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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These consolidated proceedings arise from disputes over boring (prospecting) operations in Mauza Parsundi (about 4,906–5,000 bighas). The Iron and Steel Company (the first-party petitioners) initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 10 July 1919 (Rule No. 847), alleging title and prospecting rights derived from the Maharaja of Burdwan (the zamindar) and subsequent authorizations and registered documents (authorizations of April 1918 and confirmed registrations in 1918–1919). The petitioners alleged they were in peaceful, uninterrupted possession for boring purposes (bringing boilers, boring instruments, machinery, building huts, sinking boreholes and extracting coal).

The second party (patnidars, mukarraridars and H.V. Low & Company / Sampson) claimed rival rights derived from patni settlements and amalnamas and had also carried out boring in parts of the mauza. Police reports and a Section 144 order were issued in May–July 1919 due to apprehension of breach of the peace. The Sub-divisional Officer initiated Section 145 proceedings on 10 July 1919 attaching the lands in dispute until disposal. The proceedings were amended repeatedly (four times) to define the dispute and parties; various applications to add parties (including mukarraridars and lakherajdars) were made and refused. The magistrate directed written statements and evidence; the petitioners challenged the maintainability of S.145 proceedings and contended that S.107 proceedings were appropriate. The High Court ultimately set aside the S.145 proceedings and directed that the magistrate may proceed under S.107 if he considers it necessary. All three Rules were made absolute.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether proceedings under Section 145 CrPC were maintainable in respect of a broad dispute over prospecting and mineral rights across the whole mauza Parsundi, or whether the matter was unsuitable for determination under S.145 because it required adjudication of complex title and possession issues.
  2. Whether the magistrate should determine questions of title, constructive/actual possession and rights over minerals and mining in such circumstances, or whether such questions fall outside the proper scope of S.145 proceedings.
  3. Whether, in order to prevent a breach of the peace, the magistrate ought instead to adopt summary preventive measures under Section 107 CrPC rather than the attachment and inquiry procedure under Section 145.

Arguments of the Parties

First Party (Iron and Steel Company / Petitioners)

  • Asserted that the Maharaja of Burdwan (the zamindar) was sole owner of minerals/mineral rights and had authorized the petitioners (through intermediaries and registered documents) to carry on boring operations.
  • Claimed peaceful and uninterrupted actual possession for boring purposes (bringing boilers, instruments, fitting machinery, building bungalows and huts, driving boreholes, extracting coal).
  • Alleged that they had acquired rights from mukarraridars by documents dated 4 December 1918 and 1 February 1919.
  • Argued that the only overt act giving rise to apprehension of breach of the peace was obstruction of their carts by the second party (an incident outside the mauza about three miles away), and that the correct procedure was to take action under Section 107 CrPC rather than Section 145.
  • Contended that the zamindar alone was entitled to minerals and mineral rights and that rival claimants through patnidars were mere wrongdoers lacking rights sufficient to found S.145 proceedings.
  • Applied for inclusion of the mukarraridars as parties (application refused).

Second Party (Patnidars, Mukarraridars, H.V. Low & Company / Sampson)

  • Claimed rights to boring and mineral prospecting derived from the patni settlement and documents (amalnama) executed by patnidars; alleged long possession of the mauza predating 1839 and prior to the decennial settlement.
  • Alleged that Low & Co. (and their representatives) had been in peaceful and undisturbed possession by making borings, sinking shafts, raising coal and testing fire clay and stone — with operations and substantial shafts (some reported 90 and 116 feet deep).
  • Contended that the dispute concerned the right to carry on boring operations across the whole mauza and that oral and practical identification of separate bounded plots was not feasible; therefore proceedings should cover the whole mauza rather than limited portions.
  • Asserted that the petitioners had not actually carried on boring operations (beyond mobilizing men and machinery) while the second party had already conducted substantial boring.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bejoy Nath Chatterji v. Bengal Coal Company Limited That magistrates exercising jurisdiction under provisions corresponding to S.145 (here cited as S.530 under an earlier enactment) should not volunteer decisions on complex title questions; the possession relevant to such jurisdiction must be real and tangible and cannot be inferred across a large territory merely from acts done in a limited area. The Court relied on this case as a closely analogous authority: it concluded that the magistrate should not be asked under S.145 to determine complicated questions of title, constructive possession or wide-area rights arising from contested documents and contracts; the magistrate's proper function is limited to identifying actual possession of the disputed subject matter, which in this case would not resolve the core controversy.
Moniram Bewah v. Mirjan Sardar That in disputes of this character, the senior Judge's opinion prevails and that the relevant jurisdictional posture concerns Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 rather than the revisional sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court agreed with the ruling and invoked it to support the direction that S.145 proceedings be set aside and that the magistrate should, if he thinks fit, proceed under Section 107 CrPC to prevent a breach of the peace; this influenced the Court's disposition to prefer S.107 proceedings as the appropriate preventive remedy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed both factual complexity and the legal limits of magistrates' jurisdiction under Section 145 CrPC. The central strands of reasoning, stated in the opinion, are:

  1. Scope and nature of the dispute: The disagreement was essentially about the right to carry on prospecting/boring operations and to obtain minerals across a large mauza. The contest involved multiple claimants (zamindar, patnidars, mukarraridars, lakherajdars, tenants and companies) and required construction of historical settlements, transferred rights, and documents executed both before and after the permanent/decennial settlements.
  2. Limits of S.145 jurisdiction: The Court emphasised that S.145 is concerned with determining which party is in actual possession of the subject-matter of dispute and that such possession must be "real and tangible." Where claims depend on interpretation of documents, questions of constructive possession, adverse possession and competing contractual rights, these are complex title matters properly cognizable by civil courts rather than by a magistrate in summary criminal proceedings.
  3. Nature of prospecting rights and possession: The Court noted the legal point (as stated in the opinion) that a mere prospecting license or license to dig minerals confers no estate or interest in the soil or in minerals before they are actually extracted. A license coupled with a grant to remove minerals may be a profit a prendre and could, if exclusive and exercised by actual taking, be the subject of possessory remedies — but such determinations require fuller adjudication than S.145 permits.
  4. Analogous authority: The Court relied on Bejoy Nath Chatterji v. Bengal Coal Company Limited to illustrate that magistrates should not be used to resolve wide-ranging title disputes involving mineral rights and that acts of possession in limited parts of a large territory are not sufficient to establish possession of the whole for the purposes of magistrate action under S.145.
  5. Practical and remedial considerations: The Court considered alternative criminal preventive procedure — Section 107 CrPC — as a simpler, more appropriate tool to prevent imminent breaches of the peace. It reasoned that binding principal officers and parties under S.107 could prevent disturbance without requiring the magistrate to adjudicate complex title or expansive claims of possession. The Court also addressed a practical objection (that binding under S.107 might be rendered nugatory by replacement of bound men) and observed that principal officers can be bound and further proceedings can be taken if replacements occur.
  6. Dissenting view and resolution: A learned colleague thought the report showing a likelihood of breach and the fact that the dispute concerned land meant the High Court should not interfere at that stage (and that S.146 might follow if the magistrate could not find possession). The majority, however, was of the opinion that S.145 proceedings over such a large mauza would risk injustice to actual occupants and would force the magistrate into resolving complex title and possession questions which are inappropriate in this forum.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Taking into account statutory scheme, practical consequences and precedent, the Court concluded that S.145 was not appropriate in this case and that the magistrate ought to consider proceeding under S.107 to secure the peace.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The proceedings under Section 145 CrPC were set aside and the Magistrate was directed that he may, if he considers it necessary, take proceedings under Section 107 CrPC; all three Rules were made absolute.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The attachment and inquiry under S.145 were quashed. The magistrate is authorized to consider and, if advisable, institute preventive proceedings under S.107 to avert a breach of the peace.
  • Procedural consequence: The criminal summary jurisdiction under S.145 was deemed an inappropriate vehicle to resolve substantive, wide-ranging disputes over mineral rights, possession and title; such substantive disputes should be left to the proper civil fora or fuller adjudicatory processes.
  • Precedential effect: The Court applied existing authority (Bejoy Nath Chatterji and Moniram Bewah) and statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion. The opinion does not purport to establish a new, expansive precedent beyond applying and illustrating the existing principle that magistrates should not decide complex title disputes under S.145; rather, it reaffirms that line of authority and directs remedial use of S.107 in similar circumstances.

Administrative remark from the opinion: The opinion records that the learned Judges were not unanimous on all points of law and procedure; a colleague expressed a differing view regarding non-interference at this stage, but the majority ordered S.145 proceedings set aside and permitted S.107 action.


This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion text and does not introduce facts or legal authorities beyond what the opinion itself contains.

    Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. And Others v. Banso Gopal Tewari And Others Opposite Parties.

    1. In these three matters Rules were issued on the same day practically based on the same facts. They arise out of some boring operations in Mauza Parsundi comprising of about 5,000 bighas of land (4,906 according to the revenue survey). The Iron and Steel Company, who are the first party in the; proceedings under S. 145 initiated on 10th July 1919, obtained as petitioners Rule No. 847 on the following allegations, namely, that the Maharaja of Burdwan was the zamindar of the Mauza and sole owner of the minerals and mineral rights therein. On 9th September 1839 he granted a patni settlement of the mauza to certain persons, shortly referred to as the Chatterjees and Misras. On 5th April he authorized one E.J Seth Sam on behalf of the Parsundi Mining Syndicate to go on with boring operations in the mauza pending execution and registration of a formal document and Seth Sam in his turn on 12th April 1918 authorized the petitioners to carry on boring operations therein in a similar way. On 27th September 1918 the Maharaja granted Seth Sam a formal document and Seth Sam in his turn executed and registered a similar document in favour of the petitioners on 28th April 1919 confirming the authority given to them on 12th April 1918. The petitioners further allege that they were peacefully and uninterruptedly carrying on boring operations in the mauza and were

    “in possession thereof both surface and underground, for boring purposes by bringing boiler and boring instruments, fitting machinery, building bungalows and cooly huts, driving boreholes and bringing out coal and exercising various other acts of actual possession in other ways;”

    2. That the place where boring operations were actually going on, having been claimed by Protapchandra Mondal and others as mukararridars the petitioners had acquired all their rights including mining and mineral rights, if any, by documents, dated 4th December 1918 and 1st February 1919. The petitioners further allege that one Mr. Sampson of H.V Low & Company had joined hands with the patnidars and had obtained an amalnama from them on 22nd January 1919 to carry on boring operations in the said mauza and that he had commenced boring operations on 31st March 1919 in another part of the mauza, that he had prevented carts carrying coal for the petitioners at a place outside the mauza about three miles from their boring site and a breach of the peace being apprehended the petitioners had informed the police and that the police thereupon submitted reports. On 19th May the Sub-divisional Officer of Suri passed an order under Section 144 of the Cr PC, based upon the police reports, dated 6th April 1919 and 16th May 1919 to the effect that a breach of the peace was likely at any moment. Therefore he directed both parties to abstain from doing anything which might cause a breach of the, peace. On 8th July 1919 he passed a fresh order that as the first party was trying to commit a breach of the peace in connexion with their boring operations they were to be stopped carrying them on. On 9th July the Deputy Superintendent of Police reported that he had failed to effect an amicable settlement that

    “both parties were strong and apparently irrevocably imbued with the idea of righteousness of their claim and possession and as a breach of the peace was likely it was necessary to take action under Section 107 or 145 of the Cr PC, as soon as possible”

    3. And thereupon proceedings under S. 145 were taken on 10th July by the sub-divisional officer

    “in respect of such portion of mauza Paraundi where the parties had set up their boring operations and all land in and around such places which they intended to be used for the boring operations.”

    4. The order proceeded thus:

    “Let all these lands be attached by the police till the disposal of this case. Let copies of the proceeding be served on the parties as well as the lands in dispute and all other places according to law.”

    5. The patnidars and Mr. Sampson and his employers were named as the second party. They put in a petition for amendment of the order and the proceedings were accordingly amended on 1st August 1919. Other names were aided and the boundaries of the entire mauza Parsundi were given as being the boundaries of the subject-matter of dispute. The dispute was mentioned as “concerning certain boring operations carried on in mouza Parsundi” and the parties were directed to put in written statements of their claim regarding the fact of actual possession of the land in dispute. On 19th August the parties appeared and further applications were made for addition of parties on behalf of the second party and the same were granted and the proceedings were again amended. The dispute was mentioned as

    “concerning certain boring operations carried on at Parsundi for possession of the underground coal and other mineral products in the said Mauza.”

    6. It also directed that written statements were to be put in to the respective claims of the parties regarding the fact of actual possession of the land in dispute. On that day the petitioners put in an objection against the maintainability of the said proceedings, contending that the only overt act from which a breach of the peace was apprehended from the side of the second party namely obstruction to carts carrying coal for the petitioners, and that action should therefore be taken under Section 107 of the Cr PC, and that no proceedings under S. 145 were maintainable as the police report did not disclose any dispute as to possession of the entire mauza, but only as to the boring operations carried on in certain portions of the said mauza and that the proceedings if at all maintainable should be confine to those portions. They further contended that the zamindar alone was entitled to the minerals and mineral rights and having been authorized by the zamindar and having carried on boring operations, were in actual possession thereof and the second party having been mere wrongdoers claiming title through the patnidars who had no right to the minerals and mineral rights could not be said to have such a claim to possession as would justify proceedings under S. 145.

    7. The Sub-divisional Magistrate overruled these objections and again amended these proceedings mentioning that the dispute was

    “concerning certain boring operations carried on in the mauza for possession of the underground coal and other mineral products in the said mauza”

    8. And written statements were again directed to be filed regarding the fact of actual possession of the land in dispute. Written statements were filed and evidence was directed to be produced on 1st September 1919. The petitioners filed a list of 26 witnesses to be summoned on their behalf. On 1st September 1919 the second party verbally applied for a further amendment which was objected to by the petitioners, but the sub-divisional officer amended the proceedings for the fourth time stating that the dispute was

    “concerning possession of the underground coal and other mineral products in the said mauza”

    9. And the parties were directed to put in written statements, of their respective claims regarding the fact of actual possession of the land in dispute.

    10. The petitioners applied for the inclusion of the mukarridars whose rights they had acquired as additional parties, which was refused. The mukarraridars themselves applied to be added and they were also refused on 1st September 1919 which is the subject matter of Rule No. 870. They alleged that they were vitally interested in the subject matter and that if the Maharaja of Burdwan had not got the mineral and mining rights they as mukarraridars had them and that they transferred such rights to the first party petitioners.

    11. The third Rule relates to the application of one Soshi Bhusan Tewari as one of the lakherajdars of certain of the mauza.

    12. It is quite clear that the dispute is as regards the right to carry on boring operations in the said mauza. The first party petitioners claim such right upon a grant by the zamindar, that Sampson, that is to say, Low & Company, on the other hand, claim a similar right from the patnidars. The issue as between the zamindar and the putnidars is as to whether there being no express mention of the mining rights and minerals in the grant by the zamindar to the patnidars as alleged by the Zamindar the putnidars are at all entitled to such rights. The zamindar relies upon the recent Privy Council rulings and asserts that the patnidars have no such right. The putnidars alleged that they have been in possession of the mauza from long before 1839 and prior to the decennial settlement, that one Mritunjoy Chatterjee had executed a registered kabuliyat, in favour of the patnidars in December 1907 in respect of the underground right of Nij Mauza Nakrakuda which includes Mauza Parsundi and that Mritunjoy had let out such rights to the Indian Mineral Syndicate in March 1917 who in their turn had leased them out to the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Limited, and that the company were

    “in possession of the mauza both surface and soil by bringing boiler, boring instruments, fitting machinery and building bungalows and cooly huts, driving vehicles, sinking shafts and bringing out coal and exercising other divers acts of actual possession since June 1917;

    13. That Low & Co. had taken a settlement of the surface and underground rights of Mauza Parsundi from the patnidars, the Chatterjees, and mukarraridars, the Misras, and have been

    “in peaceful and undisturbed possession by making borings, sinking shafts, raising coal and testing fire clay and digging stones;”

    14. That Low & Co. having derived their title from the patnidars have been exercising acts of possession and were in actual possession of the minerals of the whole mauza by making borings and sinking shafts and raising fire clay and coal and other minerals since January 1919. They contend that the sole question for determination is as to who was in actual possession of the disputed land at the time of the initiation of these proceedings. The second party say that the first party have not carried on any boring operations although they may have collected machinery and men for that purpose, but that they themselves had bored in at least four different places and that two of their shafts were about 90 and 116 feet deep, a fact reported to by the District Superintendent of Police on 9th July 1919. They further contend that the dispute is as to the right to carry on boring operations over the whole of the mauza and not in respect of portions in which boring operations are said to be going on, and that it is not possible to give the boundaries of the separate plots where the boring operations are said to be going on, and that these proceedings should therefore cover the whole of the mauza.

    15. The mauza was originally let out to patnidars. The patnidars have let out portions to mukararridars and the mukararidars have tenants under them. The mouza is a very large one. The surface appears to be in the actual possession of tenants. The first party contends that there has been no dispute with regard to the boring operations carried on by the second party which have not been interfered with, and say that they do not intend to interfere with their boring operations where they are being carried on; that so far as their own boring operations are concerned the tenants at the place do not object; that they have got their consent; that there was no dispute between them and the tenants who were in actual possession of the tracts where they were carrying on their boring operations. Mere recital of the above facts shows that the question of title in this matter is one of considerable difficulty in this case and involves a construction of documents, determination of rights of landowners prior to the decennial settlement and after the permanent settlement, and the consideration of Privy Council cases. It also involves a consideration of what is meant by possession in such matters and the difference between actual and constructive possession in the case of mines and minerals. The fact that the proceedings were amended four times shows that the Magistrate had difficulty in his own mind as to how to word the nature of the dispute. The dispute is not only as between the zamindar and the patnidars but also between the patnidars, mukarraridars, alleged lakherajdars and actual tenants. What the Court has to find in proceedings under S. 145 is actual possession only. Actual possession of the surface where the boring operations may have to be carried on is presumably in the tenants of the land. Finding of such actual possession will not help the matter at all. Sinking of a shaft and touching coal may be said to give title to the underground seam, but it is not for a criminal Court to deal with these matters. It is not the function of that Court to go into such complicated questions of title and possession including that of adverse possession and of constructive possession of wide areas inferred from actual possession of limited areas, based upon disputed contractual rights and obligations and contested by independent claimants. The actual disputants do not hold mining leases but merely prospecting licenses. We have seen copies of the amalnamah of the second party and the prospecting licenses of the first party. A license to dig minerals confers no estate or interest in the soil or mine containing them. Nor does it confer any estate or interest in the minerals before they are actually gotten. A license to dig minerals, coupled with a grant to carry them away, is a profit a prendre, an incorporeal hereditament lying in grant, and if exercised by an actual taking of possession it may be the subject-matter of use and occupation; and (if exclusive) may be, and (even if non-exclusive) probably may be, the subject-matter of an action to recover possession.

    16. The documents, so far as we have seen them, give the holders a right to bore and in the event of their finding coal certain terms are to be arranged between the parties and leases granted. I do not think that, in a case like this, the dispute is one concerning land involving a question of actual possession. What is actually in possession of the parties is not in dispute, but what has given rise to the dispute between the parties is the right claimed, by the first party, petitioners, and the second party, Low & Co., to bore holes for prospecting purposes over the entire mauza. I do not think that the Court has jurisdiction in a matter of this character to go into questions of title and possession which will arise between the various parties claiming and interested in the land both surface and underground. A somewhat similar case is that of Bejoy Nath Chatterji v. Bengal Coal Company Limited (1). The learned Judges there held that, although Courts are anxious not to unduly tie the hands of Magistrates who are responsible for maintaining the peace, the High Court has always so construed the provisions of S. 530 (corresponding to our present S. 145) and the corresponding provisions of earlier enactments on the same subject, as to take care that the Magistrates do not volunteer decisions on questions properly cognizable by other Courts and unnecessarily complicate investigations which afterwards take place in those Courts. That case related to a dispute regarding the right to dig for coal on some land comprised within the limits of the mauza which belonged to the proprietors under whom both the contending parties claimed. In that case the question of actual possession of the whole mauza was raised and it was asserted by one party that they were in possession of the whole of that property. It was clear in that case, upon the terms of the document relied upon, that all that the Coal Company took under the grant was the right to dig for coals under such portions of the estate as might be found fit for the purpose. Such right was distinctly limited to purposes ancillary to the working of coal underground. The learned Judges there say that the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under S. 530 is defined in these words,

    “that if he is satisfied that a dispute likely to induce a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or the boundaries of any land or concerning any houses, water, fisheries, crops or other produce of land within the limits of his jurisdiction, he is directed without reference to the merits of the claims of any party to a right of possession, to proceed to inquire and decide which party is in possession of the subject of dispute.”

    17. It is practically the same thing under the present section. The learned Judges held that the possession in regard to which a Magistrate's jurisdiction under S. 530 should be exercised must be of a real and tangible character. They thought that when a party claimed under a document or agreement the right of doing certain things over a large extent of territory, the performance of acts under such alleged right in one portion of the ground over which the right extends, although it may be good and sufficient for the purpose of keeping alive that right so as to be an answer to the plea of limitation raised in a civil suit, was not of itself a sufficient possession on which the Magistrate's order under S. 530 may be based for the purpose of forbidding in a distant locality acts not necessarily in conflict with such possession, though at variance with the right. They thought that the Magistrate was not the proper forum, for determining such questions. I take the same view in this case.

    18. One is always extremely unwilling to interfere with the orders of a Magistrate who is the proper authority for maintaining the peace, but lam of opinion that the same object can well be attained in this case by taking proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC. It is said that such proceedings may be infructuous as the man bound down may be immediately changed and replaced by another set. There is no difficulty in binding down the principal officers in charge and any change in the officers can be immediately supplemented by taking proceedings against the replaced men. Some vigilance is to be expected from the authorities. There has been no disturbance of any kind for a considerable number of months. No doubt there is a statement in the report that men had been collected on both sides; but it is clear from the report itself that such men had been collected for the purpose of carrying on mining operations. They are not mentioned as lathials and no reference is made that these men (coolies) who have been brought upon the land for the purpose of carrying on the boring operations have committed any unlawful acts. The only unlawful act mentioned is the stoppage of the first party's cart by the second party three miles away from the spot where they were preparing to carry on boring operations, and outside the mauza in question.

    19. I am sorry that my learned colleague is of a different opinion. He thinks that the matter is concluded by the fact that the report shows that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and the dispute concerns land. He is of opinion that if the Magistrate is unable to find possession he will act under S. 146, necessary and that at this stage we ought not to interfere. I am of opinion that proceedings under S. 146 with regard to such a large mauza may cause great injustice to the persons in actual occupation. It strikes me also that if proceedings under S. 107 may be rendered nugatory by replacing the men bound down by different sets of men, proceedings under S. 145 may also be made nugatory by persons who are not actual parties to these proceedings. All the persons interested in the mauza are not before the Court. The mukarraridars and lakherajdars and actual tenants of the whole mauza are not before the Court. While I feel that it is our duty to support a Magistrate in orders passed by him to prevent breaches of the peace, it is also a duty cast upon us to see that proceedings are adopted which are simple in their nature and which may be summarily and expeditiously dealt with. I think that proceedings under S. 107 ought to be adopted. We agree with the ruling of this Court in Moniram Bewah v. Mirjan Sardar (2), that in such matters the senior Judge's opinion prevails as the jurisdiction exercised by this Court is under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and not under the revisional sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We direct that the proceedings under S. 145 are to be set aside and that the Magistrate will take proceedings under S. 107 if so advised, and if he considers the same necessary. All the three Rules are made absolute.

    V.B/R.K

    20. Rules made absolute.

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    Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. And Others v. Banso Gopal Tewari And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Dec 22, 1919)