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  • Code of 1882 by Act V of 1894.
  • Public Demands Recovery Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Code of 1882 by Act V of 1894.
  • Public Demands Recovery Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges an order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing an application to set aside an execution sale under r. 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The disputed property was a house formerly belonging to Naunidh Koer. The petitioner alleges that she purchased the house at a sale in execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act on 5 November 1907. Subsequently, on 21 September 1910, the house was sold in execution of a money-decree in favour of Bansidhari Singh and was purchased by that decree-holder. The Court was closed from 2 October to 3 November 1910. On 4 November 1910 an officer of the petitioner presented an application under r. 89 for reversal of the sale together with the required deposit; however, the sheristadar refused to accept the money that afternoon, noting lack of authority. The application and deposit were presented and registered the following day. The decree-holder (auction-purchaser) objected to the petition on three grounds: (1) the application was presented beyond the time prescribed by law; (2) the deposit was conditional and therefore invalid; and (3) the petitioner lacked locus standi because her alleged title predated the sale so far that it could not be affected by the execution sale. The Subordinate Judge held the first two objections valid but overruled the third, and dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed to the present Court, which affirmed the Subordinate Judge's order but for different reasons.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application for reversal of the execution sale under r. 89, Order XXI, C.P.C. was presented within the time required by law, given the Court's closure and the sheristadar's refusal to accept the deposit on the first day it was presented.
  2. Whether the deposit made to support the application was unconditional and therefore valid under r. 89, Order XXI (i.e., whether a condition in the petition that the money be retained until disposal of another suit rendered the deposit invalid).
  3. Whether the petitioner had locus standi under r. 89 to apply for setting aside the sale when, by her own case, she had acquired title to the property on 5 November 1907—before the later execution sale of 21 September 1910—and therefore was not affected by that sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Case

  • The petitioner asserted that she purchased the house at a certificate sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act on 5 November 1907 and therefore claimed title prior to the subsequent execution sale.
  • The petitioner (through an officer) presented an application under r. 89 for reversal of the 21 September 1910 sale and sought to deposit the necessary sum; when prevented from depositing on the afternoon of 4 November due to the sheristadar's refusal, the petition was presented and the deposit made on 5 November.
  • Implicitly, the petitioner relied on the contention that the delay (presentation and deposit on the next day) was caused by the Court's action and should not prejudice her, and that the deposit (once any condition was withdrawn) was sufficient for reversal.

Decree-Holder / Auction-Purchaser's Objections

  • First objection: The application was presented beyond the time prescribed by law and therefore was of no avail to the petitioner.
  • Second objection: The deposit accompanying the application was not unconditional (a statement had been included that the money was not to be paid out until disposal of another suit), and hence was not a valid deposit within the meaning of r. 89.
  • Third objection: The petitioner had no locus standi to make the application because her alleged interest in the property predated the sale so long before the execution proceedings that it could not be affected by those proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahomed Akhar Zaman Khan v. Sukhdeo Pande Principle that a party should not be prejudiced when failure to comply with a time provision is caused by an act of the Court. Applied to hold the petitioner's failure to deposit on the first day was attributable to the Court (presiding officer absent / sheristadar refused) and therefore the presentation/deposit on the next day sufficed.
Shakoti v. Jotindra Mohan Authority for the proposition that a deposit under r. 89 must be unconditional to be valid. Referred to in recognizing the general rule that deposits must be unconditional; the Court nevertheless found the deposit ultimately became unconditional when the petitioner withdrew the condition and the decree-holder suffered no prejudice.
Hanuman Singh v. Lachmon Sahu Holds that a deposit unconditional when made is not invalidated by a subsequent, unauthorised attempt to annex a condition. Distinguished: the Court noted Hanuman Singh was not opposed to the rule requiring unconditional deposits and observed the present deposit became effectively unconditional before any withdrawal by the decree-holder.
Hazari Ram … v. Badai Ram … (Decree-Holder—Auction-Purchaser— v. Badai Ram…Judgment-Debtor) One of the authorities cited in the discussion of divergent High Court opinions on whether a person acquiring interest after a sale can apply under sec. 310A / r. 89. Cited as part of the legislative-history analysis showing prior judicial divergence on post-sale acquisitions and locus standi under the earlier provision.
Appaya v. Kunhati Example of divergent High Court opinions on whether persons acquiring interest after sale can be beneficiaries of the provision. Used as an example in explaining historical judicial divergence relevant to r. 89's drafting and scope.
Manickka v. Rajagopala Another cited decision illustrating divergent views on post-sale acquisitions and entitlement to apply under the earlier section. Referred to in the survey of case law demonstrating conflicting interpretations remedied by legislative re-wording.
Ram Chandra v. Rakhmabai Cited among authorities concerning the interpretation of the successor provision (r. 89 / sec. 310A) and related principles. Not specifically elaborated upon; included in the list of cases addressing related interpretive questions.
Mulchand v. Govind Cited among decisions on the scope of the earlier section and interests affected by sale. Referred to as part of the catalogue of decisions showing differing approaches to the section's scope.
Erode v. Pulhiedeth Cited as another authority in the historical survey of case law on the question of who may apply under the earlier statutory provision. Used in the discussion of legislative history and judicial divergence; not separately analyzed in detail.
Kunja v. Bhupendra Cited with similar purpose—to illustrate past disagreements among High Courts on the effect of post-sale transactions on standing. Included in the survey to justify a purposive, reasonable construction of r. 89 in the present case.
Nityananda Patra v. Hira Lal Karmakar Referenced in relation to the question whether the applicant under the earlier section must be full owner or whether an interest suffices. Cited as part of the history showing conflicting judicial views; noted as overruled by a Full Bench in the subsequent case.
Paresh Nath v. Nabogopal Full Bench decision overruling Nityananda Patra on the question whether full ownership was required. Referred to as settling part of the earlier divergence; used in the explanatory legislative-history narrative.
Mallikarjunadn v. Lingamurti Cited in the context of cases dealing with whether an interest rather than full ownership is sufficient. Listed among authorities illustrating the legal controversy resolved by legislative amendment and subsequent interpretation.
??? v. Morgan Source of a canonical maxim of statutory construction quoted in the opinion (name obscured in text). The maxim was invoked to support a purposive and reasonable interpretation of r. 89 rather than a literal one that would yield absurd results.
Cox v. Hakes Authority cited for approving the quoted canon of construction (as cited by Lord Halsbury, L.C.). Used to reinforce the point that statutes should be interpreted in light of legislative intent and reason.
Narendta Nath v. Nagendra Nath Cited as this Court's previous exposition of the cited canon of statutory construction. Relied upon to justify reading r. 89 in a reasonable, purposive manner rather than strictly literal terms.
Iswari Prosad v. Chatrapat Used as an example where legislative history was legitimately considered in statutory interpretation. Cited to justify looking at the history of the legislation to determine the intended scope of r. 89.
Brown v. McLachlan Also cited for the proposition that legislative history may be used to interpret statutes. Referred to in support of taking historical context into account when construing r. 89.
Mahamed Ahamndulla Khan v. Ahamed Said Khan Authority supporting the Court's view of the correct construction of r. 89 (as taken by Stanley, C.J., and Banerjee, J.). The opinion observed that the present Court's interpretation aligns with this decision; used to support the exclusion of persons not affected by the sale.
Asmutunnissa v. Ashruff Ali Decision cited as overruling a contrary view and supporting the Court's construction; specifically overruled Mr Justice Field's contrary view in Panye Chunder. Referenced to show judicial support for the narrower construction adopted by the Court in the present case.
Panye Chunder v. Hur Chunder Referenced as representing a contrary view on the interpretation of the rule, which was subsequently disapproved. Cited to indicate that an earlier contrary interpretation has been reconsidered and that the Court follows the overruling authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, addressing each of the three objections relied on by the decree-holder/auction-purchaser.

  1. Time of presentation: The Court found no substance in the first objection. The petitioner's initial inability to deposit the money on the day the Court re-opened (4 November) was caused by a Court officer's unexplained early departure and the sheristadar's refusal to accept the money for want of authority. Relying on the principle in Mahomed Akhar Zaman Khan v. Sukhdeo Pande, the Court held the petitioner could not be prejudiced by an act of the Court; therefore presenting and depositing the money on the following day complied with the statutory requirement.
  2. Validity of deposit (conditionality): The Court acknowledged the general rule (citing Shakoti v. Jotindra Mohan) that a deposit under r. 89 must be unconditional. The petition accompanying the deposit had prayed that the money be kept in Court until disposal of another suit, which prima facie introduced a condition. The Court noted Hanuman Singh v. Lachmon Sahu which holds that a deposit unconditional when made is not invalidated by a subsequent unauthorised attempt to attach a condition. More importantly for the present facts, the Court observed that the deposit had been accepted by the Court without question and, upon objection by the decree-holder, the petitioner withdrew the condition so that the money was available for payment to the decree-holder before he attempted to withdraw it. Because the decree-holder suffered no prejudice and the condition was withdrawn before any action by him, the Court concluded there was substantially a valid deposit within the statutory time sufficient for reversal.
  3. Locus standi of the petitioner: The Court disagreed with the Subordinate Judge on this point and held that the third objection should have been sustained. The petitioner's own case was that she had acquired title on 5 November 1907—well before the execution sale of 21 September 1910—so that Naunidh Koer had no subsisting interest at the time of the later sale and therefore the petitioner's interest could not have been affected by that sale. The Court examined the language and legislative history of r. 89 (which reproduces sec. 310A inserted by Act V of 1894) and the amendments meant to resolve previous judicial divergences. The Court invoked the canon of statutory construction (as quoted from the unidentified Morgan case and cited in Cox v. Hakes and Narendta Nath v. Nagendra Nath) to interpret the rule purposively: it would be unreasonable to construe r. 89 as allowing any person to apply for reversal even if obviously not affected by the sale. The Court relied on legislative history and prior authorities (including Mahamed Ahamndulla Khan v. Ahamed Said Khan and related cases) to conclude that the petitioner's title, being antecedent and unaffected by the sale, deprived her of locus standi to seek reversal under r. 89.

As a result of the foregoing analysis, although the Court disagreed with the Subordinate Judge's reasoning on the first two points (time and conditionality), it agreed with the ultimate outcome for a different reason: the petitioner lacked standing to make the application.

Holding and Implications

Rule discharged.

Holding (core ruling): The Court affirmed the Subordinate Judge's order dismissing the application to set aside the execution sale, but on the ground that the petitioner lacked locus standi to apply under r. 89 because her title predated the sale and she was not affected by it.

Consequences for the parties: The petition to reverse the sale was dismissed; the petitioner's application under r. 89 was held incompetent for want of standing. The Court further ordered that there would be no order as to costs in this Court.

Broader implications: The opinion interprets r. 89 purposively and emphasizes that the rule does not extend to persons who are not affected by the execution sale. The Court referenced legislative history and prior authorities in support of a reasonable construction, but it expressly stated that it need not determine the precise limits of r. 89 for all cases. The opinion does not announce or state the creation of a novel legal precedent beyond its holdings in this case.

Rule discharged.

    Dulhin Mathura Das Koer Objector, v. Bansidhar Singh And Anr. Judgment-Debtors, Opposite Party.

    We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order, by which the Court below has dismissed an application for reversal of an execution sale under r. 89 of Or. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. The circumstances under which the order in question has been made have not been disputed before this Court. The property in dispute is a house which admittedly belonged to one Naunidh Koer. The case for the Petitioner is that on the 5th November, 1907 she purchased the house at a sale in execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act issued against Naunidh Koer for recovery of arrears of road-cess. On the 21st September, 1910, in execution of a money-decree held by one Bansidhari Singh against Naunidh Koer, the house was brought to sale and purchased by the decree-holder. The Court was closed from the 2nd October till the 3rd November, 1910. On the 4th November, when the Court re-opened, one of the officers of the Petitioner took to the Court an application for reversal of the sale under r. 89 of Or. XXI of the Code of 1908. The presiding officer, it appears, had for some unexplained reason left the Court earlier than usual; and when the application was presented to the sheristadar, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he made a note upon it to the effect that it had been so presented, but refused to accept the money on the ground that he had no authority to receive it. On the next day, the petition was presented again and registered, and the money was also deposited.

    The decree-holder auction-purchaser objected to the reversal of the sale on three grounds, namely, first, that the application had been presented beyond the time prescribed by the law, and was consequently of no avail to the Petitioner; secondly, that the deposit was not unconditional, and was consequently not a valid deposit within the meaning of the Rule, and, thirdly, that the Petitioner had no focus standi to make the application, because, upon her own allegation, her interest, if any, had accused not only before the sale but so long before the execution proceedings commenced that it could not be affected thereby. The Subordinate Judge held that the first two objections taken by the decree-holder auction-purchaser were well-founded, but that the third could not be sustained. In this view, he dismissed the application for reversal of the sale. The Petitioner has now applied to this Court, and invited us to consider the legality of the order made by the Subordinate Judge. In our opinion the order must he affirmed but not on the grounds stated by the Subordinate Judge.

    In so far as the first objection taken by the decree-holder auction-purchaser is concerned, we are of opinion that there is no substance in it. Upon the facts stated, it is clear that the failure of the Petitioner to make the application accompanied by the deposit on the day the Court reopened was due to an act of the Court itself. Consequently, upon the principle explained in the case of Mahomed Akhar Zaman Khan v. Sukhdeo Pande(1), the position of the Petitioner could not be prejudiced in any manner. She had done her best to comply with the requirements of the statute, and the difficulty which has arisen was occasioned, because the presiding officer had left the Court earlier than usual. Under such circumstances, the fresh presentation of the application and the deposit of the money on the day following would be sufficient compliance with the provisions of the law.

    In so far as the second objection urged by the decree-holder auction-purchaser is concerned, it is in our opinion equally unsubstantial. It appears that the petition which accompanied the deposit contained a statement that the money was not to be paid out to the decree-holder auction-purchaser till the disposal of a suit which had been commenced by the Petitioner in another Court. Now, it is perfectly true that a deposit under r. 89 of Or. XXI, in order that it may be a valid deposit, must be unconditional, because the deposit is to be made for payment to the purchaser and the decree-holder. When, therefore, a deposit is made with a condition that the sum may not be drawn out at once but may be retained in Court until a certain event has happened, it is not a good deposit within the meaning of the Rule [see Shakoti v. Jotindra Mohan(2)]. The case of Hanuman Singh v. Lachmon Sahu(3) is not opposed to this view. There the deposit when made was unconditional, and it was only subsequently that an infructuous attempt was made by the Petitioner to fasten a condition thereupon. The Court held that the deposit, if good when made, cannot be invalidated by a subsequent act on the part of the Petitioner not authorised by law. On this principle, it may well be contended that the deposit in this case ought not to be treated as vaild, because a condition was annexerd thereto. It appears, however, that the deposit was accepted by the Court without any question and as soon as objection was taken by the decree-holder, the Petitioner withdrew the condition, so that the money became available for payment to the decree-holder before he had made any attempt to withdraw the money from Court. Under such circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that the deposit was invalid and not sufficient for reversal of the sale. The position might have been different if, upon objection taken by the decree-holder, the Petitioner had persisted in her effort to annex a condition to the deposit. The decree-holder was not prejudiced in any manner by the insertion of the prayer in the application of the Petitioner that the money should be retained in Court, and he was substantially in the same position in the end as if such prayer had never been made. We must consequently hold that there was substantially a valid deposit within the time limited by law, sufficient for reversal of the sale.

    In so far, however, as the third objection taken by the decree-holder auction-purchaser is concerned, it was in Our opinion erroneously overruled by the Subordinate Judge. As already stated, the case for the Petitioner is that so far back as the 5th November, 1907 she had acquired, by purchase at the certificate sale, a good title to the property in question, in other words, that at the time when the property was sold on the 21st September, 1910 as the property of Naunidh Koer, the latter had no subsisting interest therein. It is manifest, therefore, that the Petitioner has not been in any manner affected by the sale. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether she is entitled to make an application for reversal of the sale under r. 89 of Or. XXI. That Rule—we quote only so much of it as is relevant to our present purpose—provides as follows: “Where immoveable property has been sold in execution of a decree, any person either owning such property or holding an interest therein by virtue of a title acquired before such sale, may apply to have the sale set aside” on certain prescribed conditions. It may seem, at first sight, that the language of this Rule is comprehensive enough to Include a person in the position of the Petitioner, It may be contended that here immoveable properly has been sold in execution of a decree. The Petitioner is the person who owns such property by virtue of a title acquired long before the sale: she is consequently competent to apply to have the sale set aside. In our opinion, this construction, though it may be justified by the language of the Code, is not the right construction of the rule in question. R. 89 reproduces sec. 310A, which was inserted in the Code of 1882 by Act V of 1894. That section provided that any person whose immoveable property has been sold under Ch. XIX of the Code of 1882 may, at any time within 30 days from the date of sale, apply to have the sale set aside Upon the construction of this section, it is well known, two questions arose upon which there was some divergence of judicial opinion. The first point which arose for consideration was whether a person who had acquired an interest in the property after the sale sought to be set aside had taken place was competent to avail himself of the benefit of the section: the question arose, for instance, whether a person to whom the judgment-debtor sold or mortgaged the property after the sale in execution was entitled to apply under the section. Upon this point, as we have already stated, the different High Courts were not agreed [see Hazari Ram…Decree-Holder—Auction-Purchaser— v. Badai Ram…Judgment-Debtor;(4), Appaya v. Kunhati(5) and Manickka v. Rajagopala(6), see also Ram Chandra v. Rakhmabai(7), Mulchand v. Govind(8), Erode v. Pulhiedeth(9) and Kunja v. Bhupendra(10)] To settle this divergence of judicial opinion, the Legislature has introduced the words “by virtue of a title acquired before such sale”. The second question which arose for consideration was, whether the person who sought to avail himself of the provisions of sec. 310A must have been full owner of the property sold, or whether it was sufficient that he should have an interest in the property affected by the Sale [Nityananda Patra v. Hira Lal Karmakar(11), overruled by a Full Bench in Paresh Nath v. Nabogopal(12), Mallikarjunadn v. Lingamurti(13)] In order to settle this divergence of judicial opinion, the Legislature has introduced the words “either owning such property or holding an interest therein”. In order to give effect, however, to the policy of the Legislature upon the two points just mentioned, the rule appears to have been re-drafted with the result that the phraseo logy has been so altered as to lend some colour of support to the interpretation, that any person who owns the property or has an interest therein, is entitled to apply for reversal of the sale, even though his title is such as cannot be affected by the sale; in others words, the attempt to remove the two difficulties which had arisen under the old Code, has resulted in a new obscurity. It is plain, however, that a reasonable interpretation must be given to the provisions of the Statute, and it is useful in this connection to bear in mind the well-known canon of construction laid down in ??? v. Morgan(14), and quoted with approval by Lord Halsbury, L.C in Cox v. Hakes(15), and by this Court in the case of Narendta Nath v. Nagendra Nath(16) “The sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes, which comprehend all things in the letter, they have expounded to extend but to some things, and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act, they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those, which include every person in the letter, they have adjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always been founded on the intent of the Legislature which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and some times by foreign circumstances. So that they have ever been guided by the intent of the Legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to reason and good discretion.”

    It would in our opinion be an obviously unreasonable interpretation of r. 89 to hold that any person might avail himself of the benefit thereof, even though admittedly he was in no way affected by the sale sought to be reversed. In a case of this description a reference to the history of the legislation on the subject is perfectly legitimate, as was done by the Judicial Committee in Iswari Prosad v. Chatrapat(17) and Brown v. McLachlan(18). The history of the legislation here shows conclusively that the extended construction put upon the Rule by the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be supported: we must after all take a rational view of the scope and object of the section, and cannot attribute to the Legislature any intention such as would be obviously unreasonable; but we need not for our present purposes determine the precise limits of the scope of the Rule or define the circumstances under which it may be applicable. The view we take as to the true interpretation of r. 89 is in accord with that taken by Stanley, C.J, and Banerjee, J., in Mahamed Ahamndulla Khan v. Ahamed Said Khan(19) [see, also Asmutunnissa v. Ashruff Ali(20), which overruled the contrary view maintained by Mr. Justice Field in Panye Chunder v. Hur Chunder(21)]. As the Petitioner has carried hack her title to a date so far anterior to the sale and the execution proceedings that she could not possibly be affected there by, we must hold that she had no locus standi to make an application for reversal of the sale which according to her own case does, not concern her in the least.

    The result, therefore, is that although we disagree with the Subordinate Judge upon all the three points taken by the decree-holder auction-purchaser, we must affirm his order and discharge the Rule. Under the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in this Court.

    Rule discharged.

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    Comments

    Dulhin Mathura Das Koer Objector, v. Bansidhar Singh And Anr. Judgment-Debtors, Opposite Party.
    (Apr 20, 1911)