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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Prior to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Act applicable was Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
  • Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Sections 14(1)(b) and 14(3)
  • Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2/65)
  • Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965)
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control) Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Prior to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Act applicable was Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
  • Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Sections 14(1)(b) and 14(3)
  • Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2/65)
  • Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965)
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control) Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an order passed by the District Judge in R.C.P 122 of 1983. The petitioner, a landlord, claims ownership of a two-storeyed building in Broadwey, Ernakulam, which he received by gift-deed from his father in 1973. The building was originally rented out in 1965 to the father of respondents 8 and 9 for conducting business under the name “Indian Hardware Stores” at a monthly rent of Rs. 750. The petitioner sought eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the building for his own stationery business. Initially, the petition was against respondents 8 and 9, who contended that the lease was on behalf of a partnership firm, “T.N Ibrahim Karim and Company,” and that the business was now conducted by respondents 4 to 7 after respondents 8 and 9 retired. Respondents denied the petitioner’s bona fide requirement.

The Rent Controller held that the lease was in favor of respondents 8 and 9, rejecting the contention that the lease was to the firm, and found that the petitioner did not bona fide require the building. This order was challenged by respondents 8 and 9. The appellate authority reversed the Rent Controller’s decision, holding that respondents 8 and 9 were the real tenants and the petitioner bona fide required the building. Respondents 4 to 7 challenged this order before the District Judge, who set aside the appellate authority’s order, holding that the petitioner’s claim was a pretext to evict the respondents. This finding is challenged in the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge, exercising revisional jurisdiction, was justified in interfering with the appellate authority’s order regarding bona fide requirement of the landlord.
  2. Whether respondents 4 to 7, alleged sub-tenants, have the locus standi to challenge the eviction order passed against respondents 8 and 9.
  3. Interpretation and applicability of the definition of “tenant” and rights of sub-tenants under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.
  4. Whether the eviction order against the principal tenants binds sub-tenants who were not parties or did not have landlord’s consent.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The District Judge was not justified in reappraising the entire evidence and reversing the appellate authority’s order, as his revisional jurisdiction is supervisory only.
  • Respondents 4 to 7 are sub-tenants bound by the eviction order passed against respondents 8 and 9 and have no right to file revision petitions.
  • The petitioner bona fide requires the building for his own stationery business, supported by evidence including the petitioner starting another shop elsewhere after filing the petition.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Respondents 4 to 7 contend they are sub-tenants and aggrieved parties entitled to file appeals or revisions against eviction orders passed against the principal tenants.
  • Reliance placed on decisions holding that sub-tenants have locus standi to challenge eviction orders against tenants.
  • Argued that the revisional court was justified in reversing the appellate authority’s finding on bona fide requirement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rupchand v. Raghuvanshi (AIR 1964 SC 1989) Sub-tenant is bound by eviction decree against tenant even if not impleaded; omission to implead sub-lessee is not improper. Used to support that sub-tenants are bound by eviction orders against tenants without necessarily having locus standi to challenge such orders.
Narayan v. Kalan Bai (AIR 1986 Rajasthan 52) Sub-tenants without privity of contract with landlord have no locus standi to challenge eviction decrees against tenant-in-chief. Supported the position that sub-tenants cannot challenge eviction orders passed against principal tenants.
Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922) Sub-tenant as aggrieved party can maintain appeal or revision against order passed against tenant. Distinguished by the court as inapplicable due to different statutory context and facts.
Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 SC 1305) Under Delhi Rent Control Act, sub-tenants included in tenant definition and have rights to challenge eviction orders. Held inapplicable to Kerala law as sub-tenants are excluded from tenant definition under Kerala Act.
Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General (AIR 1952 SC 319) Person brought before court and adversely affected is aggrieved and entitled to challenge order. Respondents 4 to 7’s reliance rejected as they lack legal right to challenge eviction order passed against respondents 8 and 9.
Jadavji Purushottam v. Navnitbhai ((1987) 4 SCC 223; AIR 1977 SC 2146) Tenant inducted by mortgagee has no independent rights after redemption; eviction order binding on tenant without necessity of impleading tenant. Analogized sub-tenants without landlord’s consent to tenants inducted by mortgagee, lacking independent rights to challenge eviction.
Kerala Shoe Company v. K.C Bhaskaran ((1989) 2 SCC 395; AIR 1989 SC 1110) Tenant continuing after redemption of mortgage is liable to eviction; no protection under Rent Control Act. Reaffirmed that sub-tenants without consent have no independent rights under Kerala Act.
Gulabhai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra (JT 1991 (3) SC 112) Subsequent events can be considered to determine bona fide requirement in eviction proceedings. Supported consideration of petitioner starting another shop as relevant to bona fide requirement.
Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981 (3) SCR 605), Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975 (3) SCR 958), Amarjith Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain (1987 (1) SCR 272) Courts can consider post-institution events to accord just and meaningful remedy in eviction cases. Reinforced the principle allowing consideration of subsequent developments in assessing bona fide need.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory framework under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, noting that the definition of “tenant” excludes sub-tenants. The court emphasized that eviction orders against tenants bind sub-tenants even if they were not parties to the proceedings, unless obtained by fraud or collusion. The court distinguished precedents from other jurisdictions, such as the Delhi Rent Control Act, where sub-tenants have statutory rights, noting these do not apply to Kerala law.

The court found no evidence that respondents 4 to 7 had the landlord’s consent to occupy the premises, thus they lacked legal standing to challenge the eviction order passed against respondents 8 and 9. The revisional authority’s interference with the appellate authority’s order was held to be beyond the scope of supervisory jurisdiction, as the appellate authority’s finding on the petitioner’s bona fide requirement was supported by evidence including the petitioner’s subsequent actions.

Relying on Supreme Court decisions, the court held that subsequent events relevant to bona fide requirement can be considered, and found that the petitioner bona fide required the building for his own occupation. Consequently, the District Judge’s order setting aside the appellate authority’s decision was illegal and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed.

The court set aside the District Judge’s order in R.C.P 122 of 1983, reinstating the appellate authority’s decision that the petitioner bona fide required the building and is entitled to eviction of the respondents. The respondents 4 to 7, being sub-tenants without landlord’s consent, have no right to challenge the eviction order passed against respondents 8 and 9, and their revision petition was not maintainable. The petitioner is also entitled to costs from respondents 4 to 7.

This decision directly affects the parties by confirming the landlord’s right to evict the tenants on bona fide grounds and clarifies the limited rights of sub-tenants under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. No new precedent beyond the application of existing law was established.

    Varghese Ittoop v. M. Ibrahim And Others

    1. This is a writ petition filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the District Judge in R.C.P 122 of 1983. The landlord is the petitioner. The petition relates to a two storeyed building in Broadwey, Ernakulam. This building belonged to his father and as per Ext. A1 gift-deed it was given to the petitioner on 30-3-1973. This building was taken on rent originally on 1-9-65 by the father of respondents 8 and 9 herein for conducting a business in the name “Indian Hardware Stores”. Monthly rent payable was Rs. 750/-. Petitioner contended before the Rent Control Court that he wanted the building in question for conducting a stationery business. The petition was originally filed against respondents 8 end 9 alleging that the petitioner bona fide required the building for own occupation. Respondents 8 and 9 contended that the building in question was taken on rent by them representing a firm of partners by name “T.N Ibrahim Karim and Company” for the purpose of doing business in the name and style “Indian Hardware Stores” and that the partnership consisted of others also. It was alleged that the 8th respondent had retired from the firm and the business was being conducted by respondents 9 and 4. So, the 4th respondent was subsequently impleaded and this was followed later by impleadment of respondents 5 to 7 also. These respondents contended that the lease was obtained on behalf of the firm “Indian Hardware stores” and respondents 8 and 9 retired from the business and the same is being carried on by respondents 4 to 7. The respondents denied the bonafide requirement of the petitioner.

    2. The Rent Controller held that the lease was in favour of respondents 8 and 9 and they had filed an earlier application for fixation of fair rent and therefore the contention that the lease was in favour of a firm was rejected. The petitioner's father was having stationery business nearby and the petitioner was doing business along with his father and therefore the Rent Controller held that he did not bonafide require the building. This order was challenged by all the contesting respondents 8 and 9. The appellate authority held that respondents 8 and 9 are the real tenants and that the petitioner bonafide required the building for own occupation. This order was challenged by respondents 4 to 7 before the District Judge, Ernakulam. The District Judge by exercising the revisional jurisdiction set aside the order passed by the appellate authority and held that the petitioner did not require the building and that the petition was only a pretext for evicting the respondents. This finding is challenged in this proceeding. Two fold contentions have been urged by the petitioner's counsel. At first it is contended that the District Judge was not justified in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority. The District Judge had only supervisory jurisdiction and the reappraisal of the whole evidence and coming to a different conclusion altogether was illegal and unjustified in the facts of the case. The next contention urged by the petitioner's counsel is that respondents 4 to 7 are sub-tenants and they are bound by the order of eviction passed against respondents 8 and 9 and they have no right to file a revision against the order of the appellate authority.

    3. Under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965) a tenant has been defined under Section 2(6) and it specifically says that it does not include a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant. So, the definition of tenant as such does not take in a sub-tenant within its purview. Under Section 11(4)(i) the landlord is given the right to recover possession of the building if the tenant after the commencement of this Act, without the consent of the landlord, transfers his right under the lease or sub-lets the entire building or any portion thereof if the lease does not confer os him any right to do so. Proviso to Section 11(4)(i) is to the effect that an application under Section 11(4)(i) shall not be filed unless the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating the contravention of the said condition of the lease and the tenant has failed to terminate the transfer or the sublease. Section 21 of the Act further says that any order for eviction of a tenant passed under this Act shall be binding on all sub-tenant under such tenant, whether they were parties to the proceeding or not, provided that such order was not obtained by fraud or collusion. Section 21, also says that in case where sub-letting is allowed under the original agreement of tenancy the sub-tenant shall be made a party to the proceedings if he had given notice of the sub-tenancy to the land lord.

    4. In Rupchand v. Raghuvanshi (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1989) the question came up for consideration was whether a sub-tenant can challenge the decree passed in a suit between the landlord and the tenant. A landlord brought a suit against his lessee for ejectment without impleading the sub-lessee as defendant. The lessee did not contest and an exparte decree for eviction was passed. The sub-lessee thereupon filed a suit against landlord and the lessor for declaration that he was not bound by the decree which had been obtained by collusion between defendant in order to injure the plaintiff and to evict him from the premise without the decree being passed against him. Repelling this contention the Supreme Court held:

    “I………..it is clear that the law does not require that the sub-lessee need be made a party. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all cases where the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and does not implead the sub-lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit would bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lessee; but this is a position well understood by him when he took the sub-lease. The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act”.

    5. In Narayan v. Kalan Bai (AIR 1986 Rajasthan 52) a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High court took the view that the sub-tenants, unless there is a privity of contract between them and the landlord, have no locus standi to challenge the decree of eviction passed against the tenant-in-chief.

    6. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that a subtenant is an aggrieved party and hence entitled to file an appeal or revision against the order passed in a proceedings between the landlord and the tenant. Reliance was placed on a decision reported in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922). It was held that a sub-tenant is a person aggrieved by an order and he can maintain appeal of revision against the order parsed against the tenant. It may be noticed that Kalyanasundaram Pillai's case is not applicable to the facts of this case. Moreover, it is specifically stated that in a case where eviction is sought on the ground other than the grounds of sub-lease different considerations may arise. In Kalyanasundaram Pillai's case the dictum laid down in Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 SC 1035) was followed to hold that sub-lessee is entitled to challenge the order of eviction passed against the lessor. I will presently show that the decision reported in Karam Singh v. Partap Chand (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1305) also may not apply to the facts of this case.

    7. The decision reported in Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1305) is a case coming under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Prior to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Act applicable was Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 which prohibited eviction of the tenant at the suit of a landlord excepting the case mentioned in proviso to Section 13 therein. While such a matter was pending before the High Court, Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 cams into force. The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act was repealed by the later enactment in so far as it relates to the Union Territory of Delhi. However, in Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 there was a provision that all the pending proceedings shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act. The question was considered in a proceedings initiated by the sub-tenant. But, it may be remembered that under the Delhi Rent Control Act and in the earlier Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 the sub-tenant was included under the definitions of a tenant. It is so mentioned under Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Sections 14(1)(b) and 14(3) therein conferred specific rights on the sub-tenants. It was only under that circumstances the Supreme Court held that a sub-tenant had his own right to appeal from the decree. A sub-tenant who came into possession prior to the particular period was given all the benefits of the tenant whereas under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2/65) the sub-tenant is not included within the definition of tenant and therefore Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 SC 1305) has no application.

    8. Learned counsel for the respondents relying on a decision reported in Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General (AIR 1952 Supreme Court 319) contended that the respondents 4 to 7 who filed revision before the District Judge are persons aggrieved and that they are entitled to maintain such petitions. It is pointed out that a person who is brought before a court to submit to a decision, if the decision goes against him thereby “is a person aggrived by that decision”. It may be noted the circumstances under which the respondents 4 to 7 were impleaded in the rent control proceedings. Initially the R.C.P was filed by respondents 8 and 9 alleging that the petitioner bonafide required the building for own occupation. Respondents 8 and 9 contended that they left the partnership firm and the fourth respondent was conducting the business. Then the fourth respondent herein was impleaded. He later contended that the shop was in the possession of respondents 5 to 7. They too were impleaded subsequently. The Rent Control Court found that the original lease was not in favour of the firm and respondents 8 and 9 were alone tenants under the landlord. It is also important to note that respondents 8 and 9 filed application for fixation of fair rent and at no point of time they contended that the building was let out to a firm. There is no evidence that the landlord gave permission to sub-lease the building to respondents 4 to 7 herein. Under the above circumstances respondents 4 to 7 cannot be held to be persons aggrieved by the order passed against respondents 8 and 9 as they have no legal right to challenge the same.

    9. It may be remembered that in Jadavji Purushottam v. Navnitbhai ((1987) 4 SCC 223 : AIR 1977 SC 2146) the Supreme Court held that if a mortgages in possession was not empowered to create lease which would be binding on mortgagor after redemption of mortgage the tenant inducted by mortgagee is liable to be evicted on redemption of mortgage. That was a case in which the mortgagor mortgaged a house property with possession to mortgagee. The mortgage deed provided that the mortgage could be redeemed whenever the mortgagors paid the mortgage amount. Under one of the clauses of the mortgage deed the mortgagee was permitted to lease out the mortgaged house property to any one. The Mortgagee later filed a suit for recovery of mortgage amount which was resulted in consent decree. On making payment of mortgaged amount the final decree was drawn up. The mortgagor took out execution application for obtaining possession of disputed premises. It was alleged by the tenant that though the lease was given by he mortgagee, the lease was binding on the mortgagors as well. The Supreme Court held:

    “In view of the fact the mortgagors had not empowered the mortgagee to create a lease which would be binding on them after the redemption of the mortgage and the tenant's rights, as a tenant, did not become enlarged by means of any Tenancy legislation which cams to be enacted after the lease was granted, the tenant could claim tenancy rights only as against his landlord viz., the mortgages and not against the mortgagors. As soon as the mortgagee's rights become extinguished by the redemption of the mortgage, neither he nor anyone inducted by him has a right to be in possession of the mortgage property. Consequently, the mortgagors were entitled to seek ejectment of the mortgagee and the tenant inducted by him. The tenant, had no independent rights and hence it was not necessary that he should have been made a party to the suit filed by the mortgagee or the execution application taken out by the mortgagors after the redemption of the mortgage. His position was akin to that of a sub-tenant whose rights were conterminous with those of the tenant himself. As such the execution application taken against the mortgagee would be binding on the tenant. Having no independent rights of his own, the tenant could not contend that the decrees and the execution application were not binding on him as he was not made a party to the proceedings”.

    10. In Kerala Shoe Company v. K.C Bhaskaran ((1989) 2 SCC 395 : AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1110) the Supreme Court re-emphasised this position and held that a tenant continuing in possession even after the redemption of mortgage is liable to be evicted in a suit for recovery of possession by the mortgagor and it was held that a tenant was not entitled to the protection of Rent Control Act.

    11. Under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the sub-tenant is excluded from the definition of tenant. The order passed against the tenant is binding on the sub-tenant. The position of the sub-tenant who came into possession of the premises without the consent of the landlord is akin to that of a tenant Inducted by mortgagee. Merely because he is made a formal party to the proceedings for eviction it does clothe him with the right to challenge the order of eviction passed in favour of the landlord against the principal tenant. The sub-tenant cannot be construed as a person aggrieved against such an order. Different considerations may arise if the question of sub-lease itself is a matter of adjudication and the eviction is sought under Section 11(4)(i) i.e unauthorised sub-lease. Respondents 4 to 7 have no case that the landlord permitted them to occupy the building. Under that circumstance they were not entitled to challenge the order of eviction passed and the revision filed by them was not maintainable. The revisional authority lacked jurisdiction, hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

    12. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that even on the merits of the case the revisional authority was not justified in reversing the finding of the appellate authority. It is pointed out that the powers of the revisional authority are only supervisory in character. Whereas the respondent's counsel submitted that the revisional court was justified in reversing the finding on the question of bonafides and the revisional court has got power to consider the propriety and legality of the order. It may be noted that the petitioner contended that he wanted to start a stationery business in the building owned by him. His bonafides ware suspected for the reason that his father was conducting a shop and the petitioner, being the only son, would join the business of hit father and that the son did not really want to start a shop of his own. The revisional authority had also taken note of the fact that the father was suffering from some ailments and the petitioner's help was necessary for him to conduct the business. There is no such evidence in this case. The evidence only shows that the petitioner's father suspected that he had some heart ailment. The petitioner's father is hiving Independent business. The petitioner wanted to set up a stationery shop of his own and it is also submitted by the petitioner's counsel that after the filing of this petition the petitioner has started a shop of his own in another part of the town for which he obtained a building by paying a heavy rent. This also is relevant fact to be rockoned with in a proceedings for eviction on the ground of bonafide own occupation. Recently the Supreme Court held in Gulabhai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra (JT 1991 (3) SC 112) that for determining the question of bonafide need, subsequent events can be considered provided they are relevant for determining the question of bonafides. Earlier decision of Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981 (3) SCR 605) Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975 (3) SCR 958) and Amarjith Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain (1987 (1) SCR 272) also hold the view that for making the right of remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful and also to accord with the current realities, the court can and must take cautions cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of she proceedings. It is also proved that the petitioner was not in possession of any building of his own in the near vicinity. So, the evidence adduced by the petitioner clearly showed that he bonafide required the building for his own occupation and the appellate authority was justified in reversing the finding of the Rent Control Court and holding that the petitioner bonafide required the building for his own occupation. The revisional court was not justified in reversing this finding. In the result, I hold that Ext. P3 order passed by the District Judge in R.C.R.P 122 of 1983 is illegal and unsustainable in law. I set aside the same and direct that the petitioner is entitled to get eviction on the basis of the order dated 7-10-1983 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A 23 of 1981. The petitioner is entitled to get costs of this proceedings from respondents 4 to 7.

    13. Original Petition is allowed.

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    Comments

    Varghese Ittoop v. M. Ibrahim And Others
    (Aug 16, 1991)