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  • Section 14 of Regulation III of 1793 and Section 2 of Act XIV of 1859.
  • Limitation Act of 1859
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • Section 14 of Regulation III of 1793 and Section 2 of Act XIV of 1859.
  • Limitation Act of 1859
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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was a declaration of title to land, for cancellation of a permanent lease (putni) and for recovery of possession. The plaintiff sues as shebait of Issur Radha Damudor Thakur and alleges that the disputed property formed part of the idol's endowment and that a permanent lease (putni) was wrongfully granted on 9th September 1848 by Utsabananda Das when he was shebait. Utsabananda died in 1855 and was succeeded by Gur Das who retired on 17th November 1903 in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that the putni was granted for an inadequate premium (Rs. 91) and inadequate rent (Rs. 67-2-7 per annum), that the alienation was without legal necessity and not beneficial to the endowment, and therefore not binding on the endowed property in the plaintiff's hands.

The defendant resisted on the merits and pleaded the bar of limitation. The Courts below (trial Court and District Judge) had concurrently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant (appellant) appealed to the present Court contending that the suit was barred by limitation, relying principally on principles of adverse possession under the Limitation Act of 1859 and earlier Regulation III of 1793 and on a number of authorities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's claim (to annul the putni and recover possession) was barred by limitation due to adverse possession under the Limitation Act of 1859 or Regulation III of 1793.
  2. Whether a lease granted by a shebait in excess of his authority is binding beyond the term of his office, or whether each succeeding shebait acquires a fresh cause of action (i.e., whether limitation runs afresh from the date each successor assumes office).
  3. Whether the decision of the Judicial Committee in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das is binding and should be followed in determining the limitation question in this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • At the date of commencement of the suit, the plaintiff had no subsisting title because the title had been extinguished by adverse possession at a time when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force, and possibly earlier under Regulation III of 1793.
  • Relied principally upon authorities (listed in the text) to support the contention that adverse possession had run and barred the plaintiff's claim.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • A lease granted by a shebait in excess of his authority does not hold good beyond the term of his office; each succeeding shebait acquires a new cause of action which he can enforce within the statutory period calculated from the date when he assumes charge of the office.
  • It was contended that distinguishing a putni from an ordinary sale might affect the limitation analysis (i.e., putni possibly distinguishable), and there was an argument that the rule allowing adverse possession to bar successors might be disastrous to charities where a dishonest trustee continues in office for 12 years after an improper alienation.
  • The respondent's counsel conceded that a contrary view has been taken by this Court in Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy (23 C. 536 at p. 545).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Luchmee Bukhsh Runjeet Ram, 13 B.L.R. (P.C.) 177 : 20 W.R. 375 Cited by the appellant in support of the limitation / adverse possession argument. The court recorded it among authorities relied on by the appellant; the court's ultimate conclusion was based on the Judicial Committee decision in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das.
Fatimatulnissa v. Sundar Das, 27 I.A. 103 : 27 C. 1004 : 4 C.W.N. 565 Cited by the appellant in support of the limitation / adverse possession argument. Noted as an authority relied upon; the court relied on the principle in Damodar Das rather than overturning that line of authority.
Jagamba v. Ram Chandra, 31 C. 314 Cited by the appellant in support of limitation / adverse possession contentions. Recorded among the appellant's authorities; the court did not treat these as displacing the binding effect of Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das.
Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das, 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632 Authoritative Judicial Committee decision that adverse possession commenced from the original distribution (or original event creating possession) and continued uninterrupted, barring successors; treated as binding on the question whether each successor gets a fresh start for limitation. The court held this decision to be binding and followed it. Applying Damodar Das, the court concluded the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation and that each succeeding shebait did not get a fresh start.
Radha Vallab v. Jagat Chandra (1826) 4 Mac. Sel. Rep. 151 Cited in support of the proposition that a lease by a shebait in excess of authority does not continue beyond the term of office. Recorded by the court as one of the authorities relied on by the respondent/defence of the proposition, but the court found Damodar Das controlling on the broader limitation point.
Arruth Misser v. Juggurnath, 18 W.R. 439 Cited in support of the view that succession to office may affect when limitation begins (relied on by respondents in some contexts). The court noted that Arruth Misser had been relied on in earlier proceedings but that Judicial Committee authority in Damodar Das held adverse possession ran from the original distribution and was not interrupted by succession.
Bunwaree Chand Thakoor v. Mudden Mohan, 21 W.R. 41 Cited as authority on the effect of leases by trustees/shebaids and limitations. Noted by the court among authorities supporting the respondent's position; the court nonetheless applied Damodar Das as binding.
Ramchandra v. Kashinath, 19 B. 271 Cited in the context of trustees' acts and limitation. Recorded as an authority cited; court's final decision rested on following Damodar Das.
Prosunno Kumar Adhikari v. Saroda Prosunno Adhikari, 22 C. 989 Cited in support of the proposition that leases by a shebait in excess of authority do not continue beyond the term of office. Noted by the court; did not operate to displace Damodar Das in the present case.
Abhiram Goswami v. Shyam Charan, 36 C. 1003 (at p. 1013) : 36 I.A. 148 : 4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 14 C.W.N. 1 An earlier decision cited as being inconsistent with Damodar Das on the question considered; raised as a point of conflict among authorities. The court observed that Damodar Das was contrary to (or affected by) this earlier decision, but concluded that Damodar Das remained binding and must be followed.
Prosunno Moyee Dossi v. Kunjo Beharee Chowdhry (1864) W.R. 157 Relied upon in argument for the proposition that each succeeding shebait acquires a fresh cause of action. Noted among authorities relied on by the respondent; the court found the Judicial Committee's decision in Damodar Das controlling.
Burm Suroop Doss v. Khashee Jha, 20 W.R. 471 Cited in support of the view that succession to office gives a fresh cause of action. Recorded by the court as one of the respondent's cited authorities; the court held Damodar Das contrary to that position.
Ram Churn Tewary v. Protap Chandra Dutt Jha, 2 C.L.J. 448 Cited for the proposition that successors may have fresh causes of action. Noted among the respondent's authorities; the court applied Damodar Das against that line of argument.
Mahomed v. Ganapati, 13 M. 277 Cited in support of the respondent's position on succession and causes of action. Recorded; the court's conclusion was guided by Damodar Das.
Vedapuratti v. Vallabha, 13 M. 402 Cited in support of the contention that each successor might acquire a fresh cause of action. Noted in the opinion; the court held the Damodar Das principle to be decisive.
Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy, 23 C. 536 (at p. 545) Identified as a contrary view taken by this Court (on the question whether successors get a fresh start). The respondent's counsel conceded the contrary view in Nilmony Singh; the court nevertheless held Damodar Das (Judicial Committee) to be conclusive and not permitting the "fresh start" rule.
Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder, 9 W.R. 505 Cited as an analogy under the Limitation Act that adverse possession which bars a widow also bars the reversionary heir. Used by the court by analogy to support the conclusion that adverse possession can bar successors; the court approved that principle as supporting its result.
Amirto Lal v. Rajonee Kant, 2 I.A. 113 : 23 W.R. 214 : 15 B.L.R. 10 Approved the principle (from Nobin Chunder) concerning adverse possession and heirs/successors. Referred to by the court as approving the analogy relied upon in support of the view that successors are barred by the prior adverse possession.
Hari Nath v. Mathur Mohun, 21 C. 8 : 20 I.A. 183 Cited alongside Amirto Lal as supporting the principle that adverse possession may bar successors. Referred to by the court in support of the analogy; contributed to the court's reasoning that successors do not get a fresh start.
Shyam Chand v. Ram Kanai, 14 C.W.N. CCXLIV (and later 15 C.W.N. 417 on review) Judicial Committee initially took a contrary view to Abhiram Goswami, but on review recalled that judgment and finally decided in accordance with Abhiram (as recorded in the opinion). The opinion recounts the history: the Judicial Committee's temporary contrary view and later recall do not affect the binding character of Damodar Das; the court considered the sequence but followed Damodar Das.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the core contention on appeal: that the plaintiff's title had been extinguished by adverse possession under the Limitation Act of 1859 or possibly earlier under Regulation III of 1793. The putni was created on 9th September 1848; whether adverse possession was treated as commencing from that date or from the death of the grantor in 1855, the court noted the title to annul the putni was extinguished "in 1837 at the latest" (as stated in the opinion).

The respondent's opposing argument — that a lease by a shebait in excess of authority does not bind beyond the shebait's term and that each successor acquires a fresh cause of action — was examined against authority. The court acknowledged authorities supporting that view but emphasised that the Judicial Committee's decision in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das had resolved the question against the "fresh start" doctrine, holding that adverse possession, once begun, continued uninterrupted from the original event and was not interrupted by the death of the original office-holder or by succession.

The court analysed prior conflicting authorities (including Nilmony Singh and Abhiram Goswami v. Shyam Charan) and recounted how the Judicial Committee in Damodar Das expressly held adverse possession to commence from the original distribution and to continue uninterrupted. The court therefore concluded that it was no longer tenable to maintain that each succeeding shebait receives a fresh start for limitation purposes.

The court also accepted, by analogy to established principles under the Limitation Act, that adverse possession which bars one person (e.g., a widow) may also bar a reversionary heir — a principle approved in the cited authorities — reinforcing the conclusion that successors cannot claim a fresh period of limitation. The court addressed the respondent's policy concern (that charities might be prejudiced if a dishonest trustee remains in office for 12 years), observing that beneficiaries have remedies (declaration, enforcement of trust, removal of trustee) and cannot sleep on their rights and later claim fresh starts for successive trustees.

Having concluded that the Judicial Committee's decision in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das was binding and determinative, the court applied that principle to the facts and held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the District Judge is set aside; and the suit is dismissed with costs in all the Courts.

Implications:

  • The court applied and followed the Judicial Committee's decision in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das as binding authority on the question whether adverse possession against an office-holder runs so as to bar successors; accordingly, a succeeding shebait does not acquire a fresh start for limitation purposes.
  • As applied to the facts (putni created 9th September 1848), the plaintiff's claim to annul the putni and recover possession was held to be barred by limitation.
  • The decision does not purport to create a new principle; it follows and applies an existing Judicial Committee authority (Damodar Das). The court noted policy concerns for charities but observed that remedies exist for beneficiaries and that the law will not permit beneficiaries to "sleep over their rights" and claim a fresh start for each successive trustee.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or interpret facts or law beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Madhu Sudan Mandal v. Radhika Prosad Das

    1. This is an appeal on be-half of the defendant in a suit for declaration of title to land, for cancellation of a permanent lease and for recovery of possession. The plaintiff, who sues as shebait of Issur Radha Damudor Thakur, alleges that the disputed property is part of the endowment of the idol and was wrongfully granted in putni on the 9th September 18l8 by Utsabananda Das, who was at that time the shebait. Utsabananda died in 18S5 and was succeeded by Gur Das who retired on the 17th November 1903 in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that the lease was granted for a small premium of Rs. 91 and at an inadequate rent of Rs. 67-2-7 per annum, that the alienation was without legal necessity and in no way beneficial to the endowment, and that, consequently, it is not binding upon the endowed property in his hands. The defendant resisted the claim on the merits and pleaded the bar of limitation. The Courts below have concurrently decreed the suit. On the present appeal, that decree has been assailed on the ground, that the suit is barred by limitation. The case for the appellant in. substance is that at the date of the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff had no subsisting title, because the title had been extinguished by adverse possession at a time when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force and possibly at an earlier period when Regulation III of 1793 was in operation. In support of this view, reliance has been placed principally upon the cases of Luchmee Bukhsh Runjeet Ram 13 B.L.R. (P.C.) 177 : 20 W.R. 375; Fatimatulnissa v. Sundar Das 27 I.A. 103 : 27 C. 1004 : 4 C.W.N. 565; Jagamba v. Ram Chandra 31 C. 314 and Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632. On behalf of the respondent, it has been contended in answer to this argument, that a lease granted by a shebait in excess of his authority does Dot hold good beyond the term of his office, and that each succeeding shebait acquires a new cause of action which he can enforce within the statutory period calculated from the date when he assumes charge of the office. In support of the contention that a lease granted by a shebait in excess of his authority does not continue in operation beyond the term of his office, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Radha Vallab v. Jagat Chandra (1826) 4 Mac. Sel. Rep. 151; Arruth Misser v. Juggurnath 18 W.R. 439; Bunwaree Chand Thakoor v. Mudden Mohan 21 W.R. 41; Ramchandra v. Kashinath 19 B. 271 and Prosunno Kumar Adhikari v. Saroda Prosunno Adhikari 22 C. 989. Reference has also been made to the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Abhiram Goswami v. Shyam Charan 36 C. 1003 at p. 1013 : 36 I.A. 148 : 4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 14 C.W.N. 1 : 10 C.L.J. 284 : 6 A.L.J. 857 : 11 Bom. L.R. 234 : 19 M.L.J. 530. In support of the view that each succeeding shebait acquires a fresh cause of action, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Prosunno Moyee Dossi v. Kunjo Beharee Chowdhry (1864) W.R. 157; Burm Suroop Doss v. khashee Jha 20 W.R. 471 Ram Churn Tewary v. Protap Chandra Dutt Jha 2 C.L.J. 448; Mahomed v. Ganapati 13 M. 277 and Vedapuratti v. Vallabha 13 M. 402. It has been conceded, however, by the learned Vakil for the respondent, in the course of the able argument which he has addressed to us on this part of the case, that the contrary view has been taken by this Court in the case of Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy 23 C. 536 at p. 545. The question raised is not free from difficulty, and, if it hail not been, as we shall presently show, concluded by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632 a good deal could have been reasonably urged in support of the view that each succeeding shebait acquires a fresh cause of action with reference to the terms of Section 14 of Regulation III of 1793 and Section 2 of Act XIV of 1859. In the case before the Judicial Committee, debutter property was divided between two persons each of whom claimed to be entitled to the office of rnohunt. This distribution continued in operation for more than 12 years during their life-time. After the death of the senior chela, the successor-in-office commenced an action for recovery of the property. It was contended that time ran as against him from the date when he obtained possession of the office, and this view was accepted by the Subordinate Judge. When the matter was brought up to this Court on appeal, reliance was placed in support of this view upon the decision in Arruth Misser v. Juggurnath 18 W.R. 439. This Court, however, held, on the authority of the decision in Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Boy (16) that adverse possession had commenced from the date of the distribution of the property and has not been interrupted by the death of the original mohunt and the succession of the new mohunt to the office. In this view, the decision of the Court of first instance was reversed and the suit dismissed. When the case was taken on appeal to the Judicial Committee, reliance was again placed upon the decision, on the one hand in Arruth Misser v. Juggurnath 18 W.R. 439 and, on the other hand in Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy 23 C. 536 at p. 545. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that adverse possession had commenced and had continued uninterrupted from the time of the original distribution of the property, and, in this view, affirmed the decree of this Court. In our opinion, in view of this decision, it is now impossible to maintain the position that each succeeding shebait acquires a fresh start for the purpose of limitation. This conclusion may be supported on the analogy of the principle recognised under the Limitation Act of 1859 that adverse possession which bars a widow also bars the reversionary heir: Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder 9 W.R. 505 approved in Amirto Lal v. Rajonee Kant 2 I.A. 113 : 23 W.R. 214 : 15 B.L.R. 10 and Hari Nath v. Mathur Mohun 21 C. 8 : 20 I.A. 183. The learned Vakil for the plaintiff contends, however, with great earnestness that this view of the law may prove disastrous ten charities, because if a dishonest trustee continues in office for 12 years after an improper alienation for value, the trust would be left without a remedy. But there is no real hardship, for, as soon as a breach of trust is committed, it is open to the beneficiaries or the persons interested in the maintenance of the debutter, to take suitable steps for a declaration that the alienation is invalid, for the enforcement of the trust, and, if need be, for the removal of the trustee: if they sleep over their rights, they cannot be allowed to contend that each successive trustee should get a fresh start from the date of his appointment; in other words, there is no period of limitation for setting aside improper alienations for value made by a trustee.

    2. It has not been disputed that if the principle of the decision in Damodar v. Lakhan 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632 is applied, the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. As already stated, the putni was created on the 9th September 1848, and it is immaterial whether adverse possession is deemed to have commenced from that date or from the time of the death of the grantor in 1855, the title to annul the putni was extinguished in 1837 at the latest. But the learned Vakil for the respondent suggests that the case of a putni may possibly be distinguished from the case of a sale. In our opinion, no substantial distinction in principle can be recognised between the two cases. Nor are we able to accept the view that the decision of the Judicial Committee in Damodar v. Lakhan 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632 should not be followed, because it is inconsistent with the earlier decision in Abhiram. v. Shama Charan 36 C. 1003 at p. 1013 : 36 I.A. 148 : 4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 14 C.W.N. 1 : 10 C.L.J. 284 : 6 A.L.J. 857 : 11 Bom. L.R. 234 : 19 M.L.J. 530. It appears that after the case of Abhiram v. Shama Charan 36 C. 1003 at p. 1013 : 36 I.A. 148 : 4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 14 C.W.N. 1 : 10 C.L.J. 284 : 6 A.L.J. 857 : 11 Bom. L.R. 234 : 19 M.L.J. 530 which was decided on the 30th July 1908 the Judicial Committee ,took a contrary view in Shyam Chand v. Ram Kanai 14 C.W.N. CCXLIV and on the 15th June 1910 on review, recalled their judgment in that case Shyam Chand v. Ram Kanai 15 C.W.N. 417 : 38 C. 526 : 14 C.L.J. 238 : 10 Ind. Cas. 683 : 13 Bom. L.R. 421 : 9 M.L.T. 448 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 281 : 8 A.L.J. 528 : 21 M.L.J. 1145 which was finally decided on the 28th February 1911 in accordance with the case of Abhiram v. Shama Charan 36 C. 1003 at p. 1013 : 36 I.A. 148 : 4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 14 C.W.N. 1 : 10 C.L.J. 284 : 6 A.L.J. 857 : 11 Bom. L.R. 234 : 19 M.L.J. 530; meanwhile, before the application for review in Shyam Chand v. Ram Kanai 14 C.W.N. CCXLIV judgment was given in Damodar Das v. Adikari Lakhan 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632 on the 17th June 191U. This circumstance cannot affect the binding character of the decision in Damodar v. Adikari Lakhan 37 C. 885 : 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 303 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 12 Bom. L.R. 632 and we are bound to follow it in the present case.

    3. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the District Judge set aside, and the suit dismissed with costs in all the Courts.

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    Madhu Sudan Mandal v. Radhika Prosad Das
    (Aug 30, 1912)