Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Ameer Ali and Pratt, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs sued for a declaration of their right to construct and maintain a bund (dam) at a location described as "ka" in the plaint, and for a permanent injunction preventing the defendants (other than the pro forma defendants) from removing it in future. The dispute concerns a natural streamlet arising near several villages and flowing past the plaintiffs' holdings in Mitrapur and Bijoypur, through Arachia (where the defendants cultivate) and on to Paisana, joining the river Khari.

The plaintiffs alleged that riparian inhabitants had, from time immemorial, a right to raise bunds within their respective limits to conserve water for irrigation and to let surplus water pass for downstream use; they asserted that they, in exercise of this prescriptive and customary right, had constructed a bund at "ka" which the principal defendants demolished in the year 1302 (as stated in the plaint). The plaintiffs sought relief both for themselves and, under section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, on behalf of co-villagers whose lands are described in schedules kha and gah.

The defendants denied (a) that the disputed place lay within Mitrapur and Bijoypur, (b) that the plaintiffs or villagers had ever constructed a dam there or had a right to do so, and (c) that plaintiffs irrigated their lands from that place; they asserted instead that the defendants' village had a customary bund within its own confines and that their villagers took water from the stream when necessary.

At first instance (the Munsif), after detailed consideration, found in favour of the plaintiffs: that "ka" was within the plaintiffs' villages; that the talukdar of Arachia did not possess jalkar rights there; that the plaintiffs had a right to dam the stream for irrigation and had done so for over twenty years consistent with local custom; and he decreed the plaintiffs' right and enjoined the principal defendants from removing the bund. The Subordinate Judge (Lower Appellate Court) affirmed the first-instance decree. The present judgment is from this Court on a second appeal brought by the appellants (defendants).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs had established a prescriptive right (by uninterrupted enjoyment for the requisite period) to erect and maintain the bund at the place described as "ka".
  2. Whether leave granted under section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (to sue on behalf of other co-villagers) was valid and sufficient, and whether procedural requirements under that section were met.
  3. Whether a declaration of right based on custom could be made on behalf of the other inhabitants of Mitrapur and Bijoypur (i.e., whether the plaintiffs had proved that the right extended to those other persons).
  4. Whether the injunction/decree was impermissibly indefinite — specifically regarding (a) the size of the bund, (b) the period during which bunds should be constructed or maintained, and (c) whether the rights of the defendants were adequately protected by the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs asserted a mixed right (prescriptive and customary) to conserve water by erecting a bund at "ka" for irrigating lands described in schedules kha and gah.
  • They alleged that the practice of erecting the bund was public, uninterrupted and ancient; that the bund was constructed annually (seasonally) and had been demolished by the principal defendants in 1302.
  • They sought leave under section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code to sue on behalf of all riparian holders similarly situated.

Defendants' / Appellants' Arguments

  • In their written statement the defendants denied that the disputed place was within Mitrapur and Bijoypur, denied that the plaintiffs or their co-villagers had ever constructed a dam at that place or had any right to do so, and denied that the plaintiffs irrigated their lands from the stream.
  • They contended that the talukdar or their village had customary rights and a bund within their own village and that the defendants used the stream in times of scarcity.
  • On the second appeal they argued (1) the plaintiffs had not proved a prescriptive right, (2) the leave under s.30 was insufficient so plaintiffs could not sue on behalf of others, (3) a declaration based on custom could not be granted because the plaintiffs had not proved others enjoyed the claimed right, and (4) the injunction was indefinite because the size and period of maintenance of the bund were not specified and the defendants' rights were not adequately protected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dhunput Singh v. Paresh Nath Singh That grant of permission under section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code may be inferred from the circumstances of the case (i.e., formal recording of order not strictly necessary if substantive compliance shown). The Court relied on this authority to hold that notices placed in the local paper (Burdwan Sanjibani) and the plaintiffs' application sufficed to comply with s.30, so the absence of an order entry in the order-sheet did not vitiate proceedings.
The Duke of Bedford v. Ellis Authority referenced by the appellants (context: riparian rights and their limits under English authorities). The Court stated that the cases cited by the appellants (including this one) did not affect the present case given the factual findings that prescriptive/customary rights had been established here.
Deli Pershad Singh v. Joynath Singh (Privy Council) Principle that in the absence of a right acquired by contract or prescriptive use, the law does not concede an unrestricted right to impound or divert water to the detriment of lower proprietors; a mere equitable discretion is insufficient where no prescriptive/customary right is proved. The Court distinguished that decision: in Deli Pershad the plaintiffs had not proved prescription or custom and had claimed an unrestricted right; here, by contrast, both lower courts had found that prescription/custom had been established, so the Privy Council authority did not defeat the plaintiffs' claim.
Dictum of Chancellor Kent (Commentaries) Expresses that a right may be acquired by grant or uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years (authority on acquisition of rights by long user). The Subordinate Judge incorporated this dictum to support the proposition that uninterrupted user for twenty years is evidence of a grant and consistent with recognising a prescriptive right; the present Court treated that reasoning as supportive of the findings below.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the factual findings of the Munsif and the Subordinate Judge and applied the following analytical steps:

  1. Location and proprietary rights: The Munsif found, on evidence, that the disputed place "ka" was within the villages in which the plaintiffs hold lands (Mitrapur and Bijoypur) and that the talukdar of Arachia did not possess jalkar rights in the streamlet alongside those villages. The Subordinate Judge effectively affirmed those factual findings and no party disputed them before this Court.
  2. Nature of the claim: The plaintiffs' claim was "mixed"—both prescriptive and customary. The Munsif found that the plaintiffs had exercised the special right of damming the streamlet to irrigate their lands and had done so for more than twenty years; this practice was consistent with a local custom of constructing periodic bunds by inhabitants of different villages along the stream.
  3. Proof of prescription and user: Although some plaintiff witnesses did not depose to having seen actual irrigation with water from the disputed dam for twenty years, the courts accepted proof of the continuous existence of the bund for over twenty years as sufficient evidence of prescriptive user. The Subordinate Judge expressly adopted the view that uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years is evidence of an acquired right, citing Chancellor Kent's dictum.
  4. Section 30 (representative suit procedure): The Munsif found, and this Court accepted, that the plaintiffs had sought leave under s.30 and that notifications (advertisements) had been placed in a local paper (Burdwan Sanjibani). Referring to Dhunput Singh v. Paresh Nath Singh, the Court held that formal omission in the order-sheet did not vitiate the substantive compliance with s.30; permission may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.
  5. Rights of co-villagers and scope of the declaration: Given the factual findings that riparian holders in Mitrapur and Bijoypur had long erected similar bunds and that the plaintiffs' user was consistent with this custom, the Court concluded those co-villagers' rights were coextensive with the plaintiffs' rights and that a declaration on behalf of such persons was warranted.
  6. Indefiniteness of injunction: The Court examined the appellants' contention that the injunction was indefinite (size, period, protection of defendants' rights). It observed that the plaint itself described the practice as seasonal (bunds thrown up during the rainy season), obviating the need for further specification of periodicity. The Court further held that the decree must be consistent with the historic practice and custom; given that defendants themselves exercised similar rights against others, their rights were adequately protected by the factual limits of the recognised customary/user rights. The Privy Council authority in Deli Pershad was distinguished because there the plaintiffs had not proved prescription or custom.
  7. Scope of appellate review: Because both lower courts had made detailed factual findings (accepted by the Subordinate Judge and not successfully impugned here), the Court held it was not open in the second appeal to re-evaluate those primary findings of fact regarding prescriptive and customary use.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The decree of the Court of First Instance, as affirmed by the Subordinate Judge, stands: the plaintiffs are entitled to construct the bund at the place specified in the plaint and the principal defendants are enjoined from removing it.

Implications:

  • The practical effect is that the plaintiffs' declaratory and injunctive relief, as decreed below, is affirmed and the defendants are restrained from interference with the bund in the terms previously ordered.
  • The Court found that procedural requirements under section 30 CPC were satisfied in substance (notice by advertisement), so the plaintiffs could maintain the suit on behalf of co-villagers; the Court relied on established authority to permit inference of permission under s.30 from the circumstances when formal entries were lacking.
  • No broader change in law or novel principle was announced; the appellate Court distinguished prior authorities where prescriptive or customary rights were not established, and treated the matter as primarily one of fact established by the lower courts. The decision therefore affirms the application of established principles governing acquisition of rights by long user and customary local rights in the particular factual context of this streamlet and the villages concerned.

Order: Appeal dismissed with costs (per the judgment).

    Kalu Khabir v. Jan Meah

    Ameer Ali and Pratt, JJ.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs for a declaration of their right to effect and maintain a bund at a place described in the schedule attached to the plaint as ka, and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, other than the pro forma defendants, from removing it in future.

    The circumstances which gave rise to the suit are as follow:— There appears to be a natural streamlet, which issuing from some villages called Fulnagar, Beldanga, &c., in the District of Burdwan, flows in a southerly direction past the villages of Mitrapur and Bijoypur, where the plaintiffs have their holdings, and Arachia where the defendants reside and have their cultivation, and then takes an easterly course through the village named Paisana, where it joins the river Khari. The plaintiffs alleged that during the rainy season when the streamlet is filled with water the inhabitants of the riparian villages have, from time immemorial, had the right of raising bund, within the respective limits, of conserving water sufficient for irrigating their lands for agricultural purposes and letting out the surplus water for the use of the holders of servant tenements, and that they, as the owners of property lying on the bank of this streamlet, bad, in accordance with the above prescriptive and customary right, constructed a dam at the place ka which was demolished by the principal defendants in the year 1302. They alleged farther that this dam was built in this manner every year and that the practice was observed as a matter of right, publicly and uninterruptedly for upwards of twenty years for the purpose aforesaid, and that the defendants have and had no right to interfere with the construction of the bunds in question. They stated further that the people of the defendants' village had a similar right to build a dam or bund within their own limits for the conservation of water and that they were not entitled to interfere with the exercise of the right on the part of the plaintiffs; and as the right which they claimed was one shared in by all the riparian holders of Mitrapur and Bijoypur, the plaintiffs asked the Court to grant them leave under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. And they prayed for a declaration that they and their co-villagers holding the lands described in the plaint as kha and gah have a prescriptive right based on immemorial practice to conserve water by constructing a bund at the place mentioned in schedule (ka) for the purpose of irrigating their lands (kha and (gah). They also asked that the defendants might be restrained from interfering with any bund the plaintiffs might construct within the confines of Mitrapur and Bijoypur.

    The defendants in their written statement alleged, inter alia, that the place where the plaintiffs claim to erect the bun dwas not within the confines of Mitrapur and Bijoypur as alleged by them; secondly, that neither the plaintiffs, nor the pro forma defendants, nor the ryots of Mitrapur and Bijoypur, ever constructed a dam at that place, and that they had no such light, nor had they held possession of the place, nor been in the practice of building dams for the last twelve years. The defendants also denied that the plaintiffs irrigated their land with the water of the streamlet, and they went on to allege that from time immemorial the defendants had “as usual” a bund within the confines of their own village and that in the event of any scarcity of water, the people of that village cause their lands to be irrigated by taking water from the stream.

    As the Courts below point out, there is no suggestion in the written statement that the right claimed or the right which has been found to have been exercised by the plaintiffs interfered in any way with the enjoyment by the defendants of the water of this streamlet. It will be noticed also that in the plaint the plaintiffs based their right to conserve water for the irrigation of their lands by erecting a bund, both on prescriptive and customary right. The right on which this action was therefore brought was of a mixed character, neither purely prescriptive nor purely customary. We mention this in connection with an argument put forward on behalf of the appellants in this Court, to which we shall advert afterwards.

    The First Court in an extremely careful and well-considered judgment, in which it discussed the law relating to rights of this nature in some detail, found in the first place that the place where the plaintiffs claimed to have had their bund, and where they claimed to construct the same, was not within Arachia. In fact, although the defendants had denied in their written statement that it was within the confines of Mitrapur and Bijoypur, it was conceded in the course of the trial that ka was within the villages within which the plaintiffs have their holdings. But the contention was that the portion of the streamlet, in which the plaintiffs wanted to erect their bund, belonged to the talukdar of Arachia. The Munsif found as a fact upon the evidence in the case that the talukdar of Arachia did not possess the jalkar right in the streamlet alongside of the villages of Mitrapur and Bijoypur, nor was he in possession thereof. He found further that the portion of the kandar or streamlet which passes through Bijoypur and Mitrapur belonged either to the talukdars of those villages, or, as the thak map shows, exclusively to the talukdar of the latter village. This finding has been practically affirmed by the Subordinate Judge and there is no dispute about it in this Court. Upon that finding, as the Munsif very properly points oath, the plaintiffs have clearly a right to use the water of the streamlet for ordinary purposes. Some English cases were referred to, which go to show that the ordinary purposes in England are limited to personal uses and so forth. Ia this country, moreover, the ordinary use to which a riparian holder is entitled is not so limited as in England, but apart from that, the Munsif found as a fact that the plaintiffs had made out the special light which they claimed, viz., the right of damming up the streamlet for irrigating their lands, and that they had exercised that right for more than twenty years by erecting the bund, and that the use which they had made was consistent with the custom prevailing in that part of the country. He referred to the fact that there were several bunds of that character, then built by the inhabitants of the different villages for the purpose of conserving the water within the confines of their respective properties. He found further that the defendants had not shown that such conservation by the erection of periodical bunds had in any way injured them or interfered with their rights as riparian holders, and he was of opinion that the right which the plaintiffs claimed appertained to all the lands which abutted on the stream including the lands in schedule kha and gah referred to in the plain.-, and he went on to fay: “Considering all the circumstance? I am of opinion that the plaintiffs, as well as the other inhabitants of Bijoypur, are entitled to maintain a bund in the disputed place, and that it does not signify whether the right entitling them to do so be of the nature of an easement, natural or customary.” He held further that, as the plaintiffs claimed a right by prescription, they were entitled to maintain the action for themselves, but if it were a right in which other persons were entitled to sue, leave under s. 30 had been granted; that in fact advertisements had been issued in one of the local papers and that the provisions of that section were complied with for the purpose of entitling the plaintiffs to maintain the action on behalf of themselves and the others concerned. He accordingly made a decree declaring the plaintiffs right to erect a bund in the disputed place in terms if the prayer contained in the plaint and for possess on of the disputed land for the aforesaid purpose, and also declaring that the principal defendants have no right to remove the bund and enjoining them to refrain from doing so.

    On appeal to the Subordinate Judge, various questions were raised, but apparently, so far as we can see from the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, no question was raised regarding the right to the portion of the streamlet running through Mitrapur and Bijoypar, nor as regards the permission granted to the plaintiffs under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Lower Appellate Court has held that the exercise of the right by the plaintiffs as alleged by them in their plaint for more than twenty years had been satisfactorily established. He also found as a fact that, although ordinarily the holder of a dominant tenement has no right to interrupt the regular flow of a stream so as to interfere with the use of the water by other proprietors or to inflict upon them any injury, it was clear that ??? a right may be acquired by a grant or uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years, which is evidence of the grant. He in fact incorporates in his judgment the dictum of Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, and agreeing with the Munsif that the user by the plaintiffs was not by any means of an extraordinary character, but under the circumstances of this case was a right which they had established both upon prescription as well as by custom, he afield the decree of the Court of First Instance.

    The Subordinate Judge's judgment naturally is not so full as that of the Munsif with whom he agreed, and that probably has furnished the reason for this second appeal.

    It has been contended on behalf of the appellants before us first, that the plaintiffs have not proved their prescriptive right; second, that the leave which was granted under s. 30 was not sufficient, and that therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the action on behalf of others, and that a declaration based upon custom could not be made, because it was not proved in the case that others had enjoyed the right which the plaintiffs claimed. It was also contended that, the terms of the injunction were indefinite, first, because the size of the bund had not been indicated; second, nothing was said as to the period during which the bund should be maintained; and third, because the rights of the defendants were not protected.

    As regards the proof of the right by prescription claimed by the plaintiffs, the Subordinate Judge no doubt says that “the witnesses for the plaintiffs do not depose having seen the plaintiffs irrigate their hinds with the water of this stream taken from the place of the disputed dam for twenty years;” but he goes on to say that they prove the existence of the dam for more than twenty years, and this is sufficient to give the plaintiffs the right to maintain the dam. As we have already mentioned, the plaintiff's claim was based upon a right founded on immemorial user as well as customary right, that is, the right which appertained to the villages abutting on the stream and through which the kandar flows. In considering what the Munsif had found, it seems to us that the Subordinate Judge, who was affirming the judgment of the First Court, was of opinion that upon the evidence it had been clearly shown by the plaintiffs that the user which they claimed had been sufficiently and clearly established, although some of the witnesses may not have seen the plaintiffs actually irrigating their lands with the water of the stream. Reading the two judgments together, we feel no doubt, that what was intended to be found by the Subordinate Judge was exactly what had been found by the First Court.

    As regards leave under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, we are of opinion that, as it was given in fact upon the plaintiffs application, and notices were issued in compliance with the plaintiffs' prayer, the mere fact that the order was not recorded in the order sheet does not vitiate the proceedings, and in this view we are supported by the decision of Chief Justice Petheram and Mr. Justice Ghose, in the case of Dhunput Singh v. Paresh Nath Singh, where the learned Chief Justice held that the grant of permission under s. 30 may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Here the Munsif finds that in the local paper, the Burdwan Sanjibani, the fact that a suit had been instituted by the plaintiffs of the character in question was duly notified, and we are of opinion that the requirements of s. 30 were therefore sufficiently complied with.

    Then arises the question whether the right claimed on behalf of the other inhabitants of the village has been sufficiently established. We are of opinion that upon the findings of the Munsif, which have been substantially affirmed by the Subordinate Judge, there can be no doubt regarding the fact that the riparian holders of the villages of Mitrapur and Bijoypur were entitled with the plaintiffs, the present respondents, to the right which the plaintiffs in their plaint claimed, namely the right to conserve water by building up a dam in the streamlet in question during the rainy season. The rights of those persons are coextensive with those of the plaintiffs, and regard being had to the fact that the plaintiffs have established, in the opinion of both the Courts below, that they had been in the habit of erecting for many years past a dam across the streamlet in question at the particular place mentioned by them for the conservation of water for agricultural purposes, it may be taken that right is, as the Munsiff has found it to be, the right of the villagers whose Lands abut on the stream. The case of the Duke of Bedford v. Ellis and the other cases cited by the learned pleader for the appellants therefore do not in our opinion touch the present case.

    The question remains as to the indefiniteness of the terms of the ???. As we have mentioned, the objections are of a three ??? character. As regards the periodicity of the construction the bund, it is unnecessary for us to say anything, for it will be found that in the plaint itself it is mentioned that the bund is thrown up only during the rainy season.

    As regards the right of the appellants, it seems to us that the way in which the case has been dealt with, and upon the facts found by the Courts below, the defendants are sufficiently protected. The plaintiffs have established their right to take the water for irrigating their lands by building a bund in accordance with the custom and user which has prevailed from time immemorial, and that right is co-extensive with the right of the other tenement holders—a right which is exercised by the defendants themselves as against others. We do not see how any question regarding the protection of the rights of the defendants can arise in such a case.

    It was urged, on the authority of the case of Deli Pershad Singh v. Joynath Singh(2), that an injunction of such an in definite nature ought not to be granted by the Courts in the exercise of their discretion. We may observe that the case referred to was of a special character. There the plaintiffs claimed the unrestricted right of constructing a dam and of taking water without any proof that they had ever done so before, or that they had enjoyed the right by prescription or custom. The Court of First Instance and the Lower Appellate Court had made a decree in their favour upon equitable considerations. The High Court holding that the plaintiffs claimed an unrestricted right of stopping the flow of the stream for the purpose of utilising its water to such an extent as they might think fit at any time, even if the effect of the obstruction was wholly to deprive the defendants of the water, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, and naturally so because they had not either proved custom or the right of user. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held us follows: “The right of a riparian, proprietor to divert and use water for the purpose of irrigation is certainly not understated in the plaint. The right claimed by the appellants in the first conclusion is not less broadly asserted in the body of the plaint, and is neither more nor less than a right the part of an upper proprietor to dam back a river running ??? his land and to impound as much of its water as he may ??? the purposes of irrigation, leaving only the surplus, if any, for the use of proprietors below.” Then they add what is most important: “In the absence of a right acquired by contract with the lower heritors or by prescriptive use, the law concedes no such right.” The suit was dismissed because the plaintiffs bad, failed to make out any case for the relief they claimed. In this case, both the Courts below have found as a fact that the plaintiffs, have established that they have acquired by prescriptive use the right they claim; and we are of opinion that in second appeal, it is not open to the appellants to question the correctness of that finding.

    The Lower Courts have declared that the plaintiffs are entitled to construct the bund at the place mentioned. That must be consistent with what they have been doing for the last twenty years and the custom prevailing in the locality. We, therefore see no reason for complicating matters by endeavouring to define more particularly the size of the bund.

    Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of case, we are of opinion that this appeal ought to be dismissed and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.

    M.N.R
    Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kalu Khabir v. Jan Meah
    (Jul 24, 1901)