Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the amended section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Indian Evidence Act or the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • SECTION 162 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 6 or 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • section 211 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 157, Indian Evidence Act,
  • SECTION 157 EVIDENCE ACT
  • section 25, and section 27
  • section 211, Indian Penal
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the amended section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Indian Evidence Act or the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • SECTION 162 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 6 or 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • section 211 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 157, Indian Evidence Act,
  • SECTION 157 EVIDENCE ACT
  • section 25, and section 27
  • section 211, Indian Penal
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code for making a false complaint that five persons committed dacoity. The alleged dacoity was said to have occurred at 3 a.m. on 1 June 1923. The accused's complaint (Exhibit A) stated that six persons waylaid him, his daughter and his son-in-law (P.W.17), and a servant (P.W.16), threatened them and carried off a bundle. Eighteen witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove the falsity of the complaint: police investigators, formal witnesses, village officers, alleged accused persons named in Exhibit A, witnesses to prior enmity, witnesses supporting an alibi for one of the named persons, and the accused's relatives and servants.

At trial, the Sessions Judge relied substantially on oral statements made to police officers during investigation (adduced through P.Ws.2–5) that the accused's daughter and son-in-law denied any dacoity; the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for two years. On appeal, Judges Wallace and Madhavan Nayar considered whether the admission of those police-recorded oral statements was legally permissible and whether, absent those statements, there remained sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Both appellate judges concluded that the statements had been wrongly admitted and allowed the appeal, reversing the conviction and cancelling the bail bond.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amended section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure operates as an absolute bar to the admission (or "use") of oral statements made to police officers in the course of investigation.
  2. If section 162 is not an absolute bar, whether the oral statements made to police during investigation are admissible under the Indian Evidence Act (specifically considering sections such as section 157 and the doctrines of res gestae under sections 6 and 7).
  3. Whether the admission of such police-investigation statements as substantive evidence against the accused is consistent with the general principles of the Indian Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code (and whether convictions can be founded on reproducing contents of police notebooks/oral investigation remarks).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defence objected to the admission of evidence in the form of statements made to police officers (P.Ws.2 and 3) on the ground that the amended section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, prohibited such admission (i.e., it would bar the use of such statements).
  • It was also argued that, even if section 162 is not an absolute bar, the oral statements should have been excluded under the Indian Evidence Act (for example, they do not meet the requirements of section 157 and are not part of the res gestae under sections 6 or 7).

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The Public Prosecutor contended that the amended section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not operate as an absolute bar to the admissibility of oral statements made in the course of police investigation.
  • The Public Prosecutor argued that the police-recorded oral statements were admissible as part of the res gestae under sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
King-Emperor v. Nilakanta This case is cited as part of the voluminous case law interpreting the old section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code (no specific principle from the case is detailed in the opinion). The judgment refers to this body of authority to support the view that, had the legislature intended amended section 162 to cover oral statements, it would have stated so unequivocally.
Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor Cited among authorities dealing with interpretation of the old section 162 (the opinion does not state a specific holding from this case). Used to illustrate the existing volume of case law on the old section 162 and to show that an unequivocal amendment would have been expected if oral statements were intended to be covered.
Fanindra Nath Banerjee v. Emperor Another authority referenced for the interpretation of the old section 162; no particular doctrine from the case is spelled out in the opinion. Relied upon generally to show how the old section had been construed and to support the conclusion about the intended scope of the amended section 162.
Emperor v. Hanma Reddi Listed among cases construing the old section 162; specific principles from the case are not recited in this opinion. Mentioned to reinforce the view that the amendment to section 162 should have been explicit if it were to extend to oral statements.
Emperor v. Akbar Badoo Cited in relation to section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act — supporting the proposition that corroboration under section 157 must relate to testimony given at the trial. The court referred to this case to support the conclusion that statements made to police do not satisfy section 157 (which requires corroboration of testimony at the trial), and therefore the police statements could not be admitted under section 157.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court (Wallace, J., with concurrence by Madhavan Nayar, J.) conducted a staged legal analysis.

1. Interpretation of amended section 162, Criminal Procedure Code

  • Wallace, J. reasoned that the amended section 162 was not intended to be an absolute bar to the "use" of oral statements made to police officers during investigation. He compared the amended text with the old section 162 and observed that the old section dealt with written entries (police diaries) and did not concern statements not reduced to writing.
  • The judge emphasized that the provisos to the amended section clearly apply only to written statements (e.g., copying of written records to the accused), supporting the reading that the phrase "such statement" means statements reduced into writing.
  • Wallace, J. further argued that if the legislature had intended to extend section 162 to oral statements, one would have expected concomitant amendments to section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act; since no such explicit change appeared, the proper reading confined section 162 to written records.
  • Madhavan Nayar, J. concurred and made substantially the same interpretive point: that accepting a broader reading would effectively repeal section 27 of the Evidence Act without indication that the legislature intended that, which was unlikely.

2. Admissibility under the Indian Evidence Act

  • Although the judges held that section 162 did not bar the admission of oral statements per se, they proceeded to examine admissibility under the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Wallace, J. concluded that the statements were not admissible under section 157 because that provision requires corroboration of testimony given at the trial; the police statements did not corroborate testimony given at trial by the accused's daughter or by P.Ws.16 and 17.
  • He also rejected the contention that the statements formed part of the res gestae under sections 6 and 7. The court reasoned that the police investigation and the remarks made to police were separate in time and place from the alleged offence (the offence charged in this trial being the filing of a false complaint). The statements were made in response to police questioning long after the original event (the complaint) and were not spontaneous or contemporaneous utterances that naturally form part of the res gestae.
  • On general principles, Wallace, J. stressed that allowing conviction to rest on police officers' notes of what third persons said in investigation would permit criminal cases to be proved by reproducing contents of police notebooks — a procedure unwarranted by the Evidence Act or the Criminal Procedure Code.

3. Evaluation of the evidence and result

  • Having concluded that the police-investigation statements were not admissible under the Evidence Act, Wallace, J. reviewed the remaining evidence. He found that, once those statements were excluded, the prosecution was left only with self-interested statements of the appellant (the complaint itself) and certain weak or doubtful testimony (for example, uncertainty that P.W.11 was the person named in Exhibit A and the failure of key witnesses to corroborate police accounts).
  • Because the improperly admitted statements were central to the Sessions Judge's reasoning for conviction, and without them the prosecution's case was inadequate, Wallace, J. determined the conviction could not stand. Madhavan Nayar, J. reached the same outcome on substantially similar grounds.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appellate court allowed the appeal, reversed the conviction and sentence, directed that the accused be set at liberty, and ordered the accused's bail bond cancelled.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's conviction under section 211, IPC, was quashed; the sentence was set aside; the accused was to be released and his bail bond cancelled.
  • On admissibility law: The court held (i) the amended section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, should be read as confined to written statements (i.e., statements reduced into writing) and is not an absolute bar to the use of oral statements; but (ii) oral statements made to police in the course of investigation in this case were not admissible under the Indian Evidence Act (they did not satisfy section 157 and did not qualify as res gestae under sections 6 or 7), and generally police-investigation remarks cannot be used as substantive evidence to convict by reproducing contents of police notebooks. The judgment applies these principles to the facts of this case to require exclusion of the police statements that were wrongly admitted.
  • No explicit declaration in the opinion states that a new binding precedent is being established beyond the legal conclusions applied to these facts; the court applied statutory interpretation and established the inadmissibility of the challenged evidence in this case, with the direct consequence of reversing the conviction.

Signed: Wallace, J.; Madhavan Nayar, J. (concurring)

    Grandhe Venkatasubbiah (Accused), v. King-Emperor

    Wallace, J.:— The appellant has been convicted under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code for bringing a false complaint against five persons that they committed dacoity. The case requires detailed scrutiny as the lower Court has in my opinion admitted much evidence which was not admissible in law.

    The dacoity was said to be at 3 a.m on 1st June 1923. Accused's complaint was that six persons waylaid him, his daughter and his son-in-law (P.W 17), P.W 16 being also along with them carrying a luggage bundle and that they threatened them with violence and carried off the bundle.

    Eighteen witnesses were examined for the prosecution to prove the falsity of this complaint. P.Ws 1 and 18 are formal witnesses. P.Ws 2 and 3 are investigating police officers. P.W 4 is the Village Munsif to whom the accused gave his complaint (Exhibit A). P.W 5 is a karnam. (I shall refer to these witnesses later). P.W 6 is a general witness to prior enmity between the present accused and those whom he charged with dacoity. P.Ws 7 to 11 appear as those who were accused in the accused's complaint, but there is some doubt as to P.W 11. P.Ws 12 and 13 are to prove an alibi of P.W 11 at the time of the alleged dacoity. P.Ws 14 and 15 say that the accused complained to them that he was beaten by Gollas or Ayyavari Setti's men. They do not say that the accused said that there was no dacoity. P.Ws 16 and 17 deposed to the fact of there having been a dacoity and they were treated as hostile by the prosecution. They did not help the, prosecution case.

    It is clear that on the prosecution side there is no direct evidence of the falsity of the complaint except that of the persons actually accused of the dacoity who deposed to their innocence. Of these P.W 11 claims to be the person charged in the accused's complaint, Exhibit A, as Podmekala Oosavadu alias Chinniah of Obulampet. The accused says P.W 11 is not the man he charged. P.W 11 gives his name in the Sessions Court as Podamakala Golla Oosavadu alias Chinnavadu of Obulampet. But it appears from the evidence of P.Ws 12 and 13 that he was an in patient in Rajampet hospital on 1st June 1923, the day of the alleged dacoity, and that to the medical officer he gave his name of Chinnavadu tout seul of Ellampet. He explains now that he gave his village as Ellampet because it adjoins Obulampet but obviously that is no explanation at all. Exhibit A itself clearly distinguishes between the two villages and four persons named in it are said to belong to Ellampet, and the fifth to Obulampet. If it was a wrong description of P.W 11 to say that he was of Obulampet Exhibit A would hardly have made such a distinction. It is very doubtful to say the least, if P.W 11 is the man named in Exhibit A. The only reason he can suggest for the accused associating him with the dacoits, Ayyavari Setti's men, is that he sometimes does coolie work for Ayyavari Setti. This is hardly a sufficient reason. I am not prepared to accept this evidence as helping to prove that Exhibit A was false. It is significant that this alibi of P.W 11 was not put forward by the police in any record filed in this case as a reason for referring the case to the Magistrate. Nor was it put forward by the Magistrate as a reason for dismissing the complaint.

    I take up now the evidence of P.Ws 2 to 5. P.W 2 is the Head Constable who investigated the dacoity. His evidence was to the effect that he examined the accused's daughter and son-in-law, P.W 17, and that both of them said that they did not go at all with the accused and knew nothing of any dacoity. P.W 3 is the Circle Inspector who gives similar evidence. The defence objected that section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, prohibited the admission of this evidence but the Sessions Judge overruled the objections and allowed the statements to go in. It will be observed that the accused's daughter has not been examined at the trial, while the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 as to what P.W 17 told them was put in chief examination, long before P.W 17, the son-in-law was examined, and therefore at a stage when it was impossible to say whether or not P.W 17 would corroborate what the police officers had stated. As a matter of fact, he did not corroborate what they said. In cross-examination, P.W 2 added to his previous statements that be enquired “some persons” who stated that “they did not hear that any dacoity took place” and that the accused told them that he had been beaten. P.W 3 was also allowed by the Sessions Judge in chief examination to depose that he examined P.W 16 who denied having gone with the accused. This again was elicited before P.W 16 had been put into the witness-box. When he did go into the witness-box, he did not corroborate what the police officer had stated. P.Ws 4 and 5 are examined only to cox roborate the statement of P.Ws 2 and 3 that the accused's daughter and son-in-law denied the dacoity. P.W 5 added that they were saying that the accused was slippered.

    The Sessions Judge has, in his reasons for conviction, strongly relied on his conclusion that “the three persons whom the accused stated as having been eyewitnesses to the dacoity denied all knowledge of it before the police officer.” As pointed out already, two of these when examined in Court, supported the accused and the third, his daughter, was not examined by the prosecution at all. As the Sessions Judge has thus used as substantive evidence against the accused statements of witnesses made to the police in the course of the police investigation, when these witnesses have either not been examined by the prosecution at all at the trial or have denied in their evidence at the trial that they made such statements at all, the legal question arises whether these statements taken in the course of the police investigation are admissible for such a purpose.

    It is necessary first of all to consider whether the learned Sessions Judge's ruling that Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended is not an absolute bar to their Emission is correct. These are oral statements taken from witnesses in the course of police investigation. The old section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, was not an absolute bar to the admissibility (for certain definite purposes) of such oral statements. It has first to be considered whether the amended section 162 is such a bar, i.e, whether it prohibits the “use” of such oral statements for any purpose at an inquiry or trial. I do not think it does or that it goes any further in that direction than the section before amendment did, i.e, the amended section does not prohibit the use as evidence (for any purposes admissible under the Indian Evidence Act) of such oral statements. It may be answered that the words “such statement” in section 162(1), are vague enough to include oral as well as written statements, but I think, the whole design of the section implies otherwise. Both the provisos clearly apply only to written statements, so that if oral statements are wholly excluded from use by the first part of the section the provisos do not affect that total exclusion. It would follow that, on such a reading of the section, an accused person would be prohibited from using in his favour oral statements favourable to himself made in the course of police investigation. I cannot reasonably suppose that the section was designed for such a purpose. When the section uses the phrase “such statement,” I am clear that “such” means “if reduced into writing.” There are other indications to my mind that this must be so. The old section 162 had nothing to do with statements not reduced to writing and was designed to prevent entries in police diaries from being used against an accused person. If the scope of the new section was to be so much wider than the old as to include any statement not reduced to writing, I should have expected, considering the voluminous case law that has endeavoured to interpret the old section [see, e.g, King-Emperor v. Nilakanta(1); Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor(2); Fanindra Nath Banerjee v. Emperor(3); Emperor v. Hanma Reddi(4)], that the new section, if it was to cover oral statements also, would have unequivocally stated so.

    Again, the second proviso uses the same words “such statement” to mean only a written record, as it is dealing with the copy of a written record to be furnished to the accused, and obviously implies that there is a statement on the record which the Court may first examine for itself before the accused is allowed to look at it. The proviso is meaningless if “such statement” means “oral statements.”

    Again, if section 162 had been designed now to prohibit the use of oral statements made to police officers in the course of police investigation, I should have expected an amendment of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. That section has always been read as a proviso to both sections 25 and 26. But if the above suggested reading of section 162 is correct, clearly section 27 can no longer have any application to section 25, and section 27 ought, therefore, in view of the case law on the subject, to have been amended by making it clear that it no longer applied to section 25. I do not think this argument is met by saying that section 27 will still allow oral statements of the nature contemplated by it to be proved, but section 162. Criminal Procedure Code, will forbid them being used against the accused. There is no point in proving a fact unless it can be used after proof, and to allow facts against accused to be proved which cannot be used against him would be a procedure so fraught with danger to an accused person, especially in a trial by jury, that I cannot imagine the legislature countenancing it in any way.

    I conclude therefore that the application of the new section 162 is confined, as that of the old one was, to the written record, that the new section was designed to confer on an accused person a legal right, which the old section did not give, of having a copy of such written statement for the purpose of using it to contradict the witness, and that as regards proof and use of oral statements, the law is unaltered and is as it was before. All oral statements which are previously admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, the use of which was not prohibited by the Criminal Procedure Code, are still admissible and may be used.

    The learned Sessions Judge was therefore, in my view, correct in holding that the amended section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, was not a bar to the admissibility of these statements. But it appears to me that they are not admissible under the Indian Evidence Act at all, a point to which the learned Judge has not directed his attention. They are not admissible under section 157, Indian Evidence Act, as they do not corroborate any evidence given by accused's daughter or by P.Ws 16 and 17 before the trying Court or any evidence given by these witnesses outside the trying Court, but filed by the trying Court as evidence at the trial. section 157, Indian Evidence Act, clearly says that the testimony to be corroborated must be testimony at the trial. See also Emperor v. Akbar Badoo* argues that the statements are admissible as part of the res gestœ under sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Evidence Act, but I am not prepared to accede to this contention. The offence in this trial is filing a false complaint. What happened at the subsequent police investigation of the complaint forms no part of the res gestæ. That investigation is an occurrence separate in time and place from the crime itself, and the remarks of witnesses at the investigation are not remarks occasioned by the crime and springing spontaneously out of it, but remarks made in answer to police enquiries which may be made long after the crime. If the investigation had never been made, the remarks would never have been made either. All these statements by witnesses in the course of the police investigation, therefore, are neither spontaneous nor simultaneous in time and place with the crime. Different considerations would arise if the statements had been made at or about the time and place of the crime, as, for example, if when the accused made his complaint, his daughter and son-in-law had been present and had then volunteered the information that the complaint was a false one. I am satisfied therefore that the Indian Evidence Act does not permit these statements to be proved or used as evidence against the accused.

    I am quite clear on general principles also that these statements are not admissible as substantive evidence for the prosecution against the accused. If this case can be proved by the statements of the police officers that other people at a police investigation told them that there was no dacoity, it would be equally open in another case to prove by similar statements that there was a dacoity or any other fact necessary for conviction. Such a procedure, I am quite Wear, is unwarranted either by the Indian Evidence Act or the Criminal Procedure Code. The fact that this is a case of a false complaint does not to my mind alter the general principle that criminal cases cannot be proved by reproducing the contents of the note book of an investigating police officer.

    I am satisfied therefore that these statements were wrongly admitted in evidence against the accused. As I have already pointed out, if they are excluded, we are left only with the self-interested statements of the original accused in the complaint which are hardly a strong enough basis for a conviction. I would therefore reverse the conviction and sentence passed on the accused and direct him to be set at liberty, and his bail bond cancelled.

    Madhavan Nayar, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading the judgment just now delivered by my learned brother. As I agree with that judgment, I propose to deal with the facts and the law arising in the case only very briefly.

    The accused has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Cuddapah for the offence of preferring a false charge of dacoity under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code, and has been sentenced by him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years.

    The accused made a complaint (Exhibit A) that, while he was proceeding on the 1st of June 1923 from Obulampeta to Vontimitta railway station accompanied by his daughter, son-in-law and a servant, six persons assaulted him and carried away the bundle of cloths and jewels kept in the custody of his servant. As this complaint was on investigation found to be false, the case out of which this appeal arises was launched against him under section 211, Indian Penal Code.

    It seems to me that the falsity of the complaint made by the accused depends mainly upon the evidence of P.Ws 2 to 5. P.Ws 7 to 11 are the persons said to have taken part in the dacoity. All of them state that they were absent from the village at the time of the occurrence. P.Ws 12 and 13 seek to prove the plea of alibi set up by P.W 11. I agree with my learned brother in holding that it is very doubtful if P.W 11 is the man named in Exhibit A.P.Ws 16 and 17, the servant and the son-in-law of the accused, stated before the Sessions Judge that there was a dacoity and that the accused was beaten; and the Public Prosecutor was permitted to treat them as hostile witnesses and cross examine them. In this connection I may point out that the accused's daughter has not been examined at the trial.

    The evidence of P.Ws 2 to 5 is to the following effect: P.W 2, the head constable who investigated the dacoity case, stated that he examined the accused's daughter and son-in-law and that they told him that the alleged dacoity never took place, that they did not lose any jewels or cloths and that they did not accompany the accused to Vontimitta. P.W 3, the Circle Inspector who also carried on the investigation of the case, stated that the daughter and son-in-law of the accused told him that no dacoity took place. P.Ws 4 and 5 were examined to corroborate the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 that the accused's son-in-law and daughter stated that there was no dacoity. As already pointed out, P.Ws 17 and 16, the son-in-law and the servant of the accused, did not corroborate what the police officers stated.

    It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant (1) that the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 as regards what they were told at the investigation by the daughter, the son-in-law and the servant of the accused should not have been admitted in view of, the provisions of the amended section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) that, even, if section 162 is not a bar to the admissibility of their evidence, the learned Sessions Judge should have exclude, the statements as inadmissible under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The first objection was overruled by the learned Sessions Judge and the second was not considered by him.

    The evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 consist of statements made to the police by witnesses examined in the course of the investigation of the case. Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code before its amendment had nothing to do with statements not reduced to writing; the section did not prohibit “the use of such statements” as evidence for any purpose admissible under the Indian Evidence Act. I think, even after the amendment, the application of the section should be considered to be limited to the use of statements reduced to writing as under the old section. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would mean that the legislature, by amending section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has virtually repealed section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. As, in my opinion, such a result would never have been contemplated by the legislature, I hold that the amended section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, is not a bar to the admissibility of statements made to P.Ws 2 and 3 by the accused's daughter and P.Ws 16 and 17.

    Though section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, does not prohibit the use of the oral statements in question, it seems to me that the statements are not admissible in evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. It has not been argued that these statements are admissible under section 157 of the Evidence Act, as these do not corroborate the statement of the accused's daughter and the evidence of P.Ws 16 and 17 given at the trial; but what is contended for by the learned Public Prosecutor is this, that these statements are admissible as part of the res gestœ; under section 6 or 7 of the Indian Evidence Act. It will be observed that these statements were made to P.Ws 2 and 3 during the police investigation of the case. They were made long after the commission of the offence, viz., the filing of the alleged false complaint. As the statements in question are not the necessary incidents of the offence itself and are not immediately associated with it, I do not think it can be said that they form part of the res gestœ. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that these statements cannot be proved or used as substantive evidence to support the charge brought against the accused.

    As the other evidence in the case is not of any value, I allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the appellant. The bail bond of the accused will be cancelled.

    D.A.R

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Grandhe Venkatasubbiah (Accused), v. King-Emperor
    (Oct 16, 1924)