Napier, J. — The only question we have to consider in this appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff has relied on Sect. 14 of the Limitatation Act to exclude, in computing the period of limitation, the time occupied by him in the proceedings in another Court. What was done appears to be as follows: The plaintiff presented his plaint in the Court of the District Munsif of Ambasamudram as the first executant of the bond resided there. The other executants resided in different jurisdictions. The District Munsif acting under Sect. 20, Cl. (b) of the Civil Procedure Code declined to give leave for the institution of the suit in that Court in consequence of which the suit was subsequently filed in the Court of the District Munsif of Tinnevelly.
The District Munsif gives his reasons for returning the plaint in his order returning it. They are as follows: “The plaintiff is living in Tinnevelly. The bond was executed in Tinnevelly”—this latter statement is not quite correct as it appears to have been executed in a different place—“The defendants 2 to 4 are nearer Tinnevelly than Ambasamudram. The only reason alleged for filing the plaint in my Court is that the 1st defendant is here. I think that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaint being presented to the District Munsif exercising jurisdiction in Tinnevelly town. I decline to give permission for suit being filed here.” It seems to me that these reasons given by the District Munsif are perfectly sound and that they are such as might properly operate in causing him to refuse to hear the case.
With regard to the question whether the suit was bona fide filed in the Court of the District Munsif of Ambasamudram, I do not think that the fact that he thought he would be more likely to get his money paid by the 1st defendant if he sued him in the Court of which he was an officer shows want of bona fides. A man has a perfect right to endeavour to get the payment of his money and I see nothing improper in suing his debtor where he thought he would be more willing to discharge the debt. But the real difficulty in the way of the plaintiff seems to me to lie in the language of the section which is as follows: “In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit” that is to say, in reckoning the number of days to see if time has expired, you may deduct from the period that has actually expired the period allowed by Sect. 14, namely, “the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding” in a court which is unable to entertain the suit. But the right by which the plaintiff can file his suit the day after a holiday is given by Sect. 4 which is “where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court reopens “, that is to say, although the period of limitation has expired a suit may be filed After the expiration of the period of limitation. That is how I read the section. It is a particular statutory provision, not for the purpose of computing the period of limitation but allowing in certain circumstances the filing of suits after the period has expired. If that is so, then Sect. 14 will not help the plaintiff because, as I have pointed out, it begins with the phrase “in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit”, prescribed, of course, having reference to the articles. If this plaint has been presented in a proper Court on the day after that on which the limitation expired, that day having been a holiday, then the plaintiff would have been able to take advantage of the specific provision in Sect. 4; but as he has not done so, in my opinion, he is not entitled to take advantage of that provision. That seems to me to be the view taken by Mr. Justice Spencer in Mira Mohidin Rowther v. Nallaperumal Pillai(1) and I agree with him in that view. I would therefore allow the appeal and dismiss the suit, against defendants 5 to 7 also. There will be no costs in any Court.
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.—I agree.
S. S.Appeal allowed.