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Case Summary — Opinion of Suhrawardy, J.; concurring remarks by Graham, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arose from a mortgage suit in which preliminary and final decrees had been passed and a personal decree was passed against the opposite party on 13 June 1930. The opposite party (later appellant) applied for amendment on 31 July 1930; that application was rejected on 28 August 1930. An unsuccessful application was made to the High Court on 5 December 1930.

On 23 December 1930 the appellant filed a memorandum of appeal before the District Judge against the personal decree of 13 June 1930 but deposited only Re. 1 as court-fee out of Rs. 135 payable. The District Judge granted time to file the deficit court-fee until 6 January 1931. On 7 January 1931 the Judge recorded: “The deficit court-fee stamp has not been put in. The memorandum of appeal is rejected.”

On 8 January the appellant obtained seven days' further time and supplied the stamp on 10 January. On 17 January 1931 the Judge ordered the appeal to be registered, directed notices to respondents and fixed 24 February 1931 for hearing, with costs and notices to be put in within seven days. On 24 February notices were proved; Respondent 1 entered appearance and objected that the appeal was time-barred. The objection was heard on 12 March 1931, when the Judge overruled it, held the appellant's explanation for delay to be reasonable, extended time and rejected the objection with costs (pleader's fee Rs. 16).

The respondent obtained a rule in the Court below challenging the subsequent orders of the District Judge after 7 January 1931 on the ground that those orders were passed without jurisdiction because the 7 January order was, it was argued, a final order (equivalent to a decree) rejecting the memorandum of appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge's order of 7 January 1931 rejecting the memorandum of appeal was a final order equivalent to a decree (within the meaning of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code) and thereby rendered the Judge functus officio so that he had no jurisdiction to receive a subsequent memorandum or make further orders.
  2. Whether the appellate court (District Judge) had jurisdiction to register the appeal and to decide the question of extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act — and whether the appeal should have been registered without a prior determination of Section 5 questions.
  3. Whether the order of 12 March 1931 extending time and rejecting the respondent's objection was passed without jurisdiction and whether costs awarded against the respondent in that order should stand.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (who obtained the rule in the court below) contended that the District Judge's order of 7 January 1931 rejecting the memorandum of appeal had the same effect as an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code; such an order, the petitioner argued, is a "decree" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code.
  • Relying on that premise, it was submitted that, by virtue of the provisions which give appellate courts the same powers as original courts (Section 107(2) was invoked), the 7 January order should have the force of a decree and could be set aside only by appeal or review; accordingly the District Judge had no jurisdiction to ignore that order and to subsequently receive and register the memorandum of appeal after the fee defect was cured.

Other Parties' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's separate legal arguments beyond the factual explanation that the appellant supplied the deficit court-fee after the initial rejection and maintained that his explanation for delay was reasonable when the limitation objection was taken.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar, A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 179 Judicial Committee authority on procedure where appeals are presented beyond limitation; indicates appellate court should decide Section 5 questions. Cited to show that the District Judge should not have registered the appeal without considering whether extension under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was appropriate; but the Court noted a tacit term that Section 5 would be considered upon objection.
Sunderabai v. Collector of Belgaum, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 135 Along with Krishnasami Panikondar, authority concerning treatment of out-of-time appeals and Section 5 issues. Referred to for the proposition that Section 5 considerations should be determined; used to explain the expectation that such questions be considered when objection is raised.
Ram Sahay v. Lachmi Narayan, [1917] 3 Pat. L.J. 74 Authority (among others) holding that provisions like Section 149 apply to bona fide mistakes in valuation, not to deliberate under-stamping to evade limitation. Cited in support of the view that deliberately presenting an insufficiently stamped memorandum is not a case for validating under Section 149 and that the proper procedure is to return the document.
Lekh Ram v. Ramji Das, [1920] 1 Lah. 234 Similar proposition to Ram Sahay — distinction between bona fide mistakes and deliberate insufficiency of court-fee. Used to support the court's criticism of the lower appellate court's procedure in accepting an insufficiently stamped memorandum.
Akkaraju Narayana Rao v. Akkaraju Seshamma, A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 426 Authority emphasising that S.149/S. provisions are for bona fide mistakes and not deliberate under-valuation or under-stamping. Cited to bolster the proposition that the memorandum should have been returned rather than accepted when presented with insufficient court-fee.
Achut Ramchandra v. Nagappa Bab Balgya, A.I.R. 1914 Bom. 249 Bombay High Court's contrary view (to the other cited cases) on the application of S.149 to insufficiently stamped documents. Referred to as the view from which the earlier cited cases dissented; used to explain the landscape of authority.
Brijbhukhan v. Tota Ram, A.I.R. 1929 All. 75 Condemnation of the practice where parties consciously under-stamp documents to evade limitation; sets out the proper procedure of returning the memorandum. Cited as authority condemning the practice and endorsing that the memorandum should be returned rather than accepted when the insufficiency is deliberate.
Faizullah Khan v. Mauladad Khan, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 147 Observation that where an appeal document is accepted and later validated by additional fee payment, the memorandum may be treated as standing good from its original date. Quoted to explain that validation by additional payment can relate the document back to its original presentation date; the Court relied on this observation while also prescribing proper procedure.
Rup Singh v. Mukhraj Singh, [1885] 7 All. 887 (Allahabad High Court) Holding (by Allahabad HC) that decisions rejecting memoranda of appeal on grounds such as limitation or insufficient stamping might be appealable as decrees. Cited by one of the judges (Graham, J.) as an example of authority taking the opposite view; the Court considered and rejected extending the definition of "decree" to cover rejection of a memorandum of appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps:

  1. Nature of the 7 January 1931 order: The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the 7 January order rejecting the memorandum was equivalent to an original-court decree (i.e., rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11). The judge (Suhrawardy, J.) observed that the case before the Court was not one of undervaluation of relief but rather of a deliberately insufficient court-fee on a properly valued memorandum of appeal. That factual distinction was held material.
  2. Statutory interpretation of powers: The Court examined Section 107(2) (which invests an appellate Court with the same powers as an original Court) and Section 2 (definition of "decree"). Suhrawardy, J. reasoned that Section 107(2) gives appellate courts the powers of original courts but does not convert an order of an appellate court into the same species of order as an order of an original court for all consequences; likewise the definition of "decree" expressly mentions rejection of a plaint but does not expressly mention rejection of a memorandum of appeal.
  3. Analogy to Order VII, Rule 13: The Court relied on the principle in Order VII, Rule 13 — that rejection of a plaint does not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action — and applied it mutatis mutandis to appeals. Accordingly, after the defect (insufficient court-fee) was cured, the memorandum presented on 17 January 1931 was treated as a fresh presentation and the District Judge had jurisdiction to receive it.
  4. Requirement to consider Section 5: The Court acknowledged authorities of the Judicial Committee (Krishnasami Panikondar and Sunderabai) indicating that registration of an appeal presented beyond limitation should not occur without deciding whether the appellant is entitled to extension under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, Suhrawardy, J. observed that there is a tacit term in registering such an appeal that the Section 5 question would be considered on objection; in this case the respondent did raise the Section 5 objection on 24 February and the District Judge considered and overruled it on 12 March 1931.
  5. Jurisdictional conclusion on the 12 March order: The Court held that the 12 March order, though perhaps not explicit as to the grounds for exercising discretion under Section 5, was not shown to be without jurisdiction. The Court emphasised that an order extending time under Section 5 should give sufficient indication that the judicial discretion has been exercised, but absence of that detail did not render the order void for lack of jurisdiction.
  6. Procedure and irregularities: The Court condemned the lower appellate Court's initial procedure in accepting (receiving) the memorandum presented on 23 December 1930 when it plainly showed insufficient court-fee. Relying on a line of authorities, the Court held that provisions like Section 149 (validation for mistakes) are meant for bona fide mistakes and not for deliberate attempts to avoid limitation by conscious under-stamping. The correct procedure in such deliberate cases is to return the memorandum to the presenting party.
  7. Validation by subsequent payment: The Court noted observations from Faizullah Khan that where a document is accepted and later validated by additional fee payment, the document may stand good from its original date; but the Court nevertheless prescribed that courts should avoid the irregularity of accepting an obviously insufficiently stamped memorandum and should follow the practice of returning it when the insufficiency appears deliberate.
  8. Practical guidance: The Court urged that where an appeal is presented beyond the period of limitation, notices ought to be issued to respondents and the Section 5 question determined before registration. The Court said this is the practice in its own registry and should be followed by courts below.
  9. Concurrence (Graham, J.): Graham, J. concurred in discharging the rule. He gave a complementary analysis: the word “rejection” means refusal to entertain/receive and does not necessarily imply loss of power to admit the memorandum once defects are cured. He found no authority in the Code to treat rejection of a memorandum of appeal as a decree and concluded the District Judge retained jurisdiction to admit the memorandum after the defect was remedied and to exercise discretion under Section 5.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Rule discharged.

The Court held that the District Judge did not act without jurisdiction in subsequently receiving and registering the memorandum of appeal after the deficit court-fee was paid and in deciding the Section 5 issue on objection. The 7 January 1931 order rejecting the memorandum did not operate as an absolute final decree which precluded correction of the defect and fresh presentation.

Direct consequences and modifications made by the Court:

  • The Court set aside the portion of the District Judge's order that awarded costs against the respondents (that part was vacated). With that modification, the Rule stands discharged.
  • There was no order as to costs in this Court (i.e., no further costs awarded).

Broader implications and guidance (as stated by the Court):

  • Courts should not receive and register memoranda of appeal presented with plainly insufficient court-fees where the insufficiency appears to be a deliberate attempt to evade the law of limitation; in such cases the proper procedure is to return the memorandum to the presenting party.
  • Where an appeal is presented beyond the period of limitation, courts should issue notices to respondents and determine the question of extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before registering the appeal. If registration occurs, there is a tacit expectation that the Section 5 issue will be considered when an objection is taken.
  • The decision in this case did not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond these procedural directions; the Court corrected the particular consequence (costs) it considered unfair in the circumstances but declined to treat the 7 January rejection as a final decree immune to correction by subsequent payment and presentation.

This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the reasoning and statements contained in the provided opinion.

    Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala Opp. Party.

    Suhrawardy, J.:— This matter arises under the following circumstances: In a mortgage suit, after the preliminary and final decrees, a personal decree was passed against the opposite party on 13th June 1930. On 31st July 1930, an application for amendment was made by him, which was rejected on 28th August 1930. The High Court was unsuccessfully moved against that order on 5th December 1930. Then on 23rd December 1930, an appeal was filed before the District Judge against the personal decree passed on 13th June 1930, on a court-fee of Re. 1 only out of Rs. 135 payable on the memorandum. Time was granted by the District Judge to file the deficit court-fee till 6th January 1931. The deficit court-fee net having been put in, on 7th January 1931, the following order was passed:

    “The deficit court-fee stamp has not been put in. The memorandum of appeal is rejected.”

    2. On 8th January, the opposite party again prayed for seven days' time to file the deficit court-fee stamp, and the prayer was granted. The stamp was supplied on 10th January and, on 17th January 1931, the next order was passed by the Judge in these words:

    “Register. Let notices issue to the respondents and fix 24th February 1931, next for hearing. Costs and notices to be put in within seven days.”

    3. On 24th February 1931, the order passed runs thus:

    “Notices served. Services proved. Respondent 1 enters appearance and files an objection stating that the appeal is time barred. Let this objection be put up in presence of the pleaders on 12th March 1931. Inform pleaders.”

    4. On 12th March 1931, the order passed was:

    “Pleaders heard for the respondent. The explanation of the appellant for delay is reasonable and there is no reason why time should not be extended. The objection is rejected with costs. Pleader's fee Rs. 16.”

    5. Against this order the present rule has been obtained by the respondent in the Court below and the ground which has been pressed by the petitioner is that the orders of the learned District Judge after he had finally rejected the memorandum of appeal on 7th January 1931, were all passed without jurisdiction and in support of this contention it is argued that the order of 7th January 1931, had the same effect as an order passed by an original Court, under O. 7, R. 11 of the CPC. Under that rule, a trial Court shall reject a plaint where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within the time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. Such an order is a decree as defined in S. 2 of the Code, and it is submitted that by virtue of the provisions of S. 107(2), the order passed by the Judge on 7th January 1931, should also have the force of a decree and that the order can only be set aside by appeal or review and that the Judge had no jurisdiction to ignore it and to receive subsequently the memorandum of appeal. I find it difficult to accede to this view of the law for in the first place it is not a case where the relief claimed was under-valued and the plaintiff was asked to put in the court-fee upon proper valuation, but it is a case where the appellant deliberately put in insufficient court-fee upon the memorandum of appeal which was valued properly. In the second place S. 107(2) invests an appellate Court with the same powers as are conferred on a Court of original jurisdiction. It does not purport to give the order passed by an appellate Court the same effect as an order passed by an original Court of a like nature. S. 2 expressly says that “decree” shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint. If it was the intention of the legislature to include within the definition of “decree” an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal, it would have expressly said so. But it is not necessary to go into this matter further, because, in view of the provisions of S. 107(2), an appellate Court is invested with all the powers of an original Court and has accordingly the same powers as are conferred upon an original Court under O. 7, R. 13, which says that the rejection of a plaint shall not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. Applying this provision mutatis mutandis to the case of appeals the rejection of a memorandum of appeal by the appellate Court shall not, of its own force, preclude the appellant from presenting a fresh memorandum on proper court-fee. In this view it would seem that the order passed by the learned Judge on 17th January 1931 was an order receiving a fresh memorandum of appeal from the appellant and registering the appeal. I am inclined to hold that after the rejection of the memorandum of appeal, the proper court-fee having been paid, the memorandum thus brought in order should be taken to have been presented afresh by the appellant on 17th January 1931.

    6. In view of the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar . A.I.R 1917 P.C 179 and Sunderabai v. Collector of Belgaum . A.I.R 1918 P.C 135, the learned Judge should not have registered the appeal without deciding the question as to whether the appellant was entitled to extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But, as is observed in Krishnasami Panikondar's case, in an order like this, there is a tacit term that the question under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, will be considered on objection being taken by the respondent. In the present case such objection was taken on 24th February 1931, and the learned Judge, by his order of 12th March 1931, overruled that objection and held that the explanation of the appellant for the delay was reasonable and that there was no reason why time should not be extended. It cannot therefore be said that the order of 12th March 1931, was passed without jurisdiction. It may be that the order was not explicit as to the ground on which time was extended, or that, under the circumstances of this case, the order was wrong, but that may be a matter for a higher appellate Court, but it cannot, for those reasons, be said that the order was passed without jurisdiction. I should however observe that an order passed extending time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should give sufficient indication that the discretion given by the law has been judicially exercised.

    7. Before parting with this case, I should like to impress upon the Courts below the necessity of avoiding committing certain irregularities. The procedure adopted by the lower appellate Court in this matter of receiving the memorandum of appeal presented on 23rd December 1930, with a court-fee of Re. 1, which was, on the face of it, insufficient, was without jurisdiction. In Ram Sahay v. Lachmi Narayan . [1917] 3 Pat. L.J 74, Lekh Ram v. Ramji Das . [1920] 1 Lah. 234, Akkaraju Narayana Rao v. Akkaraju Seshamma . A.I.R 1915 Mad. 426 and in other cases, it has been held, dissenting from the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Achut Ramchandra v. Nagappa Bab Balgya . A.I.R 1914 Bom. 249, that the provisions of S. 149 are intended to apply to cases of bona fide mistakes in valuation and not to cases where a party consciously and intentionally puts insufficient court-fee on a document in an attempt to avoid the law of limitation. This practice has been condemned in Brijbhukhan v. Tota Ram . A.I.R 1929 All. 75, where the proper procedure is pointed out that, in such cases, the memorandum of appeal should at once be returned to the party presenting it. This view appeals to me as correct. In Faizullah Khan v. Mauladad Khan . A.I.R 1929 P.C 147, though the point before us was not under consideration, some observations made by their Lordships are to the point. In dealing with appeals presented in that case with insufficient court-fee, their Lordships remarked:

    “They (appeals) were documents duly presented to and accepted by the Court, and as to the fee thereon, should the valuation be unsatisfactory or in the end insufficient, that is validated by additional payment, the result of which payment is that the document, namely, the memorandum of appeal, stands good from its date.”

    8. The procedure here suggested is what this Court has laid down for the guidance of its office here.

    9. One other matter, which I like to impress upon the Courts below, is that in all cases where an appeal is presented beyond the period of limitation, notices ought to be issued, before registering it, upon the respondents and the question of extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be determined before such registration. This is the practice which is invariably followed in this Court. In the view however I have taken, I am not prepared to hold that the order passed by the learned Judge on 12th March 1931, is without jurisdiction, and, therefore we are not inclined to interfere under S. 115. But I do not think that, in the circumstances of this case, the learned Judge should have allowed costs against the respondents. The appeal was apparently filed long after the period of limitation and the respondent cannot be blamed for his objection that it should not be registered. That portion of the order awarding costs against the petitioner is set aside. With this modification the Rule stands discharged. There will be no order as to costs.

    Graham, J.:— I agree that the Rule should be discharged. The main contention on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of 7th January 1931, rejecting the memorandum of appeal was a final order, that it amounted to a decree, that the District Judge was therefore functus officio and had no jurisdiction to make the subsequent orders granting time for payment of the deficit court-fee and eventually allowing the appeal to be registered. The argument employed is that, under Section 2 of the CPC, the definition of decree includes rejection of a plaint. It is therefore contended that the provision relating to a plaint applies equally to a memorandum of appeal by virtue of those provisions of the Code which make provisions relating to suits applicable to appeals. This view has in fact been taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rup Singh v. Mukhraj Singh . [1885] 7 All. 887. I find too in Mullah's Civil Procedure Code a note to this effect under S. 2:

    “It is provided by the present section that decisions rejecting plaints shall be deemed to be decrees. The provisions of this and other sections relating to suits apply to appeals, so far as such provisions are applicable: (S. 108). Hence the decision rejecting the memorandum of appeal on the ground that it is barred by limitation, or is insufficiently stamped, or that it was not duly presented, is appealable as a decree.”

    10. Now, looking to S. 108 of the Code, I find it is there stated:

    “The provisions of this part relating to appeals from original decrees shall, so far six may be, apply to appeals,”

    11. The words “the provisions of this part” meaning those of part 7 of the Code in which this particular section occurs, and the section apparently has nothing to do with S. 2 of the Code which is in the preliminary part of the Code. S. 107 of the Code also appears to me to have no bearing on the point. If the legislature had intended that the rejection of a memorandum of appeal should also be deemed to be a decree, it would have been an easy matter to say so. I can find no authority in the Code for holding that such an order is a decree and therefore a final order.

    12. The question then is, what is the effect of an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal. As I understand the word “rejection” it means refusal to entertain, or receive. But it does not necessarily imply that the Court which rejects or refuses, for some reason or other, to entertain a memorandum of appeal, has not got power to admit it, provided the defect, whatever it may be, is made good. If that be so, the District Judge must be held to have had jurisdiction to make the subsequent orders. He undoubtedly had a discretion to extend the time for filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and he exercised that discretion and after hearing the parties ordered the appeal to be registered. His order might, as my learned brother has observed, have been more explicit, but it does not appear to me that there is any sufficient ground for our interference in revision beyond the modification which my learned brother has made.

    K.N/R.K

    13. Rule discharged.

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    Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala Opp. Party.
    (Jun 2, 1931)