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Structured Summary of Opinion — M.M Punchhl, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a revision petition by a tenant challenging an order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, which was confirmed on appeal by the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh.

The landlord, Khazan Singh, is the owner of House No. 1209, Sector 18‑C, Chandigarh. The tenant is R.K. Jain. On 25 May 1977 the landlord filed an ejectment application on three grounds but ultimately confined the claim to one ground: that the petitioner (landlord) wants the demised premises for his personal use and occupation.

In the written statement the tenant denied that the landlord required the premises for his own use, asserted that the landlord was carrying on business and was settled in Ludhiana, and alleged that the landlord had sought a rent increase to Rs. 450 per month and then filed the ejectment petition after the tenant refused to agree.

The landlord replied that he wanted to live in the house to lead a retired life, was not an active partner in business at Ludhiana, sought treatment at the Post‑Graduate Institute (P.G.I.) Chandigarh for a defect in his right foot, and denied ever asking the tenant for an increase in rent.

Both parties led evidence: the landlord added reasons such as insufficiency of accommodation when family visited and pressure from his landlord at Ludhiana to vacate; the tenant stated the landlord had limped since 1967 (when the tenancy commenced) and alleged the landlord's application was not bona fide.

The Rent Controller ordered eviction, relying on several decisions that emphasise the landlord's entitlement to choose to live in his house and to judge his accommodation needs. The Appellate Authority affirmed. The tenant sought revision, and this opinion is the result of that revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord's claim that he "requires" the demised premises for personal use satisfies the legal standard of "need" under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, or whether it is merely a wish, desire or excuse.
  2. Whether the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority correctly applied the law (including relevant precedents) in finding the landlord's claim bona fide and in ordering/confirming ejectment.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments (Appellant)

  • The landlord does not require the premises for his own use and personal occupation; he is carrying on business and is settled in Ludhiana.
  • The landlord sought an increase of rent to Rs. 450 per month; when the tenant did not agree, the landlord filed the ejectment petition (implying an ulterior motive).
  • Counsel relied on Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel (1974 1 SCC 661) to argue that the word "requirement" must reflect an element of need (an essential need) and not merely a wish or desire; therefore the landlord's stated reasons do not suffice.
  • The tenant pointed to evidence that the landlord had limped since 1967 (before the tenancy) to argue that the later claim of needing treatment in Chandigarh did not establish necessity.

Landlord's Arguments (Respondent)

  • The Rent Controller and Appellate Authority were aware of and applied the statutory obligation that the landlord prove his need for the premises.
  • The landlord asserted several facts in support: he wanted to live in the house and lead a retired life peacefully; he is not an active business partner in Ludhiana; he sought treatment for a major defect in his right foot at P.G.I., Chandigarh; he never asked the tenant for a rent increase.
  • The landlord added that accommodation was insufficient when family visited, his landlord at Ludhiana was pressing him to vacate, and his son manages any business activity—suggesting the landlord's need to reside in Chandigarh.
  • The Rent Controller and Appellate Authority found the tenant failed to rebut the landlord's claim by evidence or cross‑examination and therefore accepted the landlord's stated need as bona fide.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Siri Ram Nagpal v. Shri Lal Chand (1977 2 Rent. L.R. 828) Principle that a landlord is entitled to exercise his choice to live in his own house. The Rent Controller relied on this decision when ordering eviction in favour of the landlord.
Jagan Nath v. Sat Paul (1977 2 Rent L.R. 614) Support for the proposition that landlord's choice to live in his house is entitled to weight. Relied upon by the Rent Controller in ordering eviction.
Kedar Nath Bhatnagar v. Shti Dharam Paul (1978 2 Rent L.R. 614) Held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement. The Rent Controller cited this authority as support for eviction.
Ajit Singh v. Tarlochan Singh (1977 2 Rent L.R. 678) Recognition of a landlord's entitlement to live comfortably in his house and to judge his requirement. Also relied on by the Rent Controller when deciding in favour of the landlord.
Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel (1974 1 SCC 661) Established that "requirement" must reflect an element of need (an essential need), not merely a wish or want. Cited by the tenant's counsel to argue the landlord's assertions did not meet the requisite element of "need"; the Court studied and applied this standard in its analysis.
Shri Rattan Chand Jain v. Shri Charan Singh (1978 1 Rent. C.R. 265) Applied Phiroze Desai to hold that certain landlord assertions (e.g., wanting premises for grandchildren, shifting from village to town) were "excuse" and not "need". Referenced in argument and by the Rent Controller/Appellate Authority; the present Court compared its reasoning with that authority when demarcating "need" from "excuse".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a close review of the pleadings and evidence and examined the authorities relied upon by both sides. In particular, the court considered the Supreme Court's statement in Phiroze Bamanji Desai that the landlord's "requirement" must reflect an element of need (an essential need) rather than a mere wish or desire, and contrasted that with decisions that emphasise the landlord's choice to live in his house.

The court attempted to demarcate the conceptual boundary between "need" and "excuse" or "wish." It described "need" as signifying the existence of a state of affairs that requires relief which cannot be well achieved otherwise: "the want of something which cannot be fulfilled except by the course sought to be adopted." The degree of need will vary case by case, but absent such need the claim becomes an "excuse."

Applying that standard to the facts, the court evaluated the two main grounds relied upon by the Rent Controller: (1) the landlord's desire to lead a retired life in Chandigarh, and (2) the landlord's need to obtain treatment for a fractured leg at P.G.I., Chandigarh and pressure from his landlord at Ludhiana to vacate.

The court found both grounds to be reflective of a wish or desire rather than an indispensable need. The retirement ground was characterised as a mere wish. As for medical treatment, the court noted that the landlord's own evidence showed he had been limping since 1967 (when the tenancy commenced) and there was no evidence that treatment was unavailable at Ludhiana or that the landlord previously sought treatment in Chandigarh. Thus the asserted need for treatment did not establish the kind of necessity required to displace the tenant's statutory protection.

The court further observed that the Appellate Authority relied on probabilities and the landlord's asserted desire to live comfortably in Chandigarh; the revising court held that such reliance on probabilities and wishes was insufficient to establish the element of need required by Phiroze Bamanji Desai. Consequently, there was no adequate reason grounded in "need" to maintain the order of the Appellate Authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revising Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the eviction order. In the words of the opinion, the petition is allowed and the eviction petition of the landlord is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The tenant's position is preserved; the landlord's ejectment petition is dismissed and the tenant remains in possession.
  • On legal principle: The Court articulated a working demarcation between a landlord's mere wish or excuse and the "need" required to justify ejectment under the statutory scheme (following Phiroze Bamanji Desai). The Court emphasised that assertions amounting only to desire or probability are inadequate to displace a tenant's statutory protection.
  • The opinion states no separate order as to costs.

Note: All summaries and characterisations above are drawn directly from the provided opinion text; no information beyond the opinion has been introduced.

    R.K Jain v. Khazan Singh .

    M.M Punchhl, J.:— This it a revision petition at the instance of a tenant against whom an order of ejectment was passed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, which has been confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh.

    2. The facts may be stated thus:—

    Khazan Singh landlord is the owner of House No. 1209, Sector 18-C, Chandigarh, and R.K Jain is the tenant. On May 25, 1977, the landlord filed an application for ejectment of the tenant on three grounds but ultimately confined his claim to one ground, namely:—

    “That the petitioner wants the demised premises for his personal use and occupation.”

    3. To the above referred to avermnent in the petition the tenant in his written statement averred:—

    “It is stated that the petitioner does not require the premises for his own use end personal occupation. The petitioner is carrying on business in Ludhiana and settled in Ludhiana. The petitioner wanted an increase of the rent to Rs. 450/- per month and the respondent did not agree to the said increase and as a consequence thereof the petitioner has presented this petition in this Hon'ble Tribunal seeking………….”

    4. This solicited replication from the landlord, who counter averred as under:—

    “Petitioner wants himself to live in the house and lead a retired life peacefully. Petitioner is not active partner of any business at Ludhiana. Moreover by living at Chandigarh petitioner wants to get himself treated at P.G.I for his major defect in his right foot, because of which he cannot walk. Petitioner never asked the respondent to increase the rent.”

    5. The respective averments of the parties were not only supported by their evidence, but were improved upon. The landlord added that he felt insufficincy of accommodation when his daughters and children came during vacations and that his landlord at Ludhiana was pressing for the vacation of the house. He also added that his son works on his behalf in a factory where he is a sleeping partner and he does not go there personally. The tenant on the other hand stated that he had found the petitioner to be limping by foot even in the year 1967, when the tenancy commenced. He claimed the application to be not bonafide. On that evidence the Rent Controller ordered eviction of the tenant petitioner, relying upon the judgments of this Court in Shri Siri Ram Nagpal v. Shri Lal Chand . 1977 2 Rent. L.R 828. and Jagan Nath v. Sat Paul . 1977 2 Rent L.R 614., which are to the effect that the landlord is entitled to the exercise of his choice of his living in his own house and with regard to insufficiency of accommodation he is the sole judge. Reliance was also placed on Kedar Nath Bhatnagar v. Shti Dharam Paul . 1978 2 Rent L.R 614. wherein it has been held that the landlord is best judge of his requirement. To the same effect is Ajit Singh v. Tarlochan Singh . 1977 2 Rent L.R 678. recognising the entitlement of the landlord to live comfortably in his house and of his being the solo arbitrator of his requirement.

    6. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the approach of the Rent Control authorities in deciding the controversy between the parties was erroneous in law. Stressing the point he urged that the items of necessity pointed out by the landlord in his petition and improved upon in his statement are only reflective of reasons or executes on his behalf and are not sufficient to come within the ambit of the word “requires” used in Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In support thereof he cited a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel . 1974 1 SCC 661, wherein their Lordships have settled that the word “requirement” of a landlord seeking ejectment of a tenant must reflect an element of need and not a more wish or want. The decision of their Lordships in Phiroze Bamanji Desai's case (supra) was taken aid el in repelling a landlord's contention by S.P Goyal, J. in decision reported in Shri Rattan Chand Jain v. Shri Charan Singh . 1978 1 Rent. C.R 265.. There the landlord's assertion that the premises were required for his grand children and also that he wanted to shift from his village to the town, was considered to be an ‘excuse’ and not an instance of “need” at laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai's case (supra).

    7. On the other han??? the learned counsel for the respondent landlord has contended that the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority were conscious of the statutory obligation for the landlord to prove his need for the premises in dispute. In particular he referred to the findings from the judgments which may be reproduced, one after the other, as under:—

    Rent Controller:

    “Learned counsel for the respondent cited Rottan Chand Jain v. Charan Singh, to argue that the statement of the landlord cannot be accepted unless there is element of need and not more desire. However, in the present case the element of need is proved in as much as the petitioner wants to lead retired life in Chandigarh His landlord is pressing him hard to vacate the rented accommodation at Ludhiana and the petitioner wants to get treatment of his fractured leg in P.G.I Chandigarh. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner requires the demised premises for his own use and occupation.”

    Appellate Authority:

    “10. It is true that the Court is not to look to the more desire or wish of the landlord and it if bindly relied upon his statement must be satisfied about the bonafide need of the applicant. It is open to the tenant to raise an objection and bring some prima facie material on the record to show that the application is not a bonafide one. The Court cannot proceed with initial assumptions of lack of bonafide on the part of the landlord. In the present case, as already stated, the circumstances put up by the landlord were not assailed in cross-examination or rebutted by evidence. The tenant has miserably failed to prove that the applicant even approached him for enhancement of rent

    8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the leg of the applicant was already fractured when he gave the house on rent to the appellant. His client admitted that the applicant had a limping foot. The fact that the applicant took a decision to get himself treated at the P.G.I Hospital somewhat late is no ground to disbelieve him. It is emphasized that he is living in a small rented house along with his son at Ludhiana. It is quite probable that he bonafide wants to shift to his own spacious house at Chandigarh to lead a comfortable life disabled as he is. If the applicant's witness admitted that sometimes he went to his small factory and did some business for an hour or so it does not show that he is embodied in business there and could act pull himself out. This is particularly so when the business is being managed by hit own son acting as a Manager.

    9. As a result, therefore, I have no reason to doubt the bonafide of the landlord in making this application and seeking the relief. … … … …” (Emphasis supplied).

    10. It is suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the Rent Controller was aware of the element of need to be established by the landlord in order to pass the order of ejectment, the Appellate Authority has not adverted himself to this aspect of the case and has decided the case on more probabilities and has not come to any certainty. Finding merit in the contention, I deem it proper to go through the pleadings of the parties and their evidence, extracts and indications of which have been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment.

    11. It requires determination as to what would be the spreading distance of the word “need” as used by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Phiroze Bemanji Desai's case (supra) and that of the word “excuse” used by S.P Goyal, J. in shri Rattan Chand Jain's case (supra). From a given set of facts one court may spell an element of need and another as excuse, making it speculative. The sphere of the two words is obviously overlapping across their dividing line but an attempt has to be made to demarcate the same between the two. If appears that the element of need would signify the existence of such state of affairs that requires relief which cannot be well done without and it is the want of something which cannot be fulfilled except by the course sought to be adopted. The degree of need, of course, will vary from case to case but the absence thereof would make a sought for ejectment to be a more excuse. Thus the question which, necessarily, will in each case arise is whether the landlord wanting resumption of possession is pursuing a course, adoption of which he can or cannot well do without. The principle afore enunciated, has the affect of diminishing the sole judgment or arbitrariness of the choice of the land-lord as to his requirements as has been noted by the decisions of this Court, referred to earlier. As has been observed by S.P Goyal, J. in Shri Rattan Chard Jain's case (supra), that view cannot be said to be consistent with the view of the Supreme Court in Phiroze Ramanji Desai's case (supra). The landlord has to travel a longer distance, much beyond the span of a more wish, want or excuse, to enter into the field of need for the possession of the demised premises without which he cannot well do. If this principle is applied to the averments in the pleadings and the statements of the parties, the case of the landlord has to falter. Out of the two grounds, which prevailed with the Rent Controller in deciding in favour of the landlord, one was that the landlord wanted to lead a retired life in Chandigarh. This is only reflective of a wish or desire by the landlord and not reflective of an clement of need. The second ground which weighed with the Rent Controller was that the landlord was being pressed hard to vacate the rented accommodation at Ludhiana and the petitioner wants to get treatment of his fractured leg at P.G.I, Chandigarh. The earlier part which is not in the pleadings, could not be looked into. The latter part that the landlord wanted to get treatment of his fractured leg in the P.G.I, is equally devoid of the element of need as it is in his evidence that be never came to Chandigarh to seek medical assistance on an earlier occasion or that medical aid was not available at Ludhiana. This too is only reflective of a more desire and not something with which be cannot do without, necessitating his treatment to let him be in Chandigarh. The Appellate Authority, as observed earlier, is again responsive to the desire of the landlord to get himself treated with the P.G.I despite the fact that he has been limping of a foot, years ago when the house was given on rent. ‘The probability of the landlord’, as observed by the Appellate Authority, ‘that he bonafide wants to shift at his house at Chandigarh to lead a comfortable life, disabled as he is, is again reflective of a wish or an excuse and not reflective of the need which will require disturbance of the tenant protected under the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.

    12. On the evidence and the infere???ees drawn thereform, there does not appear to be an adequate reason to the point of need, which would justify the maintenance of the order of the Appellate Authority. Consequently, this petition is allowed and the eviction petition of tie land-lord is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

    R.M.S
    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    R.K Jain v. Khazan Singh .
    (Nov 20, 1979)