The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
In this case, the Local Board of Tezpur have sought to recover by a civil suit a certain sum of money due from the Defendants in their capacity as the lessees of the Borgong Hat.
In view of the provisions of sec. 93A of the Assam Local Self-Government Act there is no doubt that the amount due to the Board may be recovered as if the same were an arrear of land revenue recoverable under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886, but the question for consideration is whether this regulation will have the effect of preventing the Board from realizing their dues by instituting a civil suit if they prefer to adopt the latter procedure.
The learned Munsif held that the effect of sec. 154(1) of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations was to debar the Board from instituting a civil suit in connection with this matter. A contrary view has been adopted by the learned Subordinate Judge.
The relevant provisions of sec. 154 of the Regulation are as follows:—
“See. 151(1):—Except when otherwise expressly provided in this Regulation, or in rules issued under this Regulation no civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction in any of the following matters:—(g) claims connected with, or arising out of, the collection of land-revenue or any process for the recovery of an arrear of land-revenue or of any sum which is by this Regulation, or by any other enactment for the time being in force, realisable as an arrear of land-revenue……(2) In all the above cases jurisdiction shall rest with the revenue-authorities only.”
As I read sub-sec. (g) of sec. 154(1) of the Regulation the intention of the Legislature was to exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of claims of two kinds, namely, (1) those connected with or arising out of the collection of land-revenue and (2) similar claims connected with or arising out of any process for the recovery (a) of an arrear of land-revenue or (b) of any sum realisable as an arrear of land-revenue. The present claim clearly does not fall within the first category mentioned above.
The sum which the Local Board are now seeking to recover is admittedly a sum realisable as an arrear of land-revenue, but it is necessary to consider whether the claim of the Local Board connected with this sum arises out of any process so as to bring it within the second category of the claims mentioned above. In my opinion this condition has not been fulfilled. The expression “process” obviously has a technical meaning under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation and refers to the various processes for the recovery of arrears of land-revenue which are mentioned in Chapter V of the Regulation and the methods which may be adopted in this connection are actually described as “processes” in sec. 91 of the Regulation. It is clear from the provisions of such sections as 69, 79, 91 of the Regulation that ample scope is allowed to the aggrieved parties to file claims for the adjustment of their grievances in regard to these processes; in such cases it would follow from what is stated in sec. 154 read with sec. 94 of the Regulation that the revenue authorities only would have jurisdiction to deal with such claims. In this case, however, we are not concerned with any process which has been issued under Chapter V of the Regulation for the recovery of the amount due to the Local Board. The Board have chosen to institute a civil suit for the recovery of the money due to them and I find nothing in the Regulation to debar them from adopting this course if they wish to do so.
It is true that in a previous proceeding the Local Board resorted to various processes for the realisation of their dues. It appears that some portion of the amount due to the Board was recovered in this way, but the present civil suit is for the realisation of the balance due to the Board. The claim of the Board arises directly from a breach of the conditions of the Defendant's lease and does not appear to be connected with the processes previously issued in such a way as to bring it within the scope of sec. 154(g) of the Regulation. As far as those particular processes are concerned, it is not contended that any difficulty occurred which could have given rise to any claim. All that appears to have happened was that the Tezpur Board attached and sold some of the movable properties belonging to the Defendants under sec. 69 of the Regulation and no objection or claim was filed by any person in connection with this procedure.
It is further urged that as the Tezpur Board once resorted to the Revenue authorities for the recovery of their dues, they were thereby debarred from recovering any portion of the money due to them in a Civil Court. I am not, however, prepared to accept this argument. Chapter V of the Regulation merely provides a speedy execution procedure for realising revenue and quasi-revenue. As in the present case the whole of the amount due could not be realised in execution, the debt due to the Board remained unsatisfied and, in my view, it remained open to them to recover this money by instituting a civil suit if they considered this method the most convenient means for the purpose of realising their dues.
It is argued that sec. 94 of the Regulation indicates that all the sums realisable as arrears of land revenue must be recovered under the provisions of Chapter V, but I do not think that section can bear this interpretation. I consider that sec. 94 should be read as subject to sec. 154 by which the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is expressly excluded in connection with certain matters only. If a process were issued under Chapter V for the recovery of a sum realisable as land-re venue the provisions of Chapter V would automatically apply by virtue of sec. 94 but if the party entitled to recover such a sum instituted a suit in a Civil Court for this purpose, there is nothing, in my opinion, in the Regulation to prevent the party from doing so.
In this view of the case I consider that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct. This appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. The hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs.
Leave to prefer a further appeal under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.
The Rule for stay is discharged. No order is made as to costs in the Rule.
C.C