Kulwant Sahay, J.:— It appears that on the 12th July, 1924 two complaints were filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Begusarai; one complaint was filed by the present petitioners against the opposite lardy charging them with offences under Ss. 147, 325 and 447 I.P.C; and the other complaint was filed by Sampat Lal Singh, one of the opposite party in the present case, against the petitioners in the present case charging them with offences under S. 148 and other Sections of the I.P.C The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate examined the complaints in both cases. In the complaint of the petitioners the order passed by him was as follows: “Put up after disposal of the counter case.” In the complaint filed by Sampat Lal against the petitioners the order was as follows:
“Summon Udit, Ugan, Ramdev, Ram Saran, Ram Balak, Raghunandan and Dev Lal S. 148 I.P.C for 31-7. There are talwar cuts on the side of this complainant and the complainant in the counter case does not say that there are such cuts on his side. I have compared the initial statements of the complainants in the two cases and think that the case instituted by Sampat Lal should be tried first.”
2. Against the order passed in the complaint filed by the petitioners, namely, the order to put up the case after the disposal of the counter case, the petitioners went up before the Sessions Judge in revision and the learned Judge rejected the petition summarily. The petitioners now come up to this Court against this order and pray that the order for putting up the case after the disposal of the counter case may be set aside and the Magistrate may be directed to proceed with their case simultaneously with the counter case. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on the provisions of Sections 200, 202, 203, 204, 252 and 344 of the Cr PC and he argues that when a complaint is filed under S. 200 and the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, and the complainant is examined, the Magistrate is bound to issue process under S. 204 unless he thinks it fit to dismiss the complaint under S. 203. He further argues that after issuing process under S. 204 he ought, in the present case which is a warrant case, to proceed under S. 252 and that the Magistrate was bound to proceed to hear the complainant and take all evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. He says that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to postpone the case under S. 344 which does not govern the issue of process under S. 204. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel in this contention. S. 344 occurs in Chapter XXIV of the Code which deals with general provisions as to enquiries and trials. Mr. C.C Das argues that the provisions of S. 344 only come into operation when the enquiry or trial has commenced and he says that an enquiry or trial does not commence until after the issue of process under S. 204. I am unable to agree with Mr. Das in this contention.
3. In my opinion S. 344 is applicable to cases even before the issue of process under S. 204 and the Magistrate is entitled under S. 344, if there be a reasonable cause for doing so, to postpone any enquiry or trial and to postpone the issue of process under S. 204. S. 202 deals with enquiries after a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on complaint and before he dismisses it under S. 203 or issues process under S. 204, and there is nothing in law which prevents a Magistrate from postponing issue of process under S. 204 if there is reasonable cause for doing so even if the case be a warrant case.
4. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that after a Magistrate has taken cognizance of a case it is the policy of the law that he should proceed to deal with the case and not to postpone the enquiry or trial and he Teliei upon the case of Sheikh Bahadur v. Nobad Ali(1). I agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that it is the policy of the law that a Court should proceed to enquiry into and try the case as soon as it takes cognizance of a complaint, but he is not prevented by any provision of the law from postponing the enquiry or trial if in his opinion there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for so doing. In the case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, their Lordships after laying down the general proposition that it is the policy of the law to go on immediately with the enquiry or trial proceeded to consider whether in that particular case there were reasonable grounds to justify the order of postponement made by the Magistrate and after considering the facts of the case they were of opinion that there were no reasonable grounds.
5. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite party that simultaneous trial of two counter cases is illegal and reliance has been placed upon the case of Dhako Singh v. King-Emperor(2). This case does not support the contention of the learned Vakil foe the opposite-party. Mr. Justice Jwala Prasad, held in that case that there is no prohibition in law for simultaneous trials of counter cases and nothing has been placed before me to justify the contention that the simultaneous trial of two counter cases is illegal. In the case referred to above (2), the question arose as to whether the conviction of the petitioner in that case was bad in law on account of two counter cases being tried simultaneously and his Lordship held that the mere fact of two cases being tried simultaneously would not justify the setting aside of the conviction, but if the petitioner could show any prejudice on account of the simultaneous trial of two cases then he would be entitled to a setting aside of the conviction. Reliance has been also placed by the learned Vakil for the opposite party upon the case of Lalji Singh v. Naurangi Lal(3). In that case two counter-complaints were filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and he referred both the cases to a Sub-Deputy Magistrate for enquiry and report and on receipt of the report he issued process in one case and directed the counter case to be put up after the disposal of the former case and it was held that the action of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not contravene any rule of procedure and that the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in postponing the case was not revisable by the High Court. In my opinion the only question to be decided in such cases is as to whether there is any reasonable cause for postponing one case until after the disposal of another. The power given to a Court to postpone the hearing of one case until after the disposal of another case is conferred by S. 344 which provides that if, from the absence of a witness or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn any enquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. Therefore, the real question is as to whether there is any reasonable cause for postponing the counter case. If there be such cause it is a matter of discretion and if the Magistrate does not exercise his discretion judicially in postponing the case, this Court will interfere and set aside the order, but if the discretion is exercised in a sound and judicial manner there is no reason why this Court should interfere with the discretion. In the present case the complainant in the counter case, who is one of the opposite-party in the present application, admits having assaulted the complainant, who is the petitioner in the present case. The only question for decision, therefore, would be whether he did so in exercise of the right of private defence of properly or person. That question can be conveniently decided after the disposal of the complaint made by the opposite-party in the present case. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. It is, however, desirable that the counter case should be taken up immediately after the conclusion of the case which is now being tried, namely, the case started on the complaint of Sampat Lal Singh, and as soon as this case, namely, the case started on the complaint of Sampat Lal, is concluded, the counter case, namely, the case started on the complaint of the petitioner, should be taken up and, if possible, the judgment in the case of Sampat Lal should be postponed until after the conclusion of the trial of the case instituted by the petitioner.
6. Rule discharged.
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