Appeal No. 19.—This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Respondents to recover khas possession of one-third share in certain lands or in the alternative to have rent assessed on those lands and to recover one-third share of that rent for the years 1296, 1297, 1298 and part of 1299, on the allegation that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a one-third share of taluk No. 2169 of the Faridpur Collectorate; that the Defendants held a raiyati jama of 27 bighas of land at a rent of Rs. 37 and 8 annas within the said taluk; that the Defendants have also been in possession of about 300 bighas which have formed by the drying-up of a beel or marsh within the taluk; that the Defendants were intermediate tenants-at-will in respect of those newly-formed lands; and that though repeatedly asked to enter into a settlement and to payment in respect of those lands they have refused to do so. The defence so far as it is necessary to be considered for the purposes of this appeal, was to the effect that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover khas possession of the lands in dispute; that those lands formed part of the old holding of the Defendants, and that the suit as framed was not maintainable.
We should here add that the suit was brought against the tenants, and the co-sharers of the Plaintiffs were also made Defendants in it.
The first Court dismissed the suit for two grounds, first, because the Plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain it as they have not had their names registered under the Land Registration Act, VII of 1876 (B.C), and, secondly, because the Plaintiffs failed to prove that their cosharers were in collusion with the tenants and had refused to join the Plaintiffs in the suit. On appeal the lower Appellate Court has held that the first Court was wrong in its view that the suit was not maintainable by reason of the provisions of the Land Registration Act. It has, however, held that the suit, so far as the Plaintiffs seek to recover khas possession, is not maintainable; but it is of opinion that the suit, so far as the Plaintiffs seek to have rent assessed on the land in dispute and to have a decree for the Plaintiffs' share of that rent, was maintainable. And it has, accordingly, remanded the case to the Court of first instance for trial on the merits.
In second appeal it is contended on behalf of the Defendants that the lower Appellate Court is wrong in holding that the suit is not barred under sec. 188 Bengal Tenancy Act; and it is argued, in the first place, that the lands in dispute are an increment to the old tenure of the Defendants under the provisions of Regulation XI of 1825, and that the present suit is really a suit under sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for additional rent for the land added to the Defendants' holding, and in the second place, it is urged that even if Regulation XI of 1825 be not applicable to the case still it could be a suit for additional rent for land found in the possession of the Defendants in excess of the area for which they have been paying rent and would come within the scope of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
On the other hand, a cross-objection is raised on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents that the Court of Appeal below was wrong in holding that the Plaintiffs' prayer for khas possession was not maintainable, and that the Plaintiffs were really entitled to a decree for khas possession as the tenants Defendants though tenants in respect of their old holding were trespassers in respect of the additional land and the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act were in consequence inapplicable to their cases.
We shall consider the cross-objection urged on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents first, because, if that objection succeeds, it will be unnecessary to consider whether the suit comes under sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act or whether sec. 188 of that Act applies to the case.
In support of the cross-objection reliance is placed upon the case of Prohlad Teor v. Kedar Nath Bose(6), and it is argued that although where a tenant encroaches upon any land of his landlord outside of his tenure, it is open to the landlord to treat him as tenant and not as a trespasser, the tenant has no right to compel the landlord to treat him as a tenant of the land encroached upon. That is quite true; but it does not follow that because the landlord has this option he can treat the tenant as trespasser at any time after having exercised his option in treating him as a tenant for some time. When the landord has once made his choice he cannot be allowed to change his position. In the present case the Plaintiffs clearly admit that the Defendants were intermediate tenants-at-will for some time. If they were so, when did they cease to be tenants and become trespassers? Nothing is alleged in the plaint as to when the tenancy of the Defendants in respect of the land in dispute was terminated so as to convert them into trespassers. That being so, we think that the cross-objection must fail.
We come now to the contentions urged on behalf of the Defendants-Appellants.
As to the first contention, namely, that the land formed by the drying-up of the beel which was contiguous to the old holding of the Defendants became an accretion to the Defendants' holding under Regulation XI of 1825, and it is enough to say that Regulation applies only to land gained by gradual accession from the recession of a river or the sea. That is clear from the preamble of the Regulation as well as from sec. 4 which is the section relied upon; and the Regulation has no application to land formed by drying-up of a beel or marsh. The view we take is in accordance with that taken in the case of Suroop Chunder Mozoomdar v. Jardine Skinner & Co.. That being so, it cannot be said that the land in respect of which this suit is brought has necessarily and by law become part of the old holding of the Defendants.
Then, in the second place, it was contended for the Defendants-Appellants that even if Regulation XI of 1825 be not applicable to the case, still this suit, in so far as it seeks to recover rent, must be treated as a suit for additional rent for additional land found in the possession of the tenants Defendants, within the meaning of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and therefore not maintainable unless it is brought by all the joint landlords as required by sec. 188; and in support of this contention the case of Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesk Narain Chowdhury is cited. If sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act had been the only provision of law under which the Plaintiffs could base their right to claim rent for the lands in dispute, in that case having regard to the authorities [see the case just referred to and also the case of Beni Madhub Roy v. Jaod Ali Sicrar(7)] it would have been difficult to hold that the suit was not barred by sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
But having regard to the admitted facts of the case, we are of opinion that the right of the Plaintiffs to claim rent for the lands in dispute is a right that is inseparable from their position as part proprietors to those lands, and exists quite independently of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. And we are further of opinion that a case like this does not come strictly within the scope of that section. The lands in dispute formed no part of the holding as originally let out to the Defendants. They have been formed subsequent to the creation of the original holding; and they are outside of the boundaries of that holding. The Defendants had taken possession of them by gradual encroachment; and it was quite open to the Plaintiffs if they chose to treat the Defendants as trespassers in respect of them from the beginning. As they did not exercise their option in that way, we must take it that the Defendants are tenants in respect of those lands but they are the Plaintiffs' tenants in respect of these lands quite apart from their tenancy in respect of their old holding. The distinction between the present case and a case such as is contemplated by sec. 52, Bengal Tenancy Act, will be clearly seen from certain observations of the learned Judges who decided the case of Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury which will also go to distinguish that case from the present. Those learned Judges observe:—“We think also that the suit for additional rent on account of the excess land will not, as framed, lie. It is true that sec. 52 differs from sec. 30 in this, that it merely declares the liability of the tenant to pay additional rent, and the circumstances which the Court should take into consideration if a suit is brought to obtain it, and it does not expressly convey any authority to the landlord to bring a suit or import the provisions of sec. 188. But the principle applies alike to a claim for enhanced rent and to a claim for additional rent. The land, which is said to be in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid, has been held rightly or wrongly, as part of the original holding. There is here no allegation that it has been taken by trespass. If a decree is obtained, the excess land will be annexed to the land of the original holding and the additional rent will be added to the original rent. There will be no new holding created.”
These were considerations that were applicable to the case then before the Court but the observations contained in the last three sentences of the foregoing extract are inapplicable to the present case, and they go clearly to show where sec. 52 applies and where it does not. In the present case it cannot be said that “if a decree is obtained, the excess land will be annexed to the land of the original holding, and the additional rent will be added to the original rent and that there will be no new holding created.” It is altogether a new holding and the rent that will be assessed upon that will be a new rent in respect of this new holding and the right to claim such rent is, as we have said above, inseparable from the position of the Plaintiff as part proprietor of the land in dispute. The view we take, that a suit for the enforcement of such a right is not a thing that is authorized by the Bengal Tenancy Act within the meaning of sec. 188 of that Act, is in accordance with the view taken by this Court in the cases of Prem Chand Nuskur v. Mokshoda Debi, Umesh Cunder Roy v. Nasir Mullick, and Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi, in which a suit for arrears of rent was held to be outside the scope of sec. 188.
For these reasons we think that the conclusion arrived at by the lower Appellate Court is correct though we do not endorse all the reasons given by it for arriving at that conclusion.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
Appeal No. 77.—This case differs from the one which has just been disposed of in one material respect. Here the claim for khas possession with an alternative claim for rent is made in respect, not merely, of the additional land now found in the possession of the tenants Defendants over and above the land of their own holding but in respect of the entire quantity of land found in possession of the Defendants including the lands of their old holding. That being so, it is difficult to say that this case does not come within the scope of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. From the very frame of the suit it appears that the Plaintiffs brought it within the scope of that section.
That being so, the suit is clearly not maintainable, having regard to the provisions of sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In the next place it is not distinguishable in principle from the case of Gopal Chander Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury.
The decree of the lower Apellate Court in this case must therefore be reversed and that of the first Court restored with costs of this Court and of the Court below.
We assess the hearing fee at three gold-mohurs in each case.
Appeal No. 19 dismissed:
Appeal No. 77 allowed.
S.C.S