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Judgment Summary — Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. (Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The central factual matrix is succinctly stated by the Court. The plaintiffs (appellants) previously instituted Original Suit No. 490 of 1887 seeking recovery of land described in Schedule B, alleging wrongful withholding by a particular defendant. That suit resulted in a decree in the plaintiffs' favour which was confirmed by the High Court in second appeal on 13 August 1890 (Exhibit E).

In 1896 the plaintiffs instituted the present suit seeking recovery of land described in Schedule A. The plaintiffs' title in both suits is identical: as heirs of their father they claimed to succeed to both properties on the death of their mother on 9 January 1887. The lands in Schedules A and B were in the possession of different persons who had respectively acquired possession under separate alienations made by the mother on different occasions.

The point raised on this second appeal, and accepted as the primary procedural issue by both lower courts, is whether the appellants are precluded by section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code from bringing the present suit because they omitted to include the claim to Schedule A in their earlier suit, assuming that at the institution of the earlier suit they were aware that the land in Schedule A was in the possession of the present defendant and formed part of the father's estate.

Lower courts had treated the omission as potentially fatal under section 43; the present judgment considers that question and the relevant authorities and concludes by allowing the second appeal and remanding the matter for disposal on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants are precluded by section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code from bringing the present suit (for Schedule A) because they omitted that claim in their earlier suit (Original Suit No. 490 of 1887), given that (as found) they were aware at the time of the earlier suit that the land now sued for was in the possession of the present defendant and formed part of their father's estate.
  2. Whether a cause of action in respect of different parcels of land, albeit founded on the same title and arising at the same time, can be treated as distinct causes of action when the wrongful withholding is by different persons who acquired possession under separate alienations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs' ground of title in both suits was the same (succession as heirs after the mother's death), but the lands (Schedules A and B) and the persons wrongfully withholding possession were different; therefore the causes of action were not the same or divisible into parts that had to be joined in the first suit.
  • Where the defendant in the first suit was only interested in Schedule B, the plaintiffs were entitled in that suit only to seek relief against that defendant in respect of Schedule B; Section 43 would only bar a later suit if the omitted claim formed part of the claim against the same defendant or someone claiming under him.
  • Appellants relied upon a number of authorities (including Privy Council and Full Bench decisions) holding that distinct alienees and distinct wrongful withholdings constitute distinct causes of action and therefore are not barred by section 43 or its statutory predecessors.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent's pleader chiefly relied upon an unreported decision of this Court, Subbannavien v. Krishna Royar, in which, in substantially similar circumstances, section 43 was held to be a bar to the subsequent suit. The respondent argued that the circumstantial differences did not change the bar.
  • The respondent's pleader was unable to cite other authorities where, under similar circumstances, section 43 was held to be a bar; the Court notes that the Subbannavien decision did not appear to have considered the Privy Council authorities relied upon by the appellants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Cooke v. Gill Definition of "cause of action" as "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed". Used to state the established meaning of "cause of action" and to emphasise that it relates to the grounds set out in the plaint against a particular defendant.
Shankar v. Dya Shankar Same definitional principle regarding "cause of action". Referred to in support of the Court's construction of "cause of action" being fact-based and defendant-specific.
Chand Kour v. Pertab Singh Same definitional principle regarding "cause of action". Referred to alongside other authorities to explain the legal meaning of cause of action.
Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau Explains that the relevant section requires a suit to include "the whole of the claim arising out of the cause of action" for which the suit is brought; distinct claims (e.g., personalty vs. possession) may constitute distinct causes of action. Quoted and relied upon as supporting the proposition that different subject-matters (even between the same parties) may be distinct causes of action and not barred by the statutory provision corresponding to section 43.
Moonshee Buzloor v. Shumsoonnissa Begum Cited as an additional authority related to Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau. Noted as a supporting authority in the same vein as Pittapur Raja.
Lechmere v. Fletcher Principle (per Baron Bayley) that section 43 is not a bar to suit against one of several joint and several obligors though suit had been already brought against another. Relied on to show that different defendants in different suits may prevent section 43 operating as a bar.
Dhamput Singh v. Sham Sunder Mitter Similar principle to Lechmere v. Fletcher regarding suits against different obligors. Referred to as part of authorities indicating section 43 does not bar suits against different persons for the same debt where defendants differ.
Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran That a suit for a mere declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not necessarily obnoxious to the proviso by reason of the plaintiff being able to seek further relief against a person other than the defendant. Used as an example of circumstances in which separate actions against different persons are permissible.
Chinnammal v. Varadarajulu Similar proposition regarding section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Referred to as another decision consistent with the appellants' contention about separate suits and declarations.
Jehan Bebee v. Saivuk Ram Full Bench N.W.P. decision that heirs are not obliged to make all alienees parties to the first suit on pain of forfeiting future suits against them; wrongful withholding by different alienees constitutes distinct causes of action. Cited as a direct authority favouring the appellants; its reasoning (distinguishing cause of action against widow and against alienee) is quoted and relied upon.
Hanooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonwaree Doctrine that an alienee (purchaser or mortgagee) may defend possession by showing honest and prudent acquisition and thus differ from remedy against the alienor. Referred to within the Jehan Bebee reasoning to illustrate differences in cause of action against widow/alienee.
Kooer Goolab Singh v. Rao Kurrun Singh; Rao Kurrun Singh v. Fyz Ali Khan Combined appeals to Her Majesty in Council reversing a Full Bench decision and holding the second suit was based on a different cause of action; introduced the "splitting of cause of action" test. Relied upon to show that the true test is whether there has been a splitting of the cause of action; the Judicial Committee allowed the second suit as based on a different cause of action.
Mothoor Mohun v. Khemunkuree Calcutta High Court decision adopting the view that section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 (corresponding to section 43) penalises splitting a cause of action but does not penalise separate rights arising from different causes or dates or against different defendants. Quoted to explain the operation of the statute and to support the appellants' position that differing dates/defendants may give rise to separate suits.
Subbannavien (Subbanuavien) v. Krishna Royar An unreported decision of this Court in which a Division Bench held section 43 to be a bar in substantially similar circumstances. Noted as the primary authority relied upon by the respondent; the Court observed this decision did not appear to have considered the Privy Council authorities and found it cannot be reconciled with those decisions.
Raghunnath v. Sarosh Interpretation of section 28 ("in respect of the same matter") as wider than section 26 ("in respect of the same cause of action") with respect to joinder of defendants/plaintiffs. Used in the discussion of joinder and multifariousness; supported the Court's point that "matter" and "cause of action" are distinct concepts for joinder rules.
Ishan Chunder v. Rameswar Held that in an ejectment against several defendants who set up different titles to parts of the land, there was only one cause of action; discussed English ejectment practice. Quoted and analysed to explain how the framing of the plaint and procedural practice (including English practice) affect whether a suit is treated as one cause of action or many.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from established definitions and statutory construction.

  1. The Court begins with the established meaning of "cause of action" — "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed; every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse" — and stresses that the term refers to the grounds set forth in the plaint and is defendant-specific (para 3).
  2. Applying statutory provisions, the Court reviews section 50 (requirement that a plaint show the defendant is or claims an interest in the subject-matter and is liable to answer the demand) and section 48 (that a suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action). The Court reasons that these sections demonstrate that a cause of action is not an abstraction independent of the defendant, but must be disclosed against the particular defendant named (para 4).
  3. Consequently, the Court holds that in the earlier suit the plaintiffs were entitled to call upon the then-defendant only in respect of the land (Schedule B) in which that defendant was interested. If the person who withheld Schedule A had been the same defendant or claimed under him, section 43 could operate as a bar; but where different persons are involved and have separate titles by alienation, the omitted claim against a different person is not necessarily part of the claim against the earlier defendant (para 4).
  4. The Court then examines authorities. It cites the Privy Council in Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau to show that the statutory language requires the suit to include the whole claim "arising out of the cause of action" for which the suit is brought, and that distinct claims arising from distinct causes are not necessarily barred (para 5). The Court also relies on decisions (Jehan Bebee; Kooer Goolab Singh et al.; Mothoor Mohun) that treat wrongful withholding by different alienees, or different interests carved out of the same lands, as not amounting to the same cause of action or as not amounting to an impermissible splitting of a cause of action (paras 6–8).
  5. The Court distinguishes the respondent's primary authority (Subbannavien v. Krishna Royar), noting that that Division Bench decision did not appear to have considered the Privy Council authorities and cannot be reconciled with them (para 9). The Court analyses procedural provisions on joinder (section 28) and contrasts "cause of action" with "matter", explaining that the joinder provisions allow a plaintiff discretion to join multiple defendants when relief is in respect of the same matter, but that section 43 uses the phrase "cause of action" and not "matter" (paras 9–11).
  6. The Court also observes that under English practice and ejectment procedure there is a recognized discretion whether to bring a single action against many defendants or multiple actions against different defendants; this illustrates that procedural framing of the plaint can determine whether there is one cause of action or several, and that a plaintiff may exercise judgment in this respect (para 10).
  7. On these bases, and following the Privy Council and Full Bench authorities favouring the appellants' position, the Court concludes that the second suit is not barred by section 43 where the persons withholding different parcels of land are different and there is no combination or privity between them (paras 4–8, 12).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court allowed the second appeal, reversed the decree of the Lower Appellate Court and remanded the appeal for disposal on the merits. Costs of this second appeal were ordered to be costs in the cause (para 12). Justice Moore concurred (para 13).

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the appellants are permitted to proceed with their suit for recovery of the land in Schedule A; the Court has held that omission to include a claim against a different person in an earlier suit is not necessarily barred by section 43 where the cause of action is defendant-specific and the defendants and subject-matters differ. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel statutory rule beyond the application of existing authorities; it relies upon and follows prior decisions (including Privy Council and Full Bench authorities) in reaching its conclusion. No broad new precedent beyond the Court's application of those authorities is expressly stated in the opinion.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond the text.

    Dampanaboyina Gangi v. Addala Ramaswami

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.:— The point arising in this second appeal is whether the appellants (plaintiffs) are precluded by section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code from bringing this suit by reason of their having omitted to include the present claim in their former suit, Original Suit No. 490 of 1887, assuming, as is apparently found by both the Lower Courts, that at the institution of the former suit they were aware that the land now sued for was in the possession of the present defendant and that the same formed part of their father's estate. The first suit was brought by these plaintiffs for the recovery of some other land which was in the possession of the defendant in that suit and the same was awarded to them by the decree of the Appellate Court therein, which was Confirmed by the High Court in second appeal on the 13th August, 1890 (Exhibit E).

    The present suit was brought in 1896 for the recovery from the defendant herein, of the land mentioned in Schedule A to the plaint which is different from the land mentioned in Schedule B, the subject-matter of the former suit. The plaintiffs' ground of title in both the suits is one and the same, i.e, that as the heirs of their father they were entitled to succeed to both the properties on the death of their mother on the 9th January, 1887. The former suit was instituted against the defendant therein, by reason of his wrongfully withholding from the plaintiffs, on the death of their mother, possession of the land in Schedule B, and the present suit is brought on the defendants herein similarly withholding the land comprised in Schedule A, the defendants in both the cases having respectively come into possession of the lands comprised in Schedules B and A under separate alienations made by the mother in favour of each on a different occasion. It will thus be seen that though the ground of title is one and the same in both the suits and the cause of action in respect of both arose at the fame time, viz., the date of the mother's death, yet the person who wrongfully withheld the land in Schedule B and the person who wrongfully withheld the land in Schedule A are quite different and there was no manner of combination or privity between them in respect of the lands which they severally withheld.

    The words ‘cause of action’ have all along been held to mean ‘every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed; every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse,’ and have no relation whatever to the defence, but refer entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action (Cooke v. Gill(1), Shankar v. Dya Shankar(2), Chand Kour v. Pertab Singh(3)).

    Though the ground of title on which both suits are founded is one and the same and the causes of action also arose at the same time, yet the properties comprised in the two suits are different end the persons who severally withheld the same are also different. A reference to section 50, Civil Procedure Code, clearly shows that in every suit the plaint must show that the defendant is or claims to be interested in the subject-matter and that be is liable to be called upon to answer the plaintiff's demand. This clearly shows that the cause of action is not an abstraction, something independent of the defendant, but that the plaint should disclose a cause of action against the defendant. And section 48 only provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of taction and that if a plaintiff omit to sue in respect of any portion of his claim arising from the cause of action for the enforcement of which the suit is brought, be shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted. In the former suit the plaintiffs were entitled to call upon the defendant therein only to answer the demand in respect of the land comprised in Schedule B in which alone that defendant was and claimed to be interested. If the land in Schedule A had also been yuwitheldd by him from the plaintiffs' plaintiffs' claim to the same would be only a part of the claim which they were entitled to make against that defendant and section 43, Civil Procedure Code, would be a bar to the present suit if be were the defendant herein or the defendant herein were a person claiming under him. In respect of the land in Schedule B the plaintiffs' cause of action was only against the defendant in the former suit, and in respect of the land in Schedule A their cause of action is only against the defendant herein, and in my opinion it is impossible to hold that the former suit did not include the whole of the claim which the plaintiffs were entitled to moke in respect of the cause of action on which that suit was founded, and that the claim in the present case is a part of the claim which they were bound to make in the former suit: in other words, that a cause of action against one person is a part of the cause of action against another though it is not a joint one against both.

    In Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau in which section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 (corresponding to section 43 of Act XIV of 1882) was pleaded as a bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties, their Lordships of the Privy Council explained the law as follows at page 524):—“That section does not say that every suit shall include every cause of action, or every claim which the party has, but ‘every suit, shall include the whole of the claim arising out of the cause of action’—meaning the cause of action for which the suit is brought. The claim in respect of the personalty was not a claim arising out of the cause of action, which existed in consequence of the defendants having improperly turned the plaintiffs out of possession of Veeravaram. It was a distinct cause of action altogether, and did not arise at all out of the other. It is not like the case of one conversion of several things. There the act of conversion of the several things is one cause of action, and you cannot bring an action for the conversion of one of the things, and a separate action for the conversion of another. The conversion of the whole is one claim and one cause of action.” (See also Moonshee Buzloor v. Shumsoonnissa Begum). In Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau the parties were the same in both the suits but the subject-matter different. Neither will section 43, Civil Procedure Code, be a bar to a suit against one of two or more joint and several obligors, though for the same debt a suit had been already brought and decree obtained against another of such obligors (per Baron Bayley in Lechmere v. Fletcher, Dhamput Singh v. Sham Sunder Mitter(4)). In such a case the defendants are different in the two suits but the subject-matter is the same. The present case is stronger than either of the above classes of cases, the defendants as well as the subject-matters being different in the two suits. The wrongful withholding of Blaokacre by X and the wrongful with, holding of Whiteacre by Y, cannot constitute the same cause of action, by reason only of the plaintiff's ground of title both to Blackacre and Whiteacre being the same, when he sues X and Y separately in respect of Blackacre and Whiteacre respectively, alleging the same ground of title, but distinct wrongful with, holding by each of them. I may also here refer to more than one decision of this Court in which it was held that a suit for a mere declaration of right to any property under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not obnoxious to the proviso thereto by reason of the plaintiff being able to seek further relief in respect of such property against a person other than the defendant in the suit (Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran(5), Chinnammal v. Varadarajulu(6)).

    The very question arising in this case was considered by a Full Bench of the North-West Provinces High Court, in 1867, in Jehan Bebee v. Saivuk Ram and it was there held that it was not obligatory on the heirs to make all the alienees parties to the first suit, upon pain of forfeiting all future right of suit against them by reason of such omission. The reasoning on which the decision proceeded is as follows:—“As against the widow the cause of action is based upon the fact that she has made an alienation of the inheritance in excess of her interest. As regards an alienee, the cause of action arises from the circumstance, that the possession of a part of the inheritance is wrongfully withheld. Although the alienation may have been wrongful, it does not follow that an heir is entitled to recover possession from the alienee. Such on alienee, if a purchaser or mortgagee may, under the doctrines laid down in Hanooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonwaree successfully defend is possession by proving that he acted honestly and wish due caution, but was himself deceived — and yet the heir might, although be could not succeed in a suit against the alienee, recover damages from the widow for her wrongful act. For the same reason (i.e, that the cause of action against the alienee is the wrongful withholding of possession) the heir's cause of action as against different alienees who have acquired possession under alienations made at different times and under different circumstances, is not one and the same cause of action, as is admitted by the respondent's pleaders. To apply these conclusions to the case before us—the plaintiffs sued on the same title in the former and in the present suit and the question as to the widow's right to alien arose equally in each case. But the sales were distinct, different tends having been sold at different times to different purchasers.”

    A different view was taken in an earlier decision of a Full Bench of the Sadr Dewany Adalat of North-West Provinces, (Fyz Ali Khan's case, 20th March, 1866) which however was distinguished in the above case (Spankie, J., dissenting). In Fyz Ali Khan's case, the reversionary heir, Rao Fur run Singh, sued to establish his title to twenty-seven villages which had formed the estate of Dhuleep Singh who died in 1846 and was succeeded by his widow and mother successively. The widow died in 1856. Rao Kurrun Singh's grand-father was the heir-at-law, but he was a lunatic and Rao Kurrun Singh, on his own account and as guardian of his lunatic grand-father, sued to establish his title to the property which had been alienated by the widow with the concurrence of the mother of Dhuleep Singh, joining the mother as a party to the suit along with the alienees. She died during the pendency of the suit and Rao Kurrun Singh succeeded and obtained proprietary possession of the twenty-seven villages, though not actual possession of three of them, which were in the possession of mortgagees, who had not been made parties to the suit. The mortgages had been made by the widow, with the concurrence of the mother, prior to the permanent alienations which were set aside by the decree in the suit as not binding upon the Reversionary heir. Subsequently, Rao Kurrun Singh sued the morrgagees to avoid the mortgages as unlawful and recover full possession of the three villages in their possession. The second suit was dismissed by a Full Bench on the ground that Rao Kurrun Singh's cause of action was Dhuleep Singh's widow's death and he had to establish his title to his property the whole of which had been alienated by the widow and the mother and as he did not include the mortgagees in the first suit, though he did sue and obtain proprietary possession of the estate, he could not subsequently sue to avoid the mortgages as unlawful. Appeals were preferred to Her Majesty in Council from the decision of Sadr Dewany Adalat in the first suit and from the Full Bench decision in the second suit (Kooer Goolab Singh v. Rao Kurrun Singh; Rao Kurrun Singh v. Fyz Ali Khan). Both the appeals are dealt with in one common judgment, the result being that the appeal from the first suit was dismissed, but the appeal from the second suit was allowed and the Full Bench decision of the Sadr Dewany Adalat reversed on the ground that the second suit was based on a different cause of action from the first and the section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 was therefore no bar to the subsequent suit. It will be seen that out of the twenty-seven villages which formed the subject-matter of the first suit and had been alienated to the defendant therein, for a purpose not binding upon Rao Kurrun Singh, the next reversionary heir, three villages had already been mortgaged to, and were in the possession of, the defendant in the subsequent suit, the purpose for which the property was thus mortgaged being also found not to be one that would be binding upon the reversionary heir. The three villages were included in the first suit and also formed the subject-matter of the second suit, the equity of redemption thereof being alone comprised in the former suit, and the mortgage estate which had been carved out of the said three villages constituting the subject-matter of the second suit and defendants also being different in the two suits. The ground of title on which, the two suits were founded was one and the same, as in the present case and the cause of action in each also arose at the same time and in one sense, so for as the three villages in question were concerned, the two suite related to different interests in the same property. Their lordships of the Judicial Committee, in reversing the decision of the Full Bench, laid down that the true test of the proper application of the section in question as a bar to a subsequent suit in any particular case must he whether there has been a splitting of the cause of action, that upon the above facts the two shits cannot be regarded as having been based upon, the same cause of action and the second suit cannot therefore he said to have been brought upon a splitting of the cause of action. In Mothoor Mohun v. Khemunkuree the same view was taken by the High Court of Calcutta and the operation of section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 explained as follows:—

    “section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 requires that, if all rights arising out of the same cause of action are not sued for together, the portion abandoned cannot be separately sued for afterwards but does not enact similar penalty for all rights under the same or similar titles, the right to sue for which may arise under different dates and causes of action, and the defendants as to which different properties may be either only one party or different parties altogether.”

    These are direct authorities in favour of the appellants' contention. The respondent's pleader chiefly relies “upon the unreported decision of this Court in Subbanuavien v. Krishna Royar, where in a case which was substantially the same as the present, it was held by a Division Bench that section 43, Civil Procedure Code, was a bar, the only difference between that case and the present being that in the former the plaintiff in the second suit was not the reversionary heir himself, but a person claiming under him under an alienation made subsequent to the first suit. This, however, is only a circumstantial difference and it must be admitted that decision fully supports him. But the above decision of the Privy Council does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided that case and their decision cannot be reconciled with that of the Privy Council. The respondent's pleader is not able to cite any other case in which under similar circumstances section 43, Civil Procedure Code, was hold to be a bar.

    The decision in Subbannavien v. Krishna Royar purports to be based upon a course of decisions in this Presidency in which it was held that a suit relating to various properties in the possession of different defendants who claimed under different alienation made by a widow or by a Karnavan or the managing member of a Tarwad or a joint Hindu family, is not open to the objection of misjoinder of defendants and of causes of-action, when the plaintiff's ground of title to all the properties included in the suit is the same. With all deference, I venture to state that the course of decisions referred to does not warrant the inference drawn therefrom that the plaintiff is bound to include all the properties alienated and the alienees in one and the same suit, and that if he omits to do so, his subsequent suits are obnoxious to section 43, Civil Procedure Code. A person suing for partition of an estate or for an estate which has devolved upon him by inheritance may so shape his plaint as to base it upon a single cause of action, the various defendants being joined as parties in possession of the estate. Further, under section 28, Civil Procedure Code, relating to the joinder of different persons as defendants, it is open to a plaintiff to join as defendants various persons against whom the right to relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative in respect of the same matter. And judgment may be given against such one or more defendants at may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities. It would be noted that the phrase ‘in respect of the same matter’ occurring in this section, is wider than the phrase in respect of the same cause of action occurring in section 26, Civil Procedure Code, relating to the joinder of different persons as plaintiffs in the same suit. (Raghunnath v. Sarosh). I need hardly add that the expression in section 43., Civil Procedure Code, is ‘cause of action’ and not ‘matter.’ In Ishan Chunder v. Rameswar it was held, following the decision of this Court above referred to, that “In a suit for ejectment against several defendants who set up different titles to various parts of the land claimed, there was only one cause of action” and it was observed that ‘in England in an action in ejectment all the parties in possession are joined.’ Under the English law, the persons to be made defendants in an action in ejectment, i.e, to be named in the writ, are all the persons in possession of the land sought to be recovered; and the persons who have a right to, defend an action of ejectment are not only the persons named in the writ, but also any person who is in possession by himself or his tenant (Rules 112 and 113; pp. 494-98, Dicey's ‘Parties to an action,’ edition of 1870). As to cases in, which different persons are in possession of different portions of the property, the rule laid down in Code on ‘Ejectment’ (page 76) is as follows:— ‘When the tenements claimed and the tenants thereof are numerous, it is frequently advisable to bring two or more distinct ejectments rather than one action against all of them for the whole of the property. The exercise of a sound discretion and judgment on this point may sometimes save much trouble.’ Under the English law and practice, in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff need include in the action only those who are in possession of the land for the recovery of which the action is brought and in cases in which the plaintiff, as heir-at-law, may have, to recover different portions of the inheritance which are in the possession of different persons, be must exercise, a sound discretion and judgment as to whether it would be expedient to bring one action of ejectment against all the defendants or different actions in ejectment against different persons in respect of the tenements in their respective possession.

    Whether the action is based only upon one cause of action or not will depend upon the frame of the plaint in a suit for ejectment and not upon the answers to the suit, which may he set up the different defendants. Even if the plaint is not based upon one and the same cause of action, yet if the relief that is claimed severalty against the different defendants be in respect of the same matter, section 28, Civil Procedure Code, will save it from the objection of multifariousness.

    For the above reasons and following the Full Bench decision of the N.W.P High Court and the decision of the Privy Council I would allow this second appeal and, reversing the decree of the Lower Appellate Court, remand the appeal for disposal on the merits. Costs of this second appeal will be costs in the cause.

    Moore, J.:— I concur.

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    Dampanaboyina Gangi v. Addala Ramaswami
    (Feb 21, 1902)