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Case Number

App. No. 487 of 1920

Judges

Mookerjee
Chotzner, JJ.

Acts

Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (Act VIII of 1885)
correct.2. Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act
Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Courts Act, 1876.
Courts Act, 1906,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mookerjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit by landlords for recovery of arrears of rent based on a kabuliat (contract) executed on 28 February 1913 by the purchaser at an execution sale (Nagendra Bala Debi). The kabuliat fixed the rent for the entire tenure at Rs. 600 payable to the whole body of landlords.

Prior to the kabuliat, a notification made under Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (published 28 August 1912) invested a Settlement Officer with powers, inter alia, "to settle all rents" and "to reduce rents" for specified classes of holdings in Birbhum district—notably those held by Sonthal headmen (Chakdars) and certain other categories listed in the notification.

At the date of the notification the disputed land was in the occupation of a Sonthal Chakdar (Mangal Majhi). On 13 November 1912 the tenancy was sold in execution of a decree and Nagendra Bala Debi purchased the tenancy. She executed the kabuliat on 28 February 1913. A draft settlement rent-roll under S.104-E read with S.112 was published on 10 March 1914 fixing a progressive rent (equivalent to Rs. 204-15-0 annually for the years in suit). Landlords objected to the entry; their objection was overruled and the settlement rent-roll was republished and finally confirmed by Government on 11 December 1914.

The landlords commenced the present action on 30 April 1918 claiming their proportionate share of rent at the kabuliat rate (Rs. 600). The defendants (representing the purchaser) pleaded liability only at the rate mentioned in the settlement rent-roll. The trial Court held the kabuliat not operative and that rent was recoverable at the settlement rate; the Court of Appeal held the kabuliat operative because the settlement record had been prepared without jurisdiction. The present appeal by the defendants challenges that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Settlement Officer's rent settlement (and subsequent Record-of-Rights entry) was made with jurisdiction — i.e., whether the Settlement Officer retained jurisdiction over the disputed tenancy at the time he actually exercised the power to settle/reduce rent.
Whether an entry in the Record-of-Rights prepared under the rent-settlement procedure (Section 104-J) is conclusive evidence of the rent payable between private parties where the entry resulted from proceedings conducted without jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

Appellants contended that once jurisdiction had been vested in the Settlement Officer or tribunal it could not be divested by subsequent events — i.e., the vesting of jurisdiction at the time of appointment should be sufficient to sustain the validity of subsequent acts even if relevant facts changed.

Respondents' (Landlords') Position / Trial Position

The landlords asserted their right to recover rent at the rate fixed by the kabuliat (contract) executed by the purchaser at the execution sale.
The defendants (respondents in the trial) pleaded that rent was payable only at the rate fixed in the settlement rent-roll prepared and confirmed under the statutory procedure (S.104-E read with S.112 and S.104-J).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Schibsby v. Westenholz	Authority cited in relation to the proposition that, in some local-jurisdiction contexts, the state of things at the institution of a suit determines jurisdiction.	Contrasted with other authorities to show that that doctrine is limited and does not apply to subject-matter jurisdiction which must exist throughout proceedings.
Pemberton v. Hughes	Also cited in the same context as Schibsby as supporting the "jurisdiction determined at institution" approach in certain local-jurisdiction cases.	Used similarly as a contrasting authority to demonstrate limits of that doctrine.
Sirdar Gurdayal Singh v. Raja of Faridkote	Authority expressing a different view (Lord Selborne's dictum) on the effect of changes after institution on jurisdiction.	Contrasted with Schibsby and Pemberton to show the doctrinal debate; court observed these contrasts in framing the limits of the rule.
Hridaynath v. Ram Chandra (Full Bench)	Definition and explanation of "jurisdiction" — power of a court to hear and determine a cause and the possible qualifications or restrictions of such jurisdiction.	Cited to recall and ground the court's analysis of what constitutes jurisdiction and its limits.
Cooper v. Reynolds (Supreme Court of U.S.)	Quoted for the essentials of jurisdiction (subject matter, person, res) and the source of jurisdiction in sovereign authority or statute.	Used to explain fundamental components of jurisdiction and that jurisdiction over subject-matter is conferred by law and must exist throughout proceedings.
Vajeckand v. Nandram	Illustration that where a court had jurisdiction at institution but lost it before judgment (by statutory change), a subsequent judgment is void for want of jurisdiction.	Applied as an analogous example supporting the proposition that jurisdiction over subject-matter must persist until disposal.
R. v. Denton	Case relied upon in support of the proposition that loss of jurisdiction during proceedings renders subsequent decisions invalid.	Invoked among authorities demonstrating instances where jurisdictional loss during pendency invalidated later acts.
Nana v. Sheku	Decision refusing to apply a new statute retrospectively; noted as distinguished and not affecting the present principle.	Cited to show that retrospective operation was not followed in that case, but court said this does not touch the present question about loss of jurisdiction during pendency.
Miller's Case	One of a group of cases illustrating the category where courts proceeding after losing jurisdiction cannot validly decide.	Listed among authorities to support the general principle that jurisdiction lost during pendency invalidates judgments.
R. v. London Justices	Another authority in the category holding a decision given after loss of jurisdiction to be invalid.	Used as part of the doctrinal support for the court's rule on jurisdiction persistence.
Charrington v. Metharingham	Similarly cited as an instance where exercise of jurisdiction after loss was void.	Part of the supporting authorities for the proposition on jurisdiction continuity.
R. v. Mawgan	Another authority in the same group regarding loss of jurisdiction during the pendency of proceedings.	Included among precedents illustrating the principle that judgments rendered after loss of jurisdiction are void.
Yeaton v. U.S.	U.S. Supreme Court case holding that when a court loses jurisdiction during pendency it can no longer proceed to judgment.	Relied upon as persuasive authority for the same principle; followed in subsequent U.S. decisions.
Hunt v. Jennings	Followed Yeaton v. U.S. as authority for the proposition that loss of jurisdiction during proceedings prevents valid disposition.	Cited as part of the chain of U.S. authority affirming the rule.
Butler v. Palmer (Supreme Court of New York)	After elaborate discussion, maintained the view that loss of jurisdiction during pendency prevents the court from pronouncing valid judgment.	Used to demonstrate acceptance of the principle in another jurisdiction and to reinforce the rule.
Stephenson v. Doe	Reaffirmed the principle (similar to Yeaton and Butler) that loss of jurisdiction during proceedings invalidates subsequent decisions.	Included among decisions confirming the general rule on subject-matter jurisdiction.
Hamilton Bank v. Dudley; Gats v. Osborn; Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Granet; Henrix v. U.S; Hallowell v. Commons	U.S. cases applying the principle that courts losing jurisdiction during pendency cannot validly proceed to judgment.	Grouped as repeated applications of the Yeaton principle in U.S. jurisprudence; cited to show consistent authority.
Mora v. Kuzac	Authority for the proposition that institution of a suit in a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and subsequent conferment of jurisdiction does not cure that nullity.	Invoked to support the converse proposition that commencing in a court without jurisdiction cannot be validated later.
Hart v. Watt	Also cited for the proposition that institution of suit in a court without jurisdiction is a nullity.	Used to reinforce that subsequent conferment cannot cure an initial jurisdictional nullity.
Lawrence v. Wilcock; In re Aylmer; R. v. Judge	Authorities cited for the rule that jurisdiction over subject-matter is conferred by law and cannot be waived or conferred by consent; objections to lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by parties.	Applied to emphasize that parties cannot cure want of statutory jurisdiction by consent and that jurisdictional defects render proceedings void.
Hickey v. Stewart; Rhode Island v. Massachusetta; Wilcox v. Jackson; Thompson v. Whitman; U.S v. Clarke; Holme Insurance Co. v. Morse; Williamson v. Berry; In re Sawyer	Examples where courts' exercise of jurisdiction in matters beyond their statutory competence was held void; illustrations of usurpation of judicial power.	Referred to as supporting examples showing that acts done without statute-given jurisdiction are nullities.
Ambica v. Jay Chandra; Prasanna v. Rachimuddin; Baikuntha v. Prasanna; Rajani v. Secretary of State; Prafulla v. Palku; Pratap v. Secretary of State	Authorities for the proposition that Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act raises a strong (an "irrefutable presumption" as described) presumption in favour of the correctness/conclusiveness of entries in the Record-of-Rights.	Cited to acknowledge that entries in the Record-of-Rights normally carry conclusive effect, but the court held such conclusiveness cannot avail where the underlying proceeding was without jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two linked stages corresponding to the two issues framed.

First, the court examined the statutory power under Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the implementing notification. The power "to settle all rents" and "to reduce rents" was explicitly made exercisable in respect of specified classes of holdings — in particular, "all areas held by Sonthal headmen (Chakdars)". The court emphasised that for any particular area to be affected by the Settlement Officer's exercise of power that area must possess the prescribed character (i.e., be held by a Sonthal Chakdar) at the precise moment the power is exercised. It is not sufficient that the area was within the scope of authority at the time the Settlement Officer was originally invested with power; the critical moment is when the Settlement Officer actually exercises the power.

The appellants' contention that once jurisdiction vests it cannot be divested by subsequent events was addressed. The court rejected the contention in its broad form by distinguishing between two doctrines: (a) in some instances of local jurisdiction the state of things at institution may determine jurisdiction (illustrated by some authorities), and (b) where the dispute concerns jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the jurisdiction must exist throughout the proceedings. The court surveyed authority (including both English and U.S. decisions, and Indian Full Bench authority) to support the proposition that subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by law and must subsist at all stages — institution, conduct, and disposal — and that loss of such jurisdiction during the pendency of proceedings renders subsequent acts and decisions void.

Applying that principle to the facts, the court found that: when the Settlement Officer was appointed he had jurisdiction as the tenancy then fell within the class (held by a Sonthal Chakdar). But before the Settlement Officer actually exercised his power the tenancy had passed out of Sonthal hands (it was sold to Nagendra Bala Debi, a non-Sonthal). Consequently, by the time the Settlement Officer undertook the settlement and reduced the rent the area no longer possessed the statutory character required to bring it within the officer's competence. The Settlement Officer had therefore lost jurisdiction and the subsequent proceedings (publication of rent-roll entries and confirmation) were taken without jurisdiction.

The court further considered the effect of Section 104-J, which ordinarily gives conclusive effect to entries in the Record-of-Rights. While acknowledging authorities that support a strong presumption in favour of the correctness and conclusiveness of such entries, the court held that no conclusive effect can be attributed to an entry that was made as the result of proceedings carried on without jurisdiction. Thus, the statutory presumption could not operate to displace the kabuliat where the settlement proceedings were ultra vires.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the decree of the District Judge and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the Settlement Officer's proceedings (which led to the reduction of rent and the entry in the Record-of-Rights) were without jurisdiction because, at the time the power was actually exercised, the tenancy was no longer held by a Sonthal Chakdar. Consequently, the kabuliat executed on 28 February 1913 remained operative between the parties.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the landlords are entitled to recover rent at the contract (kabuliat) rate rather than at the rate appearing in the settlement rent-roll which was produced by proceedings held to be without jurisdiction.
The court emphasised the legal principle that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist throughout the proceedings and that entries or proceedings made in excess of statutory jurisdiction are nullities and cannot be validated collaterally by the statutory presumption in Section 104-J.
The opinion does not purport to establish a novel rule of law beyond applying established authorities on the continuity of subject-matter jurisdiction; no broader novel precedent is asserted to have been laid down by the court in this opinion. The immediate consequence is the affirmation of the District Judge's decree and dismissal of the appeal with costs.

End of summary — all content strictly confined to material explicitly stated in the provided opinion.

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Jyotish Prokas Chattoraji v. Bagla Kanta Choudari

Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent on the basis of a Kabuliat executed by their predecessor on the 28th February, 1913. The trial Court held that the kabuliat was not operative and that rent was recoverable only at the rate mentioned in a settlement record prepared under Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Court of Appeal below has held that the kabuliat was operative inasmuch as the settlement record had been prepared without jurisdiction. The substantial question in controversy is, which of these conflicting views is correct.

2. Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides as follows:—

(1) The Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, may, on being satisfied that the exercise of the powers hereinafter mentioned is necessary the interests of public order or of the local welfare, or that any landlord is demanding Tents which have been illegally enhanced above those entered as payable in a Record-of-Rights prepared under this Chapter, invest a Revenue Officer with the following powers or either of them, namely:—

(a) power to settle all rents;

(b) power, when settling rents, to reduce rents if, in the opinion of the officer, the maintenance of existing rents would on any ground, whether specified in this Act or not, be unfair or inequitable.

(2) The powers given under this section may be made exercisable within a specified area either generally or with reference to specified cases or classes of cases.

(2-a) A settlement of rents under this section shall be made in the manner provided by S. 104 to 104-J. (both inclusive).

(3) When the Local Government takes any action under this section, the settlement record prepared by the Revenue Officer shall not take effect until it has been finally confirmed by the Governor General in Council; and the revision, by direction of the Board of Revenue under Sub-S. (2) of S. 104-G, of a Record-of-Rights prepared under this section, shall be subject to a like confirmation by the Governor General in Council.

3. In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the following notification was published in the Calcutta Gazette on the 28th August, 1912 (Part I.P 1389) Birbhum. “No. 2416 L.R—The 27th August, 1912. In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 112 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (Act VIII of 1885) and with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council the Governor is pleased to invest Mr. P.M Robertson, Deputy Collector and Settlement Officer in district Birbhum, acting under Chapter X of the said Act, with the following powers:

(a) Power to settle all rents:

(b) power, when settling rents, to reduce rents, if in the opinion of the officer the maintenance of existing rents would on any ground, whether specified in the said Act or not, be unfair or inequitable.

4. These powers will be exercisable is respect of

(a) All areas held by Sonthal headmen (Chakdars) and

(b) All holdings of Sonthals, Bhuias (or Ghatwals), Mals, Baurias and Dhan-gars, in the villages in district Birbhum for which a survey has been made and a Record-of-Rights prepared under the notifications specified below:—

(1) No. 4161 L.R dated the 23rd December, 1909, published at page 1963, Part 1 of the Calcutta Gazette of the 29th idem.

(2) No. 370 T.R, dated the 10th May, 1910, publised at page 624, Part 1, of the Calcutta Gazette of the 18th idem.

(3) No. 1926 T.R, dated the 7th October, 1910, published at page 1395, Part 1, of the Calcutta Gazette of the 12th idem.”

5. At the date of this notification, the disputed land was in the occupation of a Sonthal Chakdar by name. Mangal Majhi. On the 13th November, 1912, the tenancy was brought to sale in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by the landlords against Mangal Majhi. Nagendra Bala Debi, since dead, and now represented by her sons, the defendants, became the purchaser at the execution sale. On the 28th February, 1913, she executed a kabuliat which fixed the rent at Rs. 600 payable for the entire tenure to the whole body of landlords.

6. On the 10th March, 1914, a draft settlement rent-roll was published under S. 104-E read with S. 112. The rent in respect of this tenancy was fixed at a progressive rate, which would make the rent payable at Rs. 204-15-0 annually for the years in suit. On the 9th April, 1914 the landlords objected to the entry under S. 104-E. Their objection was overruled on the 6th May, 1914. The settlement rent-roll was there-after republished on the 17th November, 1914, and was finally confirmed by the Government on the 11th December, 1914.

7. On the 30th April, 1918, the landlords commenced this action, claiming their proportionate share of the rent at the rate mentioned in the contract. The defendants pleaded that they were liable to pay rent only at the rate mentioned in the settlement rent-roll.

8. The two questions which thus emerged for consideration, were first was the settlement of rent made with jurisdiction; and secondly was the entry in the Record-of-Rights conclusive evidence of the rent payable under S. 104-J. The Courts below have expressed divergent opinions upon these points.

9. As regards the first question, it is plain that the power to settle all rents, and when settling rents to reduce rents, was exercisable by the Settlement Officer only in respect of all areas held by Sonthal headmen (Chakdars), that is, by Sonthal headmen or Sonthal Chakdars. Consequently any particular area, which is affected by the exercise of this power, must possess the prescribed character, that is must be; held by a Sonthal Chakdar, at the moment when, in exercise of the power, the rent is settled and reduced. It is clearly not sufficient that the area should have been within the scope of the authority of the Settlement Officer when he was first invested with the power. The crucial juncture is the point of time when the power comes to be exercised.

10. The appellants have contended, however, that this view is not supported by principle and that if jurisdiction has once become vested in a tribunal, it cannot be divested by subsequent events. We are of opinion that this contention is too broadly formulated.

11. Let us assume that, in cases of local jurisdiction, the principle applies that the state of things existing at the time of the institution of the suit is sufficient to determine the jurisdiction, on the theory that the progress of a suit once validly commenced in any Court is not affected by change of residence or country by the defendant; in this connection the judgment of Blackburn, J., in Schibsby v. Westenholz(1), and of Lindly, M.R in Pemberton v. Hughes(2), may be contrasted with the dictum of Lord Selborne in Sirdar Gurdayal Singh v. Raja of Faridkote(3).

12. But it is well-settled that this doctrine has no application where the question is one of jurisdiction over subject matter, such jurisdiction must exist throughout the proceedings and in the adoption of this view, full recognition is accorded to the theory that there is exercise of jurisdiction all through the different stages of trial.

13. We may usefully re-call here that, as explained by the Full Bench in the case of Hridaynath v. Ram Chandra(4), jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of a Court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power in relation to it, in other words, by jurisdiction is meant the authority by which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. This jurisdiction of the Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances.

14. Thus, the jurisdiction may have to be considered with reference to place, value, and nature of the subject-matter. The power of the tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject-matters of prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial causes, acquisition of lands for public purposes, Record-of-Rights as between landlords and tenants.

15. This classification into territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject-matter is of a fundamental character. Jurisdiction has consequently reference to the power of the Court over the parties, over the subject-matter, over the res or property in contest and to the authority of the Court to render the judgment or decree which it assumes to make.

16. The essentials of jurisdiction in each of these aspects was lucidly stated by Miller, J., in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cooper v. Reynolds(5).

“By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the Court, and is to be sought for in the general nature of its power, or in authority specially conferred.

“Jurisdiction of the person is obtained by the service of process or by the voluntary appearance of the party in the progress of the cause.

“Jurisdiction of the res is obtained by a seizure under process of the Court, whereby it is held to abide such order as the Court may make concerning it.

“The power to render the decree or judgment which the Court may undertake to make in the particular case, depends upon the nature and extent of the authority vested in it by law in regard to the subject matter of the cause.”

17. For the validity of a judgment in a suit, this jurisdiction over subject-matter must exist throughout the proceedings, as well as the time of its institution as at the time of its disposal.

18. An illustration is furnished by the decision in Vajeckand v. Nandram(6). There a suit for the possession of a house was instituted in the Court of a Mamlatdar who had jurisdiction at the date of the commencement of the litigation to entertain the suit under the Mamlatdars Courts Act, 1876. After the trial had closed and before judgment could be delivered, the Act was replaced by the Mamlatdars Courts Act, 1906, which restricted the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar to lands or premises used for agriculture. The Mamlatdar, notwithstanding this, delivered judgment. It was ruled that the judgment was without jurisdiction as the Mamlatdar had lost jurisdiction before it was pronounced.

19. Reliance was placed in support of this conclusion upon the decision in R. v. Denton(7). We are not unmindful that the construction placed on the Mamlatdars Courts Act, 1906, by the decision of Vajechand v. Nandaram, was not followed is Nana v. Sheku(8), where Jenkins, C.J declined to attribute to the new statute a retrospective operation. That, however, does not touch the present question; on the other hand, the decision emphasises the view that, if the Court were taken to have lost its jurisdiction during the pendency of the proceeding, the Court could not pronounce a decision therein. Such a result is by no means unknown to law; for the decision in R. v. Denton, belongs to the same category as the cases of Miller's Case(9), R. v. London Justices(10), Charrington v. Metharingham(11), and R. v. Mawgan, (12). A similar view was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Yeaton v. U.S(13), which was followed in Hunt v. Jennings(14), as authority for the proposition that when the Court loses its jurisdiction during the pendency of a trial, it can no longer proceed to judgment.

20. The same view was maintained after elaborate discussion by the Supreme Court of New York in Butler v. Palmer(15), and was re affirmed in Stephenson v. Doe(16). The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United Stares in Yeaton v. U.S, has since been repeatedly applied in that Court; Hamilton Bank v. Dudley(17), Gats v. Osborn(18), Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Granet(19), Henrix v. U.S(20), Hallowell v. Commons(21).

21. We sea no reason to doubt the correctness of the view that a Court may lose its jurisdiction during the pendency of a proceeding, and that in such an event, if it proceeds to pronounce judgment such judgment must be regarded as void because made without jurisdiction; Wells on Jurisdiction, Ss. 73-81; Works Jurisdiction, S. 24; Brown on Jurisdiction, S. 25.

22. Conversely, it has been maintained that if an action is commenced in a Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the proceeding is void, nor will the fact that subsequently jurisdiction was by law conferred upon the Court over that class of cases cure the error; in other words as stated in Mora v. Kuzac(22), the institution of a suit in a Courts without jurisdiction is a nullity and the investiture of that Court with jurisdiction at a subsequent period has no effect to cure the nullity; see also Hart v. Watt(23).

23. In the case before us, the Settlement Officer had jurisdiction when he was appointed to exercise his power, to reduce the rent of the disputed tenancy which at that time fell within the class of areas held by Sonthal Chakdars. Before he could exercise his jurisdiction the tenancy had passed into the hands of a non-Sonthal; consequently, the Settlement. Officer lost his jurisdiction over the area, and could no longer exercise the power conferred on him. The proceedings taken by him subsequent thereto were without jurisdiction and could not affect the subject-matter of the litigation.

24. It is also well-settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter is given only by law and cannot be conferred by consent. It follows as a corollary that the objections that a Court is not given such jurisdiction by law cannot be waived by the parties; Lawrence v. Wilcock(24), In re Aylmer(25), R. v. Judge(26). There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the case before us attracts the operation of the fundamental rule that if a Court authorised by a statute to exercise jurisdiction in a particular class of cases only, nevertheless under take at exercise there power and jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the Court acts without jurisdiction, so that its judgment is a nullity and will be so treated when it comes in question either directly or collaterally. An example is furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hickey v. Stewart(27), where a decree by a State Court of Chancery, establishing the validity of a Spanish grant over which no power had ever been conferred upon that Court, was held void, and its exercise of jurisdiction declared to be a mere usurpation of judicial power; see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetta(28), Wilcox v. Jackson(29), Thompson v. Whitman(30), U.S v. Clarke(31), Holme Insurance Co. v. Morse(32), Williamson v. Berry(33), In re Sawyer(34). We hold accordingly that the proceedings of the Settlement Officer which resulted in the redaction of rent were without jurisdiction.

25. As regards the second question, it may be conceded that Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act raises an irrefutable presumption in favour of the entry is the Record-of-Rights; Ambica v. Jay Chandra(35), Prasanna v. Rachimuddin(36), Baikuntha v. Prasanna(37), Rajani v. Secretary of State(38), Prafulla v. Palku(39), and Pratap v. Secretary of State(40). This, however, is of no avail to the appellants, for no conclusive effect can be attributed to an entry, made as the result of a proceeding carried on without jurisdiction.

26. The result is that the contract between the parties cannot be deemed to have been superseded by the Record-of-Rights and is still operative between them. The decree of the District Judge must accordingly be affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.

27. Appeal dismissed.

Jyotish Prokas Chattoraji v. Bagla Kanta Choudari

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mookerjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

Respondents' (Landlords') Position / Trial Position

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Jyotish Prokas Chattoraji v. Bagla Kanta Choudari

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