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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a landlord's revision petition brought by Pirthi Raj (landlord) against the decision of the Appellate Authority which reversed the Rent Controller's order granting ejectment. The landlord had filed an ejectment application under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 against Sardara (tenant) for eviction from a godown and a kotha in property No. MCK. 342/10 at Kaithal, District Karnal.

The ejectment was claimed on three grounds: (1) non-payment of rent; (2) unauthorized transfer of tenant's rights/subletting a portion of the premises to one Begu; and (3) construction by the tenant of a Kacha Kotha on vacant land allegedly belonging to the landlord (not included in the lease) and other acts amounting to nuisance (including parking animals and cooking outside). The tenant contested these allegations, denying construction and asserting that the vacant site and Kotha were part of his tenancy (or at least that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction over that site).

At first instance the Rent Controller: (a) accepted payment of arrears by the tenant (so ground (1) fell away), (b) found subletting to Begu and granted ejectment on that ground, and (c) found the tenant liable to ejectment for using non-rented premises in a manner amounting to nuisance. On appeal the Appellate Authority reversed the Rent Controller's findings on subletting and nuisance, allowed the appeal and dismissed the ejectment application. The landlord sought revision of that appellate decision; the present opinion dismisses the revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant was liable to eviction for non-payment of rent (noting the tenant paid arrears on the first hearing and the landlord accepted them).
  2. Whether the tenant sublet a part of the tenanted premises to Begu without the landlord's consent, thereby justifying eviction under section 13.
  3. Whether the tenant's alleged construction of a Kacha Kotha on vacant land (alleged to belong to the landlord) and other acts (parking cattle, cooking outside, tethering animals) amounted to a "nuisance" to the occupiers of neighbouring buildings so as to justify eviction under section 13(2)(iv).
  4. Whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to entertain an ejectment application in respect of the vacant site, if that site was not subject to the landlord-tenant relationship.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Landlord)

  • Claimed ejectment on three grounds: non-payment of rent; unauthorized transfer/subletting to Begu; and unauthorized construction (Kacha Kotha) on vacant land belonging to the landlord which was not rented to the tenant.
  • Produced oral evidence including the landlord himself (A.W.2) and a witness named Gomta (A.W.1) who said Begu was in possession of one Kotha while the tenant occupied the remaining property; landlord asserted possession of the site had been given to Begu without his consent.
  • Argued that tenant's acts of parking cart, tethering cattle, placing dung cakes and cooking outside caused nuisance and obstruction to passage, and that the tenant had used non-rented premises.
  • Relied on authority (Khosla C.J judgment in Hariana Ex-Servicemen ... v. Fateh Chand) to submit that using non-rented premises could amount to nuisance (quoted sentence about interference with religious meetings and loading/unloading), and cited Inder Singh v. Kalu Ram Harijan for the proposition that encroachment may give rise to other actions.

Respondent (Tenant)

  • Denied allegations: stated he had made no construction, that the Kacha Kotha and vacant site were taken on rent by him, and that he did not sublet any portion to Begu.
  • Contended the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction regarding the vacant site if it was not part of the tenancy (i.e., no landlord-tenant relationship as to that site).
  • Produced witnesses Hari Ram (R.W.1) and Bhagwana (R.W.2) who testified that the tenant had not sublet the property; Begu was the tenant's maternal uncle who visited and sometimes stayed with him, and Begu was resident elsewhere.
  • Tenant himself (R.W.3) corroborated that Begu was not an agriculturist with him at Kaithal; overall the tenant urged that exclusive possession by a sub-tenant was not established.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Inder Singh v. Kalu Ram Harijan (Falshaw C.J) — Cur L.J. 56 of 1956 Encroaching the land of a landlord may give rise to some other action (i.e., a remedy other than eviction for nuisance). The court observed that encroachment could give rise to other actions but that such encroachment would not, by itself, amount to a "nuisance" within section 13(2)(iv) of the Rent Act for purposes of eviction. The decision was cited to show an encroachment claim may lie outside the Rent Act remedy.
Hariana Ex-Servicemen M.T. Goods Carriers Co-operative Society Ltd. Rohtak v. Fateh Chand (Khosla C.J) — Cr. R. No. 5740 of 1960 (decided 13 July 1961) Where a number of neighbours depose that the tenant's use of non-rented premises causes considerable interference (for example to religious meetings), such use may amount to nuisance justifying eviction. The court distinguished that case: it held the cited sentence relied on by the landlord cannot be read in isolation because, in that case, multiple neighbours had deposed to interference. Since no such neighbour complaints existed in the instant case, the precedent was held not to assist the landlord.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through each asserted ground for ejectment and evaluated the evidence and legal standards strictly on the record.

  1. Subletting: The court emphasized the landlord bore the onus of proving subletting. To establish subletting, it must be shown that the tenant handed over exclusive possession and control of a portion of the tenanted premises to a sub-tenant. The Appellate Authority had found (and this court agreed) that the landlord failed to discharge that burden. The landlord's evidence comprised the landlord's own testimony and Gomta's testimony claiming Begu occupied one Kotha; but cross-examination and the tenant's evidence showed Begu was a maternal uncle who visited and sometimes stayed with the tenant, lived elsewhere, and was not a sub-tenant exercising exclusive possession. The court found neither the landlord nor Gomta had affirmatively stated that Sardara had sublet to Begu in a way that established exclusive control; thus subletting was not proved.
  2. Nuisance (use of non-rented premises / construction): The court required proof that the acts and conduct of the tenant amounted to a nuisance to the occupiers of neighbouring buildings (the language of section 13(2)(iv)). The landlord's evidence showed at most that the tenant parked a cart, tethered cattle in the courtyard opposite the tenanted premises and cooked outside; Gomta (the landlord's witness) did not use the term "nuisance" in his evidence. Bhagwana — one of the neighbours — who was produced by the tenant, expressly stated that the acts complained of did not cause him any nuisance. Landlord also admitted he lived in Ambala and visited Kaithal only fortnightly, weakening his immediate neighbourly complaint evidence. The court held that nuisance for purposes of section 13(2)(iv) requires neighbours to come forward and complain; the evidence fell short of that standard.
  3. Construction / Ownership of vacant land: The court noted the landlord had not proved on the record that the vacant land on which construction was alleged actually belonged to him. Even assuming the Kacha Kotha had been constructed on the landlord's vacant land, the court reiterated that such conduct, though potentially actionable by the landlord by other remedies (as per Inder Singh), did not satisfy the statutory requirement of nuisance to neighbours under section 13(2)(iv) to justify eviction. The court therefore did not treat the alleged construction as establishing the nuisance ground for eviction.
  4. Precedent and distinction: The court considered the Khosla C.J. decision relied on by the landlord but rejected its applicability on the facts: in that case several neighbours had deposed to interference (including interference with religious meetings caused by trucks loading/unloading near a temple); in contrast, in the instant case neighbours did not complain and available testimony contradicted a finding of nuisance. The court therefore distinguished the precedent and held it did not aid the landlord.
  5. Procedural outcome: Given the landlord's failure to prove subletting and nuisance on the required standards, the Appellate Authority's reversal of the Rent Controller's eviction order was upheld and the revision petition lacked merit.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The revision petition filed by the landlord was dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Appellate Authority's decision reversing the Rent Controller's ejectment order stands; the tenant is not evicted on the grounds considered (subletting and nuisance were not proved on the record).
  • The court emphasized that (a) the burden of proving subletting rests on the landlord and requires proof of exclusive possession by a sub-tenant, and (b) nuisance under section 13(2)(iv) requires evidence that neighbours (occupiers of neighbouring buildings) are affected and have complained; acts affecting only the landlord do not suffice for eviction under that provision.
  • No broader precedent was established by this dismissal; the decision is a fact-specific application and the court expressly distinguished prior authority relied upon by the landlord. The court noted that encroachment may give rise to other remedies but such remedies are not the same as eviction for nuisance under section 13(2)(iv).
  • The court ordered dismissal with no order as to costs.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

    Pirthi Raj v. Sardara .

    P.C Pandit, J.:— This is a landlord's revision petition against the decision of the Appellate Authority reversing on appeal the order of the Rent Controller evicting the respondent from the premises in question.

    2. Pirthi Raj, landlord filed an application against Sardara, tenant, under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, for the latter's eviction from a godown and a Kotha in property No. MCK. 342/10, situate in Kaithal, District Karnal. The ejectment was claimed on three grounds viz. (1) non-payment of rent; (2) the tenant had, without the consent of the landlord, transferred his rights under the lease and sublet a portion of the property to Begu and (3) that the tenant had without the written consent of the landlord constructed a Kacha Kotha on the vacant land belonging to the latter, which had not been even on rent to the former. The tenant parked his cart and tied his oxen and buffaloes on the vacant land not included in the lease. He put dung cakes on the walls of the landlord's property and his action and conduct was such, which amounted to nuisance to other neighbours. This petition was contested by the tenant who denied the allegations made by the landlord. As regards ground No. 3, it was stated by him that he had made no construction whatsoever as alleged by the landlord, and that the Kacha Kotha and other constructions, along with the vacant site, were taken an rent by him. He himself had not made any construction. Even if it was proved that the vacant site was not given on lease, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment application on the ground, as there was no relationship of landlord and tenant regarding the said site “although the vacant site along with the Kotha was under the tenancy of respondent (tenant).”

    3. Since the tenant paid the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing and the same were accepted by the landlord, this ground of ejectment no longer remained available to the latter. As regards the second ground, the Rent controller came to the conclusion that the tenant was liable to ejectment, as he had transferred a portion of the tenanted premises to Begu without the permission of the landlord. Regarding the third ground, the finding was that the tenant was liable to ejectment, as he was using a portion of the non-rented premises, which amounted to nuisance. As a result of these findings, the ejectment application was granted.

    4. When the matter came in appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, he reversed both these findings, accepted the appeal and dismissed the ejectment application. The landlord has come here in revision.

    5. After hearing the counsel for the parties, I find that there is no merit in this revision petition. As regards the ground of subletting, it has been found as a fact by the learned Appellate Authority that the landlord has failed to prove that the tenant sublet a part of the premises to Begu, the alleged sub-tenant. In order to prove this ground, the landlord, apart from himself going into the witness box, had produced one witness, namely, Gomta, A.W.I according to whom Begu was in possession of one Kotha in dispute and the tenant was in possession of the remaining property. In cross examination, this witness denied the case of the tenant that was put to him, namely, that the demised premises were in possession of the tenant along with his parents and brothers etc. So far as the landlord is concerned, he deposed as A.W 2, that the godown indispute was in possession of the tenant and the remaining property was with Begu. He also said that the possession of the site had been given to Begu without his consent.

    6. As against this, the tenant produced two witnesses, namely, Hari Ram and Bhagwana. R.Ws Nos. 1 and 2. The former stated that the tenant had not sublet the suit property. Begu, according to him, was the maternal uncle of the tenant and he visited the latter off and on. Begu was married and was resident of village Dhamtah. Bhagwana deposed that the demised premises were in the possession of the tenant himself and nobody was inducted as a sub-tenant. He also stated in cross-examination that Begu visited the respondent every now and then and resided with the tenant whenever he came to the village. The tenant as R.W 3 also stated that Begu was “not an agriculturist with him at Kaithal.”

    7. On this evidence, the Appellate Authority had rightly held that subletting was not established. In order to prove subletting it had to be shown that the tenant had handed over exclusive possession and control of the tenanted premises to the sub-tenant. This has not been done in the instant case. It was said that neither the landlord nor his witness Gomta was cross-examined by the tenant about the nature of the occupation of the Kotha by Begu, as deposed by them. In the first place, there was no necessity of cross-examining them, because none of them had stated in their evidence that Sardara, tenant, had sublet any portion of the premises to Begu. Secondly, as rightly pointed out by the Appellate Authority, the onus was on the landlord to prove subletting. He had failed to discharge the said burden, because the oral statements made by Gomta and the landlord that Begu was in occupation of the property in question, could not establish subletting. It can not be forgotten that Begu was the maternal uncle of the respondent and if off and on when he came to the village he lived with the latter that could not mean that a part of the property had been sublet to him.

    8. As regards the other ground of nuisance, in order to succeed, the landlord had to show that the tenant had been guilty of such acts and conduct as were a nuisance the occupiers of the building in the neighbourhood. The evidence led by the landlord on this point at the most showed that the tenant parked his cart and tethered his cattle in the courtyard opposite the tenanted premises and also that he cooked his meals outside the property that had been let out to him. According to Gomta, the neighbours of the tenant were Bhagwana, Surju and Lachhman. This Bhagwana was produced by the tenant as R.W 2. He categorically stated that the acts complained of did not cause him any nuisance. So far as Gomta is concerned, he has not even mentioned the word ‘nuisance’ in his evidence. As regard the landlord, he has admitted that he lived at Ambala and came to Kaithal after every fortnight. In his evidence all that he had stated was that the tenant had obstructed the passage leading to his house by tethering buffaloes and parking his cart, which caused inconvenience to Gomta, his tenant in the said building. Gomta, on the other hand, in his cross-examination, had deposed that he was the tenant of Bhagwana, a collateral of the landlord.

    9. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the tenant had built a Kotha on the property, which was not rented out to him. Though in the grounds of ejectment, it was stated that the tenant had constructed a Kacha Kotha on the vacant land belonging to the landlord, which had not been given on rent to the former, it has not been proved on the record that the land, on which the Kotha was alleged to have been constructed, really belonged to the landlord. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Kotha had been built on the vacant land owned by the landlord and which had not been given on rent to the tenant, it cannot be held that this act on the part of the tenant would amount to nuisance within the meaning of section 13(2)(iv), because there it had to be shown that the acts and conduct of the tenant were a nuisance to the occupiers of the building in the neighbourhood. This conduct on the part of the tenant may be a nuisance to the landlord himself, but that, under the law is not enough. The neighbours must come forward and complain of the particular act and conduct of the tenant, which was a nuisance to them. That had not been done in the instant case. It is needless to mention that encroaching the land of a landlord may give rise to some other action as held by Falshaw C.J in Inder Singh v. Kalu Ram Harijan . Cur L.J 56 of 1956., but it could not amount to nuisance within the meaning of this expression in section 13(2)(iv) of the Rent Act. This ruling of Khosla C.J in Hariana Ex-Servicemen M.T Goods Carriers Cc-operative Society Ltd. Rohtak v. Fateh Chand . Cr. R. No. 5740 of 1960 decided on 13th July, 1961., cannot be of any assistance to the landlord, because there a number of persons had appeared on behalf of the landlord and had deposed that there was considerable interference with the religious meetings as a result of the tenant's using a portion of the non-rented premises. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the sentence—“This, however, is not a good defence, because on their own admission, the tenants had been using a portion of the non rented premises and this alone would amount to a nuisance, more particularly when religious temple is situated near the place where loading and unloading is done”—occurring in the judgment of Khosla C.J But this sentence cannot be read in isolation. It was preceded by the following:

    “A number of persons had appeared on behalf of the applicants (landlords) and deposed that there was considerable interference with the religious meetings by the trucks, which were brought near the Chabutra for loading and unloading purposes. The only defence to this appears to have been that the tenants had from the very beginning used the ground near the Chabutta for their trucks.

    10. All this shows that in C.R 574/1960 a number of neighbours had come forward to depose about the action and conduct of the tenants pertaining to the non-rented premises, which had caused nuisance to them. Consequently this ground also had been rightly held by the Appellate Authority not to have been proved in the instant case. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

    11. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Pirthi Raj v. Sardara .
    (May 28, 1973)