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    Garabini Dassi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha

    This appeal arises out of an application for revocation of probate made in the Court below by the Appellant. That application has been refused on the ground that the Applicant has no locus standi, she not having any interest in the estate of the deceased within the meaning of sec. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act such as could entitle her to make the application in question.

    In appeal it is contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant, first, that the Court below was wrong in holding that the Applicant was not entitled to apply for revocation of probate, and, secondly, that the Court below was wrong in allowing the other side costs to the amount that has been awarded.

    Upon the first contention this is how the matter stands:—The Appellant is one of the two widows of the late Nakur Chunder Shaha, who were both authorized by their husband to adopt. The other widow adopted a son named Hari Pada, who died leaving an infant widow. Probate having been granted of the Will of Hari Pada, the Petitioner applied for its revocation. The interest that she claimed in the estate of the deceased Hari Pada in the Court below was, as the order of the Court below shows, not, strictly speaking, an interest in the estate of Hari Pada, but an interest in the estate of Hari Pada's adoptive father Nakur. The interest that the argument of the learned Advocate-General on her behalf points to is that she is entitled to maintenance out of the estate. It is also suggested that she may have other rights in respect of hat estate, rights that are only vaguely indicated, such as the right to claim the estate in preference to the widow or the executor. But these again are rights that are adverse to the rights of the testator himself. Various cases were cited in support of the contention that a person circumstanced like the Appellant ought to be held entitled to make an application for revocation of probate as a person interested in the estate of the deceased. But the facts in those cases were very different from those in the present case, and there is no principle of law laid down in any of these cases which would cover a case like the present. The only case that requires special consideration is that of Brinda Chowdhrain v. Radhica Chowdhrain. The Applicant there was the widow of the alleged testator, and this is what the learned Judges said on the question of interest:— “Upon the question of interest it appears to us that the widow, although there are sons living, has yet an interest in the estate such as to entitle her to come under sec. 50 of the Act. She is entitled to maintenance, and, if she pleases to institute a suit, to have her maintenance made a charge upon the estate of her deceased husband. She is not entitled no doubt to claim partition, but she is entitled, if the heirs of her husband make a partition, to claim a share. There is some authority for holding that this latter right is one of which she may be deprived by express words in her husband's Will—See Comulmonee v. Joy Gopaul(4).” We are of opinion that these observations taken in their entirety are inapplicable to this case. In the first place the Applicant here is not the widow of the deceased but is the widow of his adoptive father; and in the second place it is not suggested that she could have any right to any share in the estate upon any partition that could possibly be made. Her right to maintenance, such as it is, cannot be affected by the Will in question whatever the provisions of that Will may be.

    There was some question raised as to whether the Will could be looked at in this case. We think we may look at the provisions of the Will to see if really it affects the right of the Appellant to maintenance. And looking at the Will we must say that it does not affect that right in any way whatever.

    That being the position of affairs, can it be said that the Appellant has such an interest in the estate of the deceased as entitles her to make an application under sec. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act? We are of opinion that the question must be answered in the negative. The view we take is not only in accordance with common sense but is supported by the case of Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass and Rahamtullah Sahib v. Rama Rani. The first contention of the Appellant must therefore fail.

    As to the second contention for the reasons given by us in our judgment in appeal from Original Decree No. 278 of 1898 [Pratap Chandra Shaha v. Kali Bhanjan Shaha], we think it ought to prevail and the decree of the Court below ought to be varied by reducing the amount awarded as pleader's fee from Rs. 1,254 annas 8 to Rs. 80.

    Under the circumstances we make no order as to costs of this appeal.

    H.P.C
    Appeal allowed in part: Decree varied.

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    Garabini Dassi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha
    (Mar 8, 1900)