).
  • On the view of authorities such as Juhooree Lall Shahoo v. M. Dear, where land is given for building purposes and no period is fixed, the tenure may be indefeasible in the lessee's representatives—arguing that the present kabuliyat creates a tenancy which cannot be easily terminated.
  • There is no cause of action in the Plaintiff's suit (implicitly challenging the dating and basis of the cause of action).

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The Plaintiff served notice terminating the Defendant's tenancy (apparently under section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act) and, after the relevant period expired, brought suit for declaration that the Defendant's rights terminated and for an injunction restraining execution of the earlier decree.
  • The Plaintiff dated his cause of action from the decree in the former suit (this was later admitted to be a mistake by the Plaintiff's pleader).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Juhooree Lall Shahoo v. M. Dear The proposition (as stated in that decision) that where land is given for the purpose of building a dwelling-house and no period is fixed for the tenancy, the tenure could not be taken away from the lessee's representatives so long as they continued to pay rent (i.e., an effectively permanent tenure). The Court held that adopting the decision in its literal terms would have the dangerous effect of treating most urban building leases as permanent. The Court distinguished that decision in light of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the specific terms of the kabuliyat (e.g., prohibitions on masonry and cutting trees) and declined to treat the present lease as a permanent lease on that authority alone.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the points raised by the parties in sequence and applied statutory provisions and equitable principles as they found them in the record.

Res judicata (section 13 CPC and Explanation II). The court observed that in the earlier suit the Plaintiff had pleaded title under his father's lease and had asserted that he had terminated the Defendant's tenancy by notice, but the printed judgment in that case showed that this plea was never specifically considered. The court explained the effect of Explanation II to section 13: a matter which ought to have been raised as a ground of defence in the former suit may be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue. The court reasoned that Explanation II operates only where the effect of the earlier decision is necessarily inconsistent with the defence that ought to have been raised; then the defence may be treated as finally decided against the person who ought to have raised it. Applying that principle, the court found that the former decree, if taken to have decided the notice point at all, must be regarded as deciding it against the Plaintiff (i.e., the earlier decision indicated the notice was ineffectual). Because the present suit is based on a later notice which the lower courts found valid, the court concluded res judicata did not bar the present suit.

Confidential agency / trust (section 90 Trusts Act). The court noted that section 90 of the Trusts Act (though not in force in Pabna) accurately states an equitable principle: a person in a position of trust who obtains an advantage in derogation of others' rights holds it for their benefit. The court examined the factual record and found no indication that the Plaintiff had obtained any special advantage from his position in securing the second lease or that the Defendant's rights had been derogated. The court observed neighbors could likely have obtained the lease and that the Defendant's position (whether tenant at will or permanent lessee) was unchanged in practical effect. On that basis the court rejected the contention that the Plaintiff must be treated as a trustee of the lease for the Defendant.

Nature of the kabuliyat and whether it is a lease (section 4 of Act III of 1885). The court stated it was inclined to agree with the contention that the Defendant's kabuliyat should be regarded as a lease in view of section 4 of Act III of 1885, but said it was unnecessary to finally decide the issue for the disposition of the case.

Whether the tenancy was permanent (Juhooree decision and section 106 Transfer of Property Act). The court considered the argument that, because the kabuliyat granted land for building purposes and specified no term, it should be construed as a permanent lease per the authority of Juhooree Lall Shahoo v. M. Dear. The court rejected that broad application, noting that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that, absent a contract to the contrary, a lease for non-agricultural purposes without a specified term is a month-to-month tenancy terminable on notice. The court said that the fact the lease was for building purposes and that no period was specified did not, in their view, constitute a "contract to the contrary" sufficient to displace section 106. The court also pointed to terms of the kabuliyat (e.g., prohibitions on masonry and cutting trees) as inconsistent with the intention to grant a permanent lease. Thus, the court distinguished the Juhooree decision and declined to treat the kabuliyat as creating a permanent lease.

Cause of action and dating. The court noted that the Plaintiff had dated his cause of action from the decree in the former suit, which the Plaintiff's pleader admitted was a mistake. The court explained that the decree alone could not furnish the cause of action for the present suit; rather the cause of action should have been dated from the expiration of the period given in the notice on which the present suit is based. Nevertheless, the court treated the erroneous description of the cause of action as not fatal and declined to dismiss the suit on that ground.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL and supported the decision of the Subordinate Judge; the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the decree of the lower Appellate Court (which had decreed the Plaintiff's suit) is upheld and the Defendant's appeal fails. The opinion does not purport to establish any broad new precedent—the court distinguished an earlier authority (Juhooree Lall Shahoo v. M. Dear) and applied statutory rules (notably section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act) to refuse to treat the kabuliyat as a permanent lease in the circumstances of this case.

    Mohim Chandra Sarkar v. Anil Bandhu Adhikary

    The suit out of which this appeal arises related to a piece of land about 10 cottahs in area within the town of Pabna. This land was leased by the landlord to the predecessor in interest of the Defendant by a kabuliyat dated the 29th of Magh 1291. The Defendant, in which term we include his predecessor in interest, allowed the father of the Plaintiff to live on the land, the latter agreeing to work for the Defendant as mukhtear in the Criminal Courts and to pay the rent due to the superior landlord. While the father of the Plaintiff was in possession of the land under this license he obtained a lease of it from the superior landlord-It is not disputed that the rights conferred by this lease were intermediate between the rights of the superior landlord and those of the Defendant, and if the interest of the Defendant was that of a tenant at will, the father of the Plaintiff, after acquiring the second lease, had power to eject him. After the father of the Plaintiff died two suits were brought by the Defendant against the present Plaintiff for ejectment. To the first one we need not further refer. The second one was defended by the Plaintiff but was ultimately decreed and it was ordered that the present Defendant was entitled to khas possession. After that the present suit was brought. The Plaintiff gave the Defendant notice of the determination of his lease, apparently under sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, and after the period of notice had expired he brought this suit for a declaration that the rights of the Defendant had terminated. He dated his cause of action from the decree which the Defendant had obtained against him and he asked also for an injunction restraining the Defendant from executing that decree. The lower Appellate Court has decreed the suit and the Defendant appeals.

    A number of points have been taken in argument which we will deal with seriatim. The first point is that the suit is barred by sec. 13 of the former Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that in the former suit between the parties the present Plaintiff pleaded his title under the lease in his father's favour, and also that he had terminated the Defendant's tenancy by a notice, the period of which had expired before the institution of the suit. The judgment in that case has been printed and it is perfectly clear from it that this plea was never considered. The question therefore whether the Plaintiff's title is good and whether the Defendant's title has been terminated by the notice served upon him by the Plaintiff cannot be said to have been heard and finally decided in specific terms in the former suit. Reliance however is placed on Expl. II of sec. 13 of the Code which lays down that a matter which ought to have been a ground of defence in the former suit must be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue. It is clear that if this explanation applies the fact that there was no final decision of the point in specific terms is not fatal to the plea of res judicata. A matter which ought to be raised but which as a matter of fact is not raised in a suit cannot be decided in specific terms in that suit. But this fact cannot be fatal to the plea of res judicata, for in that case it is obvious that Expl. II would be meaningless. We must take it therefore that if the effect of the decision in a former suit is necessarily inconsistent with the defence that ought to have been raised but has not been raised that defence must under sec. 13 be deemed to have been finally decided against the person who ought to have raised it. But these considerations do not appear, to apply to the circumstances of the present case. The former suit was decreed. It is clear that if the plea which the Plaintiff then put forward, namely, that he was entitled to the land and that he had terminated the Defendant's interest by due notice, is regarded as having been finally decided at all it must be deemed to have been decided against him. The result of the decision was that for some reason or other the notice which was given before the institution of the former suit was ineffectual and the present Plaintiff was not entitled to retain his possession of the land in suit in that case by reason of the feet that he had given to the present Defendant a valid notice for the termination of the lease. That being so, how can this decision be regarded as res judicata in the present case which is brought on the allegation that the Plaintiff has given a second notice to the Defendant which has been found by the Courts below to be valid in law. The Plaintiff's case, as it has been laid before us now, is that for some reason or other the service of notice in the former case was not effectual. This may have been due to the fact that it was given by a benamdar or for some other reason. We have no materials before us to show why it was unsuccessful but if the decision of the Court in the former suit is regarded as constructively deciding the point it must be regarded as deciding it against the present Plaintiff, that is to say, that the notice was ineffectual. If the point had been decided the other way it is clear that the former suit would have been dismissed. This being so the plea of res judicata must necessarily fail.

    The second point taken is that the Plaintiff being a confidential agent of the Defendant was not entitled to take this second lease behind the Defendant's back and must be regarded as a trustee for the Defendant's benefit. Reference has been made to sec. 90 of the Trusts Act, 1882; and although this enactment is not in force in the Pabna District the section quoted may perhaps be taken as an accurate statement of the equitable rules which this Court would administer in a case of this nature. It is laid down in that section that where a tenant for life by availing himself of his position as such gets some advantage in derogation of the rights of the other persons interested, he holds that advantage for the benefit of the persons so interested. But it is difficult to see in this case how the Plaintiff was either benefited by his position in obtaining the second lease, or in the second place how his action in obtaining this lease has derogated from the rights of the Defendant. No doubt it would have been more honourable for the Plaintiff to have consulted his employer before taking the second lease. But at the same time he does not appear to have gained a more favourable opportunity for obtaining this lease by the Defendant's allowing him to live in the land, than was possessed by any other resident of Pabna. Any of the neighbours could probably have obtained this lease and it is not easy to see how he by reason of his position obtained any advantage over his neighbours in this respect. When he obtained it there was no special relation between him and the superior landlord, such as might induce the latter to give him preference. Nor does it appear to us that the rights of the Defendant have been in any way derogated from. If before the lease he was a tenant at will under the superior landlord he is now a tenant at will under the Plaintiff; if he had a permanent lease before, he has a permanent lease still. His position seems to be unchanged, and we cannot say that his rights have in any way been derogated from.

    The case of the renewal of a lease is not precisely similar. Where a tenant for life has a leasehold interest it has been held that if he obtains a renewal of the lease that will inure for the benefit of the reversioner. But it is clear that a lessee of property does by his position obtain an advantage in securing a renewal. In many leases there is a covenant for renewal, and even in a case where there is no such covenant yet the landlord would naturally prefer to continue the lease to a lessee with whom he is already in contractual relations. In such a case the lessee in possession might well be regarded as securing by his position a special advantage in obtaining the renewal of the lease. But in a case like the present where the person in possession under a lease from the tenant obtains a lease of a superior interest and of a different character, the principle to which we have referred seems to have no application.

    The third point taken is that the learned Subordinate Judge is wrong in holding that the Defendant's kabuliyat is not a lease. Having regard to sec. 4 of Act III of 1885 we are disposed to agree with this contention. But it does not appear to us necessary to decide the point in the view we take of the lease itself.

    The fourth point taken relates to the nature of the tenancy created by the. Defendant's kabuliyat. By that contract it was agreed that the Defendant should enjoy and possess the land after building a bahsabari upon it. No period is specified in the lease; and it is argued on the strength of the decision in the case of Juhooree Lall Shahoo v. M. Dear, that as the land was given to the. Defendant for the purpose of building a dwelling-house and no period was fixed for the tenancy, the tenure could not be taken away from the lessee's representatives so long as they continued to pay rent. To accept this contention would in our opinion be tantamount to holding that the lease in question is a permanent lease, and if we are to follow the decision in its literal terms the effect on property in towns might be very grave. Most leases of land in towns must be leases for building purposes, and to hold that all leases for such purposes are permanent leases would be very dangerous. There are circumstances in this lease which clearly indicate in our opinion that no permanent lease was intended. The lessee was not allowed to erect masonry buildings or to cut down trees. If the lease was a permanent lease to the Defendant granted for the purpose of his building a dwelling-house it is difficult to understand why the landlord should object to his living in a masonry house. Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that in the absence of a contract to the contrary a lease of immoveable property for other than agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on a certain amount of notice. We cannot regard the facts that this lease was granted for the purpose of building a bashabari and that no period was specified in it as making it a “contract to the contrary” within the meaning of sec. 106, and we feel some difficulty in holding that the decision quoted is, since the enactment of sec. 106, a correct statement of the land.

    The last point taken is that there is no cause of action in the suit. The cause of action as we have observed is dated from the decree in the former suit.

    It is admitted by the learned pleader for the Respondent that this was a mistake. It appears that the decree at the time when it was granted, which was before the expiration of the period given in the notice on which this suit is leased was a perfectly good decree; and it is quite clear that the decree by itself furnishes no cause of action, for the present suit. But the fact that notice was given to the Defendant is clearly stated in the pleadings, and the second prayer in the plaint is that the Defendant's tenancy should be declared to have expired. It is clear therefore that the cause of action should have been dated from the expiration of the period given in the notice on which the suit is based, but the fact that the Gause of action has been erroneously described does not render it necessary in our opinion to dismiss the suit.

    The result is that in our opinion the decision of the Subordinate Judge should be supported and we therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.

    N.G
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mohim Chandra Sarkar v. Anil Bandhu Adhikary
    (Jan 13, 1909)