The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
Henderson, J.:— This is a Rule calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why an order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the Petitioner to pay additional court-fees should not be set aside.
There is no difficulty in discovering the nature of the suit. The basis of the Plaintiff's case is that a compromise decree in a partition suit was obtained fraud. He therefore desired to get rid of it and to have the property properly partitioned by the Court. The plaint was drafted on these lines and the prayer is for a declaration and for partition. The suit accordingly comes within sec. 7, sub-sec. (4)(c) of the Court Fees Act—being a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for. Under that sub-section the Plaintiff is bound to pay ad valorem court-fee according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint.
The Opposite Parties raised an objection that the court-fee paid was not sufficient and this was tried as a preliminary issue. The Opposite Parties adduced no evidence whatever in support of their case that the relief was under-valued. The Subordinate Judge merely took the value of the relief to be the total value of the joint property as it emerged in the original partition suit.
The question whether the Plaintiff has an absolute right to value the relief at any sum he pleases or whether the Court may enquire into the matter and raise the valuation was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of The Nwayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society, Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Mafijvadin Ahmad (1). The conclusion reached was that the Court has such power. Until, however, reasonable standards for such valuation are laid down by appropriate rules framed under sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, it would not be possible for the Court to exercise this power except in certain defined cases.
It seems to me difficult to say that the value of the relief setting aside this decree can possibly be the total value of the joint property. There is really no objective standard of valuation at all and it is almost impossible to say with any show of reason that the relief sought is worth any particular sum of money. As rules have not yet been made under sec. 9 of the Suit Valuation Act, it is impossible to say that the relief has been under-valued by the Plaintiff.
We accordingly make the Rule absolute and set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge calling upon the Plaintiff to pay additional court-fees.
The Opposite Party will pay the costs of this Rule to the Petitioner. We assess the hearing-fee, at five gold mohurs.
Khundkar, J.:— I agree.
P.C