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Judgment Summary — Das Gupta, J. (with P. N. Mitra, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns seven villages (a single patni tenure) originally held by Jatindra Nath Singh Roy and, after his death, by his sons Kanai and Birendra. Kanai died leaving a minor son, Biswa. The appellants sued Birendra for arrears of rent and obtained a decree against Birendra only (by compromise), and executed that decree against Birendra's eight annas interest in the patni.

Prior to execution, on 12 March 1936, Birendra and minor Biswa (through his guardian mother) executed a deed of sale of their interest in the villages in favour of Sarat Kumari (Birendra's mother). Shortly thereafter Sarat Kumari executed a deed of mortgage in favour of the respondent, Gadadhar. The respondent obtained a preliminary and final decree to enforce the mortgage in 1937 and purchased portions of the patni at a sale in execution of his mortgage decree in March–April 1938; possession was delivered in May 1938.

The appellants later purchased Birendra's eight annas share in February 1939 and obtained formal possession. Sarat Kumari had filed a claim against the appellants' attachment (dismissed) and subsequently instituted an O.21, R.68 action (also dismissed). During execution the respondent's application for notifying his mortgage decree had been rejected. The appellants then sued for declaration of title and delivery of possession in respect of the eight annas share, alleging the sale to Sarat Kumari and the mortgage were sham, benami and collusive transactions designed to defeat creditor claims.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decision in an objection under Order 21, Rule 63 (and a subsequent suit under Order 21, Rule 68) against a mortgagor is conclusive and binding on a mortgagee whose mortgage predates the proceedings.
  2. Whether the dismissal of the respondent's application in the execution proceedings (seeking proclamation/notification of the mortgage claim) operated as a conclusive bar to his claiming title based on the mortgage decree under Order 21, Rule 63 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  3. Whether the sale deed from Birendra (and Biswa) to Sarat Kumari was a genuine sale for consideration or a benami/sham transaction; and, if it was sham, whether the respondent is nonetheless protected as a purchaser/transferee for consideration under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The sale by Birendra to Sarat Kumari was sham/benami and passed no title to Sarat Kumari.
  • The mortgage to Gadadhar was collusive and without consideration; the mortgage decree and sale in execution were part of a fraudulent scheme to defeat rightful claims.
  • Consequently, Birendra's eight annas interest was not affected by the mortgage sale and appellants acquired good title by purchase in the execution sale.
  • The dismissal of the respondent's application in the execution proceedings operates, by virtue of O.21, R.63, as a bar to the respondent's asserting any claim based on the mortgage decree.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The sale to Sarat Kumari was a genuine transaction for consideration.
  • In any event the mortgage deed and mortgage decree were genuine and for consideration; the respondent's purchase in execution of the mortgage decree vested title.
  • The respondent's application in the execution proceedings was not a claim under O.21, R.63 but an application under O.21, R.66 (or similar), and thus its dismissal does not conclusively preclude him from setting up his mortgage claim later.
  • There was an alternate contention that there were two separate patnis (values Rs. 1400 and Rs. 95) rather than a single patni for the seven mauzas.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dooma Sahoo v. Joonarain, 12 W.R. 362 (4 Beng. L.R. A.C. 27n) Held that a mortgagee is not bound by a decision against his mortgagor in proceedings instituted after the mortgage. Used as early authority establishing that judgments in suits after the date of mortgage are not binding on the mortgagee; relied upon to support the Court's conclusion that Gadadhar was not bound by Sarat Kumari's adverse proceedings.
Bonomalee Nag v. Koylash Chunder Dey, 4 Cal. 692 Considered whether a decision against a mortgagor (in a suit after the mortgage) is binding on the mortgagee; followed Dooma Sahoo's conclusion. Cited as a controlling decision that the mortgagee is not bound by such earlier decisions against the mortgagor; reinforced the principle applied in this appeal.
Shoshibhusan Guha v. Gogan Chunder Saha, 22 Cal. 364 Provided fuller discussion to the same point and reasoning why judgments against mortgagors do not bind mortgagees, except in limited classes of cases (e.g., Hindu widow representing the estate). Adopted and relied upon for its reasoning that a mortgagor in possession does not necessarily represent the whole estate so as to bind the mortgagee; used by the Court to conclude that Sarat Kumari's proceedings did not bind Gadadhar.
Ramchandra Dhondo v. Malkapa Narsapa, 40 Bom. 679 (A.I.R. (3) 1916 Bom. 204) Held that even after a successful suit by the former owner, a subsequent mortgagee who purchased in execution could still show his rights; confirmed that mortgagee is not bound by a later judgment against mortgagor. Relied on as a more recent High Court decision that upholds the line of authority absolving mortgagees from being bound by prior adverse litigation against mortgagors instituted after the mortgage.
Emdad Ali v. Karan Sheikh, A.I.R. (23) 1936 Cal. 590 (168 I.C. 959) Addressed cases where it cannot be clearly ascertained whether the relief sought in an execution-stage application is for insertion of the mortgage claim in sale proclamation or for sale subject to the mortgage; held doubtful cases cannot be treated as invoking the conclusive bar of O.21, R.63. Applied by the Court to hold that where the substance of an execution-stage application is unclear, the conclusive operation of O.21, R.63 cannot be extended; supported the conclusion that the respondent's execution application was not necessarily conclusive.
Ambica Prosad v. Soorjmull, 43 C.W.N. 999 (A.I.R. (26) 1939 Cal. 620) Interpreted a petition in execution that asked for notification of mortgage interest; on reading the petition as a whole the Court treated it as an application under O.21, R.68 (i.e., for sale subject to the mortgage). The Court considered this decision but concluded Ambica Prosad turned on the specific wording and heading of the petition; it did not lay down a general rule that a mere prayer for notification always converts an application into one under O.21, R.68.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The judgment proceeds by addressing the three principal questions raised on appeal and analyzing the relevant procedural provisions, evidentiary matters and authorities.

1. Whether Sarat Kumari's proceedings against the mortgagor bind the mortgagee

The Court began by stating the general principle that a judgment binds only parties and those deriving title from them, but noted recognized exceptions (e.g., where an estate is fully represented by a widow). The Court examined whether the equity of redemption was "fully represented" in Sarat Kumari's proceedings such that a later-acquiring mortgagee would be bound.

After reviewing established authorities (Dooma Sahoo, Bonomalee Nag, Shoshibhusan Guha and Ramchandra Dhondo), the Court concluded that the question is not res integra and is settled by authority: a mortgagee is not bound by an adverse judgment against his mortgagor rendered in proceedings instituted after the date of the mortgage. Applying this principle, the Court held that Gadadhar (the mortgagee) was not bound by the decision in Sarat Kumari's claim case and subsequent suit.

2. Effect of dismissal of Gadadhar's application in the execution proceedings

The Court analyzed Order 21 (specifically Rules 58, 62, 63 and 68) and distinguished two categories of relief in execution-stage applications concerning mortgages:

  • Applications seeking that the attachment/sale be made subject to the mortgage (O.21, R.68); and
  • Applications seeking merely insertion/mention of the mortgage claim in the sale proclamation (O.21, R.62 or analogous procedural relief).

The Court emphasized substance over form: the operative question is what relief the application in fact sought. If it is ambiguous and cannot clearly be said to seek the conclusive relief under O.21, R.68, then O.21, R.63 cannot be applied to bar later claims. The Court relied on Emdad Ali for the proposition that doubtful cases should not be treated as invoking the drastic consequences of O.21, R.63.

On examining the respondent's execution-stage application, the Court found it did not ask expressly for the attachment to continue subject to the mortgage; rather, it sought that the mortgage dues be "proclaimed" or "mentioned" at the sale. There was no prayer to amend or reissue the proclamation or expressly to make the sale subject to the mortgage. Accordingly the Court held the dismissal of that application was not conclusive under O.21, R.63 and did not bar Gadadhar from later asserting his mortgage claim.

3. Whether the sale to Sarat Kumari was genuine or benami and whether respondent is protected under Section 41 TP Act

The Court addressed first the evidentiary posture: appellants alleged the sale was benami and the burden was on them to show nothing passed by the sale deed. The Court noted neither the original sale deed nor its certified copy had been produced. Both parties, however, proceeded on an agreed assumption about the consideration stated in the document (Rs. 500 cash and Rs. 4,500 set off), and the Court accepted this as proved by admission of both parties.

The Court found errors of law in the District Judge's reliance on (a) a previous statement by Gadadhar in another case and (b) documentary evidence allegedly produced in another case but not produced in the present trial. Those items were not properly admissible or relevant in this proceeding and the District Judge erred in depending upon them to conclude the sale was genuine. Consequently the appellate Judge's finding of genuineness was vitiated by reliance on irrelevant evidence.

Having found legal error in the appellate Judge's reasoning, Das Gupta, J. examined the record independently and reached the conclusion (after "anxious consideration") that there was no satisfactory reason why Birendra and Biswa would bona fide transfer their patni interest to Sarat Kumari; several considerations pointed to benami motive (heavy encumbrances on the estate, hope of reacquiring the property as heirs on Sarat Kumari's death, administrative convenience while Biswa was a minor). The Court also considered the parties' conduct and circumstances and concluded the sale deed was benami and passed no interest to Sarat Kumari.

Turning then to the mortgage and the respondent's protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court examined whether Gadadhar had acted as a transferee for consideration and in good faith, taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer. The District Judge had found Gadadhar acted in good faith and made some enquiries through his brother Girija; but Das Gupta, J. found that:

  • The respondent did not make adequate enquiries as to whether the sale to Sarat Kumari was for consideration; the enquiries he asked about were limited to whether the property was subject to any mortgage and whether Sarat Kumari was in possession.
  • Girija's alleged corroboratory statements (Ex. W2) were not proved to be admissible secondary evidence and Girija did not corroborate in Court; the District Judge erred in relying upon such previous statements and documentary proof from another case.
  • Even if Girija had reported that Sarat Kumari was in possession and the sale was real, an ordinary man of business would still have required closer inquiry into the nature of the consideration given the unusual transfer (mother acquiring from son and grandson) and the possibility of sham transfers; Gadadhar did not make such inquiries.
  • Evidence suggested Gadadhar had reason to suspect the sale might be sham and that he did not act in good faith; the Court expressed the view that Gadadhar took a speculative or "gambler's chance" rather than exercising reasonable care.

On these findings, the Court concluded the respondent was not entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored.

Direct consequences specified in the opinion:

  • The Court declared that the sale to Sarat Kumari was a benami/sham transaction and that no interest passed to her by that sale.
  • As a result, the appellants obtained good title by their purchase in the court sale of Birendra's eight annas share in the patni.
  • The respondent (Gadadhar) was held not entitled to protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act because he did not take reasonable care and did not act in good faith; therefore his mortgage claim does not prevail against appellants' title to the eight annas share.
  • The plaintiffs-appellants were entitled to a declaration of title and delivery of joint possession to the extent of eight annas for all properties purchased by them, including the mouzas which the respondent had purchased in the mortgage sale.
  • The appeal was allowed with costs; the cross-objection (not pressed) was dismissed without costs.

The Court's decision rests on established authority that a mortgagee is not bound by adverse proceedings against the mortgagor instituted after the mortgage, a fact the Court explicitly recognized as being "concluded by authority." The judgment did not purport to lay down a new general principle but applied existing precedent to the facts and made specific findings of fact as to the benami nature of the sale and the mortgagee's lack of good faith.

    Chandi Prosad Ganguly And Others v. Gadadhar Singha Roy And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Das Gupta, J.:— The seven villages which are the subject-matter of this litigation were held in patni tenure by Jatindra Nath Singh Roy and on his death by his two sons Eanai and Birendra. Kanai died on 6th February 1935, leaving a minor son Biswa as his heir. The appellants sued Birendra and his was for arrears of rent and obtained a decree against Birendra only on compromise. They put that decree into execution against Birendra's eight annas interest in the patni tenure. Before this, however, on 12th March 1936, Birendra and Biswa, the latter through his guardian mother, had executed a deed of sale of their interest in these villages, in favour of Jatindras widow, Sarat Kumari, that is, Birendra's mother and Biswas' grand mother. Within a few days thereof on 2nd April 1935, Sarat Eumari executed a deed of mortgage in favour of the respondent Gadadhar. The respondent brought a suit to enforce the mortgage and obtained a decree against Sarat Kumari,—the preliminary decree on 20th August 1937 and the final decree on 20th September 1937. When the appellants, in execution of the decree obtained against Birendra, attached Birendra's eight annas interest, Sarat Kumari filed a claim case, and objected to the attachment, on the ground that Birendra's interest had passed to her by sale. This case was dismissed on 28th September 1937. Sarat Kumari instituted then a suit as contemplated under O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC. This was dismissed on 6th May 1938. On 11th March 1938, the respondent, in execution of the final mortgage decree obtained by him, purchased some portion of the patni. The sale was confirmed on 26th April 1938, and possession was delivered to him on 5th May 1938. About nine months after this, in February 1939, the appellant purchased Birendra's eight annas share of the patni and obtained delivery of formal possession. During execution proceedings, the respondent had filed an application for notifying his mortgage decree, but that was rejected. Unable, however, to obtain actual possession, the appellants brought this suit for declaration of their title to and for delivery of possession, jointly with the rightful owner of the remaining eight annas share.

    2. The appellant's contentions in the plaint are that the sale by Birendra to Sarat Kumari, was a sham collusive, benami transaction and that no title passed by that sale to Sarat Kumari, that the mortgage to Gadadhar was also a collusive transaction, and that the mortgage decree and the mortgage sale were all in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme to defeat rightful claims against the estate and consequently, the eight annas interest in the patni which Birendra admittedly had was not affected by the mortgage sale, and appellants acquired good title by their purchase. It was further contended that there consequence of the dismissal of the application that was filed by the respondent in the execution proceedings was that no claim based by the respondent on the mortgage decree can be sustained.

    3. The respondent in his written statement contended that the sale to Sarat Kumari was a genuine transaction and for consideration; that in any case, the mortgage deed was a genuine transaction, for consideration, and even if Birendra's interest had not passed by the sale deed to Sarat Kumari, the respondent by his mortgage and the sale in execution of the mortgage decree obtained good title thereto. It was also said that the application filed by the respondent in the execution case was really an application under O. 21, R. 66 of the CPC, and did not put forward any claim and objection, and so the dismissal of that application cannot be held to be a conclusive decision on the question of the mortgage claim against the property in dispute. There was also an allegation that there were really two patnis—one of Rs. 1400 and the other of Rs. 95 and not one patni as alleged by the plaintiff. The trial Court accepted all the plaintiff's contentions. He found that the sale was without consideration, that the mortgage was without consideration, that the respondent was not entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the dismissal of respondent's application barred him from basing any claim to the property on the basis of the mortgage decree or the sale in execution thereof.

    4. He found also that there was really one patni for all the seven mauzas, and that the respondent's purchase was of two only of these mauzas. As respondent's purchase would remain valid, till set aside by Court, as regards the eight annas share of Biswa, he accordingly decreed that the plaintiffs would have joint possession for these two mauzas jointly with Gadadhar, and for the other mauzas, jointly with Biswa. He gave plaintiffs a declaration of their title to eight annas share of the patni as prayed for.

    5. On appeal, the District Judge agreed with the trial Court that there was one patni for all the seven mauzas, and that the respondent's purchase was only of two of these mauzas. On all other points, he reversed the findings of the trial Court. He held that the sale to Sarat Kumari was for consideration, that the mortgage was for consideration and that Gadadhar was entitied in any case to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. He held further after almost a nominal discussion of the question, that the dismissal of the application filed by Gadadhar in the execution case would not stand in his way. Accordingly, he reversed the decree as regards the two mauzas Brittinuda and Lakshmigacha though lie maintained it as regards the other mauzas.

    6. Three principal questions have been raised by Mr. Sanyal in support of this appeal against the District Judge's partial reversal of the trial Court's decree. The first is that the dismissal of Sarat Kumari's claim case and the subsequent suit was conclusive against Gadadhar also, and so Gadadhar was barred from contending that Birendra's interest passed to Sarat Sumari by the sale deed. His second point is as regards the effect of the dismissal of Gadadhar's application in the execution case. He contends that the effect is that in consequence of the provision of O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, Gadadhar cannot claim any title on the basis of the mortgage decree.

    7. Lastly, Mr. Sanyal contends that the learned District Judge's finding as regards the genuineness of the sale-deed is vitiated by errors in law, and that the learned Judge has also armed in law in finding that the respondent would be entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    8. The first question of law that arises, therefore, for decision in this appeal, is whether the decision in an objection under O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, and the decision to the same effect in a subsequent suit under O. 21, R. 68 of the CPC, against a mortgagor are conclusive against a mortgagee, where mortgage is of a date prior to the litigation. The ordinary principle of law is that no person is bound by a decree or order in proceedings to which he is no party. This is, however, limited by the equally well-recognised principle that persons claiming under parties to a proceeding are as much bound as the parties themselves. Where, therefore, an estate is fully represented in a litigation, a decision binding against the present holder of the estate will be binding against later holders of the estate. It is on this principle that the decision in a suit brought by or against a Hindu widow, is binding against reversioners, where the widow represents the estate. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the equity of redemption was fully represented in the O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC case and O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC suit by Sarat Kumari; and so, when the respondent by his purchase acquired this equity of redemption as it stood at the date of the mortgage, he was bound by the decision in the proceedings.

    9. The argument would be worth careful consideration, if the matter was res integra. But it is not. The cases in which it has been held that a mortgagee would not be bound by an adverse judgment against his mortgagor rendered in any action instituted after the creation of the mortgage are mentioned by Sir. Rashbehari Ghosh in his Law of Mortgages, at p. 331. That learned author has no doubt said that some of the cases seem to rest upon the assumption, not altogether well founded that a restricted power of dealing with property involves an incapacity to represent the estate in any litigation connected with it; but as he him-self recognises the question was concluded by authority.

    10. The earliest decision is of the year 1869, in Dooma Sahoo v. Joonarain, 12 W.R 362 : (4 Beng. L.R A.C 27n). A suit was instituted by a mortgagee for enforcement of his mortgage lien bearing date 13th October 1863. The defendant pleaded that the mortgage was a collusive transaction, that he, the defendant, had obtained a mokarari lease of the property in question from the ancestor of the alleged mortgagor long previous to the date of the mortgage and that in execution of a decree obtained by him against the mortgagor the right, title and interest of the mortgagor was put up to Bale and purchased by the defendant in 1867. The question the Court had to consider was whether the decisions in a suit instituted after the date of the plaintiff's mortgage that the defendant had obtained a mokarari lease of the property long previous to the mortgage were binding against the mortgagee, who was not a party to that suit. It was held that he could not be bound by any decision in such a suit.

    11. In Bonomalee Nag v. Koylash Chunder Dey, 4 Cal. 692, the Court had to consider whether the decision in a suit brought by a mortgagor after the mortgage that another person had a right of way over the property, was binding against the mortgagee. Both the learned Judges (Markby and Prinsep JJ.) thought that the question was not free from doubt, but that they were bound by the Court's decision in Dooma Sahoo's case (12 W.R 362 : 4 Beng. L.R A.C 27n), and held that the decision was not binding against the mortgagee. Markby J. said that he would express no opinion of his own; Prinsep J. observed in his judgment that it could not be held that a mortgagor in possession so far represents the entire estate as to affect the right of a mortgagee.

    12. A fuller dissuasion of the question is to be found in the judgment of the Court in Shoshibhusan Guha v. Gogan Chunder Saha, 22 Cal. 364. The defendants (other than the mortgagee defendant) had contested the mortgagee's suit to enforce his mortgage on the ground that as auction purchasers of the taluka in execution of decree for arrears of rent, they had purchased the same free of all incumbrances and that the mortgage was no longer enforceable against the taluks. It was contended that the mortgagee was bound by the orders made in the course of the proceedings in execution of the rent decree in the presence of the talukdar the mortgagor.

    13. Their Lordships observed at the outset that the matter was not res integra and that there was a strong current of decisions against the above contention. After mentioning the authorities, their Lordships go on to observe:

    “Nor are the reasons urged on behalf of the appellant sufficient to induce us to dissent from the view taken in the cases cited above. The general role is that a judgment inter partes binds only the parties and persona, deriving title from them subsequent to the date of the judgment…. There are no doubt many exceptions to this rule, but they are based either on grounds of justice, and expediency as in the cases in which judgments against a Hindu widow or a sebait have been held to be binding on the reversioner, or the succeeding esbait, or upon express legislation, as in the cases in which decrees for rent against registered tenants have been held to be binding on unregistered transferees of tenures, but the present case does not come under any of these descriptions. A Hindu widow or sebait must be held to represent the estate completely, as otherwise there could be no one to represent such estate. But the same thing cannot be said of the proprietor of an estate after he has mortgaged it. The mortgagee can always be ascertained, very often his interest in the estate may be much greater than that left in the mortgagor; and sometimes, as in the present case where after the decree it was no part of the mortgagors' interest to protect the incumbrance, the interests of the two are not identical. While on the one hand, to one who is anxious to acquire a safe title by res judicata, the inconvenience in including the mortgagee as a party defendant, is not very great, on the other hand, the injustice of binding the mortgagee by a decree to which he was no party, must be very considerable.”

    14. On these considerations, and a discussion of the rent law, which according to their Lordships did not furnish any dear reason against the view that the decisions in proceedings against the mortgagor were not binding upon the mortgagee, their Lordships held that on reason and authority, this view was correct.

    15. In more recent times, we have a decision of the Bombay High Court where the same view is taken: Ramchandra Dhondo v. Malkapa Narsapa, 40 Bom. 679 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 Bom. 204). The original owner of the property which was involved in that litigation was one Devare. During his minority, his mother executed a deed of sale for this to the Bhojes; one Barchi received it from the Bhojes in exchange for another parcel of land. Thereafter Barohi mortgaged the property to Bamchandra. Some years after this Devare brought a suit against his mother Barchi and the Bhojes to set aside the sale by his mother to the Bhojes. That suit was successful and the sale was set aside. Thereafter Ramchandra obtained a decree on his mortgage and in execution thereof purchased the property. When he tried to get possession, he was resisted by Devare. He brought a suit for possession, and the appeal before the High Court arose out of the suit. The question was whether in spite of the result of Devare's suit, it was still open to Ramchandra to show, if he could show, that the alienation by Devare's mother to the Bhojes was good in law. The question was answered in the affirmative.

    16. In the face of this long line of decisions of this Court, and also of other High Courts in India the question whether the mortgagee is bound by a decision against his mortgage, in legal proceedings instituted after the date of the mortgage is no longer open to discussion. The question is concluded by authority. We may add that we respectfully agree with the proposition laid down in these decisions, and hold that the mortgagee is not bound by a decision against his mortgagor, in legal proceedings instituted) after the date of mortgage. I hold, therefore, that Gadadhar is not bound by the decision in Sarat Kumari's claim case and the subsequent suit brought by her.

    17. The decision of the next question—whether the dismissal of the application that was filed by Gadadhar in the execution case bars his claim depends on the determination of the question, whether this was an application, under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC. If it was, then by the provisions of O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, the decision in that application is conclusive as between Gadadhar and these appellants, as admittedly no suit as contemplated in O. 21, R. 68 of the CPC, was brought. Order 21, E. 58 of the CPC, is in these words:

    “(1) Where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a decree on the ground that, such property is not liable to such attachment, the Court shall proceed to investigate the claim or objection with the like power as regards the examination of the claimant or objector, and in all other respects, as if he was a party to the suit:

    Provided that no such investigation shall be made where the Court considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed.

    (2) Where the property to which the claim or objection applies has been advertised for sale, the Courts ordering the sale may postpone it pending the investigation of the claim or objection.”

    18. It is necessary to consider in this connection that the words of O. 21, R. 62 of the CPC which indicate the relief that can be given by the Court, when objection to the attachment on the ground of mortgage is made by any personal. It is quite clear, however, and is not disputed that even without making any such objection on the ground of the property being affected by mortgage, an integrated party may pray that the existence of a mortgage claim may be mentioned in the sale proclamation. The admission or rejection of such a prayer will not operate as a binding decision on the question whether the property is in fact subject to the mortgage. Whether the decision will have a binding effect under the provisions of O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, depends clearly therefore on the nature of the relief asked for. If all that is asked for is that the mortgage asserted be inserted in the sale proclamation there is no scope for the operation of O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC. If that is asked for in substance, is that the attachment and consequently the sale—be made subject to the mortgage, the application must be held to be one under O. 21, R. 68 of the CPC and so the decision will be conclusive under O. 21, R. 68 of the CPC as between the parties to the application.

    19. What is the position, where, as in the present case, there is no clear prayer for either of the reliefs indicated above? The substance of the matter has to be looked into; but I find no justification for thinking that if there is no dear prayer for insertion of the mortgage claim in the sale proclamation, it follows necessarily that the prayer is in substance for the other relief—viz., that the attachment be subject to the mortgage. There would be equal justification for holding that if there is no clear prayer for the latter relief it follows necessarily that the prayer is in substance for an insertion in the sale proclamation, of the mortgage claim.

    20. Where an examination of the application clearly shows the relief asked for to fall under the one or other of the two categories indicated above, there will obviously be no difficulty. Where it cannot be ascertained whether the relief asked for is for the continuance of attachment subject to mortgage, or for insertion of the mortgage claim in the sale proclamation, it must be held that O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, can have no application, for these drastic operations cannot be extended to doubtful cases. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision of Mitter J. in Emdad Ali v. Karan Sheikh, A.I.R (23) 1936 Cal. 590 : (168 I.C 959).

    21. Applying these principles to the application filed by the respondent, I am of opinion that the decision on that application is not conclusive. The application does not mention either O. 21, R. 68 of the CPC, or O. 21, R. 62 of the CPC, or O. 21, R. 66 of the CPC. The application may be translated thus:

    “Decree-holder Narendranath Gadadhar Ganguly etc. Judgment-debtor Birendra Nath Sinha Roy and minor Biswa Nath Sinha Roy through guardian mother Nivanani Applicant Sinha Roy

    22. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the eight annas interest of the properties of the judgment-debtors have been proclaimed for sale at the instance of the decree-holder and 16th November 1937 in fixed for the sale. The applicant is the mortgagee for the sixteen annaa interest of the attached property mentioned above and having obtained a mortgage decree against the judgment-debtors on account of the mortgage debt in Mortgage Suit No. 110 of 1937 of this Court has executed it in M. Execution Case 1419 and has prayed for realisation of his dues by the sale at auction of the mortgaged property. The dues on account of the mortgage decree have not been mentioned in the sale proclamation of this rent execution case. It is necessary that it should be so mentioned, or eke the applicant may suffer material damage. So it is prayed that proper orders may be passed for the sale of the property with, proclamation at the auction, of this matter of the dues on account of the mortgage decree in Suit No. 1419 of 1937.”

    23. It is to be noticed that though the application states that the sale proclamation has not mentioned the mortgage dues and the seriousness of the omission is stressed, the prayer is not foe amendment of the sale proclamation. Nor is any prayer made for issue of fresh proclamation, after correcting these omissions. It is equally clear, however, that there is no prayer for attachment to continue subject to the mortgage claim. I am unable to agree with the learned advocates for the appellant that the prayer for orders for sale with proclamation of the matter: of the dues on account of the mortgage decree is in substance a prayer for sale subject to the mortgage decree.

    24. Reliance wag, however, placed by the learned advocate on the decision in Ambica Prosad v. Soorjmull, 43 C.W.N 999 : (A.I.R (26) 1939 Cal. 620). There are certain observations in that judgment which at first sight appear a lend support to the learned advocate's contention that when there is no prayer for amendment of the sale proclamation, or the issue of & fresh one, an application praying that the fact of the property being subject to a mortgage might be notified and proclaimed at the sale, should be treated as a claim petition. Reading the judgment as a whole, I am of opinion that the learned Judges did not intend to lay down a general proposition of this nature. Their decision that the petition in the case before them was an application under O. 21, R. 68 of the CPC was clearly on a reading of the petition as a whole. At p. 1003 Mukherjea, J. says this:

    “Mr. Sanyal has argued that really he did Dot want that the property should be sold subject to the mortgage, but the plain reading of the petition does not lead to any other conclusion. Obviously it was not the time when the sale proclamation was being prepared and the petitioner also did not make any prayer whatsoever that the sale proclamation might be amended by mentioning the encumbrance upon the attached property or that a fresh sale proclamation might be issued and served in the locality. The object of his reciting in extense the fact of the mortgage and the interest it carried seems to me to point to the conclusion that he wanted that the property should be sold subject to the mortgage. This is strengthened by the fact that the petition was headed under O. 21, R. 62 of the CPC”

    25. The heading of the petition under O. 21, R. 62 of the CPC was a distinguishing feature of the petition in that case, and weighed with the Court, though by itself it might not have been conclusive. The observations in that context were not in my judgment intended to lay down any general principle, as contended by the learned advocate.

    26. There remains for consideration the third branch of the appellant's case before as. It is really in two parts. The first is that the finding of the appellate Court below that the sale deed to Sarat Kumari is vitiated by errors of law. The second part of this branch of argument is that once it is found that the sale deed to Sarat Kumari was a sham transaction, the defendant's claim to the property cannot succeed unless he gets the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, and this, it is said, he has failed to establish.

    27. It seems clear to me that when the appellants have come to Court for declaration of their title and possession on the basis of such title, the burden is heavily on them to show that nothing passed to Sarat Kumari by the sale deed. Until they can show this, they must fail, and the question of the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, would not arise at all. On this all important question, whether the sale to Sarat Kumari was a genuine transaction for consideration, or a sham paper transaction for fraudulent purposes the appellants are faced with this that the decision of the Court of Appeal—the final Court of facts—is against them. To get rid of this difficulty, the learned advocate for the appellant has contended that finding is vitiated by errors of law. In my opinion, this contention is correct.

    28. Strange to say, neither the original sale deed nor its certified copy has been produced in Court. As the respondent traced his title to this sale deed, it was reasonable to expect him to produce the original sale deed from Sarat. Kumari, who, it has to be remembered is related to him through his brother and does not appear to be unfriendly to him. At the same time, it has to be remembered that the appellants themselves do not dispute the existence of a sale deed to Sarat Kumari for the properties in dispute. The burden then is on them to show that it was a benami fraudulent document; and it was therefore their duty to demand the production in Court of the orginal sale deed, and if that was not produced, to give secondary evidence by producing a certified copy of the document, as otherwise there would be no means of ascertaining what consideration was mentioned in the document, and consequently, no means of showing that consideration did not pass. In view of the fact, however, that both the parties proceeded in the Courts below on the assumption that the consideration mentioned in the document was Rs. 500 in cash, and Rs. 4500 set off against the purchaser's dues against the vendor, I am of opinion that this fact should be taken to be proved by the admission of both parties.

    29. It was in this position that the appellants asked the Court to hold that the story of Saras Kumari having previous dues against her son and grandson was absurd and unbelievable. The learned District Judge relied, however, on Gadadhar's statement in a previous case that Sarat Kumari advanced Rs. 2000 on the occasion of Birendra's marriage, and a statement in a previous judgment that in that case documentary evidence showing withdrawal of Rs. 2000 from Sarat Kumari's pass book two or three days prior to Birendra's marriage. From these, the learned Judge concluded that Sarat Kumari had private means and she used to advance money to her sons.

    30. If Gadadhar had made a statement as mentioned above in this case, and if documentary evidence of the withdrawal of money from Sarat Kumari's pass book had been adduced in this case, there would have been no ground for taking exception to the Judge's conclusions whether or not, his reasoning was acceptable to us. Gadadhar was examined in this case, and has not said a word about any loan by Sarat Kumari at the time of Birendra's marriage. The evidence given by him in the previous case is not relevant in this case. I am unable to agree with Mr. Sen, that it is relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, This previous statement of Gadadhar could have been used by the appellants for the purpose of contradicting Gadadhar's evidence in this case; but the fact that the appellants put this previous deposition in evidence does not make it relevant for all purposes. In my judgment, the learned District Judge has erred in law in relying on this previous deposition of Gadadhar, in his own favour.

    31. He has equally erred in law in basing, a conclusion on documentary evidence not produced in this case, but said to have been produced in a previous case. The judgment of the previous case is not even evidence to show that such documentary evidence was produced.

    32. The main foundation of the learned Judge's decision that consideration passed is therefore vitiated by his reliance on circus stances established by irrelevant evidence. His finding of fact that the document of sale was genuine cannot, therefore, stand.

    33. I have therefore considered the evidence on the record for myself for the purpose of deciding whether the sale to Sarat Kumari was genuine. (His Lordship after considering the avidence, proceeded:) After anxious consideration I am unable to discover any reason for which Birendra and Biswa could have bona fide transferred their Patni interest in these seven villages to Sarat Kumari.

    34. On the other hand, I can see many reasons why they should create a benami document. The first is that the estate was admittedly heavily encumbered. The second is that they were not running much risk of losing the property as, on Sarat Kumari's death, they would get it as her heirs. The third is that if the state was nominally Sarat Kumari's, the many difficulties in its administration due to siswa being a minor would disappear.

    35. It would be convenient to consider next, the conduct of the parties who were affected by the ale. Was the conduct such as we should aspect if there was a real sale? [His Lordship considered this and continued:] On a consideration of these circumstances, my unhesitating conclusion is that the sale deed to Sarat Kumari was a benami deed, and no interest passed to are by that.

    36. The appellants therefore obtained good title by purchase in the Court sale of Birendra's eight annas share in the patni. The respondent will still be able however to resist a decree, as regards the two mouzaa which be purchased in execution of his mortgage decree, provided as is entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    37. If the mortgage bond evidenced a genuine transaction and was for consideration, he must be held to be a transferee for consideration. On this, we have the finding of the learn, ad District Judge in the respondent's favour, and I find nothing to justify interference with that finding.

    38. The learned District Judge has also found that the respondent acted in good faith, it is clear also that he was of opinion that Gadadhar had made reasonable enquiry through his brother Girija. Though on this important matter he has not recorded a clear finding that the respondent took reasonable care to ascertain shat the transferor had power to make the transfer, he is apparently of opinion that the respondent did take such care.

    39. We are bound to accept as correct the learned District Judge's finding of fact that the respondent made certain enquiries through Girija. The question whether the action he took mounted to “taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer” is a; question of law, and requires our careful consideration. ‘Reasonable care’ has been explained to mean such care as an ordinary man of business would take, and this obviously would vary with circumstances. Some circumstances would prima facie arouse suspicion, and would call for a detailed enquiry; other circumstances would make only a nominal enquiry sufficient. What would an ordinary man of business feel on learning that his proposed transferor had just acquired her title from her son and grandson? I have no doubt that and ordinary man of business would feel that the transferor's power looked very suspicious; for a transfer to a woman from her son and grandson is very unusual. The first care of an order nary man of business in such circumstances would be to try and find out if the transfer from the son and grandson was a genuine transaction for consideration. The respondent does not even claim to have made any enquiry to find out if the transfer to Sarat Kumari was for consideration. His evidence shows that the only point on which he asked for information from Girija and Manindra was whether the property was subject to any mortgage and whether Sarat Kumari was in possession of the property. He says further that they informed him that Sarat Kumari was in actual possession. Girija is D.W 7 and says that he made enquiries according to Gadadhar's letter. But he does not say a word about making any enquiry as to whether Sarat Kumari was in actual possession. All he says about the enquiry in that he came to learn on search from the Sub-Registry office that a kobala had already been executed and registered in favour of Sarat Kumari in respect of mortgaged property; and then on going to Sonadanga, he ascertained the average income of the mahal with reference to the record of rights and the collection papers of the previous years; that he was satisfied that the proposed advance to Sarat Kumari would be a safe investment, and he expressed his opinion to the defendant by a letter. Not a word about who was in possession of the estate? It would almost seem that Girija, a lawyer and a man of the world, was blissfully ignorant that a pernicious practice of benami sale deeds does exist in this sinful world.

    40. An argument was advanced on behalf of the respondent that he must be held to have taken sufficient care, if he asked Girija to make the necessary enquiries and Girija informed him that the sale was genuine; and stress is laid on the documentary evidence of Ex. w2, a letter written by Gadadhar to Dharani. The relevant portion of the letter runs thus:

    “I wrote to Mejda (meaning Girija) on 16th inatant to enquire about the fact of her purchase of these two patni mahala among other properties from Birendra and Nivanani for consideration of the debt one to her by the Sonadanga Estate. Mejdada writes to me about the result of his enquiry. He says that purchase by registered kobala is real and that she has actually taken possession of the kobala properties…. He assures me that it will be a good investment. I have now finally decided to advance to her Rs. 2825. I already sent Rs. 800 to Mejda on 19th as my first instalment of the advance”.

    41. This letter would be admissible in corroboration of Gadadhar's testimony in Court, if he had said here that Girija gave him such information. In order that he could give such secondary evidence of Girija's letter, he would have had to prove that the letter was missing. This has not been proved; and Gadadhar has not said in Court that Girija's letter contained these statements. The letter Ex. W2 is not, therefore, admissible in evidence. Supposing, however, it is admissible in evidence, it is of little assistance to Gadadhar.

    42. If Girija did really write to him all that is said in Ex. W2 why does not Girija say so in Court? If he had said in Court that there was a genuine purchase by Sarat Kumari, and that she had actually taken over possession, he would have been asked how he found out all this; and that was a question he wanted to avoid. That is the only explanation I can think of for his not saying in Court the things be is supposed to have written to Gadadhar. In the face of his evidence in Court, it is absurd to suggest that Girija did really ascertain on enquiry that Sarat Kumari had taken over possession of the properties, and that the sale was real. I cannot believe that Girija wrote to Gadadhar what is mentioned in Ex. W2 as his statement.

    43. Supposing however that Girija did write to Gadadhar that the sale was real, and that Sarat Kumari had taken over possession, I do not think an ordinary man of business would have been satisfied with that. Such a man would know that a make-believe transfer of possession is generally gone through to conceal benami, and that this process would be all the easier, where the vendor and purchaser are as closely connected as in this case. An ordinary man of business would in such circumstances take care, before parting with good money, to find out what consideration did actually pass; and also what was the necessity of making a transfer. Admittedly, the respondent did not make any attempt to find out any of these things.

    44. It may be mentioned that the learned Judge has found that Manindra did not make any enquiry. I agree with this finding.

    45. My conclusion is that the respondent did not take reasonable care to ascertain that Sarat Kumari had power to transfer.

    46. I believe also that Dharani, Sarafc Kumari's son-in-law, knew very well that the sale to Sarat Kumari was a sham transaction. It is not likely that be concealed this knowledge from his brother, the respondent. My conclusion from the circumstances is that the respondent had reason to believe before he advanced the money on the mortgage bonds that the sale to Sarat Kumari was a sham, transaction. The explanation why he advanced an amount of nearly three thousand rupees in spite of the knowledge lies probably in the fact that as the properties mortgaged were very valuable, he took a gambler's chance in the hope that he might be able to get hold of some of the properties in spite of everything. I hold that the respondent did not act in good faith.

    47. My conclusion, therefore, is that the respondent is not entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs-appellants are therefore, entitled to obtain the relief they have prayed for viz., declaration of title and delivery of joint possession to the extent of eight annas for all the properties purchased by them, including the mouzas which the respondents purchased in the mortgage sale.

    48. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal with costs, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court, and restore the decree of the trial Court.

    49. The cross-objection was not pressed and is dismissed without costs.

    P.N Mitra, J.:— I agree.

    R.G.D

    50. Appeal allowed.

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