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  • sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act or whether sec. 188 of that Act
  • provisions of sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • LAND REGISTRATION ACT
  • provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Land Registration Act, VII of 1876
  • sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • sec. 188 Bengal Tenancy Act;
  • sec. 52, Bengal Tenancy Act,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act or whether sec. 188 of that Act
  • provisions of sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • LAND REGISTRATION ACT
  • provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Land Registration Act, VII of 1876
  • sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • sec. 188 Bengal Tenancy Act;
  • sec. 52, Bengal Tenancy Act,
Smart Summary

Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two appeals (Appeal No. 19 and Appeal No. 77) arising from suits brought by Plaintiffs-Respondents seeking either khas possession of a one-third share in certain lands or, alternatively, assessment and recovery of one-third of the rent for specific years (1296–part of 1299). The Plaintiffs alleged that they were part proprietors of taluk No. 2169 (Faridpur Collectorate); that Defendants held a raiyati jama of 27 bighas at a stated rent and were also in possession of about 300 bighas formed by the drying-up of a beel (marsh); and that the Defendants were intermediate tenants-at-will in respect of those newly formed lands and had refused to enter into settlement or pay rent.

The suit was initially dismissed by the first Court on two grounds: (1) the Plaintiffs had not registered their names under the Land Registration Act, VII of 1876 (B.C), and therefore were not entitled to maintain the suit, and (2) the Plaintiffs failed to prove that their co-sharers were in collusion with the tenants and had refused to join the Plaintiffs in the suit. On appeal the lower Appellate Court held that the suit was maintainable despite the Land Registration Act issue, but concluded that the Plaintiffs could not maintain the suit insofar as they sought khas possession; the Appellate Court did hold that the Plaintiffs' claim for assessment and recovery of rent was maintainable and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

In second appeal (Appeal No. 19) the Defendants contested the Appellate Court's conclusions, arguing principally that the suit was barred by sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act because the disputed land either was an accretion under Regulation XI of 1825 or was additional land within the meaning of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Plaintiffs cross-objected, asserting they were entitled to khas possession because the Defendants were trespassers with respect to the additional land, making the Bengal Tenancy Act inapplicable.

Appeal No. 77 involved a different factual framing: the Plaintiffs claimed khas possession (with alternative claim for rent) in respect of the entire area in the Defendants' possession, including the old holding. The Court below had reached a decision that was reversed on this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover khas possession of the additional land (the land formed by drying up of the beel) or whether the Defendants remained tenants (or intermediate tenants-at-will) such that khas possession cannot be decreed.
  2. Whether the land formed by drying-up of the beel is an accretion to the Defendants' old holding under Regulation XI of 1825 (and thereby part of the original holding).
  3. Whether the Plaintiffs' claim for rent or khas possession falls within sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (suits for additional rent or enhanced rent) and, if so, whether sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act bars the suit unless brought by all co-proprietors.
  4. Whether suits for assessment/recovery of rent in the particular factual circumstances of these cases are governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act or arise from rights inseparable from the Plaintiffs' proprietary position (i.e., outside the ambit of sec. 52 and sec. 188).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants-Appellants' Arguments

  • The land formed by drying-up of the beel was an increment or accretion to the Defendants' old tenure under Regulation XI of 1825, making it part of their original holding.
  • Even if Regulation XI does not apply, the suit for rent is effectively a suit under sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for additional rent for land found in the tenants' possession in excess of the area for which they have been paying rent, and such a suit is barred unless brought by all co-proprietors in accordance with sec. 188.
  • Therefore, the Appellate Court was wrong to hold that sec. 188 did not bar the Plaintiffs' suit.

Plaintiffs-Respondents' Arguments (Cross-Objection)

  • The Appellate Court erred in holding that the Plaintiffs could not obtain khas possession; the Plaintiffs contended the Defendants, though tenants in respect of their old holding, were trespassers regarding the additional land and thus the Bengal Tenancy Act's protections did not apply to those lands.
  • Relying on Prohlad Teor v. Kedar Nath Bose, the Plaintiffs argued that a landlord may treat an encroaching tenant as a trespasser and is not obliged to treat him as a tenant for the encroached land.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prohlad Teor v. Kedar Nath Bose That a landlord has the option to treat a tenant who encroaches as either tenant or trespasser; the tenant cannot compel the landlord to treat him as tenant of the encroached land. The Court acknowledged the principle but held that a landlord who once treats an encroacher as tenant cannot later change position without allegation of termination of tenancy; here Plaintiffs admitted Defendants were intermediate tenants-at-will and pleaded no termination, so the cross-objection failed.
Suroop Chunder Mozoomdar v. Jardine Skinner & Co. Regulation XI of 1825 applies only to land gained by gradual accession from the recession of a river or the sea. The Court relied on this to conclude Regulation XI does not apply to land formed by drying-up of a beel or marsh; therefore the land in dispute did not automatically become part of the Defendants' old holding by operation of that Regulation.
Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesk (Umesh) Narain Chowdhury Observations about sec. 52 (liability of tenant to pay additional rent for excess land) and the practical effect where excess land is treated as part of original holding (annexation to original holding and addition to original rent); discussion relevant to whether suits for additional rent fall under sec. 188. The Court quoted and distinguished this case: it found that the circumstances described by that decision (where excess land is treated as part of original holding) do not match the present facts because here a new holding would be created and the rent assessed would be a new rent. Thus sec. 52 was not strictly applicable to Appeal No. 19.
Beni Madhub Roy v. Jaod Ali Sicrar Authority referenced in the context of whether sec. 188 bars suits for additional rent under sec. 52. The Court noted that if sec. 52 were the only basis for the Plaintiffs' claim, it would be difficult in view of authorities (including this case) to hold the suit was not barred by sec. 188. This supported the Court's analysis that sec. 52 was not the sole or necessary basis of the Plaintiffs' right.
Prem Chand Nuskur v. Mokshoda Debi; Umesh Cunder Roy v. Nasir Mullick; Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi Cases where suits for arrears of rent were held to be outside the scope of sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Court relied on these authorities to support its conclusion that a right to claim rent arising from proprietary rights (as part-proprietors) can be independent of sec. 52 and thus outside the operation of sec. 188 in the present factual context.
Gopal Chander (Chunder) Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury (referred again) Used to demonstrate the contrast between a case where excess land is treated as part of the original holding and the present case where a new holding would arise. The Court treated this precedent as distinguishable on facts and quoted its key observations to clarify where sec. 52 applies and where it does not.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the Plaintiffs' cross-objection (Appeal No. 19) that they were entitled to khas possession because the Defendants were trespassers in respect of the additional land. The Court recognized the legal proposition (from Prohlad Teor v. Kedar Nath Bose) that a landlord may elect to treat an encroaching tenant as a trespasser, but it emphasized that where a landlord has once treated an encroacher as tenant (or the parties have recognized a tenancy) the landlord cannot subsequently change position without alleging and proving termination of the tenancy. Here the Plaintiffs admitted the Defendants had been intermediate tenants-at-will and the plaint contained no allegation as to when that tenancy was terminated; accordingly the Plaintiffs failed to show the Defendants had become trespassers and the cross-objection failed.

Turning to the Defendants' contentions, the Court considered two main points:

  1. Regulation XI of 1825: The Defendants argued the land formed by drying of the beel accreted to their old holding under Regulation XI. The Court rejected this, relying on the Regulation's preamble and section 4 and authorities (notably Suroop Chunder Mozoomdar v. Jardine Skinner & Co.) to hold that Regulation XI applies only to land gained by gradual accession due to recession of a river or the sea, not to land formed by the drying-up of a beel or marsh. Therefore the disputed land did not automatically become part of the old holding by operation of that Regulation.
  2. Applicability of sec. 52 and sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act: The Defendants argued that, whether or not Regulation XI applied, the Plaintiffs' claim for rent was effectively a claim under sec. 52 (additional rent for land in excess of previously paid area) and so the suit was barred absent compliance with sec. 188 (joining all proprietors). The Court examined sec. 52 and the authorities, including Gopal Chunder Das, and concluded that the Plaintiffs' right to claim rent in this case was inseparable from their position as part proprietors and existed independently of sec. 52. The Court emphasized a factual distinction: in sec. 52 cases the excess land is treated (rightly or wrongly) as part of the original holding so that, if a decree is obtained, the excess land is annexed to the original holding and additional rent is simply added to the original rent (no new holding). In the present case the disputed land was outside the boundaries of the original holding, had been taken by gradual encroachment, and would, if rent were assessed, result in assessment of a new rent for a new holding. Thus the suit did not fall strictly within sec. 52 and was not a suit "authorized by the Bengal Tenancy Act" for the purposes of sec. 188. The Court also relied on earlier decisions where suits for arrears of rent were held to be outside the scope of sec. 188 to support this conclusion.

After these analyses the Court concluded that the lower Appellate Court's ultimate conclusion (that the Plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable insofar as khas possession was sought, but was maintainable insofar as rent assessment and recovery were sought) was correct in result for Appeal No. 19, although the higher Court did not endorse every reason given by the Appellate Court.

For Appeal No. 77 the Court found a material factual difference: the Plaintiffs' claim there covered the entire land in the Defendants' possession (including the old holding), and thus the suit plainly fell within the scope of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Because it fell within sec. 52, sec. 188 applied and the suit was not maintainable unless brought in the manner required by sec. 188. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Court in Appeal No. 77 and restored the decree of the first Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding (Appeal No. 19): The appeal is DISMISSED with costs. The lower Appellate Court's conclusion as to maintainability of the Plaintiffs' claim for rent (but not for khas possession) is upheld in result, although not all of the Appellate Court's reasoning is endorsed.

Holding (Appeal No. 77): The appeal is ALLOWED; the decree of the lower Appellate Court is reversed and the decree of the first Court is restored with costs of this Court and the Court below.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties in Appeal No. 19: The Plaintiffs cannot obtain khas possession on the pleaded facts (no allegation of termination of tenancy) but may have a maintainable claim to have rent assessed and to recover their share of rent, the Court treating that right as arising from their proprietary status rather than exclusively under sec. 52.
  • Direct effect on the parties in Appeal No. 77: Because the suit as framed covered the entire holdings (including the original holding), it fell within sec. 52 and was barred by sec. 188 unless brought in the manner required by that section; accordingly the first Court's dismissal (restored by this Court) stands.
  • No broader new legal precedent was stated to be created by this opinion beyond its application and distinction of existing authorities; the Court expressly distinguished earlier decisions where necessary and followed certain authorities to support its conclusions.

Costs and fees: The Court dismissed Appeal No. 19 with costs and allowed Appeal No. 77 with costs, and assessed the hearing fee at three gold-mohurs in each case.

    Khondakar Abdul Hamid v. Mohini Kant Saha Chaudhuhi

    Appeal No. 19.—This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Respondents to recover khas possession of one-third share in certain lands or in the alternative to have rent assessed on those lands and to recover one-third share of that rent for the years 1296, 1297, 1298 and part of 1299, on the allegation that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a one-third share of taluk No. 2169 of the Faridpur Collectorate; that the Defendants held a raiyati jama of 27 bighas of land at a rent of Rs. 37 and 8 annas within the said taluk; that the Defendants have also been in possession of about 300 bighas which have formed by the drying-up of a beel or marsh within the taluk; that the Defendants were intermediate tenants-at-will in respect of those newly-formed lands; and that though repeatedly asked to enter into a settlement and to payment in respect of those lands they have refused to do so. The defence so far as it is necessary to be considered for the purposes of this appeal, was to the effect that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover khas possession of the lands in dispute; that those lands formed part of the old holding of the Defendants, and that the suit as framed was not maintainable.

    We should here add that the suit was brought against the tenants, and the co-sharers of the Plaintiffs were also made Defendants in it.

    The first Court dismissed the suit for two grounds, first, because the Plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain it as they have not had their names registered under the Land Registration Act, VII of 1876 (B.C), and, secondly, because the Plaintiffs failed to prove that their cosharers were in collusion with the tenants and had refused to join the Plaintiffs in the suit. On appeal the lower Appellate Court has held that the first Court was wrong in its view that the suit was not maintainable by reason of the provisions of the Land Registration Act. It has, however, held that the suit, so far as the Plaintiffs seek to recover khas possession, is not maintainable; but it is of opinion that the suit, so far as the Plaintiffs seek to have rent assessed on the land in dispute and to have a decree for the Plaintiffs' share of that rent, was maintainable. And it has, accordingly, remanded the case to the Court of first instance for trial on the merits.

    In second appeal it is contended on behalf of the Defendants that the lower Appellate Court is wrong in holding that the suit is not barred under sec. 188 Bengal Tenancy Act; and it is argued, in the first place, that the lands in dispute are an increment to the old tenure of the Defendants under the provisions of Regulation XI of 1825, and that the present suit is really a suit under sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for additional rent for the land added to the Defendants' holding, and in the second place, it is urged that even if Regulation XI of 1825 be not applicable to the case still it could be a suit for additional rent for land found in the possession of the Defendants in excess of the area for which they have been paying rent and would come within the scope of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

    On the other hand, a cross-objection is raised on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents that the Court of Appeal below was wrong in holding that the Plaintiffs' prayer for khas possession was not maintainable, and that the Plaintiffs were really entitled to a decree for khas possession as the tenants Defendants though tenants in respect of their old holding were trespassers in respect of the additional land and the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act were in consequence inapplicable to their cases.

    We shall consider the cross-objection urged on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents first, because, if that objection succeeds, it will be unnecessary to consider whether the suit comes under sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act or whether sec. 188 of that Act applies to the case.

    In support of the cross-objection reliance is placed upon the case of Prohlad Teor v. Kedar Nath Bose(6), and it is argued that although where a tenant encroaches upon any land of his landlord outside of his tenure, it is open to the landlord to treat him as tenant and not as a trespasser, the tenant has no right to compel the landlord to treat him as a tenant of the land encroached upon. That is quite true; but it does not follow that because the landlord has this option he can treat the tenant as trespasser at any time after having exercised his option in treating him as a tenant for some time. When the landord has once made his choice he cannot be allowed to change his position. In the present case the Plaintiffs clearly admit that the Defendants were intermediate tenants-at-will for some time. If they were so, when did they cease to be tenants and become trespassers? Nothing is alleged in the plaint as to when the tenancy of the Defendants in respect of the land in dispute was terminated so as to convert them into trespassers. That being so, we think that the cross-objection must fail.

    We come now to the contentions urged on behalf of the Defendants-Appellants.

    As to the first contention, namely, that the land formed by the drying-up of the beel which was contiguous to the old holding of the Defendants became an accretion to the Defendants' holding under Regulation XI of 1825, and it is enough to say that Regulation applies only to land gained by gradual accession from the recession of a river or the sea. That is clear from the preamble of the Regulation as well as from sec. 4 which is the section relied upon; and the Regulation has no application to land formed by drying-up of a beel or marsh. The view we take is in accordance with that taken in the case of Suroop Chunder Mozoomdar v. Jardine Skinner & Co.. That being so, it cannot be said that the land in respect of which this suit is brought has necessarily and by law become part of the old holding of the Defendants.

    Then, in the second place, it was contended for the Defendants-Appellants that even if Regulation XI of 1825 be not applicable to the case, still this suit, in so far as it seeks to recover rent, must be treated as a suit for additional rent for additional land found in the possession of the tenants Defendants, within the meaning of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and therefore not maintainable unless it is brought by all the joint landlords as required by sec. 188; and in support of this contention the case of Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesk Narain Chowdhury is cited. If sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act had been the only provision of law under which the Plaintiffs could base their right to claim rent for the lands in dispute, in that case having regard to the authorities [see the case just referred to and also the case of Beni Madhub Roy v. Jaod Ali Sicrar(7)] it would have been difficult to hold that the suit was not barred by sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

    But having regard to the admitted facts of the case, we are of opinion that the right of the Plaintiffs to claim rent for the lands in dispute is a right that is inseparable from their position as part proprietors to those lands, and exists quite independently of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. And we are further of opinion that a case like this does not come strictly within the scope of that section. The lands in dispute formed no part of the holding as originally let out to the Defendants. They have been formed subsequent to the creation of the original holding; and they are outside of the boundaries of that holding. The Defendants had taken possession of them by gradual encroachment; and it was quite open to the Plaintiffs if they chose to treat the Defendants as trespassers in respect of them from the beginning. As they did not exercise their option in that way, we must take it that the Defendants are tenants in respect of those lands but they are the Plaintiffs' tenants in respect of these lands quite apart from their tenancy in respect of their old holding. The distinction between the present case and a case such as is contemplated by sec. 52, Bengal Tenancy Act, will be clearly seen from certain observations of the learned Judges who decided the case of Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury which will also go to distinguish that case from the present. Those learned Judges observe:—“We think also that the suit for additional rent on account of the excess land will not, as framed, lie. It is true that sec. 52 differs from sec. 30 in this, that it merely declares the liability of the tenant to pay additional rent, and the circumstances which the Court should take into consideration if a suit is brought to obtain it, and it does not expressly convey any authority to the landlord to bring a suit or import the provisions of sec. 188. But the principle applies alike to a claim for enhanced rent and to a claim for additional rent. The land, which is said to be in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid, has been held rightly or wrongly, as part of the original holding. There is here no allegation that it has been taken by trespass. If a decree is obtained, the excess land will be annexed to the land of the original holding and the additional rent will be added to the original rent. There will be no new holding created.”

    These were considerations that were applicable to the case then before the Court but the observations contained in the last three sentences of the foregoing extract are inapplicable to the present case, and they go clearly to show where sec. 52 applies and where it does not. In the present case it cannot be said that “if a decree is obtained, the excess land will be annexed to the land of the original holding, and the additional rent will be added to the original rent and that there will be no new holding created.” It is altogether a new holding and the rent that will be assessed upon that will be a new rent in respect of this new holding and the right to claim such rent is, as we have said above, inseparable from the position of the Plaintiff as part proprietor of the land in dispute. The view we take, that a suit for the enforcement of such a right is not a thing that is authorized by the Bengal Tenancy Act within the meaning of sec. 188 of that Act, is in accordance with the view taken by this Court in the cases of Prem Chand Nuskur v. Mokshoda Debi, Umesh Cunder Roy v. Nasir Mullick, and Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi, in which a suit for arrears of rent was held to be outside the scope of sec. 188.

    For these reasons we think that the conclusion arrived at by the lower Appellate Court is correct though we do not endorse all the reasons given by it for arriving at that conclusion.

    The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

    Appeal No. 77.—This case differs from the one which has just been disposed of in one material respect. Here the claim for khas possession with an alternative claim for rent is made in respect, not merely, of the additional land now found in the possession of the tenants Defendants over and above the land of their own holding but in respect of the entire quantity of land found in possession of the Defendants including the lands of their old holding. That being so, it is difficult to say that this case does not come within the scope of sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. From the very frame of the suit it appears that the Plaintiffs brought it within the scope of that section.

    That being so, the suit is clearly not maintainable, having regard to the provisions of sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In the next place it is not distinguishable in principle from the case of Gopal Chander Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury.

    The decree of the lower Apellate Court in this case must therefore be reversed and that of the first Court restored with costs of this Court and of the Court below.

    We assess the hearing fee at three gold-mohurs in each case.

    Appeal No. 19 dismissed:
    Appeal No. 77 allowed.
    S.C.S

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    Khondakar Abdul Hamid v. Mohini Kant Saha Chaudhuhi
    (Feb 13, 1900)