Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit filed by the Plaintiff seeking enforcement of a right of pre-emption over immoveable property based on both contract and custom. The property originally belonged to the Plaintiff’s paternal uncle, who transferred it to his son-in-law with a covenant that if the transferee or his successor needed to sell the property, they were bound to sell it either to the vendor or to the Plaintiff at a fixed rate. The Plaintiff contended that the third Defendant, the son of the son-in-law, transferred the property to the first two Defendants in breach of this covenant and sought a retransfer at the contract rate. The Defendants contested the claim, arguing that the covenant was void for remoteness and unenforceable under law. The lower courts accepted this defense based on precedent. The Plaintiff appealed against this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the covenant providing a right of pre-emption on the property contravenes the rule against perpetuities and is therefore void for remoteness.
  2. Whether the Plaintiff’s claim based on custom, specifically the Mahomedan law of pre-emption as followed by Hindus in the District of Sylhet, is enforceable given the Plaintiff’s compliance with its requirements.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff asserted a contractual right of pre-emption arising from the covenant in the conveyance, obliging successors to sell the property to him at a fixed price.
  • The Plaintiff challenged the lower courts’ acceptance of the remoteness argument and urged the Court to hold that the covenant did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
  • The Plaintiff also based a claim on custom, contending that the Mahomedan law of pre-emption applied and was followed by Hindus in the relevant district.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Defendants contended that the covenant was void for remoteness, relying on the rule against perpetuities, and thus unenforceable as a matter of law.
  • They relied on precedent, including the decision in Nobin Chandra Soor v. Nabab Ali Sarkar, to support this position.
  • They also argued that the Plaintiff had failed to comply with the stringent requirements of the Mahomedan law of pre-emption, particularly the requirement of immediate assertion of the claim upon receiving information of the sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nobin Chandra Soor v. Nabab Ali Sarkar Established that a covenant for pre-emption unlimited in time is void under the rule against perpetuities. The Court upheld this precedent, applying it to hold the covenant in question void for remoteness.
London and South Western Railway v. Gomm Confirmed that an option to purchase creating an equitable interest is subject to the rule against perpetuities and may be void if it extends beyond the legal limit. The Court relied on this leading English decision to affirm that the covenant created an equitable interest void under the rule against perpetuities.
Tripura Soonderi v. Juggernath Supported the principle that covenants for pre-emption must comply with the rule against perpetuities. Referenced to reinforce the binding nature of the rule against perpetuities in such covenants.
Anath Nath v. Keshab Chandra Discussed and approved the ruling in Nobin Chandra Soor. Used to support the Court’s adherence to the established principle regarding remoteness of pre-emption covenants.
Amjad Hossein v. Kharag Sen Sahu Indicated that a pre-emptor may take a short time to verify information before asserting the claim. The Court distinguished this case due to its special facts and reaffirmed that unreasonable delay defeats a claim under Mahomedan law.
Baijnath v. Ramdhan Established that any unreasonable or unnecessary delay in asserting a pre-emption claim is an election not to pre-empt. Applied to hold that the Plaintiff’s delay defeated the claim based on custom.
Ali Muhammad v. Taj Muhammad Held that even a delay of twelve hours before assertion of the claim is fatal. Supported the Court’s conclusion that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the promptness requirement.
Jadu Singh v. Rajkumar Emphasized the strict compliance and clear proof required under Mahomedan law for pre-emption claims. Reinforced the Court’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet the stringent requirements of the custom.
Chandi Churn Baru v. Sidheswari Debi Supported the doctrine that options and pre-emption rights are subject to the rule against perpetuities. Used to buttress the Court’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s contention regarding remoteness.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the contractual covenant granting the Plaintiff a right of pre-emption, finding that such a right, being an option contingent on a future sale, is subject to the rule against perpetuities. The Court relied heavily on established English and Indian precedents, particularly London and South Western Railway v. Gomm and Nobin Chandra Soor v. Nabab Ali Sarkar, to conclude that the covenant was void for remoteness as it created an equitable interest that could arise beyond the legal temporal limits. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the covenant did not contravene the rule.

Turning to the Plaintiff’s claim based on custom under Mahomedan law, the Court noted that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the strict requirements of immediate assertion upon receiving notice of the sale. Although a precedent allowed a short time for verification, the Court emphasized that any unreasonable delay defeats the claim. The Plaintiff’s delay was held fatal, and the Court found no compliance with the stringent formalities required under the custom.

Consequently, the Court held that the Plaintiff had no enforceable right either on contract or on custom.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL WITH COSTS.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Plaintiff’s suit for enforcement of the right of pre-emption is denied. The covenant is declared void for remoteness under the rule against perpetuities, and the Plaintiff’s claim under custom is rejected due to non-compliance with procedural requirements. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the Court reaffirmed existing principles governing pre-emption rights and the rule against perpetuities.

    Nabin Chandra Sarma v. Rajani Chandra Chakrabarti

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Mookerjee, C.J:— This is an appeal by the Plaintiff in a suit for enforcement of a right of pre-emption with regard to immoveable property. The claim is based on both contract and custom.

    The property in dispute originally belonged to the Plaintiff's paternal uncle who transferred it to his son-in-law. In that conveyance, a clause was inserted in the following terms: “If it became necessary for the transferee or his successor to sell it to any body he or his successor would be bound to sell it either to the vendor or to his nephew (the Plaintiff), or his heirs at the rate of 20 rupees per Kedar.”

    The case for the Plaintiff is that in contravention of this covenant, the third Defendant, who is the son of the son-in-law of his uncle, has transferred the property to the first two Defendants. He accordingly urges that the first two Defendants are bound to retransfer the property to him on receipt of price at the contract rate. No question arises as to whether the first two Defendants were or were not aware of this covenant; for they must be deemed to have notice of the contents of the conveyance which was the root of the title of their vendor.

    The Defendants have resisted the claim on the ground that the covenant is void for remoteness and is not enforceable in law. This argument has been accepted by the Courts below on the authority of the decision in Nobin Chandra Soor v. Nabab Ali Sarkar . On the present appeal, the correctness of that decision has been called in question, and we have been invited to hold that the covenant does not contravene the rule against perpetuities. We are of opinion that this contention is not well founded.

    It is now firmly settled that an option to arise on any intended sale or other particular kind of alienation by the owner, for example, a right of pre-emption or first refusal, is subject to the rule against perpetuities, and to bind the, land or property, must comply with it, unless the right is conferred by statute. It may be entirely void, even where limited to a proper period, if intended merely as a total check on alienation by the owner. The leading decision on the point is the judgment of Sir George Jessel, M.R, in London, and South Western Railway v. Gomm . In that case, the Plaintiff company, in 1865, conveyed land to Powell in fee, and Powell covenanted with the company that he, his heirs, or assigns, would, at any time on receipt of £100, reconvey the land to the company. In 1879, Gomm purchased the land from Powell with notice of the covenant; in 1880 the company demanded a conveyance and, upon Gomm's refusal, brought a bill for specific, performance. Mr. Justice Kay discussed the cases very fully, and declared that he was unable to agree with what had been said in Gilbertson v. Richards and Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright . “In my opinion,” he said, “a present right to an interest in property which may arise at a period beyond the legal limit is void, notwithstanding that the person entitled to it may release it.” The learned Judge, however, thought that the rule against perpetuities was “a branch, not of the law of contract but of property,”, and added that “a contract not creating any estate or interest properly so called in property, at law or equity, is not obnoxious to the rule;” and as the covenant in that case did not run with the land at law, and a purchaser without notice would not be bound by it, he thought it was not within the rule against perpetuities at all, and made a decree for specific performance. Gomm, thereupon, appealed. The Court of Appeal consisting of Sir George Jessel, M.R, Sir James Hannen, and Sir Nathaniel Lindley, L. JJ., reversed the decree. The Court held that the option to purchase gave an equitable interest which was within the Rule against perpetuities, and that judged by that Rule, it was void. The Master of the Rolls said he considered that Mr. Justice Kay was “quite right in the view be takes of the doctrine of remoteness and of the authorities cited before him, not forgetting the case of Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright , which must be treated as overruled”, and that lie had “most correctly and accurately defined the law,” but that he was in error in thinking that the covenant did not create any interest in land. This conclusion was subsequently applied in Trevelyan v. Trevelyan (5), Woodall v. Clifton (6) and Worthing Corporation v. Heather (7).

    The same view has been adopted in this country. One of the earliest decisions is that of Nobin Chandra Soor v. Nabab Ali Sarkar , where it was expressly ruled that a covenant for pre-emption which was unlimited in point of time was void on the ground that it was obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities. This accords with the decision in Tripura Soonderi v. Juggernath . The point was not taken in Haris Paik v. Juhuruddin , where, however, the question arose between the covenantee and a purchaser from the covenantor, as explained ??? the similar case of Kalimuddin v. Reazuddin . The case of Nobin Chandra v. Nabab Ali has been discussed and approved in Anath Nath v. Keshab Chandra (11); Ramasami Pattar v. Chinnan Asari (12) and Kalathu Ayyar v. Ranga Vadhyar (13), though, perhaps, a different note was sounded in Avula v. Marriaboyina (14) and Dahva v. Maharai (15). But we may add that the doctrine favoured in this Court is supported by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Chandi Churn Baru v. Sidheswari Debi .

    Dr. Jadu Nath Kanjilal has not produced a single authority in support of his contention that the covenant in this case is not bad for remoteness. But he has argued that in particular contingencies the covenant might not contravene the rule against perpetuities, and might consequently be upheld. This contention is wholly erroneous. To test whether a covenant violates the rule against perpetuities we must look, not to the particular events which may have actually happened but to all possible contingencies; Dungannon v. Smith , Jee v. Andley (18), Soudaminey v. Jogesh Chander (19) and Bramamayi v. Jogesh Chander (20). In the light of this principle, it is abundantly clear that the covenant in this case is obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities. The claim, in so far as it is based on contract, is consequently untenable.

    The Plaintiff next bases his claim upon custom, as it has been found by the Courts below that the Mahomed an law of preemption is followed by Hindus in the District of Svlhet. But here the Plaintiff finds himself in a situation of inextricable difficulty. It has been held by the Subordinate Judge that the Plaintiff has not complied with, the requirements of the Mahomedan law on the subject. One of these requirements is that the pre-emp-gttor must assert his claim immediately on getting information of the sale. Here the pre-emptor did not immediately, on getting the information, assert his claim. Reference, however, has been made to the decision in Amjad Hossein v. Kharag Sen Sahu , which indicates that the pre-emptor may take a short time in order, to ascertain whether his information is correct. But the facts of that case were of a very special character, and the decision cannot be taken to weaken the principle that any unreasonable or unnecessary delay is to be construed as an election not to pre-empt [Baijnath v. Ramdhan ]. On the other hand, a lapse of twelve hours before the assertion is made has been held to avoid the claim [Ali Muhammad v. Taj Muhammad (23)] and even where the delay was caused by the pre-emp for going to the land, which was the subject of pre-emption, and making the assertion there [Ram Charon v. Nara Bir Mahton (24)] or going to his own house to get the purchase money prior to asserting it [Jarfan Khan v. Jubbur Miah (25)], the delay was considered fatal to the claim. The requirements of the Mahomedan law on the subject are very stringent as appears from two well-known passages, one in Baillie's Digest of Mahomedan Law, 481, and the other in the Hedaya, Book XXXVIII, Chap. II, 550; the formalities must be strictly complied with and there must be clear proof that they have been duly observed [Jadu Singh v. Rajkumar (26)]. On the facts found, it is impossible for us to hold in the present case that the Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of the Mahomedan law on the subject.

    The conclusion follows that the Plaintiff has no enforceable right either on contract or on custom and that the suit has been rightly dismissed.

    The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Fletcher, J.:— I agree.

    J.N.R
    Appeal dismissed with costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Nabin Chandra Sarma v. Rajani Chandra Chakrabarti
    (May 14, 1920)