Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act
  • Encumbered Estates Act, and S. 12
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act
  • Encumbered Estates Act, and S. 12

    Raja Jyoti Pd. Singh Deo v. Ranjit Singh

    Das, J.:— I am unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. Section 3 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act provides that on the publication of an order under S. 2, that is to say, an order vesting in the Manager the management of the whole or any portion of the immoveable property of or to which the holder is then possessed or entitled in his own right, all proceedings which may then be pending in any Civil Court in British India or in any Revenue Court in Bengal in respect of such debt or liabilities shall be ‘barred’ and all processes, executions and attachments for or in respect of such debts and liabilities shall become null and void. S. 12 of the same Act provides that when all the debts and liabilities mentioned in the schedule referred to in S. 11 have been paid and discharged and the holder of his property or his heir is restored to the possession and enjoyment of the property, such restoration shall be notified in the Calcutta Gazette and thereupon the proceedings, processes, execution and attachments mentioned in S. 3 shall be revived.

    2. Now it appears to me that S. 3 gives a statutory protection to a person whose property is brought within the operation of the Encumbered Estates Act, and S. 12 removes that protection when the proprietor is restored to possession, and provides in effect that all remedies which, but for S. 3, the creditor could enforce against the proprietor shall been forcible against the proprietor as soon as he is restored to possession. Now, the petitioner brought a mortgage action against four persons, of whom the opposite party was one. After the commencement of the action there was a notification under S. 2 of the Act with the consequence that the proceedings which were then pending in respect of the debt due to the petitioner, by the express provision of the statute became ‘barred’ I use the expression “barred”, because the Act, which is very in artistically drafted, uses that expression; but I have no doubt whatever that the word “barred” means nothing more than what is conveyed by the expression “stayed”. The petitioner, however, proceeded with the suit so far as the other mortgagors were Concerned, and consented to an order striking out the name of the opposite party from the record. The petitioner then obtained a mortgage decree against all the mortgagors other than the opposite party. An order has now been made under S. 12 restoring the opposite party to the possession and enjoyment of his property and the sole question, which we have to decide is, whether the petitioner can continue the suit which he instituted against the opposite party notwithstanding the fact that he has not obtained a decree against the mortgagors other than the opposite party.

    3. Now it seems to me that the provision in S. 12 is closely analogous to what is known in the Chancery Courts as a proceeding of revivor. Now it is clear that a suit which was perfect at the time when it was instituted may, under certain circumstances, become defective. In such a case no proceeding can be taken in it until an order to revive the suit is made by the Court. If the defect is due to some impediment to the continuation of the suit an order of revivor cannot be passed until the impediment is removed, but when the impediment is removed, a court of Chancery will, under ordinary circumstances, make an order for revivor, provided that the petitioner proceeds with due diligence and satisfied the court that his claim will remain unsatisfied. That is the Chancery practice and I have no doubt whatever that S. 12 h-s to some extent introduced that practice here.

    4. But it was argued by the learned Vakil, who appears for the opposite party, that a mortgage claim is an indivisible claim, and the petitioner having elected to proceed against some of the mortgagors, has precluded himself from pursuing his remedy against the opposite party. That would be true under ordinary circumstances 4 but here we are dealing with exceptional legislation which bars the remedies available to the creditor for no other reason than that the proprietor is in insolvent circumstances and needs protection. The protection having been removed, the creditor is, in my judgment, restored to the position which he occupied at the time when the estate of the proprietor was vested in the Manager under the provisions of the Act.

    5. But the question still remains whether the claim of the petitioner still remains unsatisfied. On this point the parties adduced no evidence whatever. It is obvious that he ought not to be allowed to continue the proceeding, if his claim has been satisfied by the mortgagors other than the opposite party.

    6. I would set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and remand the case to him for disposal according to law.

    7. He must first investigate the question whether the debt due by the mortgagors to the petitioner has been satisfied by some of the mortgagors.

    8. If he finds that it has been satisfied, then of course no further proceedings can be taken. If he finds that the debt is still unsatisfied, then he will proceed with the suit.

    9. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.

    10. Ross, J.:— I agree.

    11. Case remanded.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Raja Jyoti Pd. Singh Deo v. Ranjit Singh
    (Apr 29, 1921)