P.C Pandit, J.:— Messrs Tilak Ram Dharam Paul landlord made an application against their tenant Dev Raj under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter called the Act, for the latter's eviction from the Chaubara in dispute, situated on the first floor of property No. B. VII/476(B. VII/646) Kesar Ganj Mandi, Luahiana. The ground for eviction, with which we are new concerned, is that the premises was required by the landlords for their own personal needs.
2. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the ground urged by the landlord for eviction was mala fide and had been taken with some ulterior motive. He, consequently, dismissed their eviction application. When the matter went in appeal before the Appellate Authority, he reversed this finding and held the Chaubara in question was needed by the landlord for task personal occupation, because it had to be used by their Palledar and customers. The appeal was, consequently, accepted, the order of the Rent Controller set aside and the ejectment application granted. The tenant has come here in revision.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in the first instance, submitted that in order to succeed on the ground of personal need, the landlord had to establish (a) that they required the Chaubara for their occupation; (b) that they were not occupying any residential building in the urban area concerned; and (c) that they had not vacated with a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act in the said urban area. These were she requirements of section 13(3(a)(i) of the Act, under which the application had been made. The said section reads:
“13(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession—
(i) in the case of a residential building, if—
(a) he requires it for his own occupation;
(b) he is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned; and
(c) has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area:
(d) it was let to the tenant for use as residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord, and the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment:
Provided that where the tenant is a workman who has been discharged or dismissed by the landlord from his service or employment in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he snail not be liable to be evicted untill the competent authority under the Act confirms the order of discharge or dismissal made against him by the landlord.”
4. According to the learned counsel, the landlord has not been able to prove (b) and (c) mentioned above. As a matter of fact, nothing was mentioned about these two matters in the ejectment application and that being so, the same deserved to be dismissed on that ground alone.
5. It is true that in the eviction application, it has not been stated that the landlords were not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned and that they had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act in the said urban area. But under the law, it was not necessary to mention these things in the application. It was so held by a Bench of this Court in Krishan Lal Seth v. Shrimati Pritam Kumari,1 whore it was observed that in an application under section 13 of the Act for eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement of the residential building for personal occupation, it was not necessary for the landlord to restate in the application the statutory conditions set out in paras (b) and (c) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 13(3).
6. So far as (c) is concerned, it may also be added that this contention was not urged either before the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority. This point was not even taken in the grounds of revision filed in this Court. Moreover, it is not the case of the tenant that the landlord had vacated a residential building in Ludhiana without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act.
7. As regards (b), firstly this argument was not raised before the Appellate Authority. Secondly, it is true that it has come in evidence that the landlord also owned a residential house and some other property in Ludhiana. But so far as the residential house was concerned, the same was held to be over-crowded and he did not meet their requirements and needs. As regards the other property, the same was rented out to the other tenants. Jagdish Chand, partner of the applicant-firm, stated as A.W 3—“Our residential house is in Malerigali. It consists of eight rooms besides bath room and kitchen. I do not remember the measurements of the rooms. Four families resides in that house, consisting of 30 members. One family is of Lala Brij Lal, my elder brother. Lala Brij Lal had got four daughters and two sons. The daughters are unmarried, while his two sons are married. Lala Brij Lal has got his wife also. My second brother is Shri Dharam Pal, aged 41 years. He has got four daughters and two sons. Daughters are unmarried and so the two sons. My mother is also residing in the same house. My father is dead. Third brother is myself. I have got two daughters and two sons and my wife. None of the children is married. We own other property also. All those buildings have been rented out.” If the landlord is occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned and that does not meet his requirements, he is entitled to get the tenant evicted from another residential building if if he requires the same for his own occupation. It was so held by a Full Bench of this Court in Sant Ram Des Raj v. Karam Chand,2 where it was observed that where a landlord established that he had made his application for eviction of his tenant in goad faith and that he required the premises for his own occupation and further that the premises already in his occupation did not meet his requirements and needs, he was entitled to evict his tenant under section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. There is, thus, no force in the first contention raised by the landlord counsel for the petitioner.
8. It was then submitted that the learned Appellate Authority had erroneously held that the premises were bona fide required by the landlord for their personal use. It was argued that the landlord had been changing their stand from time to time. In the application for eviction all that was stated was that the Chaubara was needed “for their personal need.” In the replication filed by them, it was said that their customers often came and the landlord had no other arrangements for their stay. The landlord also required the premises in dispute to accommodate their staff, as the accommodation already with them was insufficient. In evidence, it was stated that the Chaubara was required by the landlord for their customers (Beoparis) and also for their Palledar. The eviction application, according to the learned counsel was not a bona fide one and had been made merely to oust the tenant somehow.
9. The landlord firm is carrying on the business of commission Agents. It was true in the eviction application all that was mentioned was that the Chaubara was required for their personal need. But this ground was simply denied in the written statement filed by the tenant. The detailed of the personal need were given in the replication where it was stated:
“The customers of the applicants often come and the applicants have no other arrangements for their stay. The premises in dispute are situate near the premises whereby the applicants are carrying on their business. The applicants also require the premises in dispute to accommodate their staff as the accommodation already with the applicants is insufficient.”
10. In order to prove this, Jagdish Chand, partner of the landlord-firm, appeared in the witness-box and deposed that they needed the Chaubara for their customers and Palledar. In cross-examination, he said:
“Hundred or ten Beoparies may come daily who may have to reside in the room. Our Palledar resides in the courtyard of the Mandi Kesar Ganj. He is working with us for the last 1½ or 2 years. The respondent (tenant) is residing in another room of the same building. It is wrong to suggest that we do not require the house and the application has been made to harras the respondent and to increase the rate of rent.
11. In support of this assertion, the landlord also produced Baldev, their Palledar, as A.W 2, and he deposed—“I am Palledar with the applicants. The applicants have promised me to provide me with any accommodation. The Chaubara in dispute is required for my residence.” In cross-examination, this witness stated that he was working with the landlord-firm as Palledar for the last 1½ years and there was no other Palledar working with the landlord. From his evidence, it is therefore, clear that he was the only Palledar, who was working with the landlord firm. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that under these circumstances, this witness would be considered as a member of the staff of the landlord firm, he being the only Palledar employed by them.
12. In the replication, as already mentioned above, the landlord had stated that they required the premises in dispute to accommodate their staff. The landlord also produced one Kasturi Lal as A.W 1. He was also a Commission Agent for foodgrains like the landlord and his shop was adjacent to their shop. According to him, the landlord firm were working as Commission Agents for foodgrains for the last so many years. They required the premises in dispute for their customers, who come from outside and had to stay for the night. This evidence was considered by the learned Appellate Authority and on its basis, he came to the conclusion that it stood substantially proved that the landlord-firm bona fide required the Chaubara in dispute for its use by their Palledar Baldev, A.W 2, and also by their customers, who brought grains to their shop and had to stay for the night there. It was further held by him that this need for the customers and the Palledar amounted to the landlord's personal need of that Chaubara. For this finding, the Appellate Authority relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in B.M Lall v. Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd.,3 in which the requirement of the landlord-company for accommodating its staff officer was considered to be for its own occupation.
13. It may be mentioned that the Appellate Authority also referred to the evidence produced by the tenant Dev Raj, who had appeared as R.W 3. The other witnesses produced were Sital Parshad, R.W 1 and Murari Lal, R.W 2. The had stated that the landlord did not require the room for their Palledar or their customers. According to the Appellate Authority, these witnesses were not independent. Both these persons, concededly appeared as witnesses for the tenant previously also the finding of the Appellate authority that the landlord bona fide required the Chaubara in dispute for their needs is, therefore well based and learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to give any valid ground for disturbing the same. The second contention raised on behalf of the tenant therefore, is also without any merit. No other point was urged before me.
14. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court as well. The tenant is, however, given three months time to vacate the premises.
15. Petition dismissed.