Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 562.Section 566 of the 1882 Code corresponded to Order XLI, rule 25
  • Code of 1908 the restrictive provision contained in section 564,
  • section 122 or section 125 (section 2, clauses 16 and 18).
  • section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1905
  • section 107 of the Code, of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 564 of the last Code
  • Order XLI, rules 23 and 25, and section 564
  • sections 100 and 101 of the Code of 1908.
  • Civil Procedure Code of 1882, the section
  • Order XLI, rule 23 of the same Code,
  • section 564 of the Code of 1882.
  • section 107, viz., rules 24 to 29
  • provision of Order XLI, rule 23,
  • Order XLI, rule 23 of the Code;
  • 107, sub-section (1) of the Code
  • section 562 nor section 566
  • Code of 1882. Section 564
  • Code of 1908, section 151,
  • section 114 of the Code
  • Order XLIII, rule 1(u)
  • rule 23.Section 107
  • Order XLI, rule 23,
  • rule 23, Order XLI.
  • section 107(1)(b)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 562.Section 566 of the 1882 Code corresponded to Order XLI, rule 25
  • Code of 1908 the restrictive provision contained in section 564,
  • section 122 or section 125 (section 2, clauses 16 and 18).
  • section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1905
  • section 107 of the Code, of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 564 of the last Code
  • Order XLI, rules 23 and 25, and section 564
  • sections 100 and 101 of the Code of 1908.
  • Civil Procedure Code of 1882, the section
  • Order XLI, rule 23 of the same Code,
  • section 564 of the Code of 1882.
  • section 107, viz., rules 24 to 29
  • provision of Order XLI, rule 23,
  • Order XLI, rule 23 of the Code;
  • 107, sub-section (1) of the Code
  • section 562 nor section 566
  • Code of 1882. Section 564
  • Code of 1908, section 151,
  • section 114 of the Code
  • Order XLIII, rule 1(u)
  • rule 23.Section 107
  • Order XLI, rule 23,
  • rule 23, Order XLI.
  • section 107(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a Full Bench reference concerning the scope of the Appellate Court's power to remand under section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908) and the relation of that power to Order XLI, rule 23 of the Rules. The reference expressly framed two questions: (1) whether the Appellate Court's remand power under section 107 is restricted to the contingency specified in Order XLI, rule 23; and (2) whether the Appellate Court may remand a case when, in its opinion, there has been no proper trial.

The matter reached the Full Bench in the context of an application for review of a judgment delivered in Appeal No. 27 of 1916 (as stated by Teunon, J.). Multiple judges—Sanderson, C.J.; Woodroffe, J.; Mookerjee, J.; Chitty, J.; and Teunon, J.—gave separate opinions dealing with the statutory scheme of the 1882 and 1908 Codes, the omission of an express restrictive provision (section 564 of the 1882 Code) from the 1908 Code, and the statutory preservation of inherent powers in section 151 of the 1908 Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the power of the Appellate Court to remand under section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908) is restricted to the contingency specified in Order XLI, rule 23.
  2. Whether the Appellate Court is competent to remand a case in which, in the opinion of that Court, there has been no proper trial.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Habib Bakhsh v. Baldeo Prasad Demonstration that under the 1882 Code courts had claimed an inherent power to remand in cases not covered by the specific sections of the Code. Used to show that despite section 564 of the 1882 Code, Courts had remanded in cases not included within section 562 (supporting the existence of inherent remand power prior to 1908).
Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh Illustration of the recognition and exercise of inherent jurisdiction to make orders necessary for justice. Referred to as an authority where the Court had claimed power to remand outside the specific Code provisions; cited repeatedly to support inherent jurisdiction.
Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal Discussion of the relationship between the body of the Code (creating jurisdiction) and the rules (indicating the mode of exercising it). Quoted (Sir Lawrence Jenkins) for the proposition that the Code creates jurisdiction while rules indicate the mode of exercise; relied upon by some judges to interpret section 107 in conjunction with the rules.
Nabin Chandra Tripati v. Prankrishna De A contrasting view (attributed to Stephen, J.) that the rules restrict sections so that sections cannot be applied otherwise than by the rules. Cited as representing the contrary view; some judges expressly dissent from that decision and its restrictive approach.
Hurro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia Enunciation of the doctrine of inherent power by Sir Barnes Peacock. Referred to as the source of the principle embodied in section 151 (the Court's inherent power to make orders necessary for ends of justice).
Panchanan Singha Roy v. Dwarka Nath Roy Restatement and reaffirmation of inherent jurisdiction principles. Referred to as a restatement of the doctrine supporting inherent jurisdiction and salvaging orders necessary for justice.
Zohra Bibi v. Zobida Khatun An example of a case where remand/retrial was directed under inherent jurisdiction. Referred to as an early and influential case justifying remand where the Code/rules did not provide an adequate remedy; used to illustrate permissible invocation of inherent power.
Gora Chand Haldar v. Basanta Kumar Haldar Authority cited in support of inherent jurisdiction and the limited circumstances for its exercise. Grouped with Zohra Bibi as decisions supporting remand under inherent jurisdiction in special conditions.
Upendra Chandra Mandal v. Shaikh Sabhan Practices under the 1908 Code where courts ordered de novo trial/remand. Cited as a later case adopting the view that remand may be ordered beyond Order XLI, rule 23 when necessary for justice.
Uzir Ali Sardar v. Savai Behara Similar practical adoption of remand under inherent jurisdiction after 1908 Code. Cited as a case following the view that an Appellate Court may order remand/retrial in exceptional cases under inherent power.
Perumbra Nayar v. Subrahmanian Pattar Illustration of instances where the Court traced authority to inherent power when addressing remand issues. Adduced as an example of a decision that treated the authority to remand as derived from inherent jurisdiction rather than explicit Code provisions.
Jadab Gobinda Singh v. Anath Bandhu Saha Also cited in connection with historical practice under the 1882 Code. Referenced in discussion of how courts had previously handled remand questions when the statutory scheme left gaps.
Narottam Rajaram v. Mohanlal Kahandas Example of High Court practice under the 1908 Code accepting remand beyond Order XLI, rule 23. Included to show adoption of the view that remand/retrial outside rule 23 may be warranted in ends-of-justice cases.
Kuppalam v. Kunjuvalli Another example of decisions accepting remand/retrial under the 1908 Code in exceptional cases. Listed among cases demonstrating acceptability in practice of remands beyond the literal scope of Order XLI, rule 23.
Jambulayya v. Rajamma Further example of post-1908 practice supporting remand in special conditions. Used to show that several High Courts adopted the view that remand and retrial may be ordered where necessary for justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench approached the reference by examining (a) the state of the law under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, (b) the changes effected by the Code of 1908, and (c) the relation between the body of the Code (sections) and the rules (Order XLI and related rules). The analysis proceeded through separate but overlapping lines of reasoning by the individual judges; the following summarizes the step-by-step legal reasoning as presented in their opinions.

Common factual and statutory starting points relied upon by the Court

  • Under the 1882 Code, section 562 (corresponding to present Order XLI, r.23) and section 566 (corresponding to r.25) operated alongside an express prohibition (section 564) that the Appellate Court should not remand a case for a second decision except as provided in section 562. Despite that prohibition, courts had previously exercised an inherent power to remand in certain circumstances.
  • The 1908 Code altered the scheme: a general power of remand is provided by section 107, which is made "subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed" (i.e., rules); section 564 of the old Code was not re-enacted; and section 151 was added to preserve the Court's inherent power "to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice."

Divergent but overlapping judicial analyses

  • Sanderson, C.J.:
    • Examined the historical position under the 1882 Code and concluded the Legislature did not intend in 1908 to confine remand powers strictly to Order XLI, rule 23. He placed particular emphasis on the introduction of section 151, which recognises and preserves inherent powers.
    • Sanderson observed that while section 107 read alone might be interpreted as limiting remands to the contingency in rule 23, section 151 must be read with section 107 and expressly preserves the Court's inherent jurisdiction to order remands where necessary for the ends of justice.
    • He warned that inherent jurisdiction should be exercised only when the Code does not contain specific provisions that would meet the necessities of the case.
  • Woodroffe, J.:
    • Distinguished between the power created by the body of the Code and the mode of exercise indicated by the rules (citing Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal). He initially emphasised that section 107 alone cannot be read to give powers beyond those specified by the rules.
    • Nevertheless, he concluded that the Court must and can invoke its inherent powers (recognised by section 151) to order remands in cases not covered by Order XLI, rule 23, when it is necessary for the ends of justice. He stressed that this inherent jurisdiction must be exercised with care and not where the Code provides a specific remedy.
  • Mookerjee, J.:
    • Focused on construction: section 107's qualification ("subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed") does not necessarily convert every rule into a limitation on the section; whether a rule is a limitation depends on its terms.
    • He concluded that Order XLI, rule 23 should not be read as a restrictive limitation that prevents remand in other contingencies. He emphasised that section 151 formally embodies the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction and that nothing in section 107 displaces that principle.
    • Mookerjee relied on historical legislative choices (omission of section 564 and introduction of section 151) to infer that the Legislature intended to make clear the authority of appellate courts to direct remands and retrials in ends-of-justice cases beyond rule 23.
  • Chitty, J.:
    • Engaged with textual and purposive points: he observed there are no explicit limiting words in Order XLI, rule 23 but that the rules, read with the Code as framed, indicate that the Code contemplated remand under the particular circumstances described in rule 23.
    • Chitty accepted the point that the Code and rules, taken together, suggest rule 23 was intended to be the remand contingency contemplated by section 107(1)(b). However, he explicitly acknowledged that section 151 preserves inherent jurisdiction and thus an appellate court may, in exceptional circumstances and with great caution, invoke inherent power to order remand where the Code/rules provide no adequate remedy.
  • Teunon, J.:
    • Analyzed the text of section 107 and the framing intent that limitations and conditions are to be found in the rules of Order XLI. He stated the "general rule" that a remand (de novo trial) should be ordered only where Order XLI, rule 23 is inapplicable (i.e., where the trial Court disposed of suit on a preliminary point).
    • Nevertheless, Teunon recognised exceptional situations (e.g., judge disqualified, procedural attitude preventing a party from presenting a case, minor improperly treated as a major) where, effectively, there has been no trial and the appellate Court may invoke inherent jurisdiction under section 151 to order a remand or retrial.
    • He reviewed prior cases cited in the reference and observed that several decisions supported remand under inherent jurisdiction, while one or two decisions might be read otherwise; he concluded both branches of the question should be answered affirmatively subject to the qualifications he specified (i.e., rule 23 governs ordinary remand under section 107, but inherent jurisdiction permits remand in exceptional "no trial" cases).

Shared legal principles emphasized across opinions

  • The body of the Code (sections) creates jurisdiction while the rules indicate the mode of exercising that jurisdiction; they must be read together.
  • Section 151 of the 1908 Code expressly preserves the inherent jurisdiction of courts to make orders necessary for the ends of justice; this statute embodies previously recognised judicial doctrines.
  • The inherent jurisdiction to remit/retry should be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and only where the specific provisions of the Code and the rules do not provide an adequate remedy to meet the necessities of the case.
  • Exceptional factual situations can make a retrial de novo the only adequate means to vindicate justice (for example, where there was effectively no trial, or where defects of trial are incurable except by retrial).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench concluded that, while the Code and rules (Order XLI) describe the ordinary procedural contingency for remand under section 107, the Appellate Court retains its inherent jurisdiction preserved by section 151 to order a remand or retrial in cases not covered by Order XLI, rule 23 where such an order is necessary for the ends of justice.

Implications (direct consequences and caveats stated in the opinion):

  • An Appellate Court should ordinarily follow the specific procedures and contingencies set out in the Code and the rules (Order XLI) when exercising powers under section 107; the rules indicate how remand and related powers are to be exercised.
  • Where the Code and rules provide a specific remedy adequate to meet the necessities of the case, the Court must apply those provisions rather than invoke inherent jurisdiction.
  • In exceptional circumstances—for example, where there effectively has been no fair trial, where the trial judge was disqualified, or where procedural defects are so fundamental as to be incurable except by retrial—the Appellate Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 151 to remand for a new trial (retrial de novo).
  • The exercise of inherent jurisdiction to order a remand must be approached with caution and must be grounded in general legal principles; remand for retrial is permissible only where correction under the specific rule-based procedures is not reasonably practicable or adequate.
  • The opinion emphasizes that the Full Bench's decision does not license arbitrary disregard of rules 24–29 of Order XLI; rather, it affirms a limited, principled role for inherent jurisdiction where justice demands it.

Note: The Full Bench's opinions contain differences of emphasis as to whether section 107 itself, read alone, should be regarded as limited by the rules; however, there is a clear consensus across the opinions that section 151 preserves an inherent power to remand where necessary for the ends of justice, subject to the safeguards and limitations described above.

O.M

    Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank Ld.

    Sanderson, C.J:— I think the reference may conveniently be considered in two parts. First, whether the power of the Appellate Court with regard to a remand under section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1905 is restricted to the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23, and, second, whether it is competent to the Appellate Court to remand a case in which in the opinion of the Court there has been no proper trial.

    As regards the first part: In order to ascertain the intention of the Legislature on this point, I think it is useful to examine the state of the law at the time the 1908 Code was passed.

    Under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, the section which corresponded in effect to Order XLI, rule 23, was 562. That section, however, was followed by 564 which provided that “the Appellate Court shall not remand a case for a second decision except as provided in section 562.”

    Section 566 of the 1882 Code corresponded to Order XLI, rule 25 of the present Code.

    It had been held that though the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 bound all Courts as far as it went, it was not exhaustive and did not affect previously existing powers, and that in matters with which it did not deal the Court would exercise inherent jurisdiction to do that justice between the parties which was warranted by the circumstances and which the necessities of the case required and that in spite of the express provision of section 564, the Appellate Court was not precluded from remanding a suit an a case to which neither section 562 nor section 566 applied.

    See Habib Bakhsh v. Baldeo Prasad and Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh at page 932.

    The law being as stated above with regard to the power of remand the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 was passed.

    The scheme of this Code is different from that of 1882. A general power is given by section 107 which is made by its terms subject “to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed” (which means prescribed by rules) and the provisions of sections 562 and 566 of the Old Code are in effect reproduced in Order XLI, rules 23 and 25, and section 564 has not been re-enacted either in the Code itself or in the rules.

    Further, a new section applicable to this matter, viz., section 151 was introduced. This section is as follows: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

    In my judgment, it was not the intention of the Legislature in the Code of 1908 to limit the powers of remand to the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23, but that it intended to and did recognise and preserve such powers as had been exercised theretofore.

    I think it may fairly be argued that under section 107 read by itself, and having regard to the words “subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed” the power of remand is limited to the case described in Order XLI, rule 23: but that does not dispose of the matter, for that section must be read together with section 151, which not only recognises but expressly preserves the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice.

    The question whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to exercise such powers of remand must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case and in exercising such jurisdiction the Court must, no doubt, be careful to see that its decision is based on general legal principles and subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet, the necessities of the case in question, such provisions should be followed and the inherent jurisdiction, should not be invoked.

    In my judgment, therefore, the powers of the Appellate Court as regards remand are not restricted to the, case specified in Order XLI, rule 23, but the Court, by reason of its inherent jurisdiction, recognised and preserved in the Code as above mentioned, may order a remand in cases other than the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23, if it be necessary for the ends of justice.

    As regards the second part of the reference, I think on farther consideration that it is couched in too general terms; and that an answer to such a general question might lead to difficulty and misapprehension and inasmuch as the, answer to the first part of the reference is really sufficient to dispose of the matter, I do not think it is necessary to give a specific answer to the second part of the reference.

    Woodroffe, J.:— The reference raises two questions firstly, whether the Court's power of remand under section 107 is restricted to the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23 of the Code; and secondly (if the answer be in the negative) whether it is competent to the Appellate Court to remand a case in which, in the opinion of that Court, there has been no proper trial. These two matters should, I think, be kept distinct. As regards the first part of the reference, the power to remand is sought to be based, both on section 107 of the Code and on the inherent jurisdiction. In my opinion, section 107 cannot be relied upon as giving further powers than those which are specifically mentioned in the rules. This question, of the relation between the body of the Code and the rules has been discussed in Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J who took part in the framing of the new Code. I agree with what is there said and I need not repeat the whole of it. The body of the Code creates jurisdiction, while the rules indicate the mode in which it is to be exercised. The body of the Code must, therefore, be read in conjunction with the rules either as existing at the date of publication of the Code or as altered or added to subsequently. A contrary view might lead to difficulties, for (to take an example) it might be urged that section 114 of the Code gave the Court power to entertain a review in cases not covered by Order XLVII, rule 1. I think, therefore, that the power of remand under section 107 is limited to the case described in Order XLI, rule 23. If this were not so, the rules would be unnecessary, for the general power of remand would cover not only Order XLI, rule 23, but every other conceivable case. But Sir Lawrence Jenkins went on to say “and this is the general rule except under special conditions which have no application in the Circumstances of the case.” What is it which authorises the Court to act in such cases? In my opinion we must invoke in such a case the inherent powers of the Court which, are both recognised and saved by section 151 of the Code. I have dealt with this question whether the Code is exhaustive or not and whether the Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass such orders as justice requires in my judgment in Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh and I, therefore, do not repeat what I have said there. Doubtless this exercise of inherent jurisdiction must be exercised with care subject to the general legal principles and to the condition that the matter is not one with which the Legislature has so specifically dealt as to preclude the exercise of inherent power. But it is argued here that the Court has dealt with the subject of remand and has, therefore, indicated that it is not to be ordered except in the one specific instance mentioned in Order XLI, rule 23. I am not prepared to hold this, the more so that section 564 of the previous Code has not been re-enacted. The mere fact that section 107 deals with remand does not exclude the Court's inherent jurisdiction to make orders of remand in cases other than those covered by Order XLI, r. 23. I am of opinion, therefore, that the powers of the Appellate Court as regards remand are not limited to the specific case mentioned in Order XLI, r. 23, and that the Court, under its inherent jurisdiction, may order a remand to do what is right and necessary in cases other than those covered by that order if justice so requires it. Whether justice does require a Court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction, must be determined by that Court with reference to the particular facts of the case and the rule of law that a Court cannot invoke an inherent jurisdiction where there is a provision in the Code, whether by way of remand or otherwise, which, if applied, will meet the justice of the case. The merits of the particular application out of which this reference arose are not before us.

    The second part of the reference is in such wide terms that I feel a difficulty in answering it in a manner which will not lead to misapprehension. Thus the words a “proper trial” might include cases within Order XLI, and an answer in the affirmative might enable the Courts to order wrongly a new trial although the particular case ought to be dealt with under the provisions of Order XLI. It is the less necessary to do so as the Advocate-General has stated that he will be satisfied with a decision given on the first part of the reference.

    Mookerjee, J.:— The question referred for decision has been framed in the following terms: “Whether the power of the Appellate Court with regard to a remand under section 107 of the Code, of Civil Procedure is restricted to the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23 of the same Code, or, whether it is competent to the Appellate Court to remand a case in which, in the opinion of that Court, there has been no proper trial.”

    I shall confine myself to an examination of the first branch alone of the question formulated: for, if it is answered in the negative, the second does not arise, while if it is answered in the affirmative, the second need not be considered, as it is not necessary for our present purpose to specify the limits of the power of remand, if such power is capable of exercise in cases other than those contemplated by Older XLI, rule 23.

    Section 107 recognises the power of an Appellate Court to remand a case, but such power is expressly made subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, that is, prescribed by rules and forms. Contained in the first schedule or made under section 122 or section 125 (section 2, clauses 16 and 18). This, in my opinion, does not necessarily imply that whenever there is a provision in the rules relating to the matters mentioned in the section, the provision is by way of condition or limitation; whether a particular rule has or has not this effect must clearly depend on its terms. This is not inconsistent with the view indicated by Jenkins, C.J in Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal that the body of the Code creates jurisdiction, while the rules indicate the mode in which it is to be exercised, which it is important to observe, is essentially different from the view adopted by Stephen, J. in Nabin Chandra Tripati v. Prankrishna De that the sections lay down general principles, while the rules provide the means by which they can be applied and they cannot be otherwise applied as the rules restrict the provisions contained in the sections I do not read Order XLI, rule 23 as a limitation on the power of remand recognised in section 107 in the sense that the power to remand can be exercised only in the contingency mentioned in Order XLI, rule 23. Apart from this, it seems to me to be incontestable that section 151, which embodies a statutory recognition of the inherent power of a Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, gives ample authority to the Court to make an order of remand in cases not comprised within Order XLI, rule 23, where the Court is satisfied that such order is necessary for the ends of justice. Section 151 does not recognise a new principle; it embodies a doctrine which had been enunciated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Hurro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia and was restated and re-affirmed by Woodroffe, J. and myself in Panchanan Singha Roy v. Dwarka Nath Roy and Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh I feel, no doubt whatever that nothing in section 107 restricts in any manner the application of the principle of inherent power recognised by section 151. This was the view adopted by me, after careful consideration, and in concurrence with Carnduff, J. in Zohra Bibi v. Zobida Khatun and Gora Chand Haldar v. Basanta Kumar Haldar. I see no reason to depart from that view which has been subsequently followed in Upendra Chandra Mandal v. Shaikh Sabhan and Uzir Ali Sardar v. Savai Behara. The decision of Jenkins, C.J and N.R Chatterjea, J. in Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal also recognises the power of a Court of Appeal to order a remand under special conditions not included in Order XLI, rule 23. I respectfully dissent from the contrary view expressed by Stephen and Mullick, JJ. in Nobin Chandra Tripati v. Prankrishna De. That the Code itself recognises the power of a Court to direct a remand in circumstances other than those specified in Order XLI, rule 23 is clear from the terms of section 99. I am fortified in my conclusion by an examination of the condition of the law as it stood under the Code of 1882. Section 564 explicitly provided that the Appellate Court shall not remand a case for a second decision except as provided in section 562; yet the Courts had repeatedly claimed a power to direct a remand in circumstances not included in section 562. The Court sometimes traced the source of this authority to its inherent power to make such orders as might be needed for the ends of justice, as in Perumbra Nayar v. Subrahmanian Pattar, but, on other occasions, the Court, apprehensive as it were to invoke its inherent power, treated the authority as involved by implication in one or other of the provisions of the Code, for instance, in Habib Bakhsh v. Baldeo Prasad. [See also Jadab Gobinda Singh v. Anath Bandhu Saha]. While the law was in this condition, the Legislature took two significant steps, namely, first, they refrained to reproduce in the Code of 1908 the restrictive provision contained in section 564, and, secondly, they introduced in the Code of 1908, section 151, which recognises in explicit terms the inherent power of a Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. The only inference legitimately deducible from this history of the legislation on the subject is that the Legislature intended to place beyond all doubt and dispute the authority of an Appellate Court to direct a remand and retrial in cases other than those comprised in Order XLI, rule 23, where the Court is satisfied that such order is necessary in the ends of justice. There is, on the other hand, the significant fact that sections 584 and 585 of the Code of 1882, which enumerated the grounds for a second appeal and prescribed a restriction that a second appeal did not he on any other ground, reappear as sections 100 and 101 of the Code of 1908. The view that a Court of Appeal is competent to direct a remand and retrial in a case not covered by Order XLI, rule 23, if the Court is satisfied that such an order is necessary in the ends of justice, has been adopted in other High Courts under the Code of 1908: Narottam Rajaram v. Mohanlal Kahandas, Kuppalam v. Kunjuvalli, Jambulayya v. Rajamma. It is undeniable that exceptional cases, not capable of exhaustive enumeration or classification, do sometimes occur in which defects of trial are so radical as to be incurable otherwise than by a retrial de novo. In a case of this description, it is incumbent on the Court of Appeal to exercise its inherent power to make such orders as, in its opinion, are required in the ends of justice. The exercise of such inherent power can only be invoked where the Court is satisfied that the specific provisions of the Code are not sufficient to meet the necessities of the case. The Court of Appeal is invested with plenary powers to connect errors of procedure committed by the trial Court, as is clear from an examination of rules 24-29 contained, in Order XLI of the Code. These provisions cannot be arbitrarily disregarded, on well established principles which regulate the exercise of inherent power by a Court of Justice, as explained in the judgments in Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh and Panchanan Singha Roy v. Dwarka Nath Roy; but where the Court of Appeal is satisfied that the correction of the omissions or defects in the trial is not reasonably practicable by recourse to one or other of the provisions mentioned, that is, where it is clearly apparent that the Appellate Court cannot itself satisfactorily dispose of the suit on the merits by the adoption of the specific procedure mentioned in rules 24-29, a remand for retrial is not only permissible but obviously incumbent on the Court. This view has been followed in practice in this Court for a long series of years, and this is obviously a case for the application of the maxim cursus curiæ est lex curiæ, In my opinion, the reference should be answered in the terms mentioned in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice.

    Chitty, J.:— The following question has been referred for decision by the Full Bench:—“Whether the power of the Appellate Court with regard to a remand under section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure is restricted to the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23, of the same Code, or whether it is competent to the Appellate Court to remand a case in which in the opinion of that Court there has been no proper trial.” These, are really two separate questions, to which it would be inconvenient, if not impossible, to give a single answer.

    Dealing with the first part of the question, I confess that I was at first sight inclined to think that Order XLI, rule 23 while prescribing a condition to a remand under section 107(1)(b) did not impose any limitation on the power of an Appellate Court under that section. There are no words of limitation to be found in rule 23. As was said by the Court in Zohra Bibi v. Zobida Khatun, “Rule 23 makes provision for a particular contingency, but clearly in its scope is neither exclusive nor all embracing.” Section 99, also, which precedes section 107 and which forbids a remand under certain circumstances, seemed to me to imply that there may be cases, of remand not covered by Order XLI, rule 23. On the other hand, however, it may be reasonably urged that, if Order XLI, rule 23, merely prescribes one contingency, in which a remand may be made, and eaves the general provisions of section 107 otherwise unfettered in this respect, then rule 23 is wholly unnecessary and superfluous, and the same might also be said of the other rules which regulate the powers of an Appellate Court conferred by section 107, viz., rules 24 to 29 inclusive. It is obvious that this cannot have been the intention of the Legislature which framed the present Code and rules together. It may be noted that by Order XLIII, rule 1(u) the right of appeal is given only against an order under Order XLI, rule 23 remanding a case. This indicates that the only order of remand under section 107(1)(b) contemplated by the Code and rules as framed is one made under Order XLI, rule 23. I had the advantage of reading the judgment of Woodroffe, J., and I agree with what he has said in this connection. This was also the view expressed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins the late C.J, in the case of Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal and his opinion is entitled to all the more weight as he was in a great measure responsible for the Code of Civil Procedure and the rules as they now stand.

    It follows that the first part of the question must be answered in the affirmative, but the matter does not end there. I entirely agree that while the power of remand given to an Appellate Court by section 107(1)(b) is restricted by Order XLI, rule 23, the inherent power of the Court which is expressly reserved to it by section 151 may be invoked to enable it to make an order of remand in circumstances which are not provided for by the Code or the rules. This power must be exercised with the greatest caution. It must not be exercised to enable the Court to pass an order contrary to the provisions of the Code or the Rules. Nor can it properly be exercised in circumstances where the Code or rules provide an adequate remedy, as for example, in the case of Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal above cited, which was a case of adducing additional evidence. A good example of a case, to meet which there is no provision in the Code or rules, is Zohra Bibi v. Zobida Khatun, also above cited, which is the earliest of the cases now under review. Sir Lawrence Jenkins no doubt had this in mind when he said, “these rules provide that in the case of a lower Appellate Court the power of reversal and remand is limited to the position described in rule 23, Order XLI. And this is the general rule except under special conditions which have no application in the circumstances of this case.” In this view of the matter, the prohibition of remands contained in section 99 also becomes intelligible.

    I do not think that the second part of the question can be properly answered by this Full Bench. The expression “case in which in the opinion of the Appellate Court there has been no proper trial” opens up questions of fact, into which this Bench cannot go. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss the matter further as the learned Advocate-General stated that he would be content with an answer, to the first question.

    Teunon, J.:— This reference arises out of an application for review of the judgment delivered in Appeal No. 27 of 1916, and the question referred to the Full Bench has been stated in the following terms: namely, whether the power of, the Appellate Court with regard to a remand under section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure is restricted to the case specified in Order XLI, rule 23 of the same Code, or whether it is competent to the Appellate Court to remand a case in which, in the opinion of that Court, there has been no proper trial.

    Section 107, sub-section (1) of the Code provides that subject to such limitations and conditions as may be prescribed an Appellate Court shall have power—

    (a) to determine a case finally,

    (b) to remand a case,

    (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial,

    (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken.

    For the purposes of this reference sub-section (2) may be disregarded.

    The limitations and conditions prescribed are to be found in the rules contained in the first Schedule to the Code, that is, in the rules contained in Order XLI.

    It is now well settled that as regards matters specifically dealt with by the Code, the provisions of the Code are exhaustive. It would seem to follow that, when an Appellate Court, finds itself unable to arrive at a final determination, it should deal with the case under one or other of the sub-clauses (b), (c) and (d), in accordance with the circumstances set out in the appropriate rule. A case should, therefore, be remanded, in other words a de novo trial should be directed, only where Order XLI, rule 23, inapplicable, that is to say, where the trial Court has disposed, of the suit upon a preliminary point.

    In the course of the argument before us some stress was laid upon the omission from the present Code of the express prohibition of a de novo trial in other cases which was to be found in section 564 of the Code of 1882. To this omission I am unable to attach any great importance as in the view I take the provisions of section 564 of the last Code have been in effect incorporated in the wider language used in the opening clause of section 107(1), that is to say, in the words “subject to such limitations and conditions as may be prescribed.”

    I have set out above my view as to the general rule.

    But section 107 contemplates and proceeds on the assumption that there has been in the first Court a fair and honestly conducted trial. But other exceptional cases may be conceived. It may be found that the trial Judge was disqualified by personal interest, or that owing to the attitude assumed by the Judge, either party has been precluded from putting forward his case. In such cases and in other cases, where for instance a minor has been improperly treated as a major, in all such cases (and I attempt no exhaustive enumeration of such special conditions) where it may be said that in effect there has been no trial, it is necessarily open to the Appellate Court, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction, for which section 151 of the Code now makes express provision, to direct a remand or a retrial.

    Of the six cases decided by this Court that have been cited in the order of reference and discussed in the argument before us, three, namely, Zohra Bibi v. Zobida Khatun, Upendra Chandra Mandal v. Shaikh Sabhah, Uzir Ali Sardar v. Savai Behara, it may be observed are cases where, after adding parties, the Appellate Court directed a de novo trial. A remand in such cases may perhaps be supported under the provision of Order XLI, rule 23, the trial having been vitiated by the first Court's erroneous decision on the preliminary question of non-joinder and by the absence of the assistance which the added party was in a position to give. Otherwise the decision is justified under section 151 of the Code. These three cases, Gora Chand Haldar v. Basanta Kumar Haldar, and the observations of Jenkins, C.J, in Mani Mohan Mandal v. Ramtaran Mandal, support in my opinion, the view I take. The remaining case Nabin Chandra Tripati v. Prankrishna De may possibly be said to be against it, but it is doubtful whether in that case the learned Judges had in view the exceptional circumstances which may make recourse to section 151 necessary.

    For the above reasons, subject to the foregoing observations, my answer to both branches of the question referred to us is in the affirmative.

    O.M

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank Ld.
    (May 11, 1917)