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  • section 352 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of section 370, clause (f)
  • section 370, clause (f) of the Code
  • section 352, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 364, sob-section (3).
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 352 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of section 370, clause (f)
  • section 370, clause (f) of the Code
  • section 352, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 364, sob-section (3).
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This application challenged the conviction of an accused person on the ground that, after the prosecution witnesses were examined, the accused was not questioned as required by Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr PC). The offence charged was punishable under section 352 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the trial was a summons-case conducted by the Second Presidency Magistrate. The Crown (Government pleader) argued that certain words in provisions dealing with summons-cases and Presidency Magistrates (notably “if he thinks fit” in section 245 and “if any” in section 370(f) of the Code) limited the obligation to question the accused under section 342. The court called for a report from the learned Magistrate; on review of that report and the record the court accepted as a fact that the accused was not questioned under section 342. The court then considered whether the questioning mandated by section 342 was obligatory in such a case and, if so, what effect the omission had on the conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Presidency Magistrate trying an offence triable as a summons-case (here, an offence punishable under section 352 IPC) is bound to question the accused in the manner prescribed by Section 342 Cr PC before convicting.
  2. Whether the phrases “if he thinks fit” in section 245 and “if any” in section 370(f) (and similar wording in other sections) limit or control the mandatory requirement of section 342.
  3. If it was obligatory to question the accused under section 342 in the present case, what is the legal effect of the omission on the conviction and sentence?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • After the prosecution witnesses were examined, the accused was not asked to explain the evidence against him as required by Section 342 Cr PC.

Crown / Government Pleader's Arguments

  • The words of section 342 are controlled or limited by language appearing elsewhere in the Code applicable to summons-cases and Presidency Magistrates — specifically the words “if the Magistrate thinks fit” in section 245 and “if any” in section 370(f) — and therefore the Magistrate was not bound to question the accused as required by section 342 in the trial of a summons-case before convicting.
  • Practice and considerations of convenience among Presidency Magistrates were also advanced in support of the view that section 342 need not be strictly applied in all such cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Savalya Demonstrates that section 342 applies to trials before a Court of Session despite the words “if any” appearing in section 289 Cr PC. The court relied on this authority to show that the presence of words like “if any” in other sections does not negate the mandatory effect of section 342.
Emperor v. Raju Ahilaji Same proposition as above: section 342 applies notwithstanding the words “if any” in section 289; cited as authority that section 342 applies in Sessions trials. Used to support the conclusion that similar words in sections governing Presidency Magistrates cannot be read as displacing the obligation under section 342.
Basapa Ningapa … Accused v. Emperor … Listed alongside the above authorities as supporting the view that section 342 is not negated by “if any” in related provisions. Cited to reinforce the court’s reading that section 342 remains obligatory in trials despite qualifying words in other sections.
Emperor v. Harischandra Holds that a Presidency Magistrate cannot convict an accused of an offence triable as a warrant-case without recording the accused’s examination under section 342. The court cited this precedent as indicative that Presidency Magistrates are not exempt from the obligation in section 342 in warrant cases and by analogy supported application in summons-cases.
Raghu Bhumji v. Emperor (Patna High Court) Contains obiter remarks (by Sultan Ahmed, J.) indicating an inclination to hold that section 342 might not apply to summons-cases; the point in that case related to Sessions trials and the remarks are described as obiter. The court noted this decision but treated the remarks as obiter and not persuasive enough to override the statutory reading that section 342 applies to summons-cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court followed a structured approach:

  1. Fact-finding: the court requested and received a report from the learned Magistrate and accepted, on review of the report and the record, that the accused had not been questioned after the prosecution witnesses were examined in accordance with section 342.
  2. Statutory text and general principle: the court examined the plain language of section 342, emphasising the mandatory phrasing — that the court “shall… question [the accused] generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence” — and noted that the provision lies in the chapter of the Code containing general provisions as to inquiries and trials.
  3. Interaction with provisions for summons-cases: the court analysed sections in the chapter governing summons-cases (notably sections 242, 244 and 245). It found that:
    • Section 242 requires questioning at the beginning on particulars and dispenses with a formal charge.
    • Section 244 obliges the Magistrate to hear the accused and take evidence in his defence after the prosecution evidence is recorded, which the court considered consistent with, not contradictory to, section 342.
    • Section 245 contains the phrase “if he thinks fit,” but the court read those words in context as referring to further examination of the accused which the Magistrate might order of his own motion, rather than as a general limitation on the mandatory requirement of section 342.
  4. Argument from qualifying language elsewhere: the court rejected the Crown’s contention that qualifying phrases such as “if he thinks fit” in section 245 or “if any” in section 370(f) effectively curtail the operation of section 342. The court reasoned that those phrases were narrower in scope — referring to particular procedural contingencies — and that a general provision in Chapter XXIV should not be read down except on clear words showing an intention to do so.
  5. Precedent and consistency: the court relied on existing decisions (for example Emperor v. Savalya and Emperor v. Raju Ahilaji) to illustrate that similar qualifying words in other sections had not been held sufficient to negate section 342 in sessions or warrant trials, and it declined to treat the obiter remarks in Raghu Bhumji as controlling.
  6. Recording and Presidency Magistrates specifics: the court distinguished the separate question of the manner of recording an accused’s examination (reference to sections 362 and 364) from the question whether the accused must be questioned at all. It noted that section 362 makes specific provision for how evidence is recorded by Presidency Magistrates, and section 364(3) bears on recording but does not negate the obligation to question the accused under section 342.
  7. Remedial consequence: having concluded that the omission to examine the accused under section 342 could not be condoned, the court considered the appropriate remedy. While the omission vitiated the proceedings, the court exercised discretion not to order a retrial because of the trivial nature of the offence and the particular circumstances — instead setting aside the conviction and sentence and ordering refund of any fine paid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that Section 342 Cr PC applies to Presidency Magistrates and to the trial of summons-cases; therefore, a Presidency Magistrate trying an offence triable as a summons-case is bound to question the accused as required by Section 342 before convicting. The omission to comply with section 342 in the present case rendered the conviction and sentence legally defective.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The conviction and sentence in the present case were set aside.
  • The fine, if paid, was directed to be refunded to the accused.
  • The court declined to order a retrial in this matter on the ground that, given the trivial nature of the offence and the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by a retrial.

Broader legal implications:

  • The decision clarifies that general mandatory provisions in Chapter XXIV (specifically section 342) are applicable to Presidency Magistrates and to summons-cases unless the statute contains clear words excluding or limiting that applicability.
  • The presence of qualifying phrases in provisions specific to summons-cases or to the form of recording (such as “if he thinks fit” in section 245 and “if any” in section 370(f)) was held insufficient, in the court’s view, to override the mandatory duty created by section 342.
  • The omission to comply with section 342 vitiates a conviction; however, the court retains discretion in an individual case (considering nature of offence and circumstances) whether to order a retrial or simply to set aside conviction and refund fines as appropriate.

    G.S. Fernandez v. Emperor

    Shah, J.:— In this application it has been urged on behalf of the applicant that after the witnesses for the prosecution were examined, the accused was not asked to explain the evidence against him as, required by Section 342 of the Cr PC. The offence charged was punishable under section 352, Indian Penal Code, and the procedure applicable to the case was that provided for the trial of summons-cases. The trial was held by the Second Presidency Magistrate. On behalf of the Crown it is urged that the words of section 342 are controlled by the words. “If the Magistrate think fit” used in section 245 and “it any” in section 370, clause (f) of the Code and that the Magistrate was not bound to question the accused as required by section 342 in the trial of a summons-case before convicting the accused.

    2. We called for a report from the learned Magistrate as to whether the accused was in fact questioned at the close of the prosecution case under section 342. We have received a report on that point and the learned Magistrate has also submitted a supplementary report as to the practice followed in such cases by the Presidency Magistrates and as to the grounds upon which the practice is based. In view of the report and the record of the case it may be taken as a fact that the accused was not asked any question after the prosecution witnesses were examined as required by section 342 of the code. We have, therefore, to consider whether it was obligatory upon the trial Magistrate in this case to question the accused generally and if so what is the effect of the omission upon the present case.

    3. These questions most be considered with reference to the provisions of the Code, and it is clear that we cannot allow considerations of convenience and practice to control the plain meaning of the words used in a Statute. If the interpretation involves any inconvenience or departure from any practice which may be found to be suited to any class, it would be for the Legislature to consider the matter. The words of section 342 are clear. The material words are these; “For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him the Court…..shall… question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before be is called on for his defence.” The section occurs in the Chapter relating to general provisions as to inquiries and trials: and there can be no doubt and it is not disputed that it applies to the Presidency Magistrates as much as to other Courts. The purpose of the provision is clear and a general provision of this character applicable to all Courts, and to all inquiries and trials under the Code ought to be given effect to unless there are clear words to render it inapplicable to any particular case or class of cases. The provisions mainly relied upon by the Government pleader as limiting the operation of these words are to be found in the Chapter relating to the trial of summons-cases. It is urged that the provisions of that Chapter leave it to the discretion of the Magistrate to question the accused after the witnesses for the prosecution are examined. Sections 242 and 245 are relied upon as having that effect. It seems to me that when the provisions are examined carefully, they do not involve any such limitation. Section 242 requires that the accused shall be questioned at the beginning on the particulars of the offence, of which he is accused and that it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge. Section 244 provides that if the accused does not admit that he has committed the offence, the Magistrate shall proceed to bear the complainant (if any) and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take such evidence he produces in his defence. Section 245 provides that upon taking the evidence referred to in section 244, and such farther evidence (if any) as the Magistrate may of his own motion cause to be produced and (if he thinks fit) examining the accused, the Magistrate may acquit or convict the accused. It is clear that Section 244 requires the Magistrate to hear the accused and to record the evidence which he adduces in his defence after the prosecution evidence is recorded. This is quite consistent with the provisions of section 342, and does not suggest any inference against the application of the provisions of section 342 to the trial of summons-cases. Section 245 contains the words “if he thinks fit”; but having due regard to the context, it appears to the that the words are used with reference to the farther examination of the accused, which may become necessary or desirable in virtue of the evidence which the Court may call of its own motion.

    4. When we have a general provision as to the necessity of questioning an accused person to enable him to explain the evidence against him after the witnesses for the prosecution are examined, the other provisions in the Code should be read as far as possible so as to avoid as inconsistency. A particular provision may control or limit a general provision but the intention to limits the operation of the general provision must be clear. The words “if he thinks fit” do not, in my opinion, control or modify the provisions of section 342 but are capable of being read—and should be read—as serving a sufficient purpose, consistently with the provisions of section 342. The suggestion made by Mr. Binning that the words “if he thinks fit” are used in section 245, as it may not be necessary for the Magistrate to examine the accused if he is to be acquitted may afford a farther explanation of the use of the words without indicating any limitation upon the provisions of section 342. On a consideration of the provisions of this Chapter, I am unable to hold that the Magistrates are relieved in the trial of summons-cases from the obligation of questioning the accused generally under section 342 to enable him to explain the evidence against him after the witnesses for the prosecution are examined.

    5. The provisions of section 370, clause (f) do not suggest any inference to the contrary. The words “if any” do not in any sensa control the words of section 342. It has been held by this Court, and it is conceded in the argument, that in spite of these words it is obligatory upon the Presidency Magistrate to examine an accused person under section 342 in the trial of warrant-cases. The words “if any” are used in section 289 of the Code; and in spite of these words the relaxation of the rule contained in section 342 is not allowed in the trials by Sessions Courts: see Emperor v. Savalya (1); Emperor v. Raju Ahilaji (2); and Basapa Ningapa…Accused v. Emperor…. (3). The purpose of section 370 is to state the particulars to be recorded by the Presidency Magistrate instead of a judgment as provided in section 367 and not to lay down whether an accused person shall be questioned or not is a particular case or class of cases. I do not think that the words “if any” used in clause (f) of that section can be properly used as modifying the provisions of section 342 as regards the Presidency Magistrates. If that construction were adopted section 342 could be rendered nugatory even in the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates and trials by Sessions Courts as the same words are used in sections 253 and 289 of the Code. It seems to me that the weakness of the argument urged on behalf of the Crown is indicated by the circumstance that without a labored attempt to control or limit the plain meaning of the words of a section applicable to all trials and inquiries by reference to provisions in different chapters relating to different purposes, the result contended for by the prosecution cannot be reached I should say that if the Legislature intended to limit the application of section 342 in the sense suggested by the Crown there would have been clear words to that effect in the section itself. In the Chapter relating to general provisions as to inquiries and trials there are some sections of limited application and the words indicating the limitations are to be found in such sections.

    6. I may mention that I have referred to the different provisions relating to the examination of the accused in the earlier Codes of 1861, 1872 and 1682, and in the presidency magistrates act (iv of 1877). The scheme of the existing provisions as to the examination of the accused was adopted in the Code of 1882. I do not think that it will serve any useful purpose to examine them in detail: it is sufficient to say that I have not been able to find any indication therein to favour the contrary view. I am, therefore, satisfied that the accused should have been examined in this case as required by section 342.

    7. The question relating to the manner in which such examination is to be recorded under section 364 stands on a different footing. On that point I do not find any special provision regarding the Presidency Magistrates except that contained in section 364, sob-section (3). As regards the recording of evidence, section 362 makes a special and specific provision for the Presidency Magistrates. It is not without significance that in section 364 which is to be found in the same Chapter, no similar differentiation is made as regards the manner of recording the examination of an accused person by the Presidency Magistrates. In the present case, however, the point is not whether the examination of the accused was properly recorded or not but whether the accused was questioned at all after the witnesses for the prosecution were examined.

    8. The omission to examine the accused as required by section 342 cannot be condoned Having regard to the nature of the offence and the facts of the case, I do not think that it is necessary in the interest of justice to order a re-trial. I would, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence and direst the fine, it paid, to be refunded.

    Crump, J.:— The question which arises for decision at the outset in this case is whether a Presidency Magistrate trying an accused person for an offence punishable under section 352 of the Indian Penal Code is bound, before convicting, to examine the accused person in the manner prescribed by Section 342 of the Cr PC.

    9. The procedure to be followed by Presidency Magistrates differs from the procedure to be followed by other Magistrates only in those particulars which are specifically laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in this respect the relevant sections are sections 362 and 370 which presort be the manner in which the evidence and the judgment respectively shall be recorded. These two sections form exceptions ta the provisions of Chapters XXV and XXVI which deal with the mode of recording evidence in inquiries and trials, and with the judgment. Prima facie nothing in these Chapters has any bearing on section 342 which belongs to Chapter XXIV which contains general provisions as to inquiries and trials. The words of section 370(f) “the plea of the accused and his examination (if any)” do not in reality affect the present question for it cannot be doubted that there are cases other than those in which an accused person is convicted where it is unnecessary to record his examination under section 342. If for instance there is an acquittal under section 247 or 248 or a discharge under section 253 there may be no occasion for the examination prescribed by section 342. That this is so is plain if it is remembered that the examination of the accused under that section is obligatory only for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in evidence against him. If there is nothing to explain there is no necessity for the examination. Cessante legit rations cessatet ipsa lex.

    10. There is, therefore, nothing in the special procedure provided for Courts of Presidency Magistrates which for the purposes of the present question needs to be taken into account. With the exception of the two particulars noted in the preceding paragraph the procedure for the trial of summons-cases and warrant cases is applicable in those Courts. The present case was a summons-case, and the question may, therefore, be generally stated thus: “Is a Magistrate before convicting an accused person of an offence triable as a summons-case bound to examine him as required by S. 342?”

    11. The mandatory portion of S. 342 may be set out as follows:—“For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him the Court…shall…question him generally on the case attar the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.” This is one of the general provisions as to inquiries and trials as stated in the title of Chapter XXIV of which it forms part. It his been held by this Court that it applies to trials before a Court of Session in spite of the word “if any” in S. 289: Emperor v. Raju Ahilaji and Emperor v. Savalya . It has also been held by this Court that a Presidency Magistrate cannot convict an accused of an offence triable as a warrant erase without recording his examination under this section: Emperor v. Harischandra (4). So far as I am aware the point has not hitherto been decided with reference to summons-cases.

    12. Prima facie S. 342 is of general application and is based on the salutary principle that an accused person should have an opportunity of furnishing an explanation before he is convicted. The Legislature has not specifically excepted cases triable under Chapter XX (summons-cases) from its operation, and the general principle on which it is based applies to those cases as strongly as to any other cases. But it has been urged that the language used in that Chapter excludes the applicability of S. 342. Reliance is placed on the words “(if he thinks fit),” In S. 245(1). It has been held, as I have already stated, that similar words in S. 289 do not have the effect contended fer. It is significant that these words occur in para (1) of the section which deals with acquittals. We are not now concerned with cases of acquittals. As I have already pointed out there may be cases in which the Court finds nothing for the accused to explain, and in such cases it may have a discretion act to examine the accused. But I am unable to infer from these words that where the Court finds that damnatory circumstances appear is the evidence against the accused, there is any discretion in the matter. It is to be remarked that S. 244(1) makes it obligatory on the Magistrate to “hear the accused after the evidence for the prosecution is recorded” and I find it difficult to hold that had the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of S. 342 they would not have done so in plain terms. The scope of S. 342 has been the subject of discussion in a recent case before the Patna High Court: Raghu Bhumji v. Emperor (5). The point there was as regards Sessions trials, but it appears that Sultan Ahmed, J., was inclined to hold that S. 342 did not apply to the trial of summons-cases. The remarks upon this point are of course obiter. The distinction suggested, however, is that the words “before he is called on for his defence” occurring in S. 342 are found in S. 256 which deals with warrant cases, and in S. 289 which deals with Sessions trials, but do not appear in Chapter XX which prescribes the procedure for the trial of summons-cases. With all deference I am constrained to say that the argument depends upon matters of form rather than of substance. To call upon an accused person to enter upon his defence is a necessary incident of every trial. Though that precise form of words is not used, the thing itself is indicated with sufficient dearness in S. 244. A Magistrate trying a summons-case must necessarily under that section ask the accused what he has to say, and it he wishes to examine any witnesses, and when a Magistrate does this he does is substance call upon the accused to enter upon his defense.

    13. Attar giving the matter ray best consideration I find no substantial reason to doubt that S. 342 is applicable to the trial of summons-cases to the extent which I have endeavoured to indicate. The omission to comply with the section must necessarily attract the same consequence in these as in other trials, and it follows, I think, that the illegality vitiates the proceedings. It is not necessary to pronounce upon the merits, but in view of the trivial nature of the offence, and the circumstances as a whale no useful purpose would be served by a re-trial. I would set aside the conviction and sentence and direct the fine, it paid, to be refunded.

    14. Conviction and sentence set aside.

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    Comments

    G.S. Fernandez v. Emperor
    (Aug 24, 1920)