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  • Art. 62 or Art. 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Art. 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Indian Partnership Act, 1932, s.
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Citation Codes
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  • Art. 62 or Art. 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Art. 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Indian Partnership Act, 1932, s.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Mukherjea, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff and two defendants were ostensible lessees of land and market structures described in the plaint. The Mitras (landlords) granted a lease dated 26 August 1935 for nine years (with an option to renew for a further nine years) to the plaintiff and the two defendants for use as a market. From the outset defendant No. 1 was allowed by his co-lessees to manage the market: he collected tolls, paid rent and municipal taxes and ran the market business. The plaintiff alleged that although the market became profitable, defendant No. 1 did not pay the plaintiff his share of profits, prepared false accounts and had also filed a separate money suit against the plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore instituted the present suit seeking accounts of the profits of the market from 26 August 1935 to 7 January 1937 and a decree for any sum found due on accounting.

At trial the trial Court found for the plaintiff, holding that the lease was granted to the plaintiff and the two defendants (not merely to a bazaar committee), that defendant No. 1 had been in charge of management and had realised rents and profits, and it passed a preliminary decree for accounts, directing defendant No. 1 to file his accounts and for a commissioner to examine them.

Defendant No. 1 alone appealed to the District Judge, who, while concurring with the trial Court's findings of fact, set aside the judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on two grounds: (1) the suit was not maintainable in its present form (the plaintiff should have sued for joint possession or partition before seeking accounts), and (2) the suit was barred by limitation (the District Judge held the suit would be time-barred whether Article 62 or Article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, applied).

The plaintiff appealed to this Court (a Second Appeal). Mr. S.M. Bose, the Acting Advocate-General of India, appeared for the appellant. Dr. Basak appeared for the respondent and supported the decision of the lower appellate Court while also arguing an additional point (that the parties were co-partners and accounts could be claimed only on dissolution).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the parties to the suit were co-owners or co-partners (i.e., whether the relationship was one of co-ownership of property or partnership in business).
  2. Whether a suit for accounts only is maintainable by one co-owner against another without a prayer for partition (or, if parties are partners, without dissolution of partnership).
  3. Whether the plaintiff's suit for accounts is barred by limitation and, if not, which Article of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is the proper Article to apply (Articles discussed in the opinion include Art. 62, Art. 89 and Art. 120).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff alleged that the Mitras granted a lease on 26 August 1935 to the plaintiff and the two defendants and that the plaintiff was one of the co-lessees with an entitlement to a share of the profits.
  • Defendant No. 1, having been placed in charge of management, realised the market's tolls and profits but did not pay the plaintiff his share; the plaintiff sought an account of profits from 26 August 1935 to 7 January 1937.
  • The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 prepared false accounts and had sued the plaintiff in a separate money suit, supporting the need for an independent accounting remedy.

Defendant No. 1's Arguments

  • Defendant No. 1 contended that neither the plaintiff nor any of the defendants were the true lessees or had any beneficial interest; the lease was actually taken by an indeterminate body called the Bazaar Committee (Bâzâr Committee), and the document was executed in the ostensible names of the plaintiff and the two defendants because the landlords preferred named lessees.
  • He asserted that the Bazaar Committee actually ran the affairs of the market and that he personally did not make a profit from the market nor was it intended that the ostensible lessees should share in its income.
  • He further contended the suit was not maintainable in its present form and that it was barred by limitation.

Respondent's Counsel (Dr. Basak) Arguments

  • Dr. Basak supported the District Judge's decision that the suit was not maintainable without a claim for joint possession or partition.
  • He advanced an additional contention that, on the plaintiff's own case, the defendants were co-partners with the plaintiff in the market business, and that an account could be claimed only on dissolution of the partnership.
  • He argued that applying the equitable principle analogous to the Queen Anne statute might impose fiduciary obligations on a co-owner who left management to another; he relied on the Court's prior decision in Mahesh Narain v. Nowbat Pathak to underline limits to entitlement to accounts.

Appellant's Counsel (Mr. S.M. Bose) Arguments

  • Mr. Bose, appearing in support of the appeal, attacked the District Judge's conclusions on both maintainability and limitation grounds, arguing for upholding the trial Court's preliminary decree for accounts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indian Partnership Act, 1932, s. 4 Defines "partnership" as relation between persons who have agreed to share profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The Court used it to explain that no pleading or evidence established a partnership between the parties; this supported the finding that the parties were co-owners rather than partners.
Indian Limitation Act, 1908 — Art. 62 Article generally applicable to actions for money had and received (as discussed in case law). The Court held that Art. 62 was not the proper Article because an action for an account between co-owners is not an action for money had and received.
Indian Limitation Act, 1908 — Art. 89 Article dealing with suits founded on any other written contract, or for relief not otherwise provided for; invoked in limitation discussion. The Court considered Art. 89 as an alternative; even if Art. 89 applied, the Court held the plaintiff's suit was within three years from refusal of the demand and was not time-barred.
Indian Limitation Act, 1908 — Art. 120 Article often applied to suits for accounts and other similar equitable claims (discussed against other Articles). The Court indicated Art. 120 would not be improper to apply to accounts between co-owners and cited precedent (J. Subba Rao v. J. Rama Rao) supporting that view; ultimately the Court found the suit not barred regardless of which Article controlled.
Queen Anne's Statute (4 & 5 Anne, c. 16), s. 27 (historical English statute) Provided that a joint tenant or tenant-in-common could maintain an action of account against the other as bailiff for receiving more than his just share. The Court treated the principle embodied in the statute as a rule of equity applicable in India in the absence of statutory provision: a co-owner who receives more than his share must account for the excess even without partition.
Henderson v. Eason Interprets the scope of the Queen Anne statute: applies where one co-tenant receives payments from third persons in respect of the tenancy more than his proportionate share; excludes cases of exclusive occupation where account is not ascertainable. The Court relied on Henderson to explain the statutory principle and its limits and noted Parke B.'s statement about ascertaining shares and when one becomes the other's bailiff.
Denys v. Shuckburgh Equity entertained bills for account by one co-sharer against another on equitable grounds. Used to show that Courts of Equity historically granted accounts between co-owners even before the statute; supports allowing accounts without prior partition.
Bentley v. Bates Authority stating that joint ownership need not be dissolved before taking an account. The Court cited it to support the proposition that a co-owner need not compel sale or dissolution before obtaining accounts.
Balvantráv Oze v. Ganpatráv Jádhav (Bombay High Court) Affirmed that the principle underlying the Queen Anne statute is enforceable by equity and therefore by Indian Civil Courts. The Court relied on this High Court decision as supporting authority for applying the Queen Anne principle as a rule of equity in India.
Mahesh Narain v. Nowbat Pathak Considered limits on entitlement to accounts; followed Henderson v. Eason and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to accounts where there was no proof the defendant received more than his share. The Court observed Mahesh Narain did not disapprove the equitable principle but applied Henderson; it relied on it to show that proof of receipt in excess of share is necessary under that principle.
Kennedy v. De Trafford Authority that there is no fiduciary relation between co-owners of property as such. The Court cited it to reject the submission that allowing accounts would impose a fiduciary relationship merely because one co-owner manages the property for both.
Freeman on Co-Tenancy, s. 290 (treatise) Explains that where there is actual ouster, the remedy is a suit for joint possession and mesne profits; a pure action of account is inappropriate. The Court referred to this principle to distinguish cases of ouster (where possession is denied) from ordinary management where an account remedy is appropriate.
Thomas v. Thomas Held that an action for an account against a co-tenant is not to be regarded as an action for money had and received. The Court adopted this view to conclude that Art. 62 (for money had and received) was not the proper limitation provision for the plaintiff's action.
Banoo Tewary v. Doona Tewary Applied Art. 62 to suits to realise shares of joint debts realised by co-sharers under certain facts. The Court cited it as an example where Art. 62 was applied, contrasting it with other authorities and showing the limitation question depends on the nature of the claim.
Yerukola v. Yerukola (Madras High Court) Held that Art. 120 would be proper for similar suits unless agency was proved, in which case Art. 89 would govern. The Court cited it in the limitation discussion to illustrate alternative views on which Article applies to accounts between co-sharers.
J. Subba Rao v. J. Rama Rao Applied Art. 120 to an account suit between co-sharers. The Court invoked this decision to support the proposition that Art. 120 may properly be applied to accounts between co-owners.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in distinct steps, each tethered to findings of fact and established legal principles cited in the opinion:

  1. Characterisation of the relationship (co-owners v. partners): The Court accepted the lower appellate Court's factual finding that the parties were joint-owners rather than partners. The Court emphasized that no pleading or evidence was produced to establish an agreement to carry on a business and share profits in the sense required by the Indian Partnership Act, s. 4. The mere fact that the market operated before the lease date did not convert the arrangement into a partnership in the absence of supporting proof.
  2. Maintainability of a suit for accounts by one co-owner against another: Because the parties were held to be co-owners, the Court examined whether one co-owner could obtain an account without seeking partition. The Court surveyed English common law, the Statute of Anne (4 & 5 Anne c. 16 s. 27) and equitable jurisprudence: historically, equity courts entertained bills for accounts between co-sharers and the Statute of Anne secured an action of account where one co-tenant received more than his proportionate share from third parties. The Court concluded that the principle embodied in the statute and adopted by equity is applicable as a rule of equity, justice and good conscience in India in absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary.
  3. Limits of the account remedy and distinction from ouster: The Court recognized limits to the account remedy. Where there is actual ouster and exclusive hostile possession by one co-sharer, the proper remedy is a suit for joint possession (with compensation or mesne profits) rather than a pure account. But no such ouster was proved or found in the present record: defendant No. 1 throughout was described as manager in possession with consent, and mere refusal to render accounts does not constitute ouster. Hence the District Judge's view that the plaintiff had effectively pleaded ouster and therefore must sue for joint possession was incorrect.
  4. Fiduciary concern raised by respondent: The Court rejected the submission that applying the equitable account principle would convert ordinary co-ownership into a fiduciary relationship. It cited Kennedy v. De Trafford to assert there is no fiduciary relation between co-owners as such; the managing co-owner acts in his own capacity as owner, but must account for any excess receipts over his rightful share.
  5. Limitation: The Court analyzed which Article of the Limitation Act applied. Adopting the view in Thomas v. Thomas, the Court held that an action for an account between co-owners is not an action for "money had and received" and hence Art. 62 is not properly applicable. The Court observed authorities applying Art. 120 (and discussed Art. 89 as well), and held it would not be improper to apply Art. 120. Crucially, however, the Court found that the plaintiff's suit was instituted within three years of the refusal to render accounts and there was no evidence of earlier demands which would have started limitation earlier. Thus, even if Art. 89 were to apply, the suit was not barred.
  6. Relief and manner of accounting: The Court directed that a preliminary decree for accounts be granted (as the trial Court had done), and that accounts be taken by a commissioner on the basis of what defendant No. 1 had actually received. Defendant No. 1 would be entitled to all just allowances and rights of a receiver — e.g., remuneration of servants and clerks engaged in realising rents and profits, and deductions for bona fide losses incurred in the business.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court (District Judge) dismissing the plaintiff's suit are set aside.
  • The plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary decree for accounts as awarded by the trial Court; a commissioner will take the accounts on the footing of what defendant No. 1 actually received.
  • Defendant No. 1 is entitled to all just allowances as a receiver in the accounting process, including remuneration paid to servants and clerks and the opportunity to show bona fide losses.
  • The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this appeal.

Broader legal implication stated by the Court:

  • The Court expressed the view that the equitable principle underlying the Queen Anne statute — that a co-owner who has received more than his proportionate share is accountable to the other co-owner without requiring partition — is applicable in India as a rule of equity in absence of specific statutory provision.
  • The Court clarified that this equitable account remedy is distinct from remedies appropriate where there has been an ouster; in cases of ouster the remedy is for joint possession and mesne profits rather than a pure account.

The Court thus afforded an account remedy to a co-owner against a managing co-owner who has realised rents and profits, subject to the usual allowances and deductions, and found the present suit not barred by limitation on the facts of the case.

    Abu Shabid v. Abdul Hoque Dobhash

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Mukherjea, J.:— The appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and arises out of a suit for accounts. The plaintiff's case is that in the town of Chittagong there was a market known as Feringibâzâr which was held at a place close to the land described in the schedule to the plaint and was run by certain persons who may be called the Shahas. The Mitras, who are the owners of the schedule land, wanted to establish a rival market on the same, but, being unsuccessful themselves, they allowed the plaintiff and the two defendants to start a market on that land and use the structures that stood upon it for that purpose. On August 26, 1935, the Mitras granted a lease of the land and structures to the plaintiff and the two defendants, for a period of nine years only, with an option of renewal for the same period after its termination. From the very beginning, the management of the market was left to defendant No. 1 by his co-lessees and it was he who realised tolls from the vendors and stall-holders and paid the rents and taxes due to the landlord and the municipality. Although the market became a profitable concern, and its income went on increasing year after year, the defendant No. 1, it was said, did not pay anything to the plaintiff as his share of the profits. When the plaintiff asked for accounts, the defendant No. 1 prepared certain false accounts, and filed a money suit against the plaintiff, which was still pending when the present suit was commenced. The plaintiff was, under these circumstances, obliged to institute the present suit, and he prayed that defendant might be ordered to render accounts of the profits of the market from August 26, 1935, to January 7, 1937, and that the plaintiff might be given a decree for such sum of money as may be found due to him for his share on the taking of account.

    The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 alone. His contentions inter alia were that neither the plaintiff nor any of the defendants were the real lessees in respect of the lands and structures, nor had they any beneficial interest in the market or its profits. It was said that the lease was actually taken by a Committee known as Bâzâr Committee, who organised the removal of the market place to its present site, and as the landlords did not like to recognise a fluctuating and an indeterminate body of persons as lessees, the document was executed in the name of the plaintiff and the two defendants.

    It was this committee who were running all the affairs of the market, collecting tolls and paying rent and taxes. The defendant No. 1 did not make any profit out of the market, nor was it intended that any of the ostensible lessees should have any share in its income. It was further contended that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, and it was barred by the law of limitation.

    The trial Court overruled all these defences and gave the plaintiff a decree. It held inter alia, that the lease was really granted by the Mitras to the plaintiff and the two defendants and that there was no truth in the story of defendant No. 1 that they were mere benâmdârs for a committee known as the Bazâ Committee. It found also that defendant No. 1 was placed in charge of the management of the market since it was started, with the consent of his co-owners, and he was all along realising the rents and profits. The result was that a preliminary decree for accounts was passed and the defendant No. 1 was directed to file all his accounts within one month, after which a commissioner would be appointed to examine them.

    Against this decision there was an appeal taken by the defendant No. 1 to the Court of the District Judge at Chittagong. The learned District Judge, who heard the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The District Judge concurred in the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court, but dismissed the suit on the grounds that the suit was not maintainable in law and that it was barred by the law of limitation.

    According to the lower appellate Court, the plaintiff ought to have, on the allegations made in the plaint sued for joint possession, and he was not entitled to accounts unless he claimed joint possession or partition. As regards limitation, the District Judge did not discuss the matter in detail, as he was going to dismiss the suit on the other ground, but he held that the suit would be time-barred, whether Art. 62 or Art. 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, be held to be the proper Article applicable.

    It is against this decree of dismissal, that the present Second Appeal has been preferred, and Mr. S.M Bose the Acting Advocate-General of India, who appears in support of the appeal, has assailed the propriety of the decision of the District Judge on both these grounds. Dr. Basak, who appears on behalf of the respondent, has, besides supporting the decision upon the grounds upon which the lower appellate Court rested it, put forward an additional ground, viz., that on the plaintiff's own case, the defendants were not co-owners but co-partners with him in the market business and he could demand account only on a dissolution of the partnership.

    The first question that falls for determination in the appeal is, as to whether the parties to the suit were co-owners or co-partners, and whether a suit for accounts only is maintainable, without a prayer for partition in one case or dissolution of the partnership in the other.

    I do not think that it would be right to say, as Mr. Basak contends, that the parties to this suit are partners in a business and not joint-owners of a property. No such case was made by defendant No. 1 in his written-statement, and the lower appellate Court had come to the definite finding that the parties were not partners but co-owners. “Partnership” is the relation subsisting between persons, who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all: Indian Partnership Act, 1932, s. 4. We do not know what the agreement between the parties was in the present case. All that we find is that they took a joint lease of the property in suit upon which a market was started. There can be no doubt that there could be a partnership in respect of the business of the market, but no foundation for such a case was made either in the pleadings or in the evidence. The mere fact that in para. 4 of the plaint the market was said to have been opened a few days before the lease was actually granted does not justify the inference that it was a partnership business. Accepting, therefore, the finding of the lower appellate Court that the parties were joint-owners of the market and its site, the question that we have to decide is whether one co-owner can sue another for accounts, in case the latter receives rents and profits of the joint property in excess of his share, without instituting a suit for partition.

    There is no specific provision in the Indian Acts on this point, and the question has to be answered on general principles of equity, justice and good conscience. According to English common law, if one tenant-in-common occupied the entire property held in common and took the entire profit, the other had no remedy against him whilst the tenancy in common continued, unless he was actually dispossessed, in which case, he might sue for ejectment. The only case where an action of account could be maintained was where one co-owner had expressly appointed the other his bailiff as to his undivided moiety. This was remedied by a Statute of Queen Anne, viz., 4 & 5 Ann., c. 16 which by s. 27 provided that an action of account could be maintained “by one joint tenant and tenant in common, his executors and administrators, against the other as bailiff for receiving more than comes to his just share or proportion”. This statute would apply whenever it was found that one co-tenant had received rents, money or other kinds of payment from third persons in respect of the tenancy, more than his proportionate share. It had no application where one co-tenant was himself in exclusive occupation or enjoyment of the common property, or when he employed his capital and industry in cultivating the whole of a piece of land in a mode in which the money and labour spent greatly exceeded the value of the rent or compensation for the mere occupation of the land, or where it was not possible, having regard to the circumstances of the case, to say that he had received more than his just share: vide Henderson v. Eason . As was observed by Parke B. in this case (1):—

    The statute…. includes all cases in which one of two tenants-in-common of lands leased at a rent payable to both, or of a rent charge, or any money payment or payment in kind, due to them from another person, receives the whole or more than his proportionate share according to his interest in the subject of the tenancy. There is no difficulty in ascertaining the share of each, and determining when one has received more than his just share: and he becomes, as to that excess, the bailiff of the other, and must account.

    This was the principle underlying the Statute of Anne. Quite apart from this statute, the Courts of Equity in England, entertained bills for account by one co-sharer against another on the same equitable grounds: Denys v. Shuckburgh ; and, in fact, these Courts, by reason of their offering superior facilities for accounting, were often resorted to in preference to tribunals of law. Neither in equity nor, under, the Queen Anne's Statute, it was necessary for the co-owners to apply for partition or sale of the property before he could get accounts. As was observed by the Lord Chief Baron, in Bentley v. Bates :—

    It is hard to say that the joint ownership of a colliery must be put an end to by dissolution, before an account can be taken. I do not agree that in a case between joint tenants, or tenants in common, of a colliery, one party can compel another to sell his share, and dissolve the concern previously to taking the account. That was not the meaning of the statute which gave the account between them, or of Courts of Equity which had the jurisdiction over such accounts previously to the statute.

    The Queen Anne's Statute itself cannot, of course, apply to India, and it has now been repealed in England, but the principle which was embodied in this statute, and which was given effect to by Equity Courts in England, can, I think, be applied as a rule of equity, justice and good conscience in India, in the absence of any statutory provision on the point. It would be inequitable, if a co-owner is forced to have a partition of the property, and cannot otherwise get his share of the profits which is actually being received by his co-owner, even though the effect of a partition may be a practical destruction of the property, or a deterioration of its value. This principle was applied by the Bombay High Court in Balvantráv Oze v. Ganpatráv Jádhav , where West J. observed as follows:—

    This principle has in England been embodied in a Statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 27, but it is one enforceable by equity……as resting on natural right, and, therefore, by the Indian Civil Courts.

    Dr. Basak laid much stress on the decision of this Court in Mahesh Narain v. Nowbat Pathak . But the learned Judges, who decided that case, nowhere said that the principle underlying the Queen Anne's Statute was inapplicable as being unsuitable to Indian circumstances. On the other hand, they expressly followed the decision in Henderson v. Easoh (supra) mentioned above and held on the authority of that case that the plaintiff was not entitled to accounts on the principle embodied in the Queen Anne's Statute as there was no proof that the defendant had received more than his share.

    Dr. Basak argues further that if that principle is applied, it would be open to a co-owner by leaving the property to the management of the other co-owner to impose upon the latter an obligation of a fiduciary character. I don't think that there is any substance in this contention. There is no fiduciary relation between co-owners of a property as such: Kennedy v. De Trafford ; and, if one co-owner realises rents and profits, he does so in his capacity as an owner for which no agency from the other proprietor is necessary. But, for what he receives in excess of his share, he must be under an obligation to account to the other co-sharer. I cannot, therefore, accept the proposition of law formulated by Dr. Basak, that a suit for accounts is not maintainable by one co-owner against another unless there is a claim for partition. If, however, there is actual ouster by one co-sharer of another, different considerations arise. The remedy of the co-sharer who is dispossessed must be to sue the other for joint possession and he can claim, along with it, compensation or mesne profits. A pure action of account would not be an appropriate remedy under such circumstances. This is also the law in England: vide Freeman on Co-Tenancy, s. 290. The decision of the lower appellate Court would, therefore, be perfectly right, if the plaintiff was actually ousted from the common property by defendant No. 1 in the present case. To show ouster it must be found that there was an exclusive possession by one co-owner connected with some act amounting to a total denial of the rights of the co-owner who is out of possession. No such case was made by the defendant No. 1 in his written-statement, and although, he denied the title of the plaintiff, he denied his own title too and disclaimed that he was in possession of the property. The finding of the Court below is that he was a joint-owner with the plaintiff, and was in possession from the beginning as a manager. It was necessary, therefor, for him to prove, as to when he repudiated his character as a managing co-owner and asserted a title hostile to the plaintiff. There is no such finding in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. What the District Judge says is that the plaintiff in his plaint practically alleged ouster, and that is why it was necessary for him to sue for joint possession. I do not think that this view is right. The plaintiff states very clearly that the defendant No. 1 was in possession of the market as a manager. It is indeed said in para. 10 of the plaint that he refused accounts, but the mere refusal of a manager to render accounts cannot amount to an ouster.

    The only point that remains for determination is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. In England such an action of account against a co-tenant is not considered as an action for money had and received: Thomas v. Thomas ; and, in my opinion, that is the correct view to take. I do not think, therefore, that Art. 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is the proper Article to apply. In Banoo Tewary v. Doona Tewary there were some joint debts left undivided after separation of a Mitâksharâ family. Some of the co-sharers realised these debts and in a suit by the other co-sharers to realise their share of the same, it was held that Art. 62 applied. On the other hand, under very similar circumstances, it was held by the Madras High Court in Yerukola v. Yerukola , Art. 120 would be the proper Article, unless agency was proved, in which case the suit would be governed by Art. 89.

    As I have said above, according to the principle of the Queen Anne's Statute, the co-sharer is only entitled to accounts, which means that the defendant is entitled to all just allowances and all the rights and indemnities of a receiver. If it was an action for money had and received the defendant's liability would be absolute.

    There is no specific Article in the Limitation Act to regulate a case of accounts between one co-owner and another and it seems that it would not be improper to apply Art. 120 to such a case. This view was taken in J. Subba Rao v. J. Rama Rao . But even if Art. 89 is held to be the proper Article, I do not think that the plaintiff's suit can be held to be time-barred. The suit has been brought within three years from the date when the demand for accounts was refused by defendant No. 1. Dr. Bysak lays stress upon the fact that the plaintiff speaks of the last demand in his plaint, which implies that there must have been previous demands, and if these were refused the cause of action must have arisen earlier. But as to that, there is no evidence and no finding, and the defendant No. 1 nowhere attempted to show that there was any previous demand prior to 1936. Under these circumstances, I cannot hold that the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation.

    The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The plaintiff will have a preliminary decree for accounts as given by the trial Court, and the accounts would be taken by a commissioner appointed by the Court. The accounts would be taken on the footing of what has been actually received by defendant No. 1, and he would be entitled to all just allowances as a receiver, including the remuneration paid to servants and clerks in the matter of realizing rent and profits, and would be able to show losses in his business. These directions would be embodied in the preliminary decree. The plaintiff would be entitled to cost of this appeal.

    Roxburgh, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal allowed.
    P.K.D

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    Comments

    Abu Shabid v. Abdul Hoque Dobhash
    (Aug 11, 1939)