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  • rule 4 of the Secondary Education Service Commission Rules, 1983.
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  • rule 4 of the Secondary Education Service Commission Rules, 1983.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — S.R. Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Km. Meena Singh, was appointed as an adhoc assistant teacher in L.T. Grade against a short-term vacancy arising because the permanent incumbent, Mamla Jeet Singh, was granted leave from 10-8-1991 to 9-11-1991. The District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) approved the appointment by letter dated 27-8-1991, with effect from 12-8-1991 up to 9-11-1991. The permanent incumbent's leave was later extended until 30-6-1992. The college manager asked the DIOS to approve continuation of the petitioner's adhoc appointment until a candidate selected by the Commission joined. By letter dated 6-5-1992 (Annexure-5), the DIOS informed the manager that the petitioner's services would cease on 30-6-1992 because the permanent incumbent would attain superannuation on that date. The petitioner moved the Court seeking (a) writ of certiorari to quash the DIOS order dated 6-5-1992 and (b) a mandamus directing continuation of her services until replaced by a duly selected candidate. The Standing Counsel did not file a counter-affidavit, and the committee of management supported the petitioner; the petition was disposed of at the admission stage.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenure of an adhoc teacher appointed under the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 against a short-term vacancy ends automatically when that short-term vacancy is converted into a substantive vacancy (for example, by retirement, resignation, death, dismissal, termination, etc.), or whether the adhoc appointee may continue until replaced by a duly selected candidate or until their services are terminated for valid reasons.
  2. How paragraph 3(c) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 ("when the short term vacancy otherwise ceases to exist") should be construed in light of the object and legislative intent of the Removal of Difficulties Orders and the statutory framework governing appointments (including Section 18 and relevant rules).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Workmen of Dimonkunchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimonkunchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353 Principle of purposive/statutory interpretation: words of a statute, when doubtful, should be understood in the sense that best harmonises with the subject and object of the enactment. The court relied on this principle to construe para 3(c) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 purposively (to effectuate legislative intent to protect student interest), rather than adopting a literal construction that would defeat that object.
New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207 Support for the proposition (as quoted from Shah, J.) that statutory expressions should be understood in a manner that effectuates the object of the Legislature. Used alongside the Dimonkunchi authority to reinforce the purposive approach to interpreting para 3(c), emphasizing harmony with legislative objective.
Committee of Management of S.L.I.C v. District Inspector of Schools, 1985 (1) UP LB EC 496 Authority for reading statutory provisions down so that they effectuate legislative intent and do not result in hardship; construing provisions to avoid defeating the objective of the statute (in that case, Section 18(3)(3) of the Act). The court cited this decision to justify reading para 3(c) in a manner that excludes mere change in the nature of vacancy (from short-term to substantive) from the expression "short term vacancy otherwise ceases to exist," so that the legislative objective is not defeated.
Sri Chandra Bhan Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Writ Petn. No. 1524 of 1989 (decided 4-12-1991) Held that tenure of an adhoc appointee against a short-term vacancy does not end merely because the vacancy becomes substantive. The present court noted and relied upon this judgment (and the Division Bench decisions referred therein) as consistent authority within the High Court supporting continuation of an adhoc appointee until replacement by a selected candidate.
Chandra Kant Pandey v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur (Writ Petn. No. 19914 of 1991, decided 9-9-1991) Applied the view that an adhoc appointee against a short-term vacancy should be allowed to continue if the vacancy becomes substantive. Referred to as a consistent earlier decision supporting the same legal position adopted in the instant judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and purposive analysis of the relevant statutory framework and the Removal of Difficulties Orders:

  • The Court examined the scheme of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 (para 2(1) and para 2(3)), which permits the Management to fill short-term vacancies (those caused by leave or suspension) by promotion or, where promotion is not possible, by direct recruitment with prior intimation to and approval of the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS). Paragraph 2(3) also provides for an "immediate" intimation and a deemed approval if the DIOS does not communicate a decision within seven days — indicating urgency to protect student interest.
  • Paragraph 3 (as amended) prescribes duration of adhoc appointments and provides that such appointments cease on the earliest of specified events, including "(c) when the short term vacancy otherwise ceases to exist."
  • While the literal meaning of para 3(c) could be read to include conversion of a short-term vacancy into a substantive vacancy (for example by retirement or other causes), the Court rejected a purely literal construction because it would frustrate the legislative object — namely, preventing students' education from suffering due to absence of a teacher and ensuring quick filling of vacancies.
  • The Court emphasized the legislative urgency expressed in para 2(3) (use of "immediately" and "deemed approval") and noted that procedures for filling substantive vacancies (under the First Removal of Difficulties Order or Section 18 of the Act and Rule 4 of the Secondary Education Service Commission Rules, 1983) necessarily take longer (including minimum statutory periods such as 60 days and other formalities). If adhoc tenure terminated automatically on conversion of vacancy, students could remain without a teacher during these longer procedures.
  • Applying the purposive principle of interpretation (citing Workmen of Dimonkunchi Tea Estate and New India Sugar Mills), the Court concluded that the expression "when the short term vacancy otherwise ceases to exist" in para 3(c) must be construed to mean cessation of the vacancy itself (for example, by abolition of the post), not mere conversion of the nature of the vacancy from short-term to substantive.
  • The Court reasoned that both types of adhoc appointments (against short-term vacancy and against substantive vacancy) are adhoc in nature, and once the DIOS has approved or is deemed to have approved a short-term adhoc appointment, there is no harm in allowing the adhoc appointee to continue until a regular selected candidate joins, unless the appointee's services are terminated earlier on valid grounds (misconduct, unsuitability, bona fide abolition of the post).
  • The Court also addressed practical and public-policy considerations: allowing termination on mere conversion would encourage repeated adhoc recruitments, create insecurity, enable corruption and exploitation by managements and authorities, and frustrate the object of the Removal of Difficulties Order.
  • The Court noted earlier High Court decisions consistent with this view (including Sri Chandra Bhan Singh and Chandra Kant Pandey) and observed no contrary decision brought to its notice by the Standing Counsel.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed. The Court directed the respondents to permit the petitioner, Km. Meena Singh, to continue as assistant teacher in L.T. Grade and to pay her salary until she is replaced by a duly selected candidate. This continuance is subject to the respondents' right to terminate her services earlier on established grounds connected with misconduct, unsuitability, or bona fide abolition of the post.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the petitioner is entitled to continue in service and to salary until a selected candidate joins or her services are validly terminated for the enumerated reasons.
  • Broader administrative and interpretive consequence (as expressed by the Court): para 3(c) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 must be read in a manner that prevents automatic termination of adhoc tenure merely because a vacancy is converted from short-term to substantive; this protects student interest, reduces incentives for repeated adhoc appointments, and offers greater security to adhoc appointees. The Court observed that a contrary literal construction could frustrate legislative intent and, in its view, might be contrary to public policy.
  • Prior High Court decisions taking the same view were noted by the Court; the judgment therefore aligns with an existing strand of authority within the Court rather than being presented as an isolated departure.

Disposition: Petition allowed.

    Km, Meena Singh v. District Inspector Of Schools

    S.R Singh, J.:— The petition in hand raises an important question of law for consideration as to whether the tenure of an adhoc teacher appointed under the provisions of U.P Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 against short term vacancy caused by grant of leave to the incumbent of otherwise comes to an end merely on the nature of the short term vacancy being converted into a substantive vacancy on account of retirement as is the case in hand, or on account of resignation, death, dismissal, termination etc.?

    2. The Standing Counsel does not purpose to file a counter affidavit and since the concerned committee of management is supporting the petitioner's case, the petition is being disposed of at the admission stage without inviting for any counter affidavit. The petitioner was appointed assistant teacher in L.T Grade against short term vacancy which occurred due to permanent incumbent Mamla Jeet Singh being granted leave for three months w.e.f 10-8-1991 to 9-11-1991. The appointment of the petitioner Km. Meena Singh was approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide letter dated 27-8-1991 w.e.f 12-8-1991, the date of taking over charge upto 9-11-1991. It appears that Mamla Jeet Singh applied for and was granted extension of leave upto 30-6-1992 and the Manager of the College by his letter dated, 10-4-1992 requested the District Inspector of Schools to approve the adhoc appointment of the petitioner untill the date of joining of duty by a candidate selected by the Commission. The District Inspector of Schools vide letter dated 6-5-1992 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) informed, the Manager of the College that the services of the petitioner would come to an end on 30-6-1992, the date on which the permanent incumbent Mamla Jeet Singh would be attaining the age of superannuation Obviously the District Inspector of Schoo's did not approve the petitioner's appointment, as solicited for by the Manager. for a period upto the date of joining duties by a candidate selected by the Commission, Accordingly the petitioner has come upto this Court seeking the relief for issuance of a writ of certiorari quash-ing the order dated 6-5-1992 besides a mandamus commanding the respon-dents to continue until she is replaced by a duly selected candidate.

    3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel.

    4. A short term vacancy in the post of a teacher caused by grant of leave to him or on account of his suspension duly approved by the District inspector of Schools or otherwise is required, by Para 2(1) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981, to be filed by the Management of the Institution by promotion of the senior most teacher of that institution in the next lower grade. This can be done without prior approval of the Inspector of Schools though it is obligatory on the part of the Management to im-mediately inform the DIOS of such promotion along with the particulars of the teacher so promoted. But when any such vacancy cannot be filled by promotion due to non-availability of a qualified teacher In the next lower grade, the Management of the institution shall, with the prior intimation to, and approval of, the District Inspector of Schools, fill the vacancy by direct recruitment in the manner provided in Para 2(3) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981.

    5. Admittedly the petitioner was appointed against a short term vacancy under the provisions of the Second Removal” of Difficulties Order, 1981. Para 3 of the said Removal of Difficulties Order prescribes duration of such appoints. The provision as amended by Third Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982 reads as under:

    “3. Duration of Adhoc Appointment—Every appointment of teacher under paragraph 2 of this Order shall cease from the earliest of the following dates, namely;

    (a) when the teacher, who was on leave or under suspension joins the post; or

    (b) x x x (omitted by Third Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982); or

    (c) when the short term vacancy otherwise eeases to exist.”

    6. Para 3 (c) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 quoted as aforesaid, is no doubt susceptible to the view being taken by the Depart-ment that on the conversion of the short term vacancy into substantive vacancy, the appointment made against short term vacancy would come to an end but a closer scrutiny of the matter would lead to the conclusion that the Legislature would not have intended going through the same exercise of making adhoc appointment twice over, one on the occurence of the short term vacancy and the other on such a vacancy being converted into a substantive vacancy The object sought to be achieved by the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 appears to be this that the interest of the student community must not be allowed to suffer by reason of even temporary absence of a teacher caused due to grant of leave to him or on account of his suspension or otherwise. This object gets frustrated, as discussed hereinafter, if the tenure of a teacher appointed against short term vacancy is allowed to come to an end automatically with the conversion of the short term vacancy into a substantive vacancy

    7. Sub clause (iii) of para 2(3) of the said Removal of Difficulties Order provides that the Distt. Inspector of Schools shall communicate his decision within seven days of the date of receipt by him of particulars of the selected candidate failing which the Inspector of Schools will be deemed to have given his approval The word “immediately” occurring in sub-Clause (i) of para 2(3) and the provision as to ‘deemed approval’ (which is in the nature of an irrebutable presumption in the event of the Inspector's failure to communicate his decision on the proposed appointment within seven days of the date of receipt by him of the particulars of selected candidate) contained In sub-Clause (Hi) of para 2(3) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 reveal a sense of urgency and are designed to ensure fulfilment of the Legislative intention for a quick appointment so that the education of students may not suffer unnecessarily. Therefore, while construing the provisions of para 2(3) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 one has to keep in mind the aforesaid anxiety and intention of the Legisl-ature, The expression “when the short term vacancy otherwise ceases to exist” is no doubt capable of being construed in sense of cessation of short term vacancy on account of its conversion into a substantive one. But as held by the Supreme Court in the Workmen of Dimonkunchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimonkunchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353 at page 356. The Words of a Statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or esymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained”. In the words of Shah, J. “It is a recognised rule of, interpretation of Statutes that the expression used therein should ordinarily be understood in sense ia which they best harmonise the object of the Statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature.” New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207 at page 1213.1

    8. The Legislative intent in enacting a law providing for adhoc appointment either against a short term vacancy of the nature specified in para 2(1) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 or against a substantive vacancy covered by the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 or Section 18 of the Act appears to be this that the interest of students must in no case be allowed to suffer due to absence of a teacher resulting in either a short term vacancy or a substantive one. The anxiety of the Legis-lature, as seen above, is that the vacancy should be filled quickly in order to protect the interest of the students. Whether an adhoc appointment by way of direct recruitment is made under the provisions of the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 or it is made under section 18 of the Act, it is bound to take seme time for no appointment can be made under section 18 before expiry of a period of at least sixty days from the date of notification, strictly in accordance with rule 4 of the Secondary Education Service Commission Rules, 1983. of the vacancy to the Commission in case of scheduled teacher, and to the Inspector of Schools (in absence of a Selection Board) in case of a techer other than the teachers specified in the Schedule to the Act. During this period the cause of students is bound to suffer in absence of the teacher in as much as excepting a case of vacancy caused due to retirement, it is not possible to notify, in advance as per time schedule specified in rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, a vacancy caused due to death or resignation. In such a situation the cause of students is bound to suffer if the tenure of the short term appointee is allowed to come to an end on the date the short term vacancy gets converted into a substantive one due to resignation or death of the permanent incumbent during the subsistence of the short term appoint-ment and the Management of the Institution is required to proceed afresh to fill up the post either under section 18 of the Act or under the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 for in my opinion the procedure for direct recruit-ment as laid down in para 5 of the First Kemoval of Difficulties Order, 1981 is also time consuming and appointment cannot be made immediately.

    9. It is true that under the provisions of the U.P Secondary Education Service Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Orders, 1981 the appointment against a short term vacancy is made by the Committee of Management while one against the substantive vacancy under the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 is made by the District Inspector of Schools on the basis of quality point marks. But the fact remains that both the appointments are adhoc in nature and the District Inspector of Schools, although not directly involved in exercise to be undertaken in order to deter-mine merits in case of adhoc appointment against “short term vacancy, has ample opportunity to see that the appointment is made in the manner prescr-ibed by law and it is for this purpose that the prior approval to appointment is required under para 2(3)(i) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981. Once the approval is accorded or deemed to have been accorded, I find no harm if such appointee is allowed to continue even after the occur-ence of change in the nature of vacancy.

    10. At the risk of repetition it may be pointed out that Section 18 which enables the Management to make adhoc appointment against a subs-tantive vacancy would not come into play immediately on the conversion of the short term vacancy into a substantive one. It comes into play, (i) after the vacancy has been notified to the Commission and the Commission has failed to recommend a suitable candidate within one year of the notification; or (ii) the post has actually remained vacant for more than two months after the notification of the vacancy to the Commission. It is thus evident that the management has to wait at least for a period of two months from the date of notification of the vaeancy before it proceeds to make an appoint-ment under Section 18(1) of the Act. The interest of the student commu-nity is bound to suffer in absence of a teacher at least for a period of sixty days. This would run counter to the object, the Second Removal of Difficul-ties Order, 1981 seeks to achieve. The object which the Legislature wanted to achieve in enacting a law providing for adhoc appointment even against a short term vacancy has to be kept in mind while interpreting para 3 (c) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 and if the expression “the short term vacancy otherwise ceases to exist” occurring in clause (c) is inter-preted in the light of the object sought to be achieved by the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 then the expression has to be so construed as to mean cessation of vacancy itself, say by reason of abolition of post, as distinguished from cessation of short term vacancy as such by reason of its conversion into a substantive vacancy. The thrust of para 3 (c) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 is on the cessation of vacancy as such and not on its conversion into substantive vacancy. It is true that literally construed para 3 (c) may include a case of conversion of the short term vacancy into permanent one but since such a construction fends to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature, the provision has to be read down by the Court “in such a manner that it may not only carry out the intention of the Legislature but it may not result in hardship to the teachers as well” as observed by R.M Sahai, J. (as His Lordship then was) while speaking for the Division Bench in Committee of Management of S.L.I.C v. District Inspector of Schools, 1985 (1) UP LB EC 496, while construing Section 18(3)(3) of the Act.

    11. As observed above whether the Management proceeds to fill up the substantive vacancy under the provisions of the First Removal of Difficul-ties Order, 1981 or under section 18 of the Act, the process is time consum-ing and in certain cases it may consume more time than the period of leave on the grant of which to a teacher the Management is empowered to make adhoc appointment under the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981. The Legislature must not be taken to have intended the defeat of the laudable objective sought to be achieved through the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981. Education being the back bone of the all-round progress of the country it would be against public policy to allow the interst of the student community to suffer due to absence of teachers from duty on account of grant of leave, suspension or otherwise for a long time.

    12. The question may be examined from another angle. There is no dearth of people managing educational institutions and the departmental authorities vested with supervisory/regulatory powers under the Statute, whose greed for money has superseded all concerns, social, moral, ethical etc. that they might have had once and who do not hesitate in committing bteach of moral and legal codes in the pursuit of their greedy personal and material ends. The falling standard of ethics and morality, the dwindling sense of public duty and dearth of people committed and devoted the cause of education, breed and develop a tendency, among these who matter, to exploit and bargain out of the prevailing conditions of unemployment. In order to prevent this mischief being done, the provisions contained in para 3(c) of the Second Removal of the Difficulties Order, 1981 has to be so construed as to exclude within its ambit a mere change of nature of the vacancy from short term to a substantive one and, if necessary, the provision may be read down accordingly.

    13. In my opinion, therefore, a teacher duly appointed against short term vacancy under para 2 of the Second Removal of Diffiulties Order, 1981, would be entitled to continue even after the vacancy is coverted into a sub-stantive one by reason of resignation, retirement, death or otherwise till such time as a candidate selected for regular appointment turns up to join the post held by adhoc appointee unless his services are terminated earlier on grounds connected with misconduct, unsuitability or bonafide abolition of post. The view that I am taking would not only advance the object sought to be achieved by the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 but it would generate a sense of security to some extent, amongst the teachers so appointed which would be conducive to better performance of duty and at the same time it would prevent any unhealthy practice of corruption and exploitation of teachers either at the ends of the Management or at the ends of the Educational authorities the possibility of which cannot be ruled out if they are allowed to repeat the exercise of making adhoc appointment merely on account of change in the nature of vacancy. Any other view of para 3 (c) may render it unconstitutional being contrary to public policy. The fact that the appointment against short term vacancy is also required to be made on the basis of quality point marks as is done in the case of recruitment against substantive vacancy, is indicative of the fact that there is no qualitative difference in the methods of appointment under the aforesaid provisions. It is true that in case of appointment against a short term vacancy the manage-ment intimates the vacancy to the District Inspector of Schools and notifies the same on the notice board while in the case of appointment against sub-stantive vacancy the District Inspector of Schools after receiving information from the management invites applications himself from the Local Employment Exchange and also through the public advertisement in at least two newspaper having adequate circulation in Uttar Pradesh This would certainly attract more candidates for choice of a suitable candidate. Bat once the appoint-ment against short term vacancy is approved by the District Inspector of Schools it may not have been intended by the Legislature that such adhoc appointee would be replaced by another adhoo appointee merely because the nature of the vacancy has changed. If this procedure is allowed to be followed it may lead to exploitation of adhoc appointee and corruption at the relevant levels as discussed herein before.

    14. In Writ Petition No. 1524 of 1989, Sri Chandra Bhan Singh v. District Inspector of Schools decided on 4-12-1991, M.L Bhat, J. has held that the tenure of an adhoc appointee against short term vacancy would not come to an end merely because the vacancy has become substantive one. Reliance has been placed on certain Division Bench decisions referred to in the judgment dated 4-12-1991, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexare-6 to the writ petition. It is true that there is no discussion in the judgment about the effect of clause (c) of Para 3 of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981 but it appears from the said decisions that so far as this Court is concerned it has consistently taken the view that an adhoc appoin-tee against short term vacancy should be allowed to continue even if the vacancy is converted into substantive one until he is replaced by a duly selected candidate or his services are terminated on the grounds connected with misconduct or abolition of the post. Special Appeal No. 171 of 1991 filed against the aforesaid judgment was dismissed by a Division Bench vide order dated 20-12-1991. Similar view was taken by me in writ petition No. 19914 of 1991 Chandra Kant Pandey v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur decided on 9-9-1991 and no decision taking a contrary view was brought to my notice by the learned Standing Counsel. In view of the above discussion the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to allow the petitioner Km, Meena Singh to continue as assistant teacher in L.T Grade in the College and to pay her salary until she is replaced by a duly selected candidate. But this is without prejudice to the right of the respondents to terminate her services on grounds connected with misconduct or abolition of post etc.

    15. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Km, Meena Singh v. District Inspector Of Schools
    (Jul 6, 1992)