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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a partition suit in which the learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree based on an award. There were four contesting parties: the plaintiff (entitled to a one-sixth share), defendants 1 and 2 (each entitled to one-sixth), and defendants 3, 4, 8 and 9 (each entitled to an eight-annas share). In May 1940 the Court below referred the dispute to three arbitrators (Hardwar Singh, Mukhram Singh and Ganpat Singh). The award was filed on 1 August 1940 after several adjournments. On the same day arbitrator Ganpat Singh objected, alleging lack of formal sittings and that he had not been allowed to take part. The Subordinate Judge allowed objections to be filed. On 10 August 1940 defendant 3 filed objections attacking the award. After hearing evidence, the Subordinate Judge on 27 September 1940 held that the objections failed and confirmed the award. The present appeal was filed as a first appeal against the decree dated 27 September 1940.

The opinion is delivered by Fazl Ali, C.J.; Sinha, J. expressly agreed. The Court considered whether the appeal was competent under the statutory framework and, in the alternative, whether the memorandum of appeal could be treated as an application in revision. The Court also examined alleged procedural irregularities and possible misconduct (including negligence or recklessness) by the arbitrators and ultimately remanded the matter to the Subordinate Judge for fresh consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies against the Subordinate Judge's confirmation of an arbitration award where the reference was pending at the commencement of the Arbitration Act, i.e., whether the old law (Sch. 2, para. 16, Code of Civil Procedure) or the Arbitration Act (Section 39) governs appeals in this case.
  2. Whether the memorandum of appeal (filed as a first appeal) can be treated as an application in revision given the procedural circumstances and objections raised by one of the arbitrators.
  3. Whether procedural irregularities, gross negligence or recklessness by arbitrators (short of proven corruption or dishonesty) can amount to "misconduct" sufficient to vitiate an award.
  4. Whether the learned Subordinate Judge erred by confining his scrutiny to corruption or dishonesty and failing to consider non-corrupt misconduct (e.g., negligence or procedural irregularity) when deciding whether to set aside the award.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Although Sch. 2, para. 16 (old CPC) restricted appeals after refusal to set aside an award, the appellants contended that Section 39 of the Arbitration Act (allowing appeals from orders setting aside or refusing to set aside awards) applied and therefore an appeal was competent.
  • In the alternative, the appellants asked the Court to treat the memorandum of appeal as an application in revision given the circumstances.
  • The appellants emphasized suspicious features concerning the award: irregularities in the signatures of arbitrators (including a part of the award signed by only two arbitrators), discrepancies between oral evidence and the written award about shares and house divisions, possible allocation of houses not subject to partition, plots being included more than once in the schedule (e.g., Nos. 257, 298, 783, 814), and inclusion of plots not found in the plaint (e.g., Nos. 12, 73, 1029, 358, 214, 300). They argued these matters could indicate gross negligence, recklessness or misconduct by the arbitrators.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents pointed out that some of the disputed plots (for example Nos. 1029 and 868) were mentioned in the written statement, implying the arbitrators had jurisdiction to include them in the partition. This was offered as an explanation for inclusion of certain plots not in the plaint.
  • The respondents also contended they had not been given an adequate opportunity to investigate and explain why certain plots were included in the schedule; absent such explanation, the appellants' charges would remain prima facie.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, reported in 18 C.W.N. 7551 Irregularities in procedure which amount to no proper hearing of the matter in dispute constitute misconduct sufficient to vitiate an award even without any imputation of dishonesty or partiality. The Court relied on this authority to hold that gross negligence or recklessness apparent on the face of the award could amount to misconduct — i.e., misconduct need not involve corruption or dishonesty — and therefore the Subordinate Judge should have considered such non-corrupt forms of misconduct when deciding whether to set aside the award.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a series of legal and factual determinations:

  1. Statutory applicability and competence of appeal:
    • The Court noted Sch. 2, para. 16 of the old Code of Civil Procedure provided that no appeal lies from a decree following refusal to set aside an award except where the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. The appellants sought to invoke Section 39 of the Arbitration Act (allowing appeals from orders setting aside or refusing to set aside awards).
    • The Court observed that Section 48 of the Arbitration Act saves references pending at the commencement of that Act by stating that the law in force immediately before the commencement continues to apply to such references. Because the reference in this case was pending when the Arbitration Act commenced, the Court concluded the old law applied and the appeal was therefore incompetent as an appeal under the Arbitration Act.
  2. Treatment of the memorandum of appeal as revision:
    • Although the appeal was incompetent under the governing statute, the appellants pressed the Court to treat the memorandum of appeal as an application in revision. The Court, while usually discouraging revision against orders based on awards, decided to treat the memorandum as a revision application in the special circumstances of the case.
    • The special circumstances included an arbitrator (Ganpat Singh) coming to Court before parties had been heard and alleging that he had been made to sign a plain paper and had not been allowed to participate in the proceedings — a circumstance raising concerns about the integrity of the process.
  3. Standard of review in revision and limit of appellate review of findings of fact:
    • Because the matter was being considered in revision, the Court stated it could not "go behind such findings of fact as have been already arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge." Therefore the Court must assume the Subordinate Judge's factual findings (negating the arbitrator's allegations) to be correct for the limited purpose of deciding whether the order could be interfered with in revision.
  4. Misconduct beyond corruption; application of Privy Council principle:
    • The Court emphasized that misconduct need not mean corruption or dishonesty. Citing the Privy Council (18 C.W.N. 7551), the Court accepted that procedural irregularities amounting to "no proper hearing" or indications of gross negligence or recklessness could constitute misconduct sufficient to vitiate an award.
    • Thus, even if arbitrators were honestly motivated, their gross negligence or recklessness (for example, manifest errors in allocating properties beyond the scope of the reference) could invalidate the award if such negligence resulted in no proper disposal of the matters in dispute.
  5. Identification of specific irregularities and prima facie problems:
    • The Court catalogued several troubling features that could indicate serious procedural defects: (a) an arbitrator's oral evidence stating incorrect party shares (claiming 1/2, 1/4, 1/4 when three parties had one-sixth/one-sixth/eight annas shares), (b) the arbitrator's statement that houses were divided similarly though defendants 3,4,8,9 did not receive any house share mentioned in the pleadings (suggesting either allotment of properties not subject to partition or failure to allot rightful shares), (c) instances of plots being listed more than once in the schedule (Nos. 257, 298, 783, 814) potentially used to make up area deficiencies, and (d) inclusion of several plots not found in the plaint (e.g., Nos. 12, 73, 1029, 358, 214, 300), some of which might belong to outsiders.
    • The Court treated these as potentially amounting to gross negligence or recklessness on the face of the award and therefore as possible grounds of misconduct to be examined.
  6. Respondents' explanation and need for fresh inquiry:
    • The respondents had offered that some plots (such as Nos. 1029 and 868) were mentioned in the written statement and so could lawfully be partitioned; they also argued they lacked opportunity to investigate and explain certain inclusions. The Court considered that, given these competing assertions and the material irregularities, the Subordinate Judge should re-examine the matter.
  7. Conclusion of analysis and directions:
    • The Court concluded the learned Subordinate Judge had confined his enquiry to corruption/dishonesty and had overlooked the possibility of misconduct unconnected with dishonesty. On that ground the Court set aside the Subordinate Judge's order confirming the award and the decree founded on that order, and remitted the case to the Subordinate Judge to reconsider whether the award should be set aside for misconduct (including misconduct by reason of gross negligence or recklessness) and otherwise to deal with the award according to law based on the materials before him.
    • The Court explicitly refrained from forming any final opinion on the merits; it left the ultimate determination of whether misconduct had been established to the Subordinate Judge upon reconsideration. Costs were directed to abide the result.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the appeal, as framed under the Arbitration Act, was incompetent because the reference was pending at the commencement of that Act and the old law (Sch. 2, para. 16, CPC) continued to apply. However, exercising discretion in the special circumstances, the Court treated the memorandum of appeal as an application in revision, set aside the Subordinate Judge's order confirming the award and the decree based on that order, and remanded the case to the Subordinate Judge for fresh consideration on the specific procedural and factual points identified by the Court.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that both the order of 27 September 1940 confirming the award and the decree based on it are set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Subordinate Judge to reconsider whether the award should be set aside on grounds of misconduct (including misconduct that may consist of gross negligence or recklessness rather than corruption).
  • The Court did not decide the substantive merits of the partition or reach any final finding that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; it directed a fresh consideration of the points it identified.
  • The opinion underscores that procedural irregularities and gross negligence visible on the face of an award can amount to misconduct, following the principle applied from the Privy Council authority cited; nevertheless, the Court expressly formed no final opinion on whether misconduct was established in this specific case.
  • Costs were left to abide the result of the remand. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel precedent beyond applying the existing principle that non-corrupt procedural irregularities can vitiate an award.

    Sadhu Singh v. Ramdeo Singh

    Fazl Ali, C.J:— This appeal arises out of, a partition suit in which a decree has been passed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of an award. It appears that there are four contesting parties in the partition suit. The plaintiff is admittedly entitled to a one-sixth share in the properties under partition and defendants 1 and 2 also have a one-sixth share each. Defendants 3, 4, 8 and 9 have, on the other hand, an eight annas share. In May 1940 there was a reference to arbitration by the Court below upon the application of all the interested parties to three persons, namely, Hardwar Singh, Mukhram Singh and Ganpat Singh. The award was filed on 1st August 1940 after several adjournments had been granted by the Court and on the same day one of the arbitrators, Ganpat Singh, filed an objection to the award stating among other things that there had been no formal sittings of the punches and that he had not been allowed to take any part in the arbitration proceedings. Thereupon the learned Subordinate Judge gave an opportunity to the parties for filing objections, if any, against the award. On 10th August 1940 defendant 3, brother of defendant 4 and father of defendants 8 and 9, filed an objection attacking the award on various grounds. The learned Subordinate Judge upon hearing such evidence as was adduced by the parties decided on 27th September 1940 that the objections had not been made good and confirmed the award. The present appeal has been filed as a first appeal against the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge on 27th September 1940.

    2. Under Sch. 2, para. 16, Code of Civil Procedure, it was provided that after an application for setting aside an award has been refused and judgment pronounced according to the award no appeal shall lie from the decree which shall follow except in so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. As in this case it is not suggested that the decree is either in excess of or not in accordance with the award, it is contended that though no appeal would lie under the provisions contained in Sch. 2 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, yet this case would be governed by Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, which now replaces the provisions which formerly found a place in Sch. 2, Code of Civil Procedure. Section 39 does provide that an appeal shall lie from an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award. But S. 48 of the Act provides in clear terms that:

    The provision of this Act shall not apply to any reference pending at the commencement of this Act to which the law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any repeal effected by this Act, continue to apply.

    3. Now, as the reference in the present case was pending at the commencement of the Arbitration Act, it is clear that this case will be governed by the old law and not by the Arbitration Act. That being so, the appeal is clearly incompetent. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, pressed us to treat the memorandum of appeal which has been filed in this case as an application in revision and though as a rule we would have discouraged an application in revision which is directed against an order based upon an award, we have decided to treat the memorandum of appeal as an application in revision in the special circumstances of the case which I will now proceed to set out. The most prominent feature of the present case is that herebefore the parties could say anything either for or against the award, one of the arbitrators came to Court with an application in which he complained among other things that he had been made to put his signature on a plain paper on the representation made by one of the panches, Hardwar Singh, that the signature was required in token of his attendance on that day and that a decision would be given at Arrah on looking into all the papers on 1st August 1940.

    4. The arbitrator in question further alleged that though Hardwar Singh had told him that the arbitration would be completed after local inspection, yet it subsequently appeared that this representation was made to him for the purpose of his being kept in ignorance of what was going on and of the fact that an award had been filed without his concurrence, the same being engrossed upon a paper which had been already signed by him.

    5. Now, as we have to deal with the case in revision we cannot go behind such findings of fact as have been already arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge and, therefore, for the purpose of deciding whether the order of the learned Subordinate Judge can be interfered with in revision I must proceed on the assumption that the view of the learned Subordinate Judge negativing the allegations made by the arbitrator is correct. On behalf of the appellants, very great stress was laid on the fact that there are some suspicious features about the manner in which the signature of the three arbitrators run on the award and it was also pointed out to us that one part of the award has been signed only by two arbitrators and not by three arbitrators. But, as I have already stated, strictly speaking these considerations must be overlooked for the present purposes. In my opinion the strongest ground which has been urged against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is that in dealing with the case of the arbitrators' alleged misconduct he has confined himself only to the question of corruption or dishonesty of the arbitrators and paid no heed to the fact that there may be misconduct even though the arbitrators may have been honest or free from corruption. It was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 18 C.W.N 7551 that if irregularities in procedure can be proved which would amount to no proper hearing of the matter in dispute, that would be misconduct sufficient to vitiate the award without any imputation on honesty or impartiality of the arbitrator. I take it therefore that if there is an indication of gross negligence or recklessness on the face of the award, that might also amount to a form of misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, because that might by itself be sufficient to show that “there was no property hearing of the matter in dispute,” to use the words which have been used by the Privy Council.

    6. Now, in the present case our attention has been drawn, among other things, to certain special matters. In the first place, it has been pointed out that Hardwar Singh the arbitrator who has given evidence in support of the award has stated in his evidence that the arbitrators had divided the lands according to the shares of the parties which were according to this arbitrator ½, ¼ and ¼. Now, this is clearly wrong because, as I have already stated, the share of three of the parties was ¼th each and none of the parties had a ¼th share. It has been pointed out to us that the written award gives the correct specification of shares; but it is common ground that the author of the written portion of the award, with the exception of the schedule attached to it, was a pleader who has been examined in this case. However that may be, that is in my opinion only a comparatively small matter. A more important matter is that Hardwar Singh, the arbitrator, to whom I have referred just now, has stated in his evidence that not only was the milkiat interest divided according to the shares of the parties, but also the houses were divided similarly. Now, it is common ground that defendants 3, 4, 8 and 9 have not received any share of the houses which were mentioned in the pleadings of the parties. The arbitrator's attention was apparently drawn to this fact and his answer in that connexion was—“I do not know if the house allotted to defendant 3 was under partition in the plaint.” Now, the exact position is as follows: either the arbitrators have allotted no share to the appellants in the houses or they have allotted to them a house which was not the subject of partition and which they had no jurisdiction to allot. In either case the arbitrators must prima facie be held to have acted with gross negligence and recklessness and a question may arise whether such negligence or recklessness will or will not amount to misconduct. Then it was pointed out to us that some of the plots which had been allotted to defendant 3 in the schedule attached to the award have been included in the schedule more than once. Instances of such plots are Nos. 257, 298, 783 and 814. It is suggested on behalf of the appellants that the result of these plots being included at more than one place in the Sche. Rule is to make up the deficiency in the area which should have been allotted to the plain, tiff in a somewhat artificial manner which can be attributed either to dishonesty or negligence. Then again, there are several plots which are not to be found in the schedule attached to the plaint. These are plots Nos. 12, 73, 1029, 358, 214 and 300. The grievance of the appellants is that the arbitrators have allotted to them lands which were outside the scope of the partition proceedings and over which they had no jurisdiction and it is also suggested that some of the lands did not belong to any of the parties, but in fact belonged to outsiders.

    7. It has been, on the other hand, pointed to us on behalf of the respondents that some of these plots, for example, Nos. 1029 and 868 were mentioned in the written statement, and, therefore, the arbitrators were competent to make them subject of partition. It is also contended that the respondents have had no opportunity of investigating this point in order to offer a proper explanation as to why the arbitrators have included these plots in the schedule of partitioned property. If no explanation is forthcoming prima facie of partition would also amount to gross negligence or recklessness in conducting the partition proceedings and here again a question may arise as to whether such negligence or recklessness does or does not amount to a misconduct of the arbitrators. With such points staring us in the face, it seems to us that the case should be reconsidered by the learned Subordinate Judge with a view to finding out whether the award can be set aside on the ground of misconduct, if in fact the arbitrators have in dividing the property shown such negligence as amounts to no proper disposal of the matters in dispute. As I have already stated, the learned Subordinate Judge has entirely overlooked the fact that there may be misconduct on the part of the arbitrators without the imputation against their honesty or impartiality being substantiated; and, that being so, I would set aside the order as well as the decree which is based upon that order and remit the case to him for disposal according to law after considering the matters to which I have referred. I wish to make it absolutely clear that we have formed no decided opinion on the merits of the case and it will be for the learned Subordinate Judge to decide as to whether upon the materials before him any case of misconduct has been established or not and to deal with the award in accordance with law on the basis of such decision as he may arrive at upon the materials before him. Costs will abide the result.

    Sinha, J.:— I agree.

    R.K

    8. Case remanded.

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    Sadhu Singh v. Ramdeo Singh
    (Feb 23, 1943)