1. This appeal arises out ??? a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession of a certain share in the estate bearing tauzi No. 3766 in Saran District. The property which is very small, is part of a ??? which was originally held in common by four brothers, Chhatar Rai, Prayag Rai Jagu Rai and Bahadur Rai. Dudnatl Rai, the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting defendants, obtained a mortgage-decree in execution of which he brought to sale and himself purchases the share of two of the brothers, Jagur and Bahadur, together with a thin interest described in his sale-certificate as that of Sona Kuer widow of Suba Rai, the son of Prayag Rai who was then deceased. Subsequently, one Seba Rai sued the family on an earlier mort gage, said to have been granted be Nandlal one of the sons of Chhata Rai, joining defendant, Dudhanath Rai in which he obtained a decree. This Sewa Rai was brother-in-law of Nandlal, a fact which led the Court to regard with some suspicion the admissions which were made on behalf ??? Nandlal and Ramdhari; but the suit was decreed against the shares to Chattar and Prayag, the question ther having arisen of whether Dudnath Rai had, by his purchase, acquired the share of Prayag Rai and that point having been decided against Dudnati Rai. The Courts accordingly awarded to Sewa Rai a mortgage-decree against the shares of Chhatar Rai and Prayag Rai, with a reservation, which appear to have been forgotten by all parties and to have escaped their notice unt: the case came in second appeal of or the, High Court, that the share ??? Chhatar Rai was subject to the lien ??? Dudnath Rai in respect of two mortgage-deeds of 28th November 1894, an 6th June 1897. However that may be Sewa Rai did purchase the shares ??? Chhatar Rai and Prayag Rai; and the Courts below have found that by the purchase Sewa Rai obtained title to the share which he now claims. We know nothing of the two mortgages mentioned in the judgment of Sewa Rai mortgage suit; whatever may be the effect of that reservation, and the findings of the Courts below may be accepted, that Sewa Rai by his purchas acquired title to the share which he now claims. In 1927, Sewa Rai's surviving son Sheopujan Rai sold his share to the plaintiff.
2. After the purchase in execution of the shares of Jagu Rai and Bahadur Rai, Dudnath Rai obtained mutation of his name in the Collector's Register for the half share. He subsequently obtained mutation for a larger share, though it is not clear from the evidence who was the person whose share was reduced in order that Dudnath Rai might obtain this correct entry. The result was that Sewa Rai and Sheopujan Rai were recorded in Register D for a nominal share smaller than that which would be represented by the shares of Chhatar Rai and Prayag Rai. The Munsif, considering that the entries in Register D afforded evidence of possession and without any detailed examination of the record of actual facts of possession made in the Record of Rights, found that the suit was barred by limitation, on the ground that the plaintiff had not been in possession of his share within the last twelve years.
3. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit, on the ground that since there had been no formal partition of this property, the possession of the defendants, who were cosharers of the plaintiffs, should be treated as in possession on behalf of their cosharers, and that no limitation could run in their favour. He therefore reversed the decision of the Munsif and decreed the suit.
4. Mr. B.N Mitter, on behalf of the appellants, points out that in the peculiar circumstances of this case the actual possession of one party should be held to be adverse to the other, since they are all of them intruders upon the property of an undivided joint family, against whom their possession was necessarily adverse from the beginning. Mr. B.P Sinha incidentally points out from the Record of Rights that the plaintiff actually is in possession of a share in the property equivalent to that which he claims, though his share in the small collections of the area held by tenants may, owing to the entry in Register D, be less than half.
5. This case is not without difficulty and the position is certainly anomalous. It may be argued that the possession of a definitely small share as indicated by the entry in Register D and by the collections of rent, must in any event be treated as adverse, whether the opposite party is technically a cosharer of the defendant or not. On the other hand, there is authority for the proposition that the possession of an unduly large amount of bakasht land in the estate ought not to be treated as adverse against cosharers. The adoption of this principle would lead to the anomalous result that in applying the law of limitation, notice should be taken of the symbolical possession enjoyed through the nominal share recorded in Register D, while the true facts of possession, of what the parties are actually in enjoyment, ought to be ignored in this connexion. The general rule, that possession by one tenant-in-common cannot, in the absence of special circumstances, be treated as adverse to another tenant-in-common, should not, I think, be held to apply in this case, where the circumstances are such as to indicate that the possession of each must have been adverse to the other from the beginning. When Dudnath Rai purchased the share of Jagu Rai and Bahadur and entered into possession, this entry by an alienee from co-parceners into the property alienated, was adverse to the other coparceners from the very moment of that entry: 1920 Mad. 160 (1), when Sewa Rai purchased the shares of Chhatar Rai and Prayag Rai and entered into possession, his entry into whatever he did actually enter, was similarly adverse to the other coparceners, who were parties to the litigation.
6. To that extent therefore the decision of the learned Munsif must be held to have been correct, though it would I think, be wrong to hold that he acted rightly in taking notice of the symbolical possession recorded in Register D and in the khewat, and in not taking into consideration the facts of actual possession as recorded in detail in the khatian. But this creates a position of some difficulty when the question of the form of the decree in the case has to be considered. The plaintiff can claim a decree because he has shown himself to be in possession of the share which he claims; but what he wants is a decree which wall entitle him to claim possession of something more than his rightful share. The defendants on the other hand may fairly take the position that since the plaintiff is already in possession of what he claims, he should not obtain a decree which will entitle him to claim anything more. Yet if the plaintiff's suit was dismissed, it is possible that on a partition, the defendant might on the strength of the entry in Register D be able to obtain possession of about half as much again as he is entitled to. The plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that his share in the estate is of the extent claimed in the plaint, and he is entitled to a decree for confirmation of existing possession; but he is not entitled to a decree which will enable him without partition to recover a larger share of the rent in the estate than he is collecting at present. Therefore although if the assets are brought into the hotchpot, the plaintiff would be entitled to share in partition of 2 pies 12½ krant he will not be entitled, without bringing into the hotchpot the land of which he is in separate possession, to collect from the tenants a larger share than he is at present collecting as recorded in Register D. Each party may bear his own costs throughout.
V.S
7. Suit decreed.